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# SOURCES ON NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Volume One

(January 1919 to September 1920)

PROTESTS, DISTURBANCES AND DEFIANCE

*Edited by*

V.N. DATTA & S.C. MITTAL



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**V.N. Datta  
S.C. Mittal**



## FOREWORD

I am glad to present to the scholars this volume which contains the official and unofficial documents relating to the national movement from January 1919 to September 1920, one of the most significant periods in India's struggle for freedom. The mode of treatment followed in this volume is both chronological and thematic, thus unfolding the past history as it really was. A sound criterion for any selection of documents is 'let the past speak for itself'. I am happy the editors, Professor V.N. Datta and Dr. S.C. Mittal, have set this model for this task. They deserve our thanks for the pains they have taken to bring together in this volume a vast collection of valuable source material on an important period of our history. It is gratifying that the publication of this volume coincides with the Centenary Celebrations of the Indian National Congress. Two more volumes in the series are expected to be released shortly.

**Lokesh Chandra**  
*Chairman*  
Indian Council of Historical Research

New Delhi  
25th January 1985



# **CONTENTS**

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>FOREWORD</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>DETAIL OF DOCUMENTS</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>xxiii</b>
<b>SELECT DOCUMENTS</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>GLOSSARY</b>	<b>301</b>
<b>CHRONOLOGY</b>	<b>304</b>
<b>INDEX</b>	<b>307</b>



## DETAIL OF DOCUMENTS

	Page
1. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye, 9 January 1919	3
2. Lord Chelmsford's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills, 6 February 1919	3
3. Sir William Vincent's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bills, 6 February 1919	4
4. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills, 6 February 1919	6
5. M.A. Jinnah on the Rowlatt Bills, 6 February 1919	7
6. G.S. Khaparde on the Legislative Session, 6 February 1919	8
7. T.B. Sapru on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	9
8. Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	9
9. Raja of Mahmudabad on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	9
10. Sir George Lowndes on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	10
11. Mazharul Haque on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	10
12. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	10
13. G.S. Khaparde on Opposition to the Rowlatt Bills, 7 February 1919	11
14. Sir William Vincent's Speech on the Indian Criminal (Amendment) Bill, 10 February 1919	11
15. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills, 10 February 1919	12
16. The Rowlatt Bills, 19 February 1919	13
17. Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 21 February 1919	14
18. Gandhi to Private Secretary, Viceroy, 24 February 1919	15
19. On Bolshevism, 28 February 1919	16
20. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S.G. Vaze, 1 March 1919	16
21. M.K. Gandhi's Statement on Satyagraha, 1 March 1919	16
22. A Manifesto issued by some Non-official Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council on Passive Resistance, 2 March 1919	18
23. Satyagraha Vow, 2 March 1919	18
24. G.S. Khaparde on the Moderates, 2 March 1919	19
25. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S.G. Vaze, 3 March 1919	19
26. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to T.B. Sapru, 4 March 1919	19
27. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to T.B. Sapru, 5 March 1919	20
28. Public Reaction on the Rowlatt Bills, 6 March 1919	21

29. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 6 March 1919	22
30. Bureaucracy and the Rowlatt Bills, 8 March 1919	22
31. Response to Gandhi's Call, 9 March 1919	23
32. Gandhi to the Private Secretary, Viceroy, 11 March 1919	23
33. Sir William Vincent on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	23
34. Surendra Nath Banerjea on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	25
35. Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	26
36. V.J. Patel on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	27
37. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	27
38. M.A. Jinnah's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	28
39. Sir William Vincent on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	28
40. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	29
41. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 12 March 1919	30
42. G.S. Khaparde on the Legislative Council Debates, 13 March 1919	31
43. Montagu to Lloyd George, 16 March 1919	31
44. Gandhi's Message to the Madras Satyagrahis, 18 March 1919	31
45. Sir William Vincent on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	33
46. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	35
47. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	37
48. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	39
49. B.D. Shukla on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	40
50. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Rowlatt Bills, 18 March 1919	40
51. The Rowlatt Act as Passed in Imperial Legislative Council, 18 March 1919	41
52. Satyagraha Movement, 18 March 1919	54
53. The Black Bills, 18 March 1919	54
54. Public Fury on the Rowlatt Act, 19 March 1919	54
55. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S G. Vaze, 20 March 1919	55
56. Tilak's Political Activities in England, March 1919	55
57. Ronaldshay to Montagu, 21 March 1919	56
58. Breaking of Laws, 21 March 1919	56
59. Sir George Llyod to Chelmsford, 23 March 1919	56

60. Public Reaction on the Rowlatt Act, 23 March 1919	57
61. Gandhi's Instructions on Satyagraha Pledge to Volunteers, 23 March 1919	57
62. Gandhi's Hartal Declaration, 23 March 1919	58
63. C.F. Andrews to J.L. Maffey, 25 March 1919	59
64. Opposition to the Rowlatt Act, 26 March 1919	59
65. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye, 27 March 1919	60
66. M.A. Jinnah to Chelmsford, 28 March 1919	60
67. Gandhi's Letter to the Press on the Delhi Riots, 3 April 1919	61
68. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya to Lord Chelmsford, 4 April 1919	61
69. The Government Repression, 4 April 1919	62
70. Unjust Law, 5 April 1919	62
71. Indissoluble Union, 5 April 1919	63
72. Firing in Delhi, 6 April 1919	63
73. A Plea for Inquiry, 7 April 1919	63
74. Sir Michael O'Dwyer on Arrests in the Punjab, 7 April 1919	63
75. Reaction in Karachi, 8 April 1919	65
76. Gandhi's Instructions to Satyagrahis, 8 April 1919	65
77. The Secretary, Home Department, Government of India to Private Secretary to Viceroy, 9 April 1919	65
78. Gandhi's Message, 9 April 1919	67
79. The Delhi Affray, 9 April 1919	68
80. Chelmsford's Failure, 9 April 1919	68
81. Demonstrations in Bombay, 9 April 1919	69
82. India on Trial, 11 April 1919	70
83. Satyagraha Movement, 12 April 1919	70
84. Satyagraha Movement, 13 April 1919	71
85. Bureaucratic Folly, 13 April 1919	71
86. Official Account of Events in Amritsar, 12 April 1919	71
87. Resolution of the Government of India on the Political Situation, 14 April 1919	75
88. Report on the Disturbances in Calcutta, 14 April 1919	77
89. Ronaldshay to Montagu on Rioting in India, 14 April 1919	83
90. Fortnightly Report on the Political Situation in the Central Provinces for the First Half of April 1919	85
91. Montagu to George Lloyd, 15 April 1919	86
92. Report on the Situation in Delhi in Connection with the Satyagraha Movement, 17 April 1919	86
93. Gandhi on Satyagraha, 18 April 1919	91
94. Report on Disturbances in Bihar and Orissa, 18 April 1919	92
95. Atrocities Condemned, 20 April 1919	93
96. Report on the Disturbances in Bombay in April 1919	94
97. Report on Disturbances in Madras, 20 April 1919	97

98. Resolutions of the Indian National Congress, 20 and 21 April 1919	98
99. C.F. Andrews to Viceroy, 21 April 1919	100
100. O'Dwyerism, 21 April 1919	100
101. Suspension of the Civil Disobedience, 22 April 1919	100
102. James Du Boulay to the Chief Secretary of Delhi on Delhi Riots, 23 April 1919	101
103. An Appeal for Inquiry, 23 April 1919	101
104. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 24 April 1919	101
105. Appeal for Independent Inquiry, 24 April 1919	103
106. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 1 May 1919	104
107. Montagu to George Lloyd, 1 May 1919	104
108. Public Discontent, 1 May 1919	105
109. Horniman's Deportation, 1 May 1919	105
110. Indian Unrest, 2 May 1919	105
111. A Note by the Home Department on the Political Situation in India, 3 May 1919	106
112. O'Dwyer's Regime, 5 May 1919	106
113. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 8 May 1919	107
114. Meeting of London Indians on the Khilafat and Rowlatt Act, 14 May 1919	107
115. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye, 15 May 1919	108
116. Montagu on the Disturbances in India, 22 May 1919	108
117. Sir J.D. Rees on the Disturbances in India, 22 May 1919	112
118. Wedgwood on the Disturbances in India, 22 May 1919	113
119. Bennett on Disturbances in India, 22 May 1919	114
120. Montagu on the Rowlatt Act, 22 May 1919	115
121. An Open Rebellion, 24 May 1919	115
122. Reports on Gandhi's Further Activities and His Proposal to Renew Civil Disobedience, 26 May 1919	115
123. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford, 27 March 1919	117
124. Colonel Wedgwood's Question in the House of Commons and Montagu's Reply, 28 May 1919	117
125. Sir Rabindranath Tagore to Lord Chelmsford on the Renunciation of his Title, 31 May 1919	117
126. Rabindranath Tagore's Action Hailed, 4 June 1919	118
127. Montagu's Lip Sympathy, 5 June 1919	119
128. Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the All-India Congress Committee on the Events of April in the Punjab, 8 June 1919	119
129. Repression in Punjab, 10 June 1919	121
130. Montagu to Ronaldshay, 11 June 1919	122
131. Gandhi's Instructions for Satyagrahis in terms of the Resolution passed by the Committee of the Satyagraha Sabha, 15 June 1919	122

DETAIL OF DOCUMENTS	xv
132. Sir George Lloyd to Viceroy, 17 June 1919	125
133. C.F. Andrews to the Editor, "The Statesman", on the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 18 June 1919	126
134. Sir Sankaran Nair's Resignation, 18 June 1919	128
135. On the Punjab Sentences, 19 June 1919	128
136. Montagu to Ronaldshay, 25 June 1919	129
137. On the Inquiry into Punjab Troubles, 9 July 1919	129
138. Montagu to George Lloyd, 18 July 1919	130
139. Resolutions passed by the Congress at Calcutta on the events of April in the Punjab, 20 July 1919	130
140. Gandhi to the Editor, "The Bombay Chronicle", 21 July 1919	134
141. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 23 July 1919	134
142. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 24 July 1919	135
143. Lord Chelmsford to George Lloyd, 2 August 1919	135
144. Mohammad Ali on the Indian Khilafat Delegation, 5 August 1919	136
145. Lord Sydenham on Martial Law in India, 6 August 1919	137
146. Lord Sinha on Martial Law in India, 6 August 1919	137
147. Montagu to Lord Chelmsford, 7 August 1919	138
148. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 11 August 1919	139
149. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 21 August 1919	141
150. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 22 August 1919	141
151. Sir Williams Marris to Chief Commissioner of Delhi, 28 August 1919	142
152. Jawaharlal Nehru on the Punjab Occurrences, 31 August 1919	142
153. Kamini Kumar Chanda's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Replies, 3 September 1919	143
154. Montagu to George Lloyd, 8 September 1919	144
155. B.N. Sarma's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Replies, 10 September 1919	145
156. Kamini Kumar Chanda's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Replies, 10 September 1919	146
157. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Commission of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances, 10 September 1919	146
158. Kamini Kumar Chanda on the Punjab Disturbances, 12 September 1919	149
159. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 15 September 1919	150
160. Sir William Vincent on the Indemnity Bill, 18 September 1919	150
161. Kamini Kumar Chanda on the Indemnity Bill, 18 September 1919	153
162. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Indemnity Bill, 18 September 1919	154
163. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde, 18 September 1919	155

164. Major Malik Umar Hayat Khan on the Indemnity Bill, 19 September 1919	155
165. W.M. Hailey on the Indemnity Bill, 19 September 1919	157
166. H. McPherson on the Indemnity Bill, 19 September 1919	158
167. Sir William Vincent to Gandhi, 25 September 1919	158
168. Gandhi to S.R. Hignell, 30 September 1919	159
169. P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer to V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, September 1919	160
170. Montagu to George Lloyd, 2 October 1919	161
171. Jawaharlal Nehru to the Editor, "The Bombay Chronicle", 2 October 1919	161
172. Jawaharlal Nehru to the Editor, "The Bombay Chronicle", 6 October 1919	162
173. G.N. Mishra to V.J. Patel on the Political Situation in India, 15 October 1919	163
174. C.F. Andrews on J.P. Thompson's Statement in the Imperial Legislative Council, 16 October 1919	164
175. C.F. Andrews to Jawaharlal Nehru, 17 October 1919	166
176. C.F. Andrews to the Editor, "The Tribune", on the Punjab Affairs, 7 November 1919	167
177. Lord Sydenham on the Forthcoming Congress Session at Amritsar, 12 November 1919	169
178. Lord Sinha on the forthcoming Congress Session at Amritsar, 12 November 1919	169
179. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, 16 November 1919	170
180. V.J. Patel to G.N. Mishra, 20 November 1919	170
181. G.S. Khaparde's Interview with Montagu, 8 December 1919	171
182. Motilal Nehru to P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, 12 December 1919	172
183. G.A. Natesen to Charles Roberts [Andrews], 12 December 1919	172
184. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford, 17 December 1919	173
185. The Punjab Wrongs, 21 December 1919	174
186. The Punjab Incidents, 22 December 1919	175
187. Colonel Wedgwood on the Punjab Wrongs, 22 December 1919	175
188. Sir Reginald Craddock to Lord Chelmsford, 23 December 1919	177
189. M.R. Jayakar on the Royal Proclamation, 24 December 1919	177
190. Forget and Forgive, 25 December 1919	177
191. M.R. Jayakar on the Congress Session at Amritsar, 25 December 1919	178
192. On the Turkish Problem, 26 December 1919	178
193. Pandit Motilal Nehru's Presidential Address at the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress, 27 December 1919	178
194. Jayakar on the Congress Session, 27 December 1919	179
195. Resolutions of the Indian National Congress at Amritsar, 29 December 1919 to 1 January 1920	179
196. Ruchi Ram to G.K. Devdhar, 30 December 1919	184

197. The Government of India on the Political Situation in India, 1919	184
198. M.R. Jayakar on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress, 1 January 1920	185
199. G.S. Khaparde's Réactions on Nair's Appointment, 1 January 1920	185
200. Retaliatory Measures, 3 January 1920	186
201. Sir Edward Maclagan to Lord Chelmsford on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress, 3 January 1920	186
202. Major Vivian to Lieutenant-Colonel S.F. Musprath on Pan-Islamic Movement in India, 5 January 1920	188
203. The Bolshevik Menace, 5 January 1920	188
204. Political Agitation in India, 5 January 1920	189
205. The Congress-League Meetings in Amritsar, 5 January 1920	190
206. Motilal Nehru to Montagu on the Amritsar Congress, 8 January 1920	192
207. The Moderate's Conference, 12 January 1920	193
208. The Bombay Mills Strike, 12 January 1920	193
209. G.S. Khaparde on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress, 14 January 1920	194
210. The Bolshevik Menace, 19 January 1920	194
211. Labour Unrest in India, 19 January 1920	195
212. Address Presented by the Mohammedan Deputation to Lord Chelmsford in connection with the Turkish Peace Terms, 19 January 1920	196
213. Lord Chelmsford's Reply to the Mohammedan Deputation, 19 January 1920	202
214. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Turkish Peace Terms, 19 January 1919	203
215. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Rejoinder of Khilafat Deputation, 28 January 1920	203
216. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde on the C.I.D. Reports, 28 January 1920	205
217. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde on the Hunter Committee Report, 28 January 1920	205
218. Bolshevism in India, 2 February 1920	207
219. The Khilafat Agitation in India, 2 February 1920	209
220. Bolshevism and Islam in India, 2 February 1920	210
221. Gandhi in the Punjab, 2 February 1920	210
222. P. Siva Rao on the Royal Proclamation, 5 February 1920	211
223. On Bolshevism, 16 February 1920	211
224. Mr. McPherson's Reply on the Punjab Disturbances, 24 February 1920	213

225. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford on the Amritsar Cases, 26 February 1920	213
226. On Bolshevism, 27 February 1920	214
227. On Bolshevism, 4 March 1920	214
228. The Khilafat Agitation, 4 March 1920	215
229. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Question in the Punjab Legislative Council and Mr. French's Replies, 6 March 1920	216
230. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Questions in the Punjab Legislative Council and Mr. French's Replies, 7 March 1920	217
231. On Bolshevism, 9 March 1920	217
232. The Khilafat Agitation in India, 9 March 1920	218
233. The Khilafat Agitation, 9 March 1920	219
234. Gandhi's Manifesto on the Khilafat Question, 9 March 1920	219
235. On Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism in India, 15 March 1920	222
236. The Bolshevik Menace, 20 March 1920	222
237. Report on the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee by the Indian National Congress, 25 March 1920	223
238. Statement of Ratan Davi of Amritsar	225
239. Dr. Gokal Chand Narang's Statement on the Punjab Disturbances	227
240. M.R. Jayakar on the Punjab Disturbances	228
241. On Bolshevism, 5 April 1920	230
242. The Khilafat Conference, 5 April 1920	231
243. The Turkish Question, 12 April 1920	232
244. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Action Taken on the Report of the Hunter Committee, 3 May 1920	232
245. The Government of India Act, 3 May 1919	237
246. R.A. Graham to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department on Shaukat Ali's Political Activities. 4 May 1920	237
247. On the Revolutionary Parties, 10 May 1920	238
248. On Pan-Islamism, 10 May 1920	238
249. Badruddin Abdulla Koor to M.M. Chotani on his Resignation, 12 May 1920	240
250. Cape's Questions in the House of Commons and Montagu's Replies, 13 May 1920	241
251. The Khilafat Agitation in India, 17 May 1920	241
252. The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report on the Causes and General Unrest in India, 26 May 1920	242
253. The Disorders Inquiry Committee on Martial Law, 26 May 1920	247
254. The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report (Minority) on the Nature of Disturbances, 26 May 1920	249

255 C.A. Barron's Statement on the Disturbances in Delhi Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee	249
256. Swami Sharddhanand's Statement on the Disturbances in Delhi	250
257. Statement of P.L. Orde Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee	251
258. Miles Irving's Statement on the Amritsar Disturbances	252
259. Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smith on the Amritsar Disturbances	253
260. Statement of Brigadier General R.E.H. Dyer on the Firing in Jallianwala Bagh	254
261. Statement of E.P. Broadway on the Nature of Agitation	255
262. E.D. Lucas's Statement on the Student Political Activities	258
263. P.Marsden's Statement on the Disturbances in Kasur	259
264. B.N. Bosworth-Smith on the Disturbances in Gujranwala	259
265. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain on the Disturbances in Lahore	260
266. Statement of R.B. Whitehead on the Disturbances in Ambala	261
267 Montagu to Chelmsford on the Report of the Hunter Committee, 26 May 1920	262
268. Sir Harcourt Butler to Lord Chelmsford, 27 May 1920	264
269. Resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee held in Benares, 30 and 31 May 1920	264
270. M.R. Jayakar to G.N. Mishra on the Punjab Inquiry, 11 June 1920	268
271. On the Hunter Committee Reports, 25 June 1920	268
272. Plea for Action Against Officials, 25 June 1920	269
273. The Reform Scheme, 5 July 1920	269
274. The Khilafat Agitation, 5 July 1920	269
275. The British Repression, 6 July 1920	270
276. The Non-Cooperation Agitation, 7 July 1920	271
277. H.S.L. Polak to C.F. Andrews on Gandhi's Activities, 7 July 1920	271
278. Montagu on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	272
279. Churchill on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	272
280. Asquith on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	273
281. Bennett on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	273
282. Colonel Wedgwood on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	274
283. Gowynne on the Hunter Committee, 8 July 1920	274
284. The Khilafat Agitation in India, 12 July 1920	275
285. Venkatapati Raju's Question in the Madras Legislative Council and the Official Reply, 13 July 1920	276
286. Lord Sydenham's Question in House of Lords and Lord Sinha's Reply, 14 July 1920	276
287. The Labour Agitation, 19 July 1920	277

288. The Khilafat Agitation, 19 July 1920	278
289. Gandhi's Political Activities, 19 July 1920	278
290. Viscount Finlay on the Hunter Committee, 19 July 1920	279
291. Lord Sinha on the Hunter Committee, 19 July 1920	280
292. Lord Birkenhead on the Hunter Committee, 19 July 1920	281
293. Lord Harris on the Hunter Committee, 19 July 1920	282
294. Lord Ampthill on the Hunter Committee, 19 July 1920	282
295. Lord Meston on General Dyer's Action in Punjab, 20 July 1920	282
296. Earl Curzon of Kedleston on General Dyer's Yring in the Punjab, 20 July 1920	283
297. The Congress Politics, 20 July 1920	283
298. Khaparde on the Punjab Affairs in England, 20 July 1920	285
299. Sir Harcourt Butler to Sir William Vincent on the Punjab Situation, 27 July 1920	285
300. The Non-cooperation, 27 July 1920	286
301. The Secretary to the Government of India to All Local Government on the Non-cooperation, 31 July 1920	287
302. The Turkish Question, 31 July 1920	287
303. Gandhi to Lord Chelmsford, 1 August 1920	287
304. The Non-cooperation, 3 August 1920	288
305. The Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	288
306. Shaik Asgar to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	289
307. The Secretary to the Government of Madras to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	289
308. The Secretary to the Government of Bombay to the Secretary, the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	290
309. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary, to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	290
310. The Secretary to the Government of the United Provinces to the Secretary, the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement, 3 August 1920	291
311. The Chief Secretary to the Governments of Bihar and Orissa to the Secretary, to the Government of India on the Hunter Committee, 3 August 1920	291
312. The Non-cooperation Movement, 6 August 1920	291
313. The Khilafat Movement, 15 August 1920	292
314. Khaparde on Non-cooperation, 19 August 1920	293
315. Khaparde on the Viceroy's speech, 19 August 1920	293
316. Viceroy on the Khilafat agitation and the Non-Cooperation Movement, 20 August 1920	293

317. Sachchidananda Sinha's questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's reply, 27 August 1920	294
318. Babu Bhabendra Chandra Ray's questions in the Bengal Legislative Council and Stephenson's reply, 1 September 1920	295
319. H.S.L. Polak to C.F. Andrews on Gandhi, 2 September 1920	296
320. Khaparde's estimate of Gandhi, 5 September 1920	296
321. Sir Harcourt Butler to Sir William Vincent on the political situation, 8 September 1920	296
322. The Non-Cooperation Resolution of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta, 9 September 1920	297
323. Estimate of Gandhi and Tilak, 1920	298



## INTRODUCTION

The object of this work is to select and edit documents relating to the national movement, 1919-20. This selection seeks to provide source-material to researchers who wish to do their 'preliminary reading' and prepare their research designs on the national movement. All selection of documents, even the simplest one recording only bare events, is a distortion—for it denotes preference of one type of document over another which is determined by individual judgement. While selecting these documents, the question persistently asked was, 'What ought to be excluded from a work like this?' This mode of treatment has eliminated considerable material of routine nature, dealing with the implementation of various official orders by the bureaucracy, speeches, addresses and newspaper articles of identical nature, and other trivial matters. Every effort has been made not to omit anything which is necessary to the understanding of the period.

The documents are arranged chronologically with a view to giving to the reader a flavour and texture of the times. Arrangement by 'topics' has been discarded because it is apt to disperse cognate matters and disturb the order of past events and symmetry of the story, besides causing repetition and overlapping of material. Each document is a reflection of human activity and acquires a specific character by virtue of its relations with other documents. A chronological treatment of documents unfolds the national movement at successive stages, thus bringing into focus various themes in a coherent sequence.

The documents (both published and unpublished) are chiefly drawn from private correspondence of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, Governors and other officials, Indian political leaders, British Parliamentary Debates, Imperial Council and Imperial Legislative Council Debates, Proceedings of the Government of India (particularly of Home Department), Weekly and Fortnightly Reports, All-India Congress Committee Records, newspapers, etc. This selection does not give only the Indian version but also the opposite British side; it is legitimate that each side is given its due to offer its case however uncongenial it might appear to the other side. The national movement in India grew as a result of the interaction of British policies and Indian response. The historian who is

concerned with the national movement will produce too partial a picture if he confines his researches to Indian side alone. It is the collating, comparing, and combining of both the versions which make us arrive at a story which has greater validity than either of the separate versions.

Broadly speaking, this selection could be divided into two distinct categories, official and non-official. The official correspondence includes specific and definite orders and policy matters which are a high grade history. Here we are confronted with veritable acts, the facts of 'human volition', such as the Rowlatt Bills, Martial Law, the Government action on the Hunter Committee and specific directions to officials on Non-cooperation movement, which cannot lie to us. On the Indian side, for example, there are Gandhi's Satyagraha vow, Resolutions of the Congress and programme of the Central Khilafat Committee, etc. Special value ought to be attached to official documents as they were prepared by men who never imagined that the historian would be waiting to make use of them. A part of the official records consists of Weekly and Fortnightly Reports, which were initially prepared by subordinate police officials who tended to exaggerate the anti-government character of the nationalist forces but this is not to undermine their utility as they give *inter alia* detailed information about various political activities in the country. The question arises how far these reports were reliable since they could only be put together with the help of informers. The Government treated these reports as reliable and considered the matters reported as quite probable in themselves. Readers had best accept nothing from these reports unless confirmed by some independent authority.

Private correspondence fills inevitably the gaps which the official records leave and provides a clue to what remains hidden behind the scenes; for example, it is evident from E.S. Montagu's private correspondence that he had serious doubts about Lord Chelmsford's ability to handle the political situation in India, which one is apt to miss in official communications. Private correspondence of Indian leaders throws light not only on their plans and strategies, but also on their mental reservations about some of the contemporaries and their policies; for example, the Moderates while condemning the Rowlatt Bill, refused to support Gandhi in his campaign of Passive Resistance.

In this selection original documents have been reproduced as closely as possible. In rare instances punctuation has been added and spelling mistakes rectified. In the case of undated letters, dating has been made by internal evidence. In several documents paragraphs have been omitted and only extracts given. When a major portion of a document is omitted, few dots have been inserted to indicate where the excisions occur. The writers of the letters have been identified on the occasion of their first mention and brief biographical information has been supplied. Where necessary explanatory footnotes have been added to clarify obscure refere-

ences the summary of documents indicating its principal contents has been supplied.

It is not intended to give here a gist or summary of the principal events or views and actions of individuals who figured in the period but to see the period in its contemporary setting in order to understand the issues facing the Government and the people, and the course of development which the national movement took as reflected in historical literature.

This work covers the period from 1919 to September 1920, when the Congress adopted Non-Cooperation in principle at the Calcutta special Congress. The themes that dominate the period and preoccupy the British and Indian nationalists are the Rowatt Bills, Satyagraha, the Disturbances, Jallianwala Bagh massacre, Martial Law, causes of unrest, withdrawal of Satyagraha, the Hunter Committee, the Congress Inquiry Committee, the Amritsar Congress session, 1919, Indemnity Act, the Delegation of Indian leaders to England, the Khilafat, the Revolutionary activity in India and abroad, and Non-cooperation, etc.

In 1919-20 the national movement becomes more continuous and organic than ever before, embracing something broader than isolated individual achievements. This is where we find the real effective origin of the entire force of the subsequent national upsurge. In such a period of high pressure the course of events is speeded up and much of history is telescoped into a short period.

The year 1919 opens with the debate on the Rowlett Bills which became the subject of fierce controversy and a point of great prestige with the Government. These Bills evoked more discussion and widespread resentment in India than any measure since Partition of Bengal in 1905. The Viceroy introduced the Bills in the Imperial Legislative Council on 6 February 1919.<sup>1</sup>

The Government firmly believed that the 'revolutionary conspiracies'<sup>2</sup> existed in India, and in order to curb the new outburst of anarchical activity special measures were needed. The Defence of India Act, a wartime measure, which gave the Government special powers for Punjab arrests and trial by special tribunals, was to expire on 31 March 1919. Sir William Vincent, the Home Member, vehemently justified the Bills in the Council.<sup>3</sup> He declared that the Government was determined to purify Indian politics by preventing 'disorder and anarchy'. The Government maintained that the revolutionary activities were 'subversive of all good government', and that the Bills were only 'temporary measures' intended to cope only with seditious crimes, and not in any

<sup>1</sup>Document No. 2.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 3.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

way were 'aimed at political movements properly named.'

The idea of introducing these Bills stimulated Indian public opinion, not only in the Council but all over the country. M.A. Jinnah, the nationalist Muslim leader, warned the Government that dire consequences would follow if these Bills were imposed.<sup>5</sup> Even the 'Moderates', who usually desisted from opposing the Government and who stood by the Government as far as the repression of the revolutionary activity was concerned, found no justification in the passing of these Bills, and opposed the Government move to enact them.<sup>6</sup> Despite the insistent and prescient warnings from twenty-two of the twenty-three non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council, the Government refused to climb down, and adopted one of the Bills on 18 March 1919.<sup>7</sup> The Act conferred extraordinary powers on the Government. The other proposed Rowlatt Bill, which intended to alter the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, was dropped because the public opinion was hostile, the official opinion was divided, and the Government did not want another battle between the rival forces in the Imperial Legislative Council. Though many people did not really know what the Bills were about as some of them confused them with '*rowla*', yet these measures became a matter of deep concern and were condemned in the country as 'lawless laws'<sup>8</sup> the 'memorials of Indian humiliation,' a 'grave menace to public liberty,' 'untimely,' 'oppressive and repressive,' 'too sweeping and arbitrary,' etc. These Bills occasioned heated speeches, long petitions and big demonstrations. A barrage of leading and feature articles was put forth in the newspapers.

The opposition to the Bills was firm and united. The speeches of the members of the Imperial Legislative Council assailing the Bills were reproduced in Indian newspapers which caused widespread resentment. The Government disregarded Indian opinion and passed the Rowlatt Act which triggered the confrontation between the Government and Indians. People took the Bills as an affront to their self-respect, though they had little idea of what they were really about. Even ordinary people like *tongawallas*<sup>9</sup> attacked the Bills fiercely without understanding them.

At this moment when the Bills became a subject of grave concern and serious debate in the country, Gandhi appeared on the political scene, though illness had prevented him from participating in the discussion of the Bills. Ever since the Champaran Satyagraha, he had been sharpening his weapons. Perhaps he had waited too long. Here was the opportunity

<sup>4</sup>Document No. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., No. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., Nos. 47 & 48.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., No. 51.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid No. 118.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., No. 28.

for him to show his hand, and to rally the forces that were lacking co-ordination. Here was the issue that could unite the people against the Government. He did not ally himself with any party or group. He held an independent position of his own. He was too much of an individualist, and had his singular ideology to follow. He had a remarkable sense of time. He possessed a physiographic tact combined with practical wisdom. He provided a new ideal which was an adventure of ideas. He did not wish to repeat what others had been saying or doing for generations. He did not wish to work within the old framework which he threw overboard, and introduced a new style of politics, simple, unique and effective.

Mere speeches, resolutions and petitions did not interest Gandhi. He had a highly developed sense of fact. He decided to oppose the Rowlatt Bills which he described as 'symptoms of a deep-seated disease'.<sup>10</sup> He thought that they would 'augur ill coming as they do over the Reform Bills'. From a loyalist he turned an agitator. He discarded the old politics of petition, terrorism and Home Rule. As a skilled political mobilizer, he adopted a political technique of superb flexibility. He decided to launch a non-violent movement against the Government by demanding the withdrawal of Rowlatt Bills. He launched Satyagraha (Truth force) on 6 April 1919 which he thought to be a 'religious movement, a process of purification and penance'.<sup>11</sup> He declared, 'Once you introduce the religious element in politics you revitalize the whole of your political outlook'.<sup>12</sup> He administered the Satyagraha vow to his followers. It was his first experiment with truth in Indian politics on a big scale. The issue he took up was not local or provincial but national, and he applied Hindu spirituality to the national cause. He brought renunciation into politics to gain a mass support for the cause he held dear to his heart.<sup>13</sup> Gandhi violated the press laws in order to perform symbolic civil disobedience against the Rowlatt Bills. *Satyagraha* was not merely or chiefly a political attitude but a 'moral attitude which touches the inner life of man'. According to Sir Herbert Read, Satyagraha is the 'psychological process of individuation—man cannot make peace with man until he has made peace with himself'.<sup>14</sup> The rationale of Gandhian *Satyagraha* was that a dissenter obliged the Government or a fellow citizen to realise that he would rather be in jail than comply with unjust Government policies.

Gandhi established the Satyagraha Sabha (Association of Satyagraha) with its headquarters at Bombay, and its rules and procedures were drawn

<sup>10</sup> Document No. 18; D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, (Delhi, 1951), I. p. 241.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 62.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 44.

<sup>13</sup> Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *Hindutsm: A Religion to Live*, (New Delhi, 1979), pp. 326-28.

<sup>14</sup> S. Radhakrishnan & Others (Ed.), *Mahatma Gandhi 100 Years*, (New Delhi, 1968), p. 34.

up. As President of the Satyagraha Sabha, he drafted the Satyagraha vow in Gujarati which B.G. Horniman, Editor of *The Bombay Chronicle*, translated into English. The Satyagraha vow was issued on March 1919.<sup>15</sup> While inaugurating the Satyagraha agitation on that date Gandhi warned that the fight against the Rowlatt Bills was 'probably the most momentous in the history of India'.<sup>16</sup> He issued general instructions to Satyagrahis on 23 March.<sup>17</sup> He declared, 'It is my firm belief that we shall obtain salvation only through suffering and not by reforms dropping on us from the English—they use Brute force, we Soul force.'<sup>18</sup> By courting arrest his object was to embarrass the Government, but in no case was violence to be used. Volunteers began to sign the Satyagraha pledge in large numbers. By the middle of March there were a thousand signatories of which eight hundred belonged to Kaira and Bombay.

When the Rowlatt Bill became law, Gandhi was staying at Kasturi Ranga Iyenger's residence in Madras. C. Rajagopalachari was Iyenger's tenant. Gandhi decided to call a *hartal* as a protest against the Rowlatt Bills. He related the story of the idea of *hartal* to Rajagopalachari.<sup>19</sup>

The idea came to me last night in a dream that we should call upon the country to observe a general *hartal*. Satyagraha is a process of self-purification, and ours is a sacred fight, and it seems to me to be in the fitness of things that it should be commenced with an act of self-purification. Let all the people of India, therefore, suspend their business on that day and observe the day as one of fasting and prayer. The Musalmans may not fast for more than one day: so the duration of the fast should be 24 hours. It is very difficult to say whether all the provinces would respond to this appeal of ours or not, but I feel fairly sure of Bombay, Madras, Bihar and Sindh. I think we should have every reason to feel satisfied even if all these places observe the *hartal* fittingly.

Gandhi places reliance here on intuition or 'inner voice'. It is perfectly in key with the tenets of ancient Hindu thought which regarded logic as an inadequate instrument to tackle the problem of Ultimate Reality. According to Gandhi, the problem was to be spiritually comprehended. Thus it was, by and large, mystical-intuitive rather than intellectualistic approach.

The *hartal* was fixed for 30 March 1919 but was subsequently changed

<sup>15</sup>Document No. 21.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>17</sup>Document No. 61.

<sup>18</sup>Government of India, Home Department, Political B, February 1920, No. 373.

<sup>19</sup>M.K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Ahmedabad, 1963), p. 281.

to 6 April, the notice being too short. Since February 1919 a vigorous campaign had been carried on against the Bills. Gandhi was at the centre of affairs. He made preparations for starting the Civil Disobedience campaign which, he thought, might be offered only to such laws as easily lent themselves to being disobeyed. As a part of the Civil Disobedience movement, Gandhi commenced with the distribution of a free translation of prohibited literature—Ruskin's *Unto the last and Defence and Death of Socrates*, and his own pamphlet on *Home Rule*. He launched the Satyagraha movement which produced a flurry of meetings from one end of the country to the other. He toured some part of the country, was received with respect, and established branches of the Satyagraha Sabha with the help of local leaders.

The Rowlatt Bills provided an excellent rallying point for the Indian masses, who responded whole-heartedly (and often blindly) to Gandhi's call. Gandhi so fascinated the imagination and influenced the hopes of the time that thousands of men willingly came out on the street to protest and to agitate against the Government for the withdrawal of the Bills. Many exaggerated rumours were in circulation, such as that according to the Act neither marriages nor funerals could be held without police supervision, the Zamindars would be robbed of 80% of their grains, etc. People believed these rumours to be true.<sup>20</sup>

The Government regarded the *hartal* as illegal and intimidatory. Almost the entire country observed *hartal* on 6 April; it was the first time in India's history that such unanimity of action on a popular issue had been achieved. According to Gandhi the *hartal* was a 'magnificent success', and '6th of April found India vitalised as never before'.<sup>21</sup>

The response to Gandhi's call to observe *hartal* on 6 April was unexpected and unprecedented. The Hindu-Muslim *entente* grew closer than ever before; it alarmed the Government. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, said that the people regarded the 6th of April as 'our national day'.<sup>22</sup> One may say that from this day India's struggle for freedom assumed a national character. Such a 'patriot explosion' was entirely a new phenomenon in Indian politics. The railway workers were threatening to strike, the mill hands were out, and Gandhi was trying to paralyse the government. On the whole, the *hartals* were peaceful until the 10th of April. Only in Delhi, on 30 March, did a Satyagraha demonstration become disorderly—the railway station was damaged and British Police Officers assaulted.<sup>23</sup> As a result of police firing the number of casualties were 8 killed and 12 wounded.

<sup>20</sup>Document No. 165; *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, (Calcutta, 1920), III, p. 50.

<sup>21</sup>*Young India*, 1919-1922 (Madras, 1922), p. 14.

<sup>22</sup>*Disorder Inquiry Committee*, VI, p. 64.

<sup>23</sup>People had no sufficient information about the change of *Hartal* to 6 April.

During the *hartal* there were big meetings, demonstrations, and processions. Shops were closed, traffic disturbed, and intemperate language used. Anti-British slogans were raised and the Government was condemned and ridiculed openly. In such a situation, when passions reached fever pitch and when the Government felt its *izzat* threatened, the confrontation between the Government and the people became inevitable. The whole atmosphere was surcharged with electricity and anything could happen.

Just when the country was in such a sullen and petulant mood, the Government arrested Gandhi on 9 April at Palwal near Delhi while he was on his way to the Punjab and sent him back under escort to Bombay. This incident and gratuitous provocation was bound to create excitement in the country and incite people to commit violence. In his own characteristic style, he wrote, 'My arrest makes me free'.<sup>24</sup> Gandhi's arrest was a crass error on the part the Government which acted rashly and produced widespread fury all over the country. From Rowlatt Bills to Gandhi's arrest, the Government was showing its failure to understand the gravity of the situation. The Government refused to perform a desirable operation by which they could manipulate, negotiate, relent or control.

Due to Gandhi's arrest, violent outbreaks took place on 10 April in his home town of Ahmedabad and Viramgam. Two men were murdered in the city and an Indian magistrate was killed in Viramgam. A number of acts of incendiarism and violence also occurred. There were no riots in Madras, Central Provinces and Berar, U.P., Bihar and Orissa.<sup>25</sup> Calcutta was almost quiet.<sup>26</sup> Indian army and the police remained loyal to the British. The Punjab was the worst affected area during the disturbances. It was estimated that one-third of the total hartals staged all over India against the Rowlatt Act between 30 March and 6 April occurred in the Punjab.<sup>27</sup> Thus, political activity in the Punjab was more widespread from March to April than elsewhere in India. In the Punjab riots extended over one-tenth of the area involving one-third of the population and covering half a dozen 'guilty districts'—Amritsar, Lahore, Jullundur, Lyallpur, Multan and Ferozepur.

At Amritsar on 10 April<sup>28</sup> prominent local leaders, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal, were called to the Deputy Commissioner Miles Irving's residence, shown the orders of their deportation received from the Provincial Government and bundled off to Dharamsala in motor cars at 11.30 a.m. The news of the arrest of the two leaders spread quickly, and ardent followers of the deportees made people close their shops. Almost all business transactions in the town were suspended.

<sup>24</sup>Document No.78.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., Nos. 90 and 94.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., No.88

<sup>27</sup>*Disorders Inquiry Committee*, VI, p.72

<sup>28</sup>Document No. 86.

People in a large number assembled at the carriage bridge with the intention of entreating the Deputy Commissioner to cancel the orders for the deportations, but in vain. There was confrontation between the mounted soldiers and the people, resulting in casualties, between 20 and 30.<sup>29</sup> This firing forced the mob to stream back in the city and destroy property and kill five Englishmen and assault an Englishwoman. The civil authority had virtually abdicated. The town hall was set on fire and some sub-post offices were looted. Even the Indian Christian Church and the Religious Book Society's depot were burnt. Railway telegraph wires were severed and the railway line was damaged. The property worth about thirty lakh rupees had been looted. On the 12th and 13th the city was quiet, and those who visited the railway station found it a deserted place. Rumours circulated freely, the chief among these being that Lahore fort had fallen into the hands of Indians.

According to Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, the city was in a state of 'tumult and revolt'.<sup>30</sup> The Deputy Commissioner said it was freely proclaimed that it might be the *Raj* of the *Sarkar* outside but inside it was *Hindu-Mussalman ki Hakumat*.<sup>31</sup>

On receiving the message from Lahore to proceed to Amritsar and at once to take charge, Brigadier-General R.E. Dyer, rather big in build and about fifty years old, arrived there on 11 April and held hurried consultations with the local authorities. On 13 April, the *Baisakhi* day, as usual, a large influx of people from adjacent areas poured into the city. Dyer issued a proclamation banning processions and any gathering of more than four men. When Dyer learnt that people had assembled in large numbers in Jallianwala Bagh in violation of his orders, he went there, accompanied by his aide-de-camp Captain F.C. Briggs, and reached the narrow entrance to the Bagh between 5 and 5-15 p.m. on 13 April. He got out of the motor car and advanced up the alley followed by the troops. The sky was still overcast and the dust raised by the crowd in the Bagh added to the gloom. Dyer stationed 25 Gurkhas on the left and 25 Baluchis on the right, and ordered firing. It was about 5.15 p.m. At first the crowd shouted hack 'phokian' 'phokian' (meaning blanks) imagining that it was just a bluff. But they quickly discovered their illusion as people began to fall and crumble. 1650 rounds of 303 mark were fired within ten minutes. The ammunition was almost exhausted. Dyer had fired without warning, and continued to fire even when people were dispersing. The Bagh looked like a battlefield with corpses scattered about in heaps and the wounded crying for help.<sup>32</sup> Dyer along with the troops marched off the way he had come.

<sup>29</sup>According to official vision the number of the killed was 12.

<sup>30</sup>Home Poll.B, August 1920, No, 373.

<sup>31</sup>Hindu-Muslim Raj.

<sup>32</sup>For an eye-witness account see Document No.241.

Dye's estimate of the killed was between 200 and 300, while the official figures were 379 killed and 12,00 wounded. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya believed that over 1,000 were killed, but this figure was somewhat exaggerated.<sup>33</sup> The number of the dead was around 700.

About Jallianwala Bagh massacre, Col. Josiah C. Wedgwood, Member of Parliament, said in the Dyer Debate in England as follows:<sup>34</sup>

There has never been anything like it before in English history and not in the whole of our relations with India has there ever been anything of this magnitude before. . . . You will have a shrine erected there and every year there will be processions of Indians visiting the tomb of the martyrs and Englishmen will go there and stand bare-headed before it. . . whenever we put forward the humanitarian view, we shall have this tale thrown into our teeth.

Martial Law was promulgated in five districts of the Punjab. At O'Dwyer's request, the Government of India proclaimed Martial Law first in the districts of Amritsar and Lahore on 15 April and directed the trial of offenders under Regulation X of 1804, i.e. by Court Martial. Martial Law was sanctioned before Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh but was not received till 14 April which was described by O'Dwyer as 'high-watermark of rebellion' because of the disruption of communications at various places in the Punjab. Martial Law was not proclaimed before 15 April though the situation was hardening into Martial Law from 10 April. O'Dwyer sent a wireless message, the Bolshevik wireless at Tashkant picked it up and used it to show that the British were fighting for their existence in India. Martial Law was extended to the district of Gujranwala on 16, Gujrat on 19, and Lyallpur on 24 April. It remained in force at Gujrawala till 9 June and at Amritsar and Lahore till 11 June, and ended on 25 August.

The statement of the Punjab Government gives details on the Martial Law administration.<sup>35</sup> Dyer issued the crawling order at Amritsar on 19 April. Kutcha Kaurianwala Khu, where Miss Marcella Sherwood, a missionary for the Church of England Zenana Missionary Society, was knocked down was chosen for punishing the offenders, and all men, who passed that way, had to crawl.<sup>36</sup> Dyer placed his pickets at different exits of the streets with instructions that no Indians (women exclusive) were to pass between these two points but added that if they did pass, they must go on all fours. Even a blind man was compelled to crawl. According to Dyer, fifty men were made to crawl. Dyer's crawling order was condemn-

<sup>33</sup>V.N. Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, (Ludhiana, 1969), pp. 104-5.

<sup>34</sup>Document No. 187.

<sup>35</sup>V.N. Datta, *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances* (Simla, 1975) I, 234-65.

<sup>36</sup>Document Nos. 72 and 253.

ed by his colleagues and the British bureaucracy, and he was made to withdraw it.

During the Martial Law administration flogging was publicly given in the presence of prostitutes with the object of humiliating the offenders. At the time of flogging, clothes were stripped off and hands tied. Whipping under Martial Law was carried out in Lahore (80), Kasur (85) Chuharkam (4), Gujranwala (24), Gujrat (31) and Amritsar (38).<sup>37</sup> The Punjab Government admitted that there were 123 sentences of whipping.<sup>38</sup> Handcuffing of respectable persons was the order of the day. Some of the lawyers were recruited as constables who had to attend to their roll calls four times a day. A large number of students were made to walk sixteen miles a day in sultry heat<sup>39</sup> A wedding party was arrested just for the breach of curfew. There were cases of men forced to draw pictures in the dust with their noses. Martial Law notices were pasted on the houses of some Indians and their inmates were ordered not to allow the posters to be removed or defaced, failing which they were punished. The vehicles of some people were commandered. Teachers and students of colleges were made to stand in the sun for hours. Abusing, slapping, pulling of moustaches and beards, and forcing people to *salaam* every Englishman were a daily occurrence. One man was compelled to drink urine and sticks were thrust in the anus of others. People were arrested without charges being preferred. Bombs were dropped on Gujranwala on 15 and 16 April.

Martial Law Courts and Summary Courts awarded punishments ranging from death sentences to imprisonments. As a result of the review by the Punjab Government, of the 110 death sentences passed by the Martial Commission, 23 were maintained (of which 5 were stayed pending decisions of appeals to the Privy Council), of the remaining 55, 23 were committed to transportation for life, 26 to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years, 14 to 7 years, 1 to 6 years, 10 to 5 years and 11 to periods ranging from 1 to 4 years. A few commutations of the sentences for the transportation of life were made.<sup>40</sup> 766 sentences of imprisonment were passed by the Summary Courts. Many of the convicted persons were amnestied by Royal Pardon at the end of 1919.

The Martial Law administration was subjected to vigorous criticism in many Indian newspapers. Several members of the Imperial Legislative Council severely attacked the Martial Law Administration and made specific charges of oppression and complete disregard of legal principles. Madan Mohan Malaviya moved a Resolution<sup>41</sup> on 10 September for the

<sup>37</sup>Rupert Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar*, (London, 1963), p. 100.

<sup>38</sup>V.N. Datta, *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances*, I. p. 261.

<sup>39</sup>S.C. Mittal, *Freedom Movement in Punjab*, (Delhi, 1977), pp. 131-32.

<sup>40</sup>For the punishments given, See Datta, *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances*, I, p. 268.

<sup>41</sup>Document No. 157.

appointment of Royal Commission to enquire into the causes of disturbances with powers to amend or modify the sentences passed by the Commission.

The Government's sole justification for the introduction of Martial Law was its inability to deal with the situation through the civil administration. It is true that in several places in the Punjab trains were stopped or derailed, railway lines were torn up and telegraph 'wires cut. It was this 'menace to communications' which forced the Government to introduce Martial Law. The Government felt threatened by what it believed to be 'an open rebellion' against the Raj. The theory of Bolshevik agents working in India during the disturbances was a myth created by the bureaucracy. There is no evidence to establish any communication between any Bolshevik agents and the disturbances in the numerous trials held against the persons convicted for disturbances nor later even in the Hunter Committee Report.<sup>42</sup>

The object of the acts perpetrated with impunity and vengeance, was to teach people a lesson for the 'wrongs' they had done by defying British rule and to break their spirit by humiliating and terrorising them. The Martial Law administration had acted in vengeance. There seemed no justification for extending the Martial Law beyond 19 April in any case as complete normalcy had been restored in the Punjab. This was admitted by the Disorders Inquiry Committee. Martial Law in fact had been introduced only after the disturbances had nearly ceased. Gandhi called for a temporary suspension of Civil Disobedience on 18 April.<sup>43</sup> The demonstration of violence by his countrymen in killing and destroying Government property made him suspend the movement. He admitted that he had committed a 'Himalyan blunder' by launching that type of programme which people had no moral strength to follow.

There appears no reason why curfew was imposed on Gujrat and Lyallpur even when no disturbances had occurred there. Sir Sankaran Nair, Member of the Indian Government, who resigned later as a protest against the Martial Law administration wrote in his highly critical book 'Gandhi and Anarchy', (which led to O'Dwyer's action for libel) as follows :<sup>44</sup>

'Before the Reforms under a lieutenant Governor, a single individual, the atrocities in the Punjab which we knew too well, could be committed with impunity.'

Montagu regretted certain features of the Martial Law administration and stated that the civil and military officers had administered Martial

<sup>42</sup>Ibid. Nos. 203, 210 and 218.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., No. 93.

<sup>44</sup>Sankaran Nair, *Gandhi and Anarchy*, (Madras, 1923), p. 54.

Law in the spirit of 'an army of occupation in a hostile country'.<sup>45</sup>

Why did the disturbances occur? It would be naive to think that the Rowlatt Bills or Gandhi's Satyagraha caused the disturbances.<sup>46</sup> The Rowlatt Bills were not really the cause but the occasion which people used desperately to give vent to their grievances. In fact, the Rowlatt Bills became 'a sort of simulacrum which represented to every class the embodiment of the particular grievances from which it suffered'.<sup>47</sup>

Montagu observed that economic factors had a considerable influence in fostering unrest in India.<sup>48</sup> On 1 March 1919, Lord Chelmsford informed Montagu that the continuing rise in the price of necessities was causing resentment among the lower cadre of Government servants.<sup>49</sup> India felt the effects of the War, and the strain in proportion to her vitality and means was substantial. There was unprecedented rise in the cost of living which hit the lower middle classes, persons of fixed income, and the labouring classes. The prices of necessities rose alarmingly high. There was a general failure of monsoons. India suffered one of its worst harvests in 1919 and local recrudescence of plague took a heavy toll of life in January 1919.

The following Table indicates the sharp rise in the prices of foodgrains<sup>50</sup>

TABLE I  
*Index Numbers of Retail Prices of Foodgrains in India*  
Prices of 1873—100

Year	Rice	Wheat	Jawar	Bajra	Gram	Barley
1914	254	200	206	207	226	204
1915	246	227	201	212	220	212
1916	234	193	175	199	198	203
1917	215	205	193	188	197	190
1918	234	281	333	324	250	239
1919	377	359	444	437	398	319

When prices were rising, there was export of grains, cloth, pulses and other necessities of life which exposed people to greater hardships. The

<sup>45</sup>Secretary of State to viceroy. Tel. No. 567 dated 6 May 1920. Home Poll A, June 1920, No. 135 and K.W.

<sup>46</sup>Document No. 43.

<sup>47</sup>*India in 1919*, A Report prepared for presentation to parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 26th Section of the Govt. of India Act, p. 31.

<sup>48</sup>Document No. 116; see also evidence of J.P. Thompton; V.N. Datta, *New Light on the Punjab Disturbance* (Disorders Enquiry Committee) VI, p. 52.

<sup>49</sup>Hore Poll, Deposit, March 1919, No. 17. for economic causes as factors for the disturbances, see Hari Singh, *Political Disturbances in Punjab and Delhi in 1919, A Study in the Evolution of Nationalism in India*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Kurukshetra University, Nov. 1976); see also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 20-24.

<sup>50</sup>Quoted in Hari Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

export of 400 million yards of cloth during the war raised the cloth price, and for the poor there was cloth famine. By March 1919 export of cereals from India rose to over 50 per cent, and in case of wheat, a record figure of 15,00,000 tons was reached.<sup>51</sup> Famine riots were reported in different parts of the country. Grain robberies occurred in some districts of the Punjab like Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh. The fury of the mob was so intense in Calicut that it seized 3,500 bags of rice on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1919.<sup>52</sup> The increasing import of finished goods and the export of raw material led to the impoverishment of manufacturing classes. Fodder was exported when cattle were dying.

The silver currency disappeared and there was an increase in the use of paper currency as the following Table would show.<sup>53</sup>

TABLE 2

*Increase in Paper Currency*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rupees in crores</i>
1915	55.50
1917	82.00
1918	98.00
1919	150.00

The yield from taxation rose three times during 1914-19. The new Income Tax, which came into force on 1 April 1919, irritated the assessee.<sup>54</sup> War loans of 100 million had been raised from India. Loss of business affected the traders. Low wages of labour and high cost of living caused labour unrest. The following Table shows the wages and high cost of living.<sup>55</sup>

TABLE 3

*Money Wages, Cost of Living and Real Wages, Period 1880-1919*  
Index Number 1900—100

<i>Years</i>	<i>Money Wages</i>	<i>Cost of Living</i>	<i>Real Wages</i>
1880-1889	87	69	127
1890-1899	94	85	112
1900-1909	107	97	111
1910-1919	211	207	98

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.<sup>52</sup>Hom. Poll, Deposit, July 1919, No. 37.<sup>53</sup>Hari Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 26.<sup>54</sup>N. Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 22-23.<sup>55</sup>Hari Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

There was labour unrest in the early month of 1919. In January and February 1919 labour strikes occurred in Madras and Bombay. In February over 100,000 mill workers went on strike in Bombay.<sup>56</sup> The strike spread to Poona, Ahmedabad and Broach. In Calcutta 10,000 Iron and Steel workers and the Taxi-drivers resorted to a strike.<sup>57</sup> In Bihar and Orissa, postal employees stopped work. In the Punjab there were two Railway strikes initiated by the clerks in Government service.

Besides economic unrest, another cause of disturbances was the subdued aspiration of the politically-minded classes who began to feel cheated by the wild promises of Government. Montagu's declaration of 20 August 1917 and the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme had raised high hopes for India's constitutional advancement, but with the termination of the war, the politically conscious classes thought that they were going to be left out in the cold when England no longer needed Indian help.

A major factor of unrest among the Muslims in India at this time was the humiliating treatment accorded to Turkey by the Allies. The threatened dismemberment of the Turkish Empire and an apprehension about the Khilafat and the holy places aroused strong pro-Turkish and anti-British sentiment among the Muslims in India. The Pan-Islamists began to preach that the first duty of the Muslims was allegiance to the Caliph, and they founded a new organisation, the *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba* (Association of the Servants of Mecca). The fiery Ali Brothers, Muhammad and Shaukat, appealed to the deepest sentiments of Islamic faith and built up a strong following.

It would be seen thus from the above brief account that due to economic distress of the people, subdued ambitions of the politically minded classes and pro-Turkish sentiment among the Muslims, an atmosphere of discontent prevailed. The people were in a restless and disillusioned mood. Nowhere were they probably as angry and bitter as in the Punjab which was then ruled by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab. This was so because O'Dwyer was exacting, ruthless, despotic, stubborn, and completely uncompromising.<sup>58</sup> He believed that he was always in the right, and that Government's only function was to keep law and order and to rule efficiently. He throttled the press, banned the entry of political leaders in the Punjab, and condemned the politically-ambitious classes. He ridiculed the idea of sharing power with Indians and made frothy speeches on this theme. Gandhi held O'Dwyer responsible for having committed 'serious errors' by provoking the people to violence.

The Punjab was regarded as a sensitive province because of its proximity to the frontier and its sturdy soldiery. The closeness to the

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>See for O'Dwyer, V.N. Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 50-57.

frontier was exploited to the full and the proposals made by the 'man on the spot', as it had happened in the case of Danzil Ibbetson in the past and now with O'Dwyer, secured ready acceptance of the Viceroy. The Punjab had the advantage of having the 'ear of the Viceroy', and because of this sanguine position the Punjab Government adopted rough methods, particularly in recruitment campaigns during the war. The Punjab Government was very sensitive about its *izzat*, and any manifestation of political activity it regarded as sedition. The absence of a legislative council in O'Dwyer's scheme of administration made people feel suffocated.

During his 1917-1918 visit to India, Montagu had felt that the Government of India, obsessed with files and regulations and lacking in political instinct, was inadequate to cope with the tense political atmosphere, as he found it.<sup>59</sup> In his opinion Chelmsford was nervous and obsolete. Chelmsford was just like a stranger on the political scene, cold, aloof and reserved. By 1919 matters seemed to be drawing to a head. "Yes," John Lawrence had said in the sixties of the last century, "India is quiet, as quite as gunpowder." That was the political situation in the beginning of 1919. Only a spark was needed to start the conflagration, and the Rowlatt Bills provided the spark.

Ever since Gandhi launched his Sayagraha against the Rowlatt Bill, he remained at the centre of the stage. He had emerged as leader of the Indian people. He cast a magic spell on the people in whom he evoked the deepest reverence. He acquired the reputation of a *rishi* and a *wali*<sup>60</sup>. In this period, he meets us at every turn but eludes us. It is not so much the principal events connected with his life, but the complexity of his personality, the contradictions and paradoxes which his ideology and action produced and the spiritual reservoirs (another name for internal resources) which make the whole system of his beliefs, practices and actions not really amenable to rational explanations. It is a pitfall for historians to project the present-day notions into the past while judging Gandhi. Gandhi has to be judged and understood in the context of his times; how he was, what he came to be, what he did to himself and to others, what was the nature of his actions and their influence on society.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup>E.S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary* (London, 1930), pp. 16, 41, 43, 70-71 and 116.

<sup>60</sup>Document No. 165.

<sup>61</sup>Judith Brown in her work '*Gandhi's Rise to Power, Indian Politics, 1915-22*,' analyses the mechanism by which Gandhi emerged as an all-India leader, but says little on his motivation and ideas. Another work '*Essays on Gandhian Politics*' (Oxford, 1971, ed. R. Kumar) is more a study of the Rowlatt Agitation and less of Gandhi. Curiously enough, this work excludes Amritsar where the agitation was at its peak. This study attempts to show that Gandhi's charisma rested upon his exploitation of religious idiom. What this idiom is the book does not analyse. Oddly enough, Gandhi is clubbed with Herbert Risley and Alfred Lyall in their recognition of the importance of caste, religion, and community.

For the British, Gandhi had been their ally who turned later an agitator and a fighter against their rule. He was somewhat of a puzzle and an enigma,<sup>62</sup> but the British still hoped that the country would be soon fed up with his vagaries. He had launched a non-violent Disobedience movement. He had no faith in violence. He was honest in his intentions, but the disturbances revealed that non-violence was the first casualty. His integrity of character and nobility of actions was never in doubt which was eloquently lauded by Montagu.<sup>63</sup> People resorted to violence which Gandhi woefully regretted. Gandhi perhaps never realized that they would go berserk.

The question is what was Gandhi's motive, and how far was he responsible for the disturbances? Did he confine himself only to the withdrawal of the Rowlatt Act? Or was it his object to defeat his enemy by a sort of non-violent warfare? Why did he withdraw his movement after violence had occurred? Did he become conscious of his failure or did he realize like a true politician that his object in arousing national consciousness amongst his people had been well served. To take a charitable view, it was perhaps best for him to withdraw the movement when he found that the people were not morally ripe to practice *Satyagraha*.

On the character of the disturbances there is considerable debate in contemporary historical material. Discontent was smouldering in India in early 1919 and beneath all the contributory factors was a current of nationalism swollen by extrinsic sources of dissatisfaction. The Government took an unwise step of clamping on the people the Rowlatt Bills which acted as a red rag to the Indian bull. Gandhi used this opportunity to launch an All-India agitation but did not realize the incalculable forces that his agitation would unleash. He did not anticipate the disturbances. He underestimated people's propensity to violence. If there had been no Rowlatt agitation, there would probably be some other issue to arouse people against the Government. Such was the prevalent anti-British attitude Gandhi was temperamentally a pacifist, but the demonstrations and protest processions confronting the Government's repressive measures resulted in violence. According to Dr. Hein Fein, the Government was equally responsible for initiating violence by its repressive response to pacific protests.<sup>64</sup>

There was no pre-meditated plan or organisation in the disturbances. On the contrary, the disturbances were spontaneous, brought about by a rash and thoughtless bureaucracy determined to fight nationalism. These eruptions were not confined to one or two days but were dispersed over 15 days. What the people reacted to was not the same stimuli but often an

<sup>62</sup>See 'Reflections on Gandhi' in George Orwell, *Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays* (London, 1953), pp. 102-114.

<sup>63</sup>Document No. 116.

<sup>64</sup>Hein Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment*, (Honolulu, 1977), p. 123.

independent action. The disturbances were the consequence of the Rowlatt Bills, and the resistance offered by the middle-class leaders, educated and liberal in outlook, who fiercely attacked the Government in the Press and on the Platform. So long as these leaders controlled the agitation they kept themselves within bounds, and things went on well enough until then, and there was no direct confrontation with the Government; but once the Government resorted to oppressive measures by arresting leaders and using force to deal with the deteriorating political situation, then the roughs went berserk and, abandoning non-violence took to violence. According to Mark Naidis, the disturbances were 'prompted by the politically-conscious classes, involved in a wild competition for popularity'.<sup>65</sup> This Namierite explanation is rather too simplistic, but Naidis is close to truth when he says that the 'professional classes were the agitators who initiated the whole agitation but the toughs did the damage'. The bulk of the crowd was composed of the lowest classes, viz. petty shopkeepers, sweepers, artisans, leather workers, butchers, etc.

In certain areas the political situation remained under control due to tactful handling by high officials. Sir Harcourt Butler, Governor of U.P., George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, and Earl of Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal, knew how far to go, and showed *sang-froid* in dealing with the political development. That was not so with Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who had sheer contempt for the politically-conscious class. He had the smell of rebellion in his nostrils. That is why the Punjab experienced the worst of the disturbances when wild passions of the mob were aroused, and the province witnessed the scenes of horrid murders by soaking men in kerosene oil and burning them, indiscriminate firing, cutting of telegraph wires, the tearing of railway lines and razing to the ground of public buildings, etc.

The disturbances culminated in the sombre tragedy of Jallianwala Bagh massacre. In his conversation with Lord Montgomery, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru remarked that the Jallianwala Bagh episode marked a turning point in Anglo-Indian relations.<sup>66</sup> In February 1921 the Duke of Connaught, who had been brought to India to inaugurate the Reforms, quite appropriately said that the shadow of Amritsar lengthened over the fair face of India. This tragic event had a profound effect on the country. Never in the history of India had the action of an individual

<sup>65</sup>Mark Naidis, *The Punjab Disturbances of 1919—A Study in Indian Nationalism* (A dissertation submitted to Stanford University, Feb. 1950), p.75. Naidis's work, a study of the nature and significance of the disturbances, apportions responsibility for the disturbances on the corporate shoulders of the official bureaucracy. His thesis is that the bureaucracy brought Indian nationalism. Hence the disturbances.

<sup>66</sup>*The Sunday Times* (London) 29 January 1961.

officer had such a decisive impact on political developments as Dyer's Jallianwala Bagh.

Dyer's action was widely discussed in contemporary documents, particularly in the Evidence volumes and the Report of the Hunter Committee (known as such after its Chairman, Lord Hunter). Historians have also interpreted his action differently. B.G. Horniman in his '*Amritsar and Our Duty to India*', the first work on Jallianwala Bagh, regards Dyer's action as purely vindictive and an exemplification of O'Dwyerism.<sup>67</sup> Pearay Mohan, in his '*An Imaginary Rebellion and how it was suppressed*', an unsystematic compilation of historical material, points out *inter-alia*, that Dyer had used one Hans Raj, an opportunist of the worst type, to assemble people in the Bagh so that he could do them to death',<sup>68</sup> but Pearay Mohan's argument is speculative without any supporting evidence. Furneaux, in his '*Massacre at Amritsar*', thought that Dyer's mental state was abnormal as he was suffering from *arterio sclerosis*, and hence his morbid action of incessant firing without any sense of proportion.<sup>69</sup> Arthur Swinson knocks out Furneaux's psychological theory and believes that Dyer's action was influenced by (i) danger from Afghanistan, (2) deep concern for the protection of European lives in India, and (3) his determination to give unstinted support to his soldiers.<sup>70</sup> Raja Ram, in his work '*The Jallialawal Bagh: A Pre-meditated Plan*', calls the Jallianwala Bagh massacre a sinister pre-meditated conspiracy, hatched secretly by the Punjab Government, but he offers no evidence for it.<sup>71</sup> This writer has shown that Dyer used Hans Raj, a man of dubious character, as already stated, to collect people in the Bagh with a view to inflicting on them a condign punishment for their crime of killing Englishmen at Amritsar on 10 April.<sup>72</sup>

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre provoked strong public reaction in India and England. It created a wide breach between the Government and Indians which it was not possible to heal and overcome. Fierce arguments and counter-arguments followed Dyer's action which fostered ill-will between the rulers and the ruled. Edward Thompson noted that one S.K. Datta, while thinking of Jallianwala Bagh, stood weeping and saying, 'This ends the British connexion with India.<sup>73</sup> Dyer's action became a subject of historical importance and acrimonious debate, and

<sup>67</sup>B.G. Horniman, *Amritsar and our Duty to India* (London, 1920), see the concluding chapter.

<sup>68</sup>Pearay Mohan, *An Imaginary Rebellion and how it was suppressed* (Lahore, 1920), pp. 117-20.

<sup>69</sup>Rupert Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar*, pp. 173-79.

<sup>70</sup>Arthur Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset* (London, 1964), pp. 185-205.

<sup>71</sup>Raja Ram, *Jallianwala Bagh: A Pre-meditated Plan*, (Chandigarh, 1969), pp.89-92, 138-90.

<sup>72</sup>V.N. Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 162-66.

<sup>73</sup>Edward Thompson, *A Letter from India* (London, 1932), p. 99.

with it the whole administration of Sir Michael O'Dwyer who had approved his action came under fire, which, is evident in contemporary literature, particularly in the Hunter Committee Report, Montagu's Despatches and the nationalist press.

Due to the disturbances, Martial Law administration and Jallianwala Bagh massacre, the prevailing mood in the country was one of fear, terror, and uncertainty. People became bitter and angry. Their faith in British justice was shaken. The nationalist leaders asked the Government to institute an enquiry into the disturbances and Martial Law administration. Rabindranath Tagore returned his knighthood to the Government as a protest against the 'severity inflicted upon the unfortunate people' and addressed a strong letter on it to the Viceroy.<sup>74</sup> Gandhi also requested the Viceroy for an 'impartial and independent committee of enquiry to examine the cause of the disturbances in the Punjab and the administration of Martial Law.'<sup>75</sup> E.S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, who was impatient for constitutional reforms for India, realized that for the conciliation of Indian opinion an enquiry into the causes of unrest was absolutely necessary, and he announced therefore in his budget speech on 22 May 1919 the setting up of an enquiry into the political disturbances.<sup>76</sup> The Government of India and some high officials, particularly O'Dwyer, were opposed to the Enquiry but Montagu disregarded the opposition.<sup>77</sup> There was much discussion between the Secretary of State and the Government of India on the composition of the Enquiry.<sup>78</sup> Finally the Disorders Enquiry Committee (known as the Hunter Committee) was appointed on 14 October 1919 with Lord Hunter, formerly Solicitor General for Scotland as its Chairman, the other members of the Committee were: W.F. Rice, Additional Secretary to the Government of India (Home Department), Justice G.C. Rankin, Major General Sir John Barrow, Commandant in the Peshawar division, a non-official Englishman, Thomas Smith, member of the Legislative Council U.P., Sir Chiman Lal Hiralal Setalvad, an advocate of the High Court of Bombay, Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan, Bar-at-Law, Member of the Court of Appeals in Gwalior State and Pandit Jagat Narayan, Member of the Legislative Council, U.P. Mr. H.C. Stokes acted as Secretary.

The Committee began its hearing on 29 October, 1919 and sat for a total of forty-six days. The Indian National Congress boycotted the Hunter Committee, a decision in which Gandhi's influence was decisive.

<sup>74</sup>Document No. 125.

<sup>75</sup>Gandhi to S.R. Hignell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy. 30 May, 1919. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, (Ahmedabad, 1965), XV, Letter No. 303.

<sup>76</sup>Document No. 116.

<sup>77</sup>For Montagu's motives on the enquiry, see V.N. Datta. *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances*, I, pp. 3-4.

<sup>78</sup>Document Nos. 147, 148 and 159.

Gandhi insisted on the release of the prisoners, believing that unless they appeared before the Hunter Committee the enquiry would be incomplete. Montagu was willing to reconsider the Congress request but by then the evidence had been closed.

The Hunter Committee did not inspire Indian politicians as it was examining only the official witnesses. The Congress decided to set up a non-official inquiry committee of which Madan Mohan Malaviya, Motilal Nehru, Rash Behari Ghosh, Syed Imam, B. Chakravarti, C.R. Das, Kasturi Ranga Iyenger, Umar Sobhani and Gokaran Nath Mishra were the members. Gandhi was co-opted in mid-October. In the Punjab the Committee was assisted by C.F. Andrews. Gandhi played the most vital role in the preparation of the report.<sup>79</sup> At first C.R. Das supervised the work; later Gandhi and M.R. Jayakar did the remaining work on the report, of which Gandhi was the dominant partner.

Another issue which provoked controversy was the Government's passing of the Indemnity Bill on 25 September 1919.<sup>80</sup> During the disturbances some officials, while confronting the difficult situation, acted outside the letter of the law. In order to protect such officers, the Government passed the Indemnity Bill to indemnify those officers who had, in suppressing the disturbances, acted in good faith and in a reasonable belief that their actions were necessary. It indemnified actions on the ground that they were necessary for maintaining or restoring order, while it left the ordinary courts to judge whether these conditions were fulfilled. Departmental action, however, could be taken against the officials if it was warranted.

The Indemnity Act became a subject of severe attack from several sections of the press. Malaviya in a long speech of about five hours in the Imperial Council assailed the Act with his usual eloquence.<sup>81</sup> The Government had, however, no difficulty in passing the Act. Even Sir Dinshaw Wacha declared himself convinced of the justification of the Act. Gandhi too, surprisingly enough, flew in the face of strong Indian opinion against the Bill. This was so because Gandhi felt that it was legitimate for the ruling power to resort to such measures in order to safeguard its interests in difficult circumstances.<sup>82</sup>

The Royal assent was given to the Government of India Bill (incorporating the Montagu Chelmsford report) on 23 December.<sup>83</sup> The Act introduced in a small measure some features of responsible government in the provinces. Provincial Subjects such as Education, Agriculture, Public Health and local self-government were transferred to Indian

<sup>79</sup>Jayakar Papers (Punjab Inquiry), Dec. 1919, NAI.

<sup>80</sup>Document Nos. 160, 161, 162, 164, 165 and 166.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 162.

<sup>82</sup>Document., No. 167.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 245.

ministers responsible to the elected legislature, but subjects like Law and Order were reserved to the control of the Governor and his official executive. In the Central Government a bicameral legislature was created—an Assembly and a Council of State—a majority of whose members were henceforth to be elected. Thus reforms were to raise the ‘stakes in nationalist politics by extending the franchise and thereby giving leverage in politics.’<sup>84</sup>

The year 1919 closes with the session of the Indian National Congress in Gol Bagh at Amritsar.<sup>85</sup> The site was fixed at Amritsar with the idea of focusing attention on the Punjab tragedy. The Government of India thought at first of disallowing the Congress to take place at Amritsar but later changed its mind on the ground that such a step would inflame the public mind.<sup>86</sup> The Congress was presided over by Motilal Nehru and attended by a galaxy of nationalist leaders, including B.G. Tilak, Annie Besant, B.C. Pal, C.R. Das, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Gandhi, Srinavasa Sastri and M.A. Jinnah.<sup>87</sup> The session was attended by about 36,000 ordinary delegates and 1200 tenent delegates.<sup>88</sup> The Ali Brothers—Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali also attended the Congress and were given a tumultuous welcome.

Tilak took a prominent part in the deliberations but there could be no doubt that majority of the delegates looked to Gandhi as their leader, who had emerged as a challenging force. Jawaharlal Nehru described the Amritsar Congress as the first Gandhi Congress.<sup>89</sup> At the session, C.R. Das, Tilak, Hasrat Mohani and others condemned the Reforms and demanded full responsible government. The Reforms were described as the ‘device of a bankrupt statesman’. Gandhi intervened with an amendment to give the Reforms a trial and to co-operate with the British in making them a success, despite their inadequacy. A compromise was thus made whereby Reforms were called disappointing but Montagu was thanked and promised co-operation in the working of the scheme.<sup>90</sup> So the Congress did not boycott the Reforms. This was due to Gandhi, who enjoyed confidence of the majority, and it was to him that C.R. Das and Tilak capitulated. Fifty resolutions were passed at the Session covering a variety of topics, ranging from a demand for the recall of Lord Chelmsford to the investigation of Land Revenue system, labour and present conditions, removal of General Dyer from his command, the

<sup>84</sup>Judith M. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

<sup>85</sup>Document Nos. 177 and 178. There was much controversy about the holding of the Congress session at Amritsar.

<sup>86</sup>S.C. Mittal, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>87</sup>Document No. 193.

<sup>88</sup>Pattabhai Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian Congress (1885-1935)* I, (Delhi, 1969), p. 180.

<sup>89</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London, 1936), pp. 44.

<sup>90</sup>Document No. 195.

repeal of the Rowlatt Act and Press Act, the cancellation of the indemnities and the release of prisoners who were still in jails, despite the Royal Proclamation.<sup>91</sup>

As noticed earlier, the Nationalist leaders attacked the Government and even passed the Resolution for the recall of the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. But the Government hoped that the Congress resolution assuring co-operation in the working of the Reforms would improve Anglo-Indian relations. Gandhi too counselled moderation and warned that madness should not be returned for madness. These hopes of peaceful atmosphere were blasted by the turn of events in early 1920. The Khilafat issue which deeply concerned the Muslims gained primary importance, dominated the political life of the country and came more and more to the fore during February and March 1920.<sup>92</sup>

The Muslims saw the humiliation of Turkey (the last Mahomedan power in existence) by Britain on the termination of the War as an international spoliation of Islam and a deep-laid conspiracy by the Imperial power to subvert the sacred institution of Khalifa, whose duty it was to exercise control over Muslim sanctuaries. The Muslims were convinced that the British were determined to wipe out the Khalifa whom they regarded as the Viceregent of God on earth. Thus, during 1919 there was witnessed a strong Muslim opinion, *Shaiah* as well as *Sunni*, for the support of Turkey.

Judith Brown has divided the Khilafat movement into three phases, the first phase lasting until December 1919, the second from the release of the Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad at the end of December up to early May, and the third from mid-May to August 1920, when the Khilafat issue was joined with the agitation over the Punjab and made into a single movement of Non-Cooperation.<sup>93</sup> In the initial stages a Bombay Khilafat Committee was set up in March 1919 at Bombay with Mian Mahomed Chotani, a rich timber merchant, as its President on 19 March 1919, who later paid for the Khilafat delegation sent to England, and also financed much of the agitation in upper India.<sup>94</sup> The All-India Khilafat Conference took place at Lucknow on 21 September. The Khilafat Day was observed on 17 October to focus public attention on the Khilafat issue. Not that all the Muslims were touched by it but their

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., Nos. 195 and 206.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., No. 192.

<sup>93</sup>Dr. Judith M.Brown presents a valuable analysis of the Khilafat movement but is considerably influenced by *India in 1920* (A Report prepared for presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 26th Section of the Government of India Act), a brilliant analysis possibly by Rushbrook Williams, which is based on the political studies of Mr.Alfred Nundy and official documents. For details see, Judith M. Brown, *op.cit* pp. 190-230. See another work on the Khilafat, A.C.Niemeijer, *Khilasat Movement in India*, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

<sup>94</sup>Richard Gorden, *Non-Cooperation and Council Entry: Locality, Province and Nation. Essays on Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940* (Cambridge, 1973), p.13.

response was quite strong. Until November 1919 the Bombay Khilafat Committee controlled the entire campaign (and Shaukat Ali was drawn to Bombay) but on 23 November 1919 at Delhi it changed its name to Central Khilafat Committee of India. North India became the power house of the movement, though Bombay was still the Treasury.<sup>95</sup>

Gandhi expressed his great concern for the Khilafat from the very beginning. At the Khilafat meeting on 23 November, he mildly warned the Government that if the Muslim demands were not met, he would not hesitate to launch a Non-Cooperation movement. A sub-committee was formed to examine the whole question of Non-Cooperation movement. This was the first time that Gandhi used the word 'Non-Cooperation' in the context of the Khilafat Movement. Until the Ali brothers wrested control from the Bombay men, the attitude of the Muslim leaders on their plans was one of moderation.<sup>96</sup> The Bombay men did not wish to take to extreme measures; they feared that an extreme measure might eventually be a threat to their commercial interests<sup>97</sup>

As a protest Gandhi called for the boycott of Victory celebrations of the Allied powers. He guided the deliberations of the Khilafat conference, presided over by Shaukat Ali at Amritsar in December 1919, which decided to send a delegation to the Viceroy to present their case. A deputation of the Muslims met the Viceory in January 1920<sup>98</sup> and appealed to him to ensure the preservation of Turkey and the sovereignty of the Sultan as the Khalifa. Chelmsford's response was sympathetic.<sup>99</sup> It was a religious question in which a foreign government could not really do much to redress the grievances of Muslims, though the Viceroy promised to write to the Secretary of State to take into account the Muslim feeling in India. Mohammad Ali left India in February 1920 as leader of the Khilafat Delegation to meet the Prime Minister of England and other authorities with a view to presenting the Muslim demands. The third All India Khilafat Conference was held in Bombay on 15, 16 and 17 February 1920, but no definite action emerged from the meeting. Gandhi published his manifesto on Khilafat on 9 March 1920.<sup>100</sup> He suggested 19 March as the Khilafat Day and warned that if the Muslim demands were not acceded to, then the only course left for him was to launch a Non-Cooperation movement. A *Hartal* on 17 March was observed, and there was nearly complete stoppage of business and a large number of well-attended public meetings. Great disappointment was felt in India by the published accounts of the interview between the members of the delegation and Mr. Lloyd George (17 March), who had declared that Turkey

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>96</sup>Document No. 235.

<sup>97</sup>Judith M. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

<sup>98</sup>Document No. 212.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.* 213.

<sup>100</sup>Document No. 234.

could not be given any special treatment and would have to be put on par with other Christian countries which had fought the Allied powers.

The Allied Peace Treaty with Turkey in Sevres was published on 14 May which gave the control of Constantinople to the Sultan, but the *Jazirat-ul-Arab* would not remain under Muslim sovereignty and the Khalifa would be no longer the warden of the Muslim sanctuaries. The Muslims regarded these terms a shattering blow to the essential elements of Muslim faith. Gandhi condemned the terms as a 'staggering blow to the Indian Musalmans'. After the publication of the terms, the Khilafat movement enters a new phase of active vicarious political activity astir with passion. The Ali brothers infused a new spirit of enthusiasm in the Khilafat movement.<sup>101</sup> They toured the country, delivered eloquent speeches in chaste Urdu, and stirred Muslim religious sentiments by invoking examples of chivalry and sacrifice from the pages of Islamic history. Excitement rose high. *Jehad* was openly preached and an intensive propaganda campaign was conducted in U.P. and Bengal. Thus, from May 1920 onward the Khilafat movement became a mass movement through which the religious appeal of the *Ulema* and vernacular journalists reached the Muslims, high and low, all over the country. For the Muslims now the politics of moderation was a thing of the past; they wanted a new type of agitation, a more aggressive action to force the Government to modify the Peace terms. The anti-Turkish feeling in the West naturally produced his reactions in India.

Gandhi began to occupy the most important and perhaps the most enviable position in the entire campaign of support for Turkey and the Khilafat. The Muslims who became his adherents realized that he was a force to reckon with. He had a large following and his word carried weight with the Government. He had a definite and concrete programme to offer to the Muslims which none of the Muslim leaders had. He was both a man of conviction and action. By virtue of his extraordinary position, he was a key man between the two communities, a link man, the only rising hope and guarantor of Hindu support to Muslim leaders in this hour of their trial. He took up Khilafat as means of cementing Hindu-Muslim unity.

On 22 June Gandhi and the Central Khilafat Committee addressed a communication to the Viceroy warning him that a Non-cooperation movement would be launched if the peace terms were not modified. By his threat of Non-Cooperation he was determined to bend the Government to its knees. He was no longer a mere individual in politics but a mass leader. On 28 April he took over as President of the All-India Home Rule League. He was now a 'lynchpin' in the existing political structure.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 235 and 302.

The political situation was complex. The Muslim community was not cohesive. It was not attracted temperamentally to non-violence which was Gandhi's pre-condition to Non-Cooperation. The Muslims believed that violence was justified in a righteous cause. Further they began to entertain serious doubts about the wisdom of resigning from their jobs as envisaged by Non-Cooperation. They thought that if they did so Hindus would occupy all the positions they would then vacate. The Muslim League was lukewarm about Non-Cooperation. The Government was thinking of prosecuting Gandhi for his threat of Non-Cooperation. Opinion in the country was divided on Non-Cooperation. Gandhi's Hindu followers too had reservations because they believed that his espousal of the Khilafat might lead to communal strife and competitive nationalities.<sup>102</sup> They were reluctant to associate themselves with the Khilafat affair which they regarded as a 'factitious agitation', having little relation to their immediate concern with the Reforms.<sup>103</sup>

Gandhi assured the Khilafat leaders his own individual support but made no commitment on behalf of the Congress, from which he had failed to extract support. A Special Congress session was to be called in September to decide whether to support the Khilafat cause. It took the Congress a long time to accept the Khilafat cause and when it did in the teeth of opposition, it was entirely due to Gandhi. He was fully conscious of the difficulties but held the precarious balance adroitly. He exploited brilliantly like a true tactician the excellent opportunity that came his way in the publication of the Hunter Committee Report, which had brought to light the grievous wrongs the Government had done by committing oppression on Indians but still exonerating their officials' ignominious conduct in the discharge of their duties. The 'Punjab wrongs' thus provided a 'missing ingredient', which Gandhi joined to the Khilafat cause, raising both issues to an all-India dimension. Thus the 'Punjab wrongs' served as a 'counterpoise to the Khilafat'.<sup>104</sup>

The Report of the Congress Sub-Committee on the Punjab, published on 25 March 1920, considered the Martial Law unjustified and strongly condemned O'Dwyer's administration and the Summary Courts which caused widespread miscarriage of justice. It described Jallianwala Bagh massacre as a 'calculated piece of inhumanity towards utterly innocent and unarmed men including children and unparalleled for its ferocity in the history of modern British administration'.<sup>105</sup> Gandhi had been closely connected with its preparation and final draft.

<sup>102</sup> Dr. Moin Shakir, *Khilafat to Partition, A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims, 1919-47* (New Delhi, 1972), p. 67.

<sup>103</sup> Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>104</sup> Document Nos. 185, 186 and 187; Judith M. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 180 and 240

The Hunter Committee Report was published on 26 May. It contained both the majority and minority views. The three Indian members, called the minority, dissented from the European majority on some of the main issues, and produced a separate report. The European members thought that the elements of rebellion persisted throughout the disturbances with which the Indian members did not agree.<sup>106</sup> The European members assumed that the outbreaks were the result of a definite organisation. They justified the imposition of Martial Law but the Indian members contended that the disorders could be dealt with by the civil authorities. The Committee condemned Dyer's crawling order and public flogging.<sup>107</sup> It criticised Dyer's grave error in firing so long. The Indian members were highly critical of the actions of some of the British officials, who had acted in sheer vengeance and brought unprecedented suffering on a large number of Indians.

Dyer was made to resign his command, and some other British officials were censured. O'Dwyer was left completely untouched as though nothing in his administration had deserved condemnation. At the Lords debate in London, 129 peers supported Dyer and only 86 voted against him. The *Morning Post* set up a fund as a testimonial to him, a move initiated by Carson and O'Dwyer. The fund amounted to £ 26000, a third of it having been contributed from India, where a majority of the Europeans considered that Dyer's action had indeed saved the Empire. The British support for Dyer's action and for O'Dwyer's administration outraged Indian opinion and filled Indians with a sense of great humiliation.<sup>108</sup> It exacerbated racial animosity. Such a defence of rackless shooting and wholesale repression deepened Indian nationalists conviction that the British believed in ruling India by force and not by constitutional methods.

Gandhi felt greatly disturbed to see how the Punjab Government had committed atrocities in the name of administrative necessity. He was completely dissatisfied with the Government's dealing with the British officials who had done immense wrongs. He decided to launch a movement. On 9 June 1920 he condemned the Hunter Report and the two Government despatches on it as an 'attempt to condone official lawlessness and page after page of thinly disguised official whitewash'. At a meeting on 26 June in Bombay he supported a resolution demanding the impeachment of O'Dwyer.<sup>109</sup> He endorsed the Congress demands for the repeal of the Rowlatt Act, the recall of the Viceroy, and the refund of the fines imposed by Martial Law Tribunals and Summary Courts. So he decided to launch an all-India movement but not through conventional constitutional channels.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid No. 252.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., No. 253.

<sup>108</sup>Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, p. 150.

<sup>109</sup>Judith Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

Gandhi did not wish to wait any longer. Times was ripe for action. People were in a sullen mood. He had succeeded in reconciling the Muslims to *Satyagraha* and the Hindus to the Khilafat. He did not wish to wait for the Congress session to endorse his line of action. He wanted to anticipate the Congress by his remarkable strategy. He created a climate in which success would be his by launching Non-Cooperation movement. He had the support of the Muslims by the continued espousal of their cause since October 1919, and gained tremendous response from a large section of the people for his exposure of the Punjab wrongs. Thus he tapped new sources of strength. He launched his Non-Cooperation on 1 August 1920. He returned his Zulu and Boer war Medals and Kaisar-i-Hind Gold Medal.<sup>110</sup> He found ready support for his programme in Gujerat, Punjab and Sind.<sup>111</sup> At the level of mass membership the distinction between the Khilafat and the Congress disappeared henceforth.

The opinion was divided on Non-Cooperation at the Congress session in Calcutta. There was support for Non-Cooperation, but not for the programme presented by Gandhi. C.R. Das, B.C. Pal and Jinnah opposed Gandhi's programme. B.C. Pal proposed an amendment accepting the principle of Non-Cooperation but recommending immediate adoption of uncontroversial points of Gandhi's programme and consideration of other points later for which a committee was to be appointed for reconsideration.<sup>112</sup> But Gandhi had his way, He had the support of the Muslim contingent whom he allied with another large and vital section of people, who were ready to support him because of the condemnation of Punjab wrongs. Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Resolution, which incorporated the demand for Swaraj, was carried on 9 September.<sup>113</sup> Tilak had his reservations about Non-Cooperation. He died the day when Gandhi launched his Non-Cooperation, but his followers had opposed Gandhi's programme at the Calcutta session as is evident from the voting.<sup>114</sup>

Gandhi's *Realpolitik* established him at Calcutta as the most important leader in Indian politics. Non-Cooperation was adopted not because the Reforms of 1919 were inadequate—the boycott was an afterthought which was tacked on to Gandhi's programme.<sup>115</sup> Nor could it be said that unrest in the working classes forced Gandhi's hands to resort to Non-Cooperation—there was a railway strike towards the end of April 1920 in which 15000 strikers took part.<sup>116</sup> Two issues really made Non-Coopera-

<sup>110</sup>Document No. 303.

<sup>111</sup>For general reaction see Documents Nos. 306-312; see also Judith Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-262.

<sup>112</sup>Document No. 265.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 322.

<sup>114</sup>Judith Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

<sup>115</sup>Richard Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>116</sup>Home Poll. A, August 1920, No. 71-2.

tion possible, the Khilafat and the Punjab wrongs, and if the people had been satisfied with the Government's treatment of the 'Punjab wrongs', then it would have been difficult to find another issue to unite such divergent elements of society.

The main facts and accounts of events as described above show that probably never in India's history was the country swept by such a political storm as in the years 1919-1920. The significance of the period lies not so much in the recital of various episodes occurring during it, but in the distinct and unmistakable change in the style of Indian politics and the schism it produced between the ruling power and the Indian people; it was a gulf never to be filled up again. It was a parting of the ways. After the traumatic experiences the Indian people had, the country could never be the same again. Indian politics took a new turn, the Government began to see things differently, the people lost their faith in Government and its professions of justice and fair deal. Politics was no longer confined to the intellectual, the professional, and the sophisticated but extended wider sections of the people, including shop keepers, money lenders, students and workers. Politics no longer consisted of slogan-mongering or merely a series of resolutions annually passed by a coterie of westernized libertarians and high caste Hindus adept in the art of public speaking in chaste English nor was it mainly a monopoly or preoccupation of a particular community. Now was the period of a positive collective action rationally conceived and emotionally surcharged to fight the British.

Before 1919 India was contended with local and sectional leadership, and politics were then limited to the elite group in specific regions, but now Gandhi broke through at a mass level and emerged as a leader of the finest quality, who gave a new direction to Indian politics. He was a revolutionary *par excellence*.

In this period India found not only a unique leader of national stature, but also an ideology which had a mass appeal because of its simplicity and effectiveness, a concrete programme and a large following determined to follow their leader and fight for India's freedom. Earlier there used to be local protest meetings, but now for the first time the whole country responded to the nationalist upsurge. Politics now came to the level of shops, streets, market place and the mosque. The Rowlatt Bills agitation had given Gandhi an all-India reputation, but the Khilafat and the 'Punjab wrongs' gave him real hold on the Hindus and Muslims whose unity made the Government nervous. Collaboration yielded place to Non-Cooperation, this change was not sudden but the consequence of British policy and Indian reaction. Nationalist feeling was crystallized, and India woke up from its slumber.

The politically-articulate classes began to challenge the authority of the Government with the very weapons with which it had been trained and made conscious of its rights and claims in the stream of national

life. The British began to lose their initiative in 1919-20 particularly in view of the moral character which Gandhi lent to his fight against British rule. The Government thought his actions as vagaries and hoped that he would not last long but did not realize what mettle he was made of and how much reverence he evoked among his countrymen.

This period denoted the rise of new issues, new ideas, and new men on the political issue. It was the age of protest, repression and defiance. Elite nationalism merged into mass politics. The Congress ceased to be, in the words of Professor Low, a 'federation of provincial grandees'. The Moderates lost their voice. In fact the history of Indian nationalism with a highly concrete ideology and an articulate homogeneous political community determined to defy the Government begins in the period 1919-20.

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November, 1984

## **SELECT DOCUMENTS**



## **1. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye,<sup>1</sup> 9 January 1919**

I have duly received your letter dated 21.11.18 with enclos. Your circular regarding self-determination is very good. We have taken up the same in our pamphlet but from a different point of view, so as to meet the criticism. I send you a copy of the report of our work, also a packet of leaflets and pamphlets published by us. I will give you for information as to what [we] are doing here. The pamphlet is written by Mr. Baptista.<sup>2</sup>

We are doing very well all of us . . . Baptista may return after a month . . . .

With compliments to all.

## **2. Lord Chelmsford's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>3</sup>**

### **6 February 1919**

. . . Among the legislative matters to be brought before you in the ensuing session are two Bills<sup>4</sup> of the highest importance. I refer of course to the Bills to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission presided over by Sir Sydney Rowlatt.<sup>5</sup> These recommendations were unanimous,

<sup>1</sup>Dr. D D. Sathaye's Papers. National Archives of India (hereafter NAI). Private Letter.

Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) : Patriot, politician and scholar, advocated National Education, *Swadeshi* and *Swaraj* : leader of the Home Rule Agitation.

Dr. Dinkar Dhone Sathaye : Joint General-Secretary of Tilak Swarajya Sangh, and Member of the Indian Home Rule Delegation to England

<sup>2</sup>Joseph Baptista : President of Maharashtra Home Rule League, 1918; Deputy of the Indian Home Rule League Deputation to England, 1919.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 435

Lord Chelmsford : 1st Viscount (Frederic John Napier Thesiger) Viceroy of India, 1916-21.

<sup>4</sup>The two Bills were (i) The Criminal Law Amendment Bill No. 1 of 1919 and (ii) The Criminal Law Emergency Bill No. 2 of 1919.

<sup>5</sup>Sir S.A.T. Rowlatt : Justice of the King's Bench Division of the Majesty's Court of Justice; Chairman of the Sedition Committee appointed in 1917 to investigate and report on the nature and extent of criminal conspiracy connected with the revolutionary movement in India.

and coming as they did from persons who command the greatest authority, the Government of India decided that they should be brought before this Council in the shape of the necessary legislative measures. The necessity for proceeding with legislation on the subject in this Session is of course due to the early termination of hostilities and the prospect of the conclusion of peace in the near future. The very important powers which have enabled the public peace and order of India to be preserved during the war will shortly come to an end. It is essential in my judgement that they should be replaced by adequate substitutes. The sudden release from restraint and control of the forces of anarchy would involve a position which we cannot contemplate. The reaction against all authority which has manifested itself in many parts of the civilised world is not likely to leave India entirely untouched, and the powers of evil are still abroad. We cannot shut our eyes to the undoubted existence in India of definitely revolutionary organisations.

There are facts which can neither be denied nor explained away, and the Government of India would be failing in its duty if it did not make preparation to deal with them. After the most anxious consideration of the subject I have come to the very clear conclusion that special measures are essential, not only to the maintenance of His Majesty's Government in this country, but to the safety of the lives and property of its citizens. I can only commend these Bills to your very earnest and careful consideration . . . .

### **3. Sir William Vincent's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bills,<sup>1</sup> 6 February 1919**

As the Council are aware for some time before the war the Government of India were faced with the difficulty of dealing with a number of revolutionary conspiracies or rather with one revolutionary conspiracy of which there were several sub-divisions. The intention of these conspiracies was by dacoity, murder and other crimes of violence to promote a rising against the British Government and to render the administration of this country impossible. Owing to lack of any effective measures for dealing with this conspiracy, the movement gained considerable strength, and either before the war or shortly after the inception of the war, the difficulty of the situation was complicated because it received material assistance from the King's enemies. It attained indeed such serious proportions that it was

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 451-53.

Sir William Vincent : Home Member, Government of India.

really subversive of all good government in parts of this country.

It was impossible to cope with this movement under the normal law, and if Hon'ble Members will read the Report of the Rowlatt Committee, upon which the present legislation is based, they will find confirmation of this not only in the findings of the authors of the Report, but also in the figures which they cite.

... I think if you read the Report the vital propositions are that under pre-war conditions the machinery of law and order was unfitted to cope with lawlessness of a particular type; that the coming of the war with its emergency legislation really saved the peace of India by providing machinery which could deal with this lawlessness; and that it is unsafe for us now to revert to the previous condition of affairs, in which these anarchical forces were allowed unrestricted license to prosecute their designs. It is on the basis of this Report that we have undertaken this legislation. But before I explain exactly what the details of the Bill are, I think I ought to make one point quite clear, and that is, that this Bill is in no sense aimed at political movements properly so called. It is definitely and distinctly intended and framed to cope with seditious crime, and it differs very materially also in its scope from the Defence of India Act. It is not, if I may say so, nearly as wide as that Act, and so far as I am able to interpret it, it cannot be used against any activities other than seditious activities, even though they may endanger or tend to endanger the public safety . . . .

We have no desire to restrict the liberty of persons further than a compelling sense of duty forces us to do. At the same time we are responsible for the public peace in this country and it is our duty to take such measures as may be necessary to secure that. No other remedy has been suggested in regard to this form of crime as yet for attaining that object. If, however, any effective remedy is proposed the Government of India will be only too glad to consider it. There seems, however, to me to be some misunderstanding as to the nature of the disruptive forces of this anarchism. There are those apparently who look upon these men as innocent patriots, guilty of nothing save an excess of possible mistaken zeal. My Lord, I ask the Council to get rid of this delusion. These men are not patriots; they are really enemies of civilization, they are enemies of progress and enemies of any form of organised government, whether European or Indian. It may be suggested, as it has been suggested before, that all their activities will be reduced by the introduction of the Reforms Scheme. My Lord, I should like to say that these men are as much opposed to the Reform Scheme as to anything else. During Mr. Montagu's<sup>1</sup> visit last year, I my-

<sup>1</sup>Edwin Montagu (1876-1924) : Member of Parliament 1906-22 ; Under-Secretary of State for India, 1910-14 and Secretary of State for India, 1917-22 ; visited India at the end of 1917 to help determine the form of the constitutional reforms which were introduced in 1919.

self saw a circular which was addressed to a prominent citizen in Calcutta where it was openly stated that these men were not concerned with Mr. Montagu's coming or going, and that their object was first and last to spread terror and make the Government impossible. My Lord, I think if these facts were more fully realized, we should hear less of that veiled sympathy with desperate men which really encourages them to further efforts and hinders the work of many who have the progress of this country at heart, and I suggest that it is the duty of all sober-minded men to combat this dangerous confusion of crime with patriotism, remembering what the effect of any such encouragement is. The Bill which I now seek to introduce is not aimed at patriots; it is aimed at criminals; it is not aimed at the suppression of politics at all; it is aimed rather at the purification of politics. What we seek to do is to prevent anarchy and disorder, and I think that many here will realise the importance at this juncture of combating these forces of disorder so rampant in many parts of the world when they consider the effect of anarchy both in Russia and in other countries. My Lord, if ever there was a time when it was necessary to check revolutionary and anarchical tendencies, I think it may be safely said that it is the present.

#### **4. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 6 February 1919**

. . . In every country, my Lord, revolutionary crime is really the outcome of what I may call political and administrative stagnation; if the political advancement of a country is really very slow and does not keep pace with the times, this sort of crime is bound to raise its head and disturb the peace of the country. What is then the remedy? The remedy, I submit, does not lie in repressive measures, but I am strongly of opinion that the remedy lies in the removal of the standing grievances which bring revolutionary crime into existence.

My Lord, I cannot disguise the fact that the whole country from one end to the other is entirely opposed to this measure, and I am absolutely certain, and I shall be very sorry to see it, that the passage of this Bill will stir up, in fact the introduction of it has already stirred up a tremendous and unprecedented agitation in the country at a time when great changes are in sight. Surely Government intends that the reforms should be given a fair trial, and I am afraid that intention of Government will not be ful-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 454-57.

Vithal Javehbhai Patel (1873-1933) : Lawyer and Member, Bombay Legislative Council and Imperial Legislative Council.

filled if at this juncture this measure is passed. I must say that I am not at all surprised that the Government have thought it proper to introduce this measure at this juncture. It is one of those blunders which a Government not responsible to the people is likely to commit in moments of excitement. What I am, however, surprised at really is that a Bill of this kind should have been brought forward at a time when people really expected the introduction and discussion in this Council of measures which would bring them more liberty, more contentment, measures which really would conduce to the greater well-being of the people in matters political, in matters social, and in matters industrial.

. . . In these circumstances, and particularly if the reforms are to be given a fair trial and they are to be well received in this country, I think it is absolutely necessary, particularly when crime is at a stand-still, that Government should not press this motion of reference to a Select Committee at this stage, but wait till the new Councils come into existence.

. . . My Lord, I consider this as a grave menace to public liberty, a serious encroachment upon the rights which have been guaranteed to us and which we prize. If a right of this kind were taken away by a duly constituted court of law, no one would have the slightest objection, but to place such dangerous, illimitable powers in the hands of executive authority, deliberating in secret, discussing in secret, deciding in secret, seems to me to be an infraction of personal rights which I almost shudder to contemplate.

### **5. M.A. Jinnah on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 6 February 1919**

I shall place before the Council the grounds on which I am opposed to these Bills. My first ground is this, that it is against the fundamental principles of law and justice, namely, that no man should lose his liberty or be deprived of his liberty, without a judicial trial in accordance with the accepted rules of evidence and procedure. My second reason is, that this is a wrong remedy for disease, namely, these revolutionary crimes, although I, for one, am prepared to accept as correct the findings of facts of the Rowlatt Committee that the crimes of the nature indicated have been committed. My third ground is that the powers which are going to be assumed by the executive, which means substitution of executive for judicial, such powers are likely to be abused, and in the past we have instan-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 463.'

Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) : Lawyer, politician and statesman; President, All India Muslim League, 1916 and 1920 ; Member, Imperial Legislative Council.

ces where such powers have been abused. My fourth ground is that there is no precedent or parallel that I know of in any other civilized country where you have laws of this character enacted. My fifth ground is that this is a most inopportune moment. At this moment I can tell you that high hopes have been raised among the people of this country because we are on the eve of great and momentous reforms being introduced. My sixth ground is that the proposed measures are of a permanent character and not temporary measures intended only to deal with an emergency of temporary character. And the last ground why I oppose this measure is that my Lord, I do not wish to state it by way of any threat or intimidation to Government, but I wish to state it because it is my duty to tell you that, if these measures are passed, you will create in this country from one end to the other a discontent and agitation, the like of which you have not witnessed, and it will have, believe me, a most disastrous effect upon the good relations that have existed between the Government and the people.

## 6. G.S. Khaparde on the Legislative Session,<sup>1</sup> 6 February 1919

The Legislative session began today. There was not much time to do anything after I got up as usual and prayed. About 10.30 a.m. I, [K.Y.] Ayyanger,<sup>2</sup> [B.D.] Shukul<sup>3</sup> and [V.J.] Patel went to the Council Hall. The Viceroy presided and made a speech which was good. It dealt on the two Bills drafted to carry out the recommendation of the Rowlatt Commission which we wish to oppose as strongly as we can. V. Patel moved his amendment. Surendra Nath [Banerjea]<sup>4</sup> and [M.A.] Jinnah made good speeches. [M.M.] Malaviya<sup>5</sup> spoke very long and took up the whole of the

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1919, NAI.

Ganesh Shri Krishan Khaparde (1854-1938) : Lawyer, politician and social reformer; Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Amraoti Congress Session, 1897, and Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>K.Y Rangaswamy Ayyanger; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1919, and associated with Gandhi.

<sup>3</sup>Bishnu Datta Shukul (1877-1921) : A leading *malguzar* from Sihore (Jabalpur District), Vice-President, Sihore Municipality; Member, Imperial Legislative Council.

<sup>4</sup>Surendra Nath Banerjea (1848-1925) : Educationist, politician and journalist; passed Indian Civil Service, 1871; founder of Indian Association, 1876; President, Indian National Congress, 1895 and 1902; Member, Imperial Legislative Council

<sup>5</sup>Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946) : Lawyer, journalist; and politician; joined Indian National Congress, 1886; Editor, *Hindustan*, 1887-89 and *Abhyudaya*, 1907-9; President, Indian National Congress, 1909 and 1918; President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1916-17; founder of Banaras Hindu University, 1916, Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1910-19.

afternoon. There is a movement of stiffening opposition to the Bills but does not look likely that members will combine so far as to walk out. We returned home a little before sunset.

#### **7. T.B. Sapru on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 7 February 1919**

... Now my Lord, I oppose this Bill on many grounds. In the first place, I have no hesitation in saying that it is wholly wrong in principle, unsound in its conception, dangerous in its operation and too sweeping and too comprehensive, indeed far more comprehensive than many of us are prepared to admit at the present moment. In the next place, my Lord, the Bill which is now before us is sought to be placed permanently on the Statute Book, and I say that is not the right thing to do. In the last place, my Lord, I say that this is not the time to introduce a measure of this character.

#### **8. Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>2</sup> 7 February 1919**

... I am convinced, not that the introduction of such a measure as this would not be justifiable under any circumstances, but that the enactment of the proposed law at this juncture is unnecessary and inopportune.

#### **9. Raja Mahmudabad on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>3</sup> 7 February 1919**

The Bill as it stands is, in my humble opinion and in the opinion of those whom I have the honour to represent, inopportune, unsound, un-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 510.

Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949): Member, All-India Congress Committee, 1906-17; and Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1916-20.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 519.

Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi (1889-1932) : Lawyer, Member, Anglo-Mahomedan Defence Association of Upper India; President, All-India Muslim League 1913; President, High Court and Bar Association, 1917-19; Member, Punjab Legislative Council and Imperial Legislative Council, 1909-19.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 520.

Raja of Mahmudabad (Ali Mohammad Khan) : Landlord and politician; Member, Imperial Legislative Council; first Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1920-23.

called-for and un-British. My Lord, it means the disfigurement of the political life in this country. It is a question of life and death to us . . . . This legislation, I am sure, will weaken the political activity and political life in India . . . . I appeal to you my Lord, that before it has passed the stage of this Select Committee, it may be dropped, and I do not agree with those who want to postpone it because it is not a right remedy to suppress the present discontent. This discontent is a discontent of bread, and I am of the opinion that it cannot be suppressed by repressive legislation.

#### **10. Sir George Lowndes on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 7 February 1919**

This act does not go nearly so far as the Defence of India Act, it is surely a far milder measure than Regulation III of 1818.

. . . Then what is the alternative policy that we have heard from nine-tenths of speakers in this Council? It is the policy which is summed up in the Asquithian<sup>2</sup> ‘wait and see’. Well, my Lord, we do propose as a Government to wait and see, but we propose before we start on the period of waiting to arm ourselves, in case it is necessary to use our powers again.

#### **11. Mazharul Haque on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>3</sup> 7 February 1919**

I oppose this Bill on several grounds. Firstly, I think, that no case has been made out for the introduction of this measure; Secondly, I think it is the negation of all law; Thirdly, I think it is dangerously inexpedient; Fourthly, it is entirely inopportune, and lastly, no urgency has been shown for this measure.

#### **12. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>4</sup> 7 February 1919**

. . . We have made it clear that the passage of this measure will put an end to all constitutional agitation in the country. We have also made it

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 526.

Sir George Lowndes: Law Member, Government of India, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>This expression ‘wait and see’ is attributed to H.H. Asquith, Prime Minister of England, 1908-16.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 536.

Mazharul Haque (1866-1930): Lawyer and politician; founder of both Congress and Muslim League in Bihar; participated in the Champaran Satyagraha, 1917.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 543.

quite clear that the passage of this measure will affect the reception of the proposed reforms . . . .

**13. G.S. Khaparde on Opposition to the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup>**  
**7 February 1919**

All the non-official Indians except one opposed it. Even the one<sup>2</sup> that did not oppose, did not support it. In the life of this Council this was the first instance on which all the Indians voted one way . . . .

**14. Sir William Vincent's Speech on the Indian Criminal  
 (Amendment) Bill,<sup>3</sup> 10 February 1919**

. . . The Bill, I should say, differs from the Bill I introduced last week, in that it is intended to make permanent changes in the ordinary criminal law of the land. The first clause deals with the possession of a seditious document and is based on Rule 25-A of the Defence of India Rules, which rule has been in force for sometime. It provides that any person who has in his possession a seditious document intending, that is, with the deliberate intention, that the same shall be published or circulated, shall, unless he proves that he had such document in his possession for a lawful purpose, be punishable with imprisonment which may be extended to two years.

Clause 3 of the Bill merely authorises a District Magistrate to direct a preliminary inquiry to be made by the police in the case of certain offences, a prosecution which cannot at present be launched without the sanction of the local Government. In practice it is often necessary to have such inquiries made before the local Government can decide as to whether a prosecution should be launched or not.

Clause 4 of the Bill makes a modification in section 343 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section prohibits the offer of any promise or threat or inducement to any accused person to make a statement save to the extent provided specifically in sections 337 and 338 in the case of conditional pardons. It has been found that this provision of the law

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1919, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Sir C. Sankaran Nair (1859-1934) : Indian jurist and administrator; Member, Governor-General's Executive Council, 1915-19, and resigned as a protest against the Disturbances and Martial Law in the Punjab.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 554.

interferes with a promise of protection to an accused person who is willing to give King's evidence, but is really afraid of violence, indeed often of being murdered, by his confederates, the intention is to enable Government to offer such protection to a person who is prepared to give evidence if protected.

Clause 5 of the Bill introduces another new section into the Code of Criminal Procedure, and provides that where a person is accused of an offence against the State, that is, an offence under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code, evidence of the fact that he has previously been convicted of a similar offence, or that he habitually and voluntarily associated with any person convicted of such an offence, shall be admissible against him.

There is only one other clause of the Bill to which I need refer, Clause 6. This provides that when a man has been convicted of an offence against the State, for instance of waging war against the King, or conspiring to wage war against the King, then the Court may order him to execute a bond for his good behaviour for a term not exceeding two years after the expiration of his sentence. The new section is analogous to the present section 565. Further, where the Court has made such an order, the local Government is, if the security is not furnished, authorised to impose restrictions upon the person so convicted in order to restrain his criminal activities after release from jail. The restrictions are that he shall not enter, reside or remain in any area specified, shall abstain from addressing public meetings for furtherance or discussion of any subject likely to cause disturbance or public excitement, or of any political subject, or for the distribution of any writing or printed matter relating to any such subject.

The details of this Bill, my Lord, are in my judgement more a matter for Select Committee than for examination in this Council. At the same time, it is my duty to explain, so briefly, as I can to the Council, what the proposed changes in the law are. With these words I introduce the Bill and move that it be referred to a Select Committee.

### **15. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 10 February 1919**

It is a Bill which has excited alarm and apprehension in the public mind, and it seems to me that it does not stand upon the same footing as the other Bill, and therefore, I appeal to your Excellency's Government to drop it altogether.

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 558.

## 16. The Rowlatt Bills<sup>1</sup>

It is remarkable that notwithstanding the assiduous efforts of the promoters of the Rowlatt Bills to concentrate attention on the past, present, and future evils of anarchical crimes and by conjuring up the bogey of disorder and violence to secure non-official consent for these measures, the public is coming more and more to understand the real issues involved and the opposition to these measures is gradually taking a definite shape. It is not the manner in which these bills will strike against anarchy and violence but it is the alarm which an ordinary innocent citizen pursuing his ordinary affairs of life, would feel in his own home, the insecurity in his every day relations with man and his co-operation and association with the government of his country as a citizen, that is to be considered. It is now clear that the bill does not affect merely a handful of anarchists, but it will touch millions of men engaged in their own peaceful activities and working out their programme involving some humble effort on their part for the social, economic and political improvements of their country. The reign of law administered through courts of justice would be over and an era of the substitution of the executive for the judicial would begin in which the informer and the *agent provocateur* would reign supreme. Friend would not trust friend and brother would not trust brother in that demoralised atmosphere in which false accusations and blackmail and terrorism of the worst kind would be rampant.

. . . It is hardly necessary to refute the much talked of efficacy of repression against political discontent because it is impossible to convince those whose reason is blinded. The real foundations of British rule in India are not in the terror of the sword or the jail, but in the confidence which millions of men have in the essential justice of British administration. If the atmosphere must be poisoned by the foul breath of repression, if honest citizens must feel alarmed in their peaceful activities by the uncertain and capricious action of the executive, the melancholy results must follow and one of them which will spell disaster to this country would be that the confidence of the Indian public in the fairness and equity of British administration would be weakened . . . We want the Government to feel that it is not merely the I.C.S. and British commerce which have to be protected and placated; we want them to realise that millions of men in India have ceased to regard the making of laws and their administration as somebody else's business and are quite alive to the issues and that no government in the world can administer such laws as are proposed without that silent consent and co-operation from the community even in

<sup>1</sup>Young India (Ahmedabad), 19 February 1919; Government of India, Home Political B, June 1919 The Young India was M.K. Gandhi's weekly paper published every Wednesday.

a dependency. All the armies in the world cannot bend in every essential matters, affecting the elementary liberties as these bills do, people whose souls have awakened with political aspirations as they have been awakened in India by the traditional history of the English race with whom her destinies are cast, by the approval and exhortation of high-souled Englishmen, Emperor, administrators and statesmen for the last two or three generations.

. . . There is absolute unanimity in the Indian political camps that the resistance should begin at once, that it should be as powerful as possible, and that all our resources should be used up in this direction alone. Further, it is obvious that only such resources of energy as are available could be utilized towards the same end. Whatever the form of the resistance may be, it should be generally accepted from one end of the country to the other. It is a very fortunate circumstance that everybody is now discussing seriously what should be done. The cry of passive resistance is a legitimate cry because it is the one constitutional means employed with success in the past and which can never be better employed than at the present moment.

. . . Passive resistance if well-planned is a constitutional shield for a subject race against which the official sword may strike until it is blunt against which repression will exhaust itself. Because while the brain of the bureaucrat will plan out the persecution, his conscience and the conscience of the community around him in India and of his own community in England will revolt against the employment of brute force and the abuse of machinery of law for the coercion of men who ask nothing more than the little liberty to which they have been used up to now . . . .

### **17. Ronaldshay to Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup> 21 February, 1919**

I hear that the Select Committee on the Rowlatt Bills have under consideration certain proposed amendment. . . . One of the most important proposals appears to be that no order to restriction or confinement should be passed until a Report has been obtained from the investigating authority. The result of any such alteration being made in the Bill must be obvious. It would make it impossible in many cases for the policy to prevent the commission of outrages . . . . From our point of view there are also strong objections to the proposal that the enquiry made by the investigating authority should be held in public and that Counsel should appear before them. This would place us in the same difficulty before the investigating

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll B, June 1919.

Earl of Ronaldshay, Governor of Bombay.

authority as we now are before the ordinary courts. One of the great difficulties which stands in the way of our being able to prosecute revolutionaries in the ordinary courts is the refusal of witnesses to give evidence. Their refusal to do so is based on the knowledge proved over and over again by experience that if they are marked men as having given evidence against the movement, their lives are forfeited. If the investigating authority is to be converted practically into an ordinary court, all the difficulties which apply to the latter will crop up in the case of the former and the whole object of the proposal contained in the Rowlatt Bill will be defeated.

There is one other proposal to which I should like to refer, namely, that any prolongation of the period of detention beyond the space of one year should be referred to the investigating authority. If this proposal were accepted, it seems to me that the functions of Government would be transferred to the investigating authority . . . It seems to me that if the investigating authority is to be given powers we ask that the investigating authority should equally be made responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

#### **18. Gandhi to Private Secretary, Viceroy,<sup>1</sup> 24 February 1919**

Ever since publication Rowlatt Bills have been considering my position regarding them. Have been conferring with friends. In my opinion bad in themselves Bills are but symptoms of deep-seated disease among the ruling class coming as they do on eve Reforms Bill augur ill for their success. Those who have been associated with me in public work and other friends met today and after the greatest deliberations have decided to offer *Satyagraha* and commit civil disobedience of such laws as committee to be formed from ourselves may decide. After Sir George Lowndes's speech it is necessary to demonstrate to Government that even a Government, most autocratic finally owes its power to the will of the governed. Without recognition of this principle and consequently withdrawal Bills many of us consider Reforms valueless. I wish to make an humble but strong appeal to His Excellency to reconsider Government's decision to proceed with Bills and reluctantly add that in event of unfavourable reply the pledge must be published and the signatures must invite additions. I am aware of

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22, No. 81, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter NMML). Telegram; Home Poll A, March 1919; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 115.

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948): Lawyer, social reformer and politician; leader of the Anti-Rowlatt Agitation. J.L. Maffey was Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

seriousness of the proposed step. It is, however, much better that people say openly what they think in their hearts and without fear of consequences enforce the dictates of their own conscience. May I expect early reply?

### **19. On Bolshevism<sup>1</sup>**

Bolshevism appears to be spreading in every country and in India Lord Chelmsford and his colleagues have extended an invitation to 'this struggle' by the introduction of the Sedition Bills. It is necessary for our national self-respect and progress that we should reply to this invitation in a thoughtful and courageous manner. We are devoted to the King-Emperor but not to the existing bureaucracy. We want to remain within the British Empire but not under the existing arbitrary system of government. These inhuman measures must be met by passive resistance.

### **20. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S.G. Vaze,<sup>2</sup> 1 March 1919**

I have been feeling guilty since I read your last letter in a way I never did before . . . . Don't express any sympathy with Tilak. His failure has damaged India's cause considerably. Even *The Hindu*<sup>3</sup> says he made a mistake . . . . We must strongly but respectfully disapprove of Gandhi's passive resistance. Some members here are thinking of openly expressing an adverse opinion. If this idea matures I may have to join. It won't do neither to be here nor there. I tried to dissuade Gandhi . . . .

### **21. M.K. Gandhi's Statement on Satyagraha<sup>4</sup>, 1 March 1919**

Sir, I enclose herewith the *Satyagraha* pledge regarding the Rowlatt Bills. The step taken is probably the most momentous in the history of

<sup>1</sup>*Bhavishye* (Allahabad) 28 February 1919.

Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces 1919, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup>V.S. Srinivasa Sastri Papers, S.N. 297, NAI.

V.S. Srinivasa Sastri (1869-1946) : Member, Madras Legislative Council, 1913; Member, Imperial Legislative Council 1919; President of the Servants of India Society, 1915-27.

S.G. Vaze: journalist and Vice-President, Servants of India Society.

<sup>3</sup>A leading paper of Madras founded in 1876 by G. Subramanie Iyer. It was edited by S. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar in 1919.

<sup>4</sup>The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 126; Home Poll B, Feb. 1920, No. 273. According to Mahedev Desai's Diary this press note was issued on 26 Feb. 1919.

India. I give my assurance that it has not been hastily taken. Personally I have passed many a sleepless night over it. I have endeavoured duly to appreciate Government's position but I have been unable to find any justification for the extraordinary Bills. I have read the Rowlatt Committee's Report. I have gone through the narrative with admiration. Its reading has driven me to conclusions just the opposite of the Committee's. I should conclude from the reports that secret violence is confined to isolated and very small parts of India, and to a microscopic body of people. The existence of such men is truly a danger to society. But the passing of the Bills designed to affect the whole of India and its people and arming the Government with powers out of all proportion to the situation sought to be dealt with is a greater danger. The Committee utterly ignores the historical fact that the millions in India are by nature the gentlest on earth.

Now look at the setting of the Bills. Their introduction is accompanied by certain assurances given by the Viceroy regarding the civil service and the British commercial interests. Many of us are filled with the greatest misgivings about the Viceregal utterance . . . .

Reforms may or may not come. The need of the moment is a proper and just understanding upon the vital issue. No tinkering with it will produce real satisfaction. Let the great Civil Service Corporation understand that it can remain in India only as its trustee and servant, not in name but in deed, and let the British commercial houses understand that they can remain in India only to supplement her requirements and not to destroy indigenous art, trade and manufacture; and you have two measures to replace the Rowlatt Bills. They, I promise, will successfully deal with any conspiracy against the State.

Sir George Lowndes simply added fuel to the fire when he flouted public opinion. He has forgotten his Indian history or he would have known that the Government he represents has, before now, surrendered its own considered opinion to the force of public opinion.

It will be now easy to see why I consider the Bills to be an unmistakable symptom of a deep-seated disease in the governing body. It needs therefore to be drastically treated. Subterranean violence will be the remedy applied by impetuous hot-headed youths who will have grown impatient of the spirit underlying the Bills and the circumstances attending their introduction. The Bills must intensify the hatred and ill-will against the State, of which the deeds of violence are undoubtedly an evidence. The Indian covenanters by their determination to undergo every form of suffering make an irresistible appeal to the Government towards which they bear no ill-will and provide the believers in the efficacy of violence as a means of securing redress of grievances, with an infallible remedy, and withal a remedy that blesses those that use it and also those against whom it is used. If the covenanters know the use of this remedy, I fear no

ill from it, I have no business to doubt their ability. They must ascertain whether the disease is sufficiently great to justify the strong remedy and whether all milder ones have been tried. They have convinced themselves that the disease is serious enough, and that milder measures have utterly failed. The rest lies in the lap of the gods. I am yours etc.

**22. A Manifesto issued by some Non-official Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council on Passive Resistance,<sup>1</sup>**  
**2 March 1919**

Prominent non-official Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council headed by Sir Dinshaw Wacha<sup>2</sup>, Messrs. Surendranath Banerjea, Mian Mohammad Shafi and Srinivas Sastri have issued the following manifesto against the passive resistance movement.

While strongly condemning the Rowlatt Bills as drastic and unnecessary and while we think we must oppose them to the end we disapprove of the passive resistance movement started as a protest against them and dissociate ourselves from it in the best interests of the country, especially in view of the Reforms proposals, which are about to be laid before Parliament in the form of a bill (signed).

**23. Satyagraha Vow,<sup>3</sup> 2 March 1919**

Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, No. 1 of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, No. 11 of 1919 are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community, as a whole, and the State itself, is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee, to be hereafter appointed, may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, March 1919, No. 250.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Dinshaw Edulji Wacha (1848-1936) : Politician and Journalist; President, Indian National Congress, 1901, Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1916-20.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373.

**24. G.S. Khaparde on the Moderates,<sup>1</sup> 2 March 1919**

We disapprove of the conduct of the moderates. They were not called upon to help Gandhi, but why should they obstruct him (in Passive Resistance).

**25. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S.G. Vaze,<sup>2</sup> 3 March 1919**

I have signed a manifesto disapproving of Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement and disassociating myself from it. You see my position makes it essential to take prompt and unequivocal action. [S.N.] Banerjea, [D.E.] Wacha, [T.B.] Sapru and 15 others are signing also. The reasons are it will hinder the reform proposals and possibly the introduction of the Bill in May. Other people may say "what does it matter" but we believe otherwise and have sacrificed too much for the scheme. We no doubt disapprove and condemn the Bills, their sting has been half taken out by the limitation to 3 years and to offences connected with anarchical and revolutionary crime (put into the introduction of sections and not to be evaded by the executive). The legislation cannot be used against ordinary political agitation.

P.R. [Passive Resistance] is not a suitable remedy at all. That it is not recognised by the very fact that they have to artificially disobey other law also in order to get into conflict with the authorities. Otherwise they may passively resist for years without ever coming in the path of the police.

**26. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to T.B. Sapru,<sup>3</sup> 4 March 1919**

I asked for and obtained an interview with the Viceroy yesterday. It was long and full of interest. I will give the points that emerged.

The Government of India have passed their despatch on the Reforms. It will go home by next mail. It encloses and reviews the recommendations of local governments. It supports the Joint Report entirely. The only exceptions are those you know—the divided purse and its consequences and the addition of a European councillor (official) where the Governor is from home . . . . One of the arguments on which stress was laid was the unpopularity of the idea that the minister was to approve of and therefore take all the odium for additional taxation.

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary 1919, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>V.S. Srinivasa Sastri Papers, No. 300, NAI.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 305, NAI. Thoroughly confidential letter.

The idea of members without portfolios had been entirely the Viceroy's. He confessed that it found no support whatever. It was withdrawn and in its place you get the second departure above mentioned—involving in the Executive Councils of the Presidencies two Europeans and one Indian. I could gather that an unavoided additional reason was that, owing to the large number of transferred subjects, thought of more ministers than one would be required—"three" was mentioned in the case of Bombay as a possibility (i) hereafter, the Governor will nowhere have a portfolio. It comes to this—in the government of the major provinces [there] will be three and three (Bombay may have three and four).

One interesting little remark was on the exceeding difficulty of finding competent Mohammadans, e.g. in Bihar. After a Hindu must come a Mohamadan.

Then passive resistance. Gandhi will come. He will be told not to be a fool. A straight, unbending adorable person, but unpractical. Has not understood this legislation and takes an absurdly sentimental view, will no doubt have a large following; government are quite prepared. Gandhi may die. Government may by its enemies be held responsible. But his conscience won't trouble him. Gandhi will have brought it on himself. It is a dangerous precedent to yield to threats of this kind e.g., a detenu in Bengal hunger-struck and came near to death. Even local government pleaded he might be let off. But Government of India at his instance simply refused on grounds of discipline. Result the detenus saw no opening, took food and was saved. But Gandhi will not be interfered with in any way of that I might be assured.

No postponement of any kind was possible. The Bill must be enacted. Montagu agreed thoroughly. All in the interests of Reform. The Reform Bill cannot be introduced in April (Eastern-time) unless it could be replied to critics that the Government of India had taken power to deal with anarchism. There was much fanatical opinion on the subject in England; the cabinet may not face the violent criticism and allow Montagu to think of the Reform Bill without Rowlatt Legislation. Tilak's case had made the situation worse.

No doubt the spread of Passive Resistance might also afford the foes of reform a strong argument and prove formidable. But H.E. hoped to use the Moderate's disapproval as a counter-argument.

## 27. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to T.B. Sapru,<sup>1</sup> 5 March 1919

I met Gandhi today on his return from H.E. He had no comfort there. Each stood unmoved on his own ground, and they parted friends at heart

<sup>1</sup>V.S. Srinivasa Sastri Papers, No. 306, NAI. Thoroughly confidential letter.

though opposed in policy faction. I tried to argue with him but with the result you may easily anticipate. . . . He [Shraddhanand]<sup>1</sup> and Gandhi believe that the Rowlatt Act will be used and is intended to be used, when the sepoys return with their hearts bitter with the ill-treatment and humiliation they had to endure, as a means of terrorising them. Gandhi says, whatever the sections may contain, ordinary political agitation will come under the crushing wheel.

The case of the Ali Brothers<sup>2</sup> is another monstrous injustice, says Gandhi. He returns day after tomorrow to meet Sir W. Vincent *re* this case. He had resolved to start passive resistance, on this account before this big thing claimed precedence. What are the Reforms worth, if they are to be enjoyed with the helter round one's neck?

[V.J.] Patel was urging me to organise all non-official members on a plan of not attending the Council on the 12th and following days. I flatly refused to countenance the idea—is it not exquisite that Mrs. Annie Besant<sup>3</sup> should have joined p.r. (passive resistance) so soon after denouncing it? That woman is mad, I tell you. She is writing kindly of moderates now, especially of me—of course you come to me, why say that again and again? I will take it ill if you don't.

## 28. Public Reaction on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>4</sup> 6 March 1919

Rowlatt Bills are exercising our minds very much. I drafted a letter to the Viceroy as President of the Council saying the signatories would leave the Council as a protest. After food I went to the Secretariat in a hired *tonga* and was very much surprised to see that the driver who was an illiterate Mahomedan spoke of the Rowlatt Bills and objected to them very strongly.

<sup>1</sup>Munshi Ram, Mahatma Shraddhananda (Swami), (1856-1926): founded the Gurukul at Hardwar 1902; Governor-Director (Chancellor) of Gurukul Institution, 1902-17; became *Sanyasi*, 1917; and a prominent leader of Arya Samaj.

<sup>2</sup>Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), Elder brother of Muhammad Ali; failed I.C.S.; opium agent, Baroda, 1904-12; Pan-Islamist journalist; interned, May 1915—Dec. 1919 and Secretary, Central Khilafat Committee; founder of Anjuman-i-Khuddam-Ka'bah (The Association of the Servants of Kabaah).

Muhammad Ali (1878-1931), younger brother of Shaukat Ali; journalist and politician; founder Editor, *Comrade*, 1911 and *Hamdard*, 1913; Pan-Islamist journalist; helped to found Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913; interned with Shaukat Ali, 1915-19; Khilafat leader.

<sup>3</sup>Mrs. Annie Besant (1847-1933), British theosophist; founded Theosophical Society; established Indian Home Rule League; founder of the Central Hindu College, Benaras; President, Indian National Congress, 1917.

<sup>4</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary 1919, NAI.

### **29. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>1</sup> 6 March 1919**

A letter has been published by Gandhi in connection with the Rowlatt Bills giving reasons for starting passive resistance. He disagrees with the conclusions of the Rowlatt Committee and thinks that the Bills arm the Government with dangerous and unnecessary powers. He makes a reference to the assurance given by the Viceroy regarding the Civil Service and British Commercial interests which he states have 'filled him with misgivings'. To this letter is attached a pledge signed by a number of people among whom the only conspicuous names are Horniman<sup>2</sup> and a few of its (sic) immediate followers, who vow that in the result of the Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn they will refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as may be specified by a Committee to be appointed for the purpose . . . An important manifesto stating that while they condemn the Bills they deprecate passive resistance has since been issued by moderate non-official Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council.

In Madras Mrs. Besant is following suit, but confines vow to Rowlatt Bills. Whether movement will attain any real or lasting importance is doubted by us, though it is not possible to be certain of this and it is unlikely to do so in Madras for obvious reasons. It is quite impossible in any case to take note of threats of this kind.

### **30. Bureaucracy and the Rowlatt Bills<sup>3</sup>**

These bureaucrats whose main principle is to govern in India on the policy of 'divide and rule' are doing many wicked acts so as to enable them to keep the Indians under subjection for several years to come, and the introduction of the Rowlatt Bills is one of such Acts. Though these Bills are opposed by Indian leaders and newspapers, the bureaucrats are ready to get them passed by gaining over some Indians to their side. Seeing that the opposition of Indians is growing stronger day by day, these bureaucrats are prepared to come to terms with the Indian leaders at any cost. Any Indian who gives room for these Bills being passed by yielding to the bureaucrats, will be committing the sin of having murdered his mother

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, March 1919, No. 250, Telegram.

<sup>2</sup>B.G. Horniman (1873-1948): Political agitator and journalist; Editor, *The Bombay Chronicle*; Vice-President, Home Rule League (Bombay Branch); deported from India, April 1919.

<sup>3</sup>*Dashbhaktam* (Madras), 8 March 1919, Report on English papers examined by the CID, Madras, and on vernacular papers examined by the translator to the Government of Madras, 1919, p. 433.

and be condemned both in this and the next world. Indian sisters and brothers! Be up therefore and oppose the Rowlatt Bills by resorting to passive resistance . . . .

Without understanding the real nature of the Indians the bureaucrats are conducting their administration by means of rude force. How long are the Indians to put up with their irresponsible and unjust administration which is contrary to British justice and the like of which has not been heard of till now? Is there not a limit for every thing? Have the British come to rule, only to destroy the primary rights of the Indians by means of uncivilized laws? Is there no value for the promises given and the Royal proclamations issued till now? . . . The Indians have woken up and the Government should remember that they would adopt the method of passive resistance and keep on a struggle with the authorities until the repressive laws are cancelled.

### **31. Response to Gandhi's Call<sup>1</sup>**

The country is enthusiastically responding to the call of Mr. Gandhi as a last desperate effort to get rid of the Rowlatt Bills which the bureaucracy is so obstinately and arbitrarily inflicting upon the country with her starving millions.

### **32. Gandhi to [the Private Secretary, Viceroy,<sup>2</sup> 11 March 1919**

Even at the eleventh hour respectfully ask H.E. and his Government to pause and consider before passing Rowlatt Bill whether justified or not. There is no mistaking the strength of public opinion on the measures. I am sure Government do not intend intensifying existing bitterness. Government will risk nothing by delay, but express by bowing to public opinion will smooth down feeling and enhance real prestige.

### **33. Sir William Vincent on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>3</sup> 12 March 1919**

I beg to move that the Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to make provision in special circumstances to supplement the ordinary crimi-

<sup>1</sup>Cawnpore (Kanpur) Samachar, 9 March 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers, published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll A, March 1919, No. 250.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 868-69.

nal law and for the exercise of emergency powers by Government be taken into consideration.

... in addressing the Council on this motion, I do not propose to discuss in any detail the various modifications which have been made in the Bill by the Select Committee. They are clearly expressed in the Bill itself, and, I think, explained in the Report. But there are some matters of some importance to which I must refer. It will be within the memory, I think, of many Hon'ble Members of this Council that on the last occasion on which this Bill was under discussion, the Government gave three undertakings in respect of this Bill. The first undertaking was to make the Bill a temporary measure instead of a permanent one, in the hope that the Reform proposals from which so much is expected may do something to remove the danger which is now experienced from these conspiracies.

In the second place, I promised to make more apparent what was already abundantly clear to my mind the fact that the application of the Bill was strictly confined to the activities of revolutionary and anarchical conspirators.

In the third place, I promised to consider any other modifications in the Bill which non-official Members might wish to put forward in so far as I could do so without rendering the Bill ineffective for the purpose for which it was intended. My Lord, I contend that all these three undertakings have been amply fulfilled. The operation of the Bill has been limited to three years, and in the preamble and the opening sections of the different parts of the Bill, Hon'ble Members will find modifications made which indicate clearly that the application of the Bill is rigidly restricted to movements of the character to which I have referred. In addition to this, in deference to the wishes of various Hon'ble Members, we have made a number of substantial modifications in the Bill. The Government regret that they could not go further to meet the wishes of Hon'ble Members in this matter, but they trust those Members of this Council who were in the Select Committee will admit that the Government has approached the case with the greatest care, and has been reasonable in its attitude towards those Members who put forward proposals for modifications of the Bill. If it had been possible to meet Hon'ble Members further, no one would have been more rejoiced than myself, but there are responsibilities which the Government of India have for the welfare of this country, for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity which they cannot subordinate to any other consideration.

... I do not desire to-day to go over the whole of the old ground which was traversed at the last debates, but there are some weighty considerations to which I ask the earnest attention of the Members of this Council before I close my speech. I want the Members of this Council to believe that the Government is perfectly sincere in its conviction as to the urgent necessity of this Bill, that there is no Machiavellian plot at all

against political agitation, and that there is no intention whatever to frustrate, or defer the advent of reforms.

Indeed, your Excellency, as one of the authors of the Reforms Report, would, I think, be the last to have allowed this Bill to be introduced had such a result been possible. We seek to safeguard India from criminal movements which though affecting a very small portion of the population have done much to discredit the loyalty of the great body of the citizens in the past. Finally, I want to make it clear that this Bill is not a Bill which will come into general operation. It cannot be applied indiscriminately all over India. It can only come into operation in certain circumstances of a special character, and then only in areas in which these revolutionary or anarchical movements are prevalent. Further, in those areas it cannot be used in any way to attack the liberties of the law-abiding citizen. It can only be employed against criminals whose activities are really a menace to the whole State, and even in dealing with these men, every effort, so far as we could do so without rendering the Bill wholly ineffective, has been made to prevent any other than those manifestly guilty from being touched under the provisions of the law. My Lord, if there are Members in this Council who accept the necessity for this measure, accept the facts that I have stated, if they are satisfied that Government has really gone as far as is possible to meet them in modifying the provisions of the Bill, I ask them in all earnestness to pause before they oppose a measure which is framed in our judgement in the best interests of this great country whose welfare we all have at heart.

#### **34. Surendra Nath Banerjea on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>1</sup> 12 March 1919**

My Lord, I have the honour to move the following amendment:

That the Select Committee's Report, together with the Bill and connected papers, be referred to Local Governments, High Courts and public bodies for criticisms.

... I am here to re-echo the voice of the saner section of my countrymen. Public opinion is not satisfied. We want the Government to pause and to reconsider the situation. And what could be more reasonable than that the Government should obtain and receive further light, further guidance, not from irresponsible critics, but from its accredited advisers,

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 871-73.

namely, the Local Governments, the High Courts and the recognised public bodies?

... the Government says that the Bill is not severe, it is not drastic, it is not a menace to public rights and, as the Hon'ble the Home Member<sup>1</sup> has just observed, that no one need concern himself about it unless he be an anarchist or revolutionary. On the other hand, the public hold a wholly different view; they say that the Bill is pregnant with danger, and the magnitude of the public fears and apprehensions may be gauged from the fact that Mr. Gandhi has been able to start a campaign of passive resistance against the Bills. You and I may condemn it, but it is an index of the situation, and we have to allay that situation. The proper solvent would be the abandonment of the Bill or its postponement until the Reforms proposals have become the law of the land.

The reactionaries in England are taking the fullest advantage of the Report of the Rowlatt Commission. They will try to block the way. They will perhaps say 'Deal with the anarchists first, and then we shall allow the Reforms Bill to pass through Parliament'. My Lord, to this you have an unanswerable reply. You have the Defence of India Act. The Defence of India Act does not expire till the 31st December 1919 according to my computation, and by that time you will have fortified yourself with this Bill which will have become law in the month of September next. My Lord, you have to look to English opinion, but you have also to look to Indian opinion, and to Indian opinion as profoundly influencing the trend of English public opinion.

### **35. Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shafi's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers),<sup>2</sup> 12 March 1919**

My Lord, I support the motion<sup>3</sup> before the Council on three principal grounds.

The first ground is this. Under ordinary circumstances, in accordance with the usual procedure of this Council, this particular Bill on its introduction would have been published in the official gazette and circulated for opinion among the Local Governments as well as among representative bodies. That procedure was not adopted in the first instance....

The second ground on which I support this motion is this. The feeling against the hurrying through of this measure through Council as voiced in the country is both widespread as well as deep....

<sup>1</sup>Sir William Vincent.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 874-75.

<sup>3</sup>Amendment Motion put up by S.N. Banerjea.

The third ground on which I support the motion placed before the Council by my venerable friend, is based upon political expediency. . . .

**36. V.J. Patel on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>1</sup>**  
**12 March 1919**

. . . I am one of those [who] believe that the only way to improve this Bill is to entirely drop it, and I do not think any amount of opinions received from the High Courts or the Local Governments or any political associations will make this Council a bit wise. I am, however, prepared—the Council will be surprised to learn to support the motion of my Hon'ble friend, Mr. Surendra Nath, and my reasons are only two. The first is, that it is human nature to see that the evil day is postponed, and I should certainly like to see that that day is postponed to September of this year or to any other further day. From that point of view I welcome the motion of my Hon'ble friend, Mr. Surendra Nath [Banerjea]. My second reason is, that there is always a slip between the cup and the lip and if this matter is now postponed, it may be that time may bring wisdom, and the Government might see the unwisdom of passing this measure at any time. With these few remarks I cordially support the motion of my Hon'ble friend Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjea.

**37. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia on the Criminal Law  
 (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>2</sup> 12 March 1919**

. . . I am not convinced of the hurry with which the measure is proposed to be dealt with, infringing as it does with some of the vested rights of citizens of the Empire. I am aware that the provisions of the Bill are meant for those who have anarchical tendencies, but you have, my Lord, to consider the vast majority of innocent people and you cannot help considering that it is the subordinate police who will have to take the first step in the matter.

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 886.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 890.

Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia (1872-1941): a rich *jagirdar* of the Punjab; President, Sikh Educational Conference (1908-40); Additional Member, Punjab Legislature Committee, 1911-16; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1916; Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1919.

**38. M.A. Jinnah's Speech on the Criminal Law  
(Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>1</sup> 12 March 1919**

. . . Nobody has suggested that the Government have acted with sinister motives; nobody says that the Government is not convinced. But you forget that the Government, as it is constituted, has no check on it of any kind whatsoever. You find that the executive, or the Governor-General in Council, have decided that these Bills must go through. You find in this Legislature an official majority at their back who are under orders to vote for the Bill and you find every non-official Member opposed to it. Now, how is the issue to be decided? Are we wrong or are you wrong? That is the question. Have we gone mad? There is not a single non-official Member in favour of the Bill. My Lord, this is a serious situation. I appeal to the Hon'ble Mr. Ironside,<sup>2</sup> are we wrong under these circumstances to say 'please stay your hand'. Let us get outside this Chamber. In this Council-chamber the atmosphere is surcharged with two elements, you are determined to carry the Bills through; we, on the other hand, are determined to oppose the Bills to the last. Now, my Lord, I appeal to any reasonable man, is the situation not serious? Should it not be solved? We say get the opinions of Local Governments, get the opinions of High Court Judges, get the opinions of public bodies.

**39. Sir William Vincent on the Criminal Law  
(Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>3</sup> 12 March 1919**

. . . It is not accurate to suggest that we have not consulted Local Governments and others on this subject fully and very comprehensively. As a matter of fact the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee's Report were circulated to Local Governments and we have either had written opinions from them or consulted leading officers sent up by the Local Governments to discuss the question with us. The decision we have made has not reached by the wisdom of the Government of India alone, but after very careful discussion with numerous authorities. As for public bodies, may I draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the Rowlatt Report has now been published in India for about eight months and every public body, indeed many individuals, have had ample opportunities of saying anything that they liked about it. Nor has there

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 894.

<sup>2</sup>W.A. Ironside: Law Member, Government of India.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 898.

been any lack of criticism by public bodies on the Bills now before the Council.

. . . It is true that we have not got the opinions of the High Courts, but, on the other hand, we have the opinions of a number of judicial officers and the Committee, which was originally constituted to consider this question and of whose recommendations this Bill is the result, consisted entirely, save for one officer, of either professional lawyers or judicial officers. This is not a Bill hatched in the innermost recesses of the Secretariat. It is not a Bill concocted by some bureaucratic civilian; it is a Bill that emanates from the recommendations of a Committee composed of three Judges, one Indian lawyer and, I think, one executive officer. It cannot be said, therefore, that judicial opinion on this measure has not been taken.

#### **40. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>1</sup> 12 March 1919**

The Hon'ble Member<sup>2</sup> referred to the passive resistance movement which has been started against the Bill, and said that it was regrettable that a man of the character of Mr. Gandhi should have lent his support to such a movement. I will say this, my Lord, that when a man of the saintly character of Mr. Gandhi, who is the best friend that the Government have in this country, than whom there is no better friend of the Government among Indians, has felt it his duty to vow passive resistance in relation to the Bill, that is a matter for the Government to ponder over, to take into the most serious consideration. My Lord, the opposition to the Bills has been spreading far and wide in the country and it has been deepening. That is a new circumstance, and it is the duty of the Government to show reasonable deference to public opinion, and in deference to that opinion to proceed at least at a slower speed than this Government is proceeding. My Lord, the Hon'ble Home Member said that when the Government had determined that the proposed emergency legislation was necessary, the opposition raised against the Bill would not affect the attitude of the Government. Well, as my friend, Mr. Jinnah, has pointed out, situated as it is, the Government has it in its power to disregard public opposition. But it is not wise to do so . . . .

Now, my Lord, I want to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that this measure, as it has emerged from the Select Committee, not being

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 902-4.

<sup>2</sup>Sir William Vincent.

altered in any important respect, is more drastic than the most drastic legislation which was ever passed by Parliament.

#### **41. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill,<sup>1</sup> 12 March 1919**

... with reference to the point taken in my amendment, namely, that the Report of the Select Committee and the Bill and connected papers should be sent to the High Court, my Hon'ble friend observed that there were three judges of the High Court on the Rowlatt Commission. There was Mr. Justice Rowlatt, a Judge of the King's Bench Division, there was Sir Basil Scott, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, and there was Mr. Justice Coomarswamy Sastri, officiating Judge of the Madras High Court. But, my Lord, there was not a single Calcutta High Court Judge there, and it is Bengal that was the province that was the most concerned in the matter and Bengal High Court Judges—I may mention my Hon'ble friend Sir Asutosh Mookerji<sup>2</sup> [Mookerjee]—have had the greatest experience and knowledge in dealing with these cases. Was it not right and proper that these Bills should have been laid before them for their opinion?

Then, my Lord, the Rowlatt Commission reported, I think, it was about 18 months ago. Since then, the circumstances of the province have very considerably changed. And the whole of this Bill is based upon the recommendations of the Rowlatt Commission. Since the submission of this report the number of detenus has sensibly gone down. I think at the time it was about 1,200, the number is now less than 400, and you would not have let off these 800 men unless and until you were quite satisfied that there was no danger to be apprehended from their release. Therefore, from the action of the Government itself, I am entitled to hold that the situation has improved, changed very much for the better. Therefore, the circumstances under which the Report was submitted by the Rowlatt Commission do not exist at the present moment, and, if the circumstances are not the same as they were say 18 months ago, is it right and proper, expedient, wise, statesmanlike, to legislate upon a situation which has now become more or less a matter of ancient history?

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 910.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, (1864-1924): Educationist and Jurist; opposed Lord Curzon's Indian University Act, 1904; Vice-Chancellor, \*Calcutta University, 1906-14.

**42. G.S. Khaparde on the Legislative Council Debates,<sup>1</sup>**  
**13 March 1919**

Our Indian members maintained a good fight except [V.S.] Sastri who in a speech admitted that he was converted by the speech of Sir G. Lowndes. Jinnah was very strong and made good speeches.

**43. Montagu to Lloyd George,<sup>2</sup> 16 March 1919**

I am somewhat concerned at the agitation that appears to be in progress in regard to the Rowlatt Bills. I always anticipated trouble in this quarter. But I recognise that drastic legislation was unavoidable on the unanimous recommendations of the Committee which contains a strong Indian element.

**44. Gandhi's Message to the Madras Satyagrahis,<sup>3</sup>**  
**18 March 1919**

I regret that owing to heart weakness I am unable to speak to you personally. You have no doubt attended many meetings, but these that you have been attending of late are different from the others, in that as the meetings to which I have referred some immediate tangible action, some immediate definite sacrifice has been demanded of you for the purpose of averting a serious calamity that has overtaken us in the shape of what are known as the Rowlatt Bills. One of them, Bill No. 1 has undergone material alteration and its further consideration has been postponed. In spite, however, of the alteration it is mischievous enough to demand opposition. The second Bill has probably at this very moment been finally passed by the Imperial Legislative Council or rather will be claimed to have been passed by that Council, for in reality you can hardly call a Bill having been passed by that august body when all its non-official members unanimously and in strong language opposed it. The Bills require to be resisted not only because they are in themselves bad but also because Government who are responsible for their introduction have seen fit practically to ignore public opinion and some of its

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1919, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Montagu's Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 2, NMML. Private Letter. Lloyd George (First Baron, George Ambrose Lloyd, 1879-1941); Governor of Bombay, 1918-23.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 143.

members have made it a boast that they can so ignore that opinion. So far it is common cause between the different schools of thought in the country. I have, however, after much prayerful consideration, and after very careful examination of the Government's standpoint, pledged myself to offer satyagraha against the Bills, and invited all men and women who think and feel with me to do likewise. Some of our countrymen, including those who are among the best of the leaders, have uttered a note of warning and even gone so far as to say that this *Satyagraha* movement is against the best interests of the country. I have naturally the highest regard for them and their opinion. I have worked under some of them. I was a babe when Sir Dinshaw Wacha and Surendranath Banerjea were among the accepted leaders of public opinion in India. Mr. [V.S.] Sastri<sup>1</sup> is a politician who has dedicated his all to the country's cause. His sincerity, his probity are all his own. He will yield to no one in the love of the country. There is a sacred and indissoluble tie binding me to him. . . . It is not therefore without the greatest grief and much searching of heart that I have to place myself in opposition to their wishes, but there are times when you have to obey a call which is the highest of all, i.e. the voice of conscience even though such obedience may cost many a bitter tear, nay even more separation from friends, from family, from the state to which you may belong, from all that you have held as dear as life itself. For this obedience is the law of our being. I have no further and other defence to offer for my conduct. My regard for the signatories to the manifestoes remains undiminished, and my faith in the efficacy of *Satyagraha* is so great that I feel that if those who have taken the pledge will be true to it we shall be able to show to them that they will find when we have come to the end of this struggle that there was no cause for alarm or misgivings. There is, I knew, resentment felt even by some Satyagrahis over the manifestoes. I would warn Satyagrahis that such resentment is against the spirit of *Satyagraha*. I would personally welcome an honest expression of difference of opinion from any quarter and more so from friends because it puts us on our guard. There is too much recrimination, innuendo and insinuation in our public life and if the *Satyagraha* movement purges it of this grave defect, as it ought to, it will be a very desirable byproduct. I wish further to suggest to Satyagrahis that any resentment of the two manifestoes would be but a sign of weakness on our part. Every movement and *Satyagraha* most of all must depend upon its own inherent strength, but not upon the weakness or silence of its critics. Let us therefore see wherein lies the strength of *Satyagraha*. As the name implies it is in an insistence on truth which dynamically expressed means love; and by the Law of Love we are required not to return hatred for hatred, violence for violence, but to return

<sup>1</sup>For V.S. Srinivasa Sastri.

good for evil. As Srimati Sarojini Devi<sup>1</sup> told you yesterday the strength lies in a defined recognition of the true religious spirit and action corresponding to it and when once you introduce the religious element in politics, you revolutionise the whole of your political outlook . . . . It has, however, been suggested that the Government will leave the handful of Satyagrahis severely alone and not make martyrs of them. But there is here, in my humble opinion, bad logic and an unwarranted assumption of fact. If Satyagrahis are left alone, they have won a complete victory because they will have succeeded in disregarding the Rowlatt Bills and even other laws of the country and in having thus shown that a civil disobedience to a Government is held perfectly harmless by it. I regard the statement as an unwarranted assumption of fact because it contemplates the restriction of the movement only to a handful of men and women. My experience of *Satyagraha* leads me to believe that it is such a potent force that once set in motion it ever spreads till at last it becomes a dominant factor in the community in which it is brought into play and if it so spreads no government can neglect it. Either it must yield to it or imprison the workers in the movement. But I have no desire to argue. As the English proverb says 'the proof of the pudding lies in the eating'. The movement for better or for worse has been launched. We shall be judged not by our words, but solely by our deeds. It is, therefore, not enough that we sign the pledge. Our signing it is but an earnest intention of our determination to act up to it, and if all who sign the pledge and according to it, I make bold to promise that we shall bring about the withdrawal of the two Bills and neither the Government nor our critics will have a word to say against us. The cause is great, the remedy is equally great; let us prove worthy of them both.

#### **45. Sir William Vincent on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>2</sup> 18 March 1919**

I must at the outset express my great regret that in spite of the modifications which we have made in this Bill in our attempt to meet the wishes of non-official members, we have not been able to secure more support for this measure. . . . I address myself to those whom I believe to be anxious to co-operate with the Government and who yet feel the greatest apprehension.

<sup>1</sup>Mrs. Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949) : Poetess, politician and social reformer; took part in Anti-Partition agitation of Bengal in 1905; awarded the Kaiser-i-Hind Gold Medal for social services; worked as a faithful lieutenant of Gandhi and went to England as a Member, All India Home Rule Deputation in 1919; President, Bombay Province Congress Committee, 1920.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 1173-76.

hension regarding the use which may be made of this Bill. Well, my Lord, I should be very glad if they would consider the position a little from the point of view of the Government. We have examined it from their point of view; we have done all that we can to meet them and have made changes in the Bill which I think have commended themselves to Hon'ble members as improvements. The position as it appears to Government is very clear. The facts are well-known. This revolutionary movement is here as is abundantly proved by the findings of the Rowlatt Report. . . . It has, however, been alleged that this revolutionary movement, it if once existed, is dead and that there is now no reason for such action as we propose to take. I think my Hon'ble friend Mr. [S.N.] Banerjea rather takes that line—I wish that this were true, my Lord, and I wish that it was not incumbent upon us to introduce legislation of this character. I will not repeat now the arguments to show that this movement is there very alive, but I will only ask the Council to read again the statements made in the first debate in this Council, and to say then whether or not this movement is not unhappily still prevalent. I admit that it has been scotched; but it is not killed, and I should look upon any revival of it as a very very terrible calamity . . . .

We have here keen thinkers, great speakers and acute lawyers, all of whom have combined upon destructive criticisms of this Bill. So far as it is possible, we have accepted much of this criticism modifying the Bill in very important particulars. It has been suggested by some members that the changes that have been made are not important, but I do not think that can really be argued by anyone who examines the Bill as introduced and as it stands now. Another argument which has been put forward is the suggestion that the present Law is adequate to meet our requirements, that section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the provisions of the Penal Code and the Act of 1908 provide us with all that we require. Well my Lord, I ask the Council to consider the broad facts and whether it is not proved to the hilt that these measures are inadequate.

The main criticism of the Bill, my Lord, however, is based on a different line. It is said that it is an unfair infringement of the liberty of the subject, that it is repugnant to all ideas of western justice. This aspect has been put before us with very great force by many speakers. I do not know if it is fair to single out individual speakers but I should like to say that the Hon'ble Mr. V.S. Sastri and the Hon'ble Mr. M.A. Jinnah, though he is not here, put this matter in a way that moved all of us and prompted a careful reconsideration of the facts. My Lord, we admit that this is a drastic measure and a departure from ordinary principles. But I want the Council to look at the position more from a practical point of view rather than from a theoretical one. I want them again to remember what I said very often, and cannot repeat it too often—I want them to remember the authorities by whom this Bill was recommended. . . . It can only apply

when revolutionary crime is prevalent, and then only to persons found to be actively concerned in these crimes.

My Lord, I have heard a great deal during this debate of the liberty of the subject and of the privileges of citizenship. Sometimes, I wish I had heard a little more of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship which are equally important, and even now I ask the Members of this Council to co-operate with the Government and the authorities in crushing this movement through the ordinary courts of justice, to use their great authority, their weighty influence, in inducing the public to assist us in this matter: to get members of the public to come forward as witnesses courageously and to do their duty as jurors or in whatever capacity it may be in connection with the case honestly and fearlessly. . . . It has been suggested that we are always anxious to take drastic powers, that we seek to increase our authority and our prestige by legislation of this character. My Lord, those who are familiar with the history of the Government of India know that there really is no foundation for that assertion. If Members of Council read this very report they will find there that the Government of India refused to the last moment, though pressed repeatedly to do it, to enact the Defence of India Act. It was only when we were forced by circumstances of a very cogent character that we undertook that legislation. . . and there are really only two points which remain to which I wish to refer, in order to allay, as far as I may, the fears of those who think firstly, that the law can or will be abused, and secondly, that even in the case of these young revolutionaries it may have the effect of driving young men to further sedition and making them worse than they are at present. My Lord, it is far from the desire of Government that any of these young revolutionaries should be further embittered, and I think if the Council were aware of the efforts which are made by the authorities at present to reform these young men, to lead them to saner habits of thought in the hope that they may realise the path of the future of India does not lie through treason and murder. I think if the Council knew of these facts, the Government would at least get some credit for its efforts in that direction.

. . . Finally, my Lord, should it ever be necessary to put this Act into force, I can only assure the Council that we will make it our duty to see that it is used only for the suppression of revolutionary and anarchical offences, a form of crime which we believe to be of the greatest danger to the future of this country . . .

#### **46. V.J. Patel on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 18 March 1919**

My Lord, we have now reached the final stage of this extremely unpopu-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 1176-83.

lar measure. The Government remains as unbending as ever in total disregard or, I should say, defiance of the unanimous protest of the entire Indian opinion both inside and outside of this Council. We did our best to persuade the Government to abandon the measure or at any rate to postpone its consideration till the passing of the Reform Bill into Parliament. We failed. We did all that was possible to have some of our important amendments accepted in order to make the Bill less dangerous, less obnoxious, and thereby perhaps less unacceptable, but our appeals and our prayers fell on deaf ears. We confess we miserably failed in all our endeavours. It remains for us now in this Council to enter our most emphatic protest in the clearest possible manner against the passing of this Bill into law. In doing so, I propose to place on record once again some of my reasons in brief. I am of the opinion, my Lord, that it is not within the competence of this Council to enact this law . . . . We believe that repression is really no remedy to eradicate revolutionary and anarchical crimes. What is the root cause of the evil? These crimes are the outcome of political and administrative stagnation which has resulted in untold miseries to the people of India. The only remedy, therefore, is to remove the standing grievances of the people which the Indian National Congress has been proclaiming year after year for the last three and thirty years. Has repression succeeded in any country? Has it succeeded in Ireland with all its Crimes Act. Has it succeeded in our own?

My Lord, on the motion that the report of the Select Committee be taken into consideration we again suggested postponement. We were defeated by the official majority. Then we moved amendments suggesting the deletion of Parts I, II and III; we lost. We also moved amendments to make the Bill less offensive in some important particulars. The Government remained as firm as a rock. They would not and did not yield. Is it not then a legitimate question to ask whether the British rule in India is based on force or on the people's will? I submit that it is due to the people that they should understand how they stand.

. . . I am of the opinion that the whole proceedings in connection with this Bill since and from the presentation of the so-called Report of the Select Committee are invalid and illegal.

The Chairman of the Select Committee by his ruling prevented the Select Committee from discussing the principles of the Bill and considering the question of the competence of the Indian legislature to enact this law. This ruling and your Excellency's ruling about which I am not allowed to talk in my humble opinion, have vitiated the whole proceedings in connection with this Bill and the Bill passed in that manner cannot have any recognition in law. To sum up, my Lord, I protest against this Bill for the following among other reasons.

1. It is not within the competence of the Indian legislature to pass this

bill into law.

2. It casts an undeserved slur on the loyalty of 300 millions of people and amounts in fact to an indictment against the whole nation.
3. It substitutes the rule of the executive for that of the judiciary and thus destroys the very foundation on which British liberty rests.
4. It will kill all political life in the country and thus make ordered progress impossible.
5. It will intensify and not mitigate the evil complained of. It will drive all agitation into hidden channels with the result that consequential evils will follow as surely as night follows the day.
6. It is utterly subversive of the order of things hitherto recognised and acted upon all civilised countries. It is unparalleled in the legislative history of any such country.
7. It is being passed in defiance of the unanimous Indian opinion both in and outside this Council.
8. Repression is not the remedy for eradicating anarchical and revolutionary crimes. These crimes are the outcome of political stagnation which has resulted in untold miseries to the people of this country.

Remove the root cause and anarchy will disappear.

9. It will plant in the minds of the people harsh memories which even time will not soften.
10. Stability of British rule in India depends and must depend on the people's will and not on force.
11. The Bill is being passed into law on an incomplete and invalid Report of the Select Committee. All the proceedings of the Council since the presentation of such report, are therefore, invalid. Law passed in that manner would be ultra vires.

No wonder then that under these circumstances you find some of us who care for liberty, who believe in liberty, who love liberty, are prepared to disobey laws of this character and submit to the penalty of such breaches. Passive resistance, my Lord, is the last and the only constitutional weapon of a despairing people. It is my duty to warn your Excellency's Government against the consequences of driving the peaceful and law-abiding people as the people of India are to resort to passive resistance. I do so, my Lord, in the best interests of India and the Empire.

#### **47. Surendra Nath Banerjea's Speech on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 18 March 1919**

My Lord, my Hon'ble Friend<sup>2</sup> has invited us, the party of moderates,

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 1183-86.

<sup>2</sup>Sir William Vincent.

to co-operate with Government in regard to this matter. That is our creed—co-operation with the Government wherever possible, opposition where the interests of the motherland require it. I am afraid that we are now in the latter category.

... Meetings have been held, organizations have been formed, leaflets have been published, articles have appeared in the newspapers warning the people against the danger of revolutionary movements. Therefore, my Lord, I claim that we have done our bit in helping the Government to root out anarchical and revolutionary movements. As regards repressive policy, we have never supported it . . . .

It is my duty to oppose the Bill under a sense of overwhelming responsibility. I frankly acknowledge that the Government have made important concessions from their point of view; the Bill has been made temporary, its scopes have been confined to anarchical crimes, and many modifications have been made in its provisions. But all this does not go far enough. My Lord, the Bill in its essence and character remains unaffected. Its executive complexion still overshadows every other aspect of the Bill. My Lord, the Bill as it emerged from the Select Committee and as amended and revised by this Council remains in its main features the same Bill that it was when it was originally introduced. It is in truth an executive order robed in a legislative grab; it is, to quote the words of a distinguished jurist Sir Rash Behari Ghosh,<sup>1</sup> 'a lawless law', it is a glorified Ordinance, with a judicial colouring sometimes thickly, sometimes thinly laid on. And, therefore, my Lord, you cannot ask us to take in any sense a share of responsibility for this measure. My Lord, responsibility and power go together. Where there is responsibility there must be power. There is none of it in this Council so far as the non-official Indian members are concerned. We have influence, but not power. We can persuade, but we cannot instruct or direct, though we hope under the Reform Scheme the foundations will have been well and truly laid for the transition from influence to power.

... And, my Lord, what is at the root of this agitation that is going on in connection with these two Bills, and echoes of which have been heard in this Council? It is the love of constitutional freedom, the jealous regard for constitutional rights safeguarded by law. Therefore, my Lord, I feel that in opposing this Bill we are developing the qualities which Englishmen have taught us to prize, demonstrating to the world the possession of those moral attributes which are a guarantee for the success of representative institutions.

<sup>1</sup>Sir Rash Behari Ghosh (1845-1921) : Lawyer and politician; President, Indian National Congress, 1907 and Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1891-96, 1906-7.

**48. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 18 March 1919**

... We feel very strongly that the Bill is not now necessary, that it is not now emergent, that it is inopportune, and we believe in the strength of our belief that this cannot be unknown to Government.

... We believe that if it was necessary for the peace of Bengal and, therefore, of the peace of other provinces that might be affected, that if it was necessary for the peace of India, to check anarchical and revolutionary crime by a new measure, it was open to Government, having the knowledge that they now keep under control nearly every one connected with this form of violence to society, with that knowledge it was open to Government to come to us with a measure confined to these people, taking power from this Council to continue the custody and the detention and the internment, perhaps the imprisonment of people whom they already hold in these ways. It was perfectly open to ask us to give them leave, legislative sanction, to a measure which was confined to these people and to some others who are still at large, but who, they may have evidence to think, deserve this sort of treatment; that was open to Government . . . I had in the *London Times* the other day the glimpse of a reason which might really lie at the back of this legislation. I will not say it is; I only conjecture. It was said when a lakh of sepoys or so that have served with distinction in the various theatres of the war are returning to India, it is necessary to have in the armoury of Government a strong measure wherewith they could put down, before it reaches any dimension, the signs of incipient trouble. Another guess that has been put forward is that perhaps it is just as well that Government armed itself with this power before the peace is signed in Europe and the fate of the Turkish Empire fills the Mohammadan community, the hearts of the Mohammadan community, with dangerous discontent. Other people have said it might even be that when the reforms, as they finally come out of Parliament, are found to be shadow, political discontent in the land may take forms which cannot be grappled with successfully unless Government have extraordinary powers . . .

In a few moments more this Bill will be law and when the Bill is law it does not remain there, we have still the aftermath, the consequences of the law to the Government of India no less than to us. For as a poet has said in tragic connection 'If it were done when it is done, then it were well it were done quickly.' I will not go further with this awesome passage; but the darkened page is there and unfortunately, although some of us have tried to dissuade him from the course, Mr. Gandhi has taken it up. Well I know how he will play his part, his character will be bold, blameless,

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, pp. 1189-90.

perfectly white. I could only wish, your Excellency, although I trust but faintly, that those of us who also have to write on this darkened page, his followers, the Government and Government employees, the political agitators and detenus, that we could all say at the end of the business that we also wrote perfectly white.

#### **49. B.D. Shukla on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>1</sup> 18 March 1919**

The Bill is not only drastic in nature but wholly uncalled for and above all quite un-British . . . . My Lord, this measure will come and go as it must. It cannot stand very long. I for one decline to accept it as a settled fact. I have known of many a settled fact in the past which have been unsettled, and the Bill which is to be passed into law in such a great hurry and in the teeth of such a solid strong opposition from the people, is bound to defeat its own purpose and die a premature death. If at present the Government on its part is determined not to yield to the wishes of the people, the people on their part are also determined not to take the Bill lying down. Such a state of things will not and cannot continue very long and the day is sure to come when the Government will have to yield to the will of the people and the Bill repealed . . . .

#### **50. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Rowlatt Bills,<sup>2</sup> 18 March 1919**

. . . Will the Government pause to think if they are right in carrying this Bill only by the official votes which they command in this Council? My Lord, they are not. And we apprehend that as the Government committed a great mistake in the case of the Bengal Partition in carrying it out in the teeth of the protests of the people, so it is committing a similar mistake now, and we shudder to think of the estrangement of feelings between the people and the representatives of the Government which is likely to result from this attitude of the Government . . . . I respectfully join with my friend the Hon'ble Mr. Banerjea, in the appeal which he has made to your Excellency that though the Bill will be passed today, your Excellency may yet be pleased to withhold your assent from the same, until, at any rate I would add, until the time that the Bill and the papers connected with it and a full report of the debates of this Council

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1918 to March 1919, LVII, p. 1203.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 1221.

have been laid before His Majesty's Secretary of State for India and His Majesty has signified his pleasure relating thereto.

**51. The Rowlatt Act as Passed in Imperial Legislative Council,<sup>1</sup> 18 March 1919**

(PASSED BY THE IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL)

(Received the assent of the Governor-General on 21 March 1919)

*An Act to cope with anarchical and revolutionary crime*

Whereas it is expedient to make provision that the ordinary criminal law should be supplemented and emergency powers should be exercisable by the Government for the purpose of dealing with anarchical and revolutionary movements;

And whereas the previous approval of the Secretary of State in Council has been accorded to the making of this law; it is hereby enacted as follows:---

1. *Short title, extent and duration.*—(1) This Act may be called the Anarchical Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919;

(2) It extends to the whole of British India; and

(3) It shall continue in force for three years from the date of the termination of the present war.

2. *Definitions.*—(1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

“Chief Justice” means the Judge of highest rank in a High Court;

“The Code” means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898;

“High Court” means the highest Court of criminal appeal or revision for any local area;

“Scheduled Offence” means any offence specified in the schedule.

(2) All words and expressions used in this Act and defined in the Code, and not hereinbefore defined, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them in the Code.

**PART I**

3. *Condition of application of Part I.*—If the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that, in the whole or any part of British India, anarchical or

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, June 1919, No. 82.

revolutionary movements are being promoted, and that scheduled offences in connection with such movements are prevalent to such an extent that it is expedient in the interests of the public safety to provide for the speedy trial of such offences, he may, by notification in the Gazette of India, make a declaration to that effect, and thereupon the provisions of this Part shall come into force in the area specified in the notification.

4. *Initiation of proceedings.*—(1) Where the Local Government is of opinion that the trial of any person accused of a scheduled offence should be held in accordance with the provisions of this Part, it may order any officer of Government to prefer a written information to the Chief Justice against such person.

(2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made in respect of, or be deemed to include, any person who has been committed under the Code for trial before a High Court or a Court of Session, but save as aforesaid, an order under that sub-section may be made in respect of any scheduled offence whether such offence was committed before or after the issue of the notification under section 3.

(3) The information shall state the offence charged and so far as known the name, place of residence, and occupation of the accused, and the time and place when and where the offence is alleged to have been committed and all particulars within the knowledge of the prosecution of what is intended to be provided against the accused.

(4) The Chief Justice may by order require any information to be amended so as to supply further particulars of the offence charged to the accused, and shall direct a copy of the information or the amended information, as the case may be, to be served upon the accused in such manner as the Chief Justice may direct.

(5) *Constitution of Court.*—Upon such service being effected, and on application duly made to him, the Chief Justice shall nominate three of the High Court Judges (hereinafter referred to as the Court) for the trial of the information, and shall fix a date for the commencement of the trial:

Provided that when the total number of Judges of the High Court does not exceed three, the Chief Justice shall nominate not more than two such Judges, and shall complete the Court by the nomination of one or, if necessary, two persons of either of the following classes, namely:—

- (a) persons who have served as permanent Judges of the High Court; or
- (b) with the consent of the Chief Justice of another High Court, persons who are Judges of that High Court.

6. *Place of sitting.*—The Court may sit for the whole or any part of a trial at such place or places in the province as it may consider desirable:

Provided that if the Advocate-General certifies to the Court that it is in his opinion necessary in the interests of justice that the whole or any part of a trial shall be held at some place other than the usual place of sitting of

the High Court, the Court shall, after hearing the accused, make an order to that effect, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing it thinks fit to make any other order. It shall not be necessary for the certificate of the Advocate-General to be supported by any affidavit, nor shall he be required to state the grounds upon which such certificate was given.

7. *Application of Code of Criminal Procedure subject to this Part.*—The provisions of the Code shall apply to proceedings under this Part, in so far as the said provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, and such proceedings shall be deemed to be proceedings under the Code, and the Court shall have all the powers conferred by the Code on a Court of Session exercising original jurisdiction.

8. *Trial.*—(1) The trial shall be commenced by the reading of the information, and thereafter the prosecutor shall state shortly by what evidence he expects to prove the guilt of the accused.

(2) The Court shall then, subject to the provisions of this Part, in trying the accused, follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrate.

9. *Adjournment.*—If a charge is framed, the accused shall be entitled to ask for an adjournment for fourteen days, or any less period that he may specify, and the Court shall comply with his request, but, subject to the adjournment provided for by this section, the Court shall not be bound to adjourn any trial for any purpose, unless such adjournment is in its opinion necessary in the interests of justice.

10. *Record of evidence.*—The Court shall cause the evidence of each witness who is examined to be recorded in full in such manner as the Court may direct.

11. *Prohibition or restriction of publication of trial.*—The Court, if it is of opinion that such a course is necessary in the public interest or for the protection of a witness, may prohibit or restrict in such way as it may direct the publication or disclosure of its proceedings or any part of its proceedings.

12. *Examination of accused.*—(1) No questions shall be put by the Court to the accused in the course of a trial under this Part until the close of the case for the prosecution. Thereafter, and before the accused enters on his defence, the Court shall inform the accused that he is entitled, if he so desires, to give evidence on oath on his own behalf, and shall at the same time inform him that if he does so, he will be liable to cross-examination. Unless the accused then states that he desires to give evidence on oath, the Court may at any time thereafter question the accused generally on the case in accordance with the provisions of section 342 of the Code.

(2) If, when so called upon, the accused states that he desires to give evidence on oath, the Court shall not at any subsequent stage put any question to him:

**Provided that if the accused does not so give evidence, then, after the**

witness for the defence has been examined, the Court may question the accused generally on the case in accordance with the provisions of the said section.

(3) The failure of the accused to give evidence on oath shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution, nor shall the Court draw any inference adverse to the accused from such failure.

(4) If the accused gives evidence on oath, the following rules shall be observed, namely:

- (a) He may be asked any question in cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to the offence charged.
- (b) He shall not be asked, and if asked shall, not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of, or has been charged with, any offence other than that with which he is then charged, or has a bad character, unless:
  - (i) proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible in evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence with which he is then charged, or
  - (ii) witnesses for the prosecution have been cross-examined with a view to establish his own good character, or he has given evidence of his good character or the nature or the conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution, or
  - (iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence.
- (c) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, he shall give his evidence from the witness-box or other place from which the other witnesses give their evidence.

13. *Right of reply*.—If the accused or any one of the accused calls and examines any witness, the right of final reply shall lie with the prosecution, but in all other cases with the accused:

Provided that the examination of a accused as a witness shall not of itself confer the right of final reply on the prosecution.

14. *Differences of opinion*.—In the event of any difference of opinion among the members of the Court, the opinion of the majority shall prevail.

15. *Accused may be convicted of any offence referred to in the Schedule*.—At any trial under this Part the accused may be charged with and convicted of any offence against any provision of the law which is referred to in the Schedule.

16. *Sentence*.—The Court may pass upon any person convicted by it any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted, and no order of confirmation shall be necessary

in the case of any sentence passed by it:

*Provided that a sentence of death shall not be passed upon any accused person in respect of whose guilt there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Court.*

17. *Exclusion of interference of other criminal Courts* —The judgement of the Court shall be final and conclusive and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Code or of any other law for the time being in force, or of anything having the force of law by whatsoever authority made or done, there shall be no appeal from any order or sentence of the Court, and no High Court shall have authority to revise any such order or sentence or to transfer any case from such Court, or to make any order under section 491 of the Code or have any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings under this Part:

Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the powers of the Governor-General in Council or of the Local Government to make orders under section 401 or section 402 of the Code in respect of any person sentenced by the Court.

18. *Special rules of evidence I of 1872.*—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where—

- (a) the statement of any person has been recorded by a Magistrate, and such statement has been read over and explained to the person making it and has been signed by him, or
- (b) the statement of any person has been recorded by the Court, but such person has not been cross-examined.

Such statement may be admitted in evidence by the Court if the person making the same is dead or cannot be found or is incapable of giving evidence, and it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that such death, disappearance or incapacity has been caused in the interests of the accused.

(2) Depositions recorded under section 512 of the Code may, in the circumstances specified in that section, be given in evidence at the trial of an accused under this Part I.

19. *Recall of witness on reconstitution of Court.*—In case of any reconstitution of the Court during the trial, the Court so reconstituted shall, if the accused so desires, recall and re-hear any witness who has already given evidence in the case.

20. *Power to make rules.*—The Chief Justice may from time to time make rules providing for—

- (1) the appointment and powers of a President of the Court, and the procedure to be adopted to complete the Court in the event of any Judge of the Court being prevented from attending throughout the trial of an accused; and

- (2) any matters (including the intermediate custody of the accused and his release on bail) which appear to him necessary for carrying into effect or supplementing the provisions of this Part preliminary or ancillary to trials.

## PART II

21. *Condition of application of Part II.*—If the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that anarchical or revolutionary movements which are, in his opinion, likely to lead to the commission of scheduled offences are being extensively promoted in the whole or any part of British India, he may, by notification in the Gazette of India, make a declaration to that effect, and thereupon the provisions of this Part shall come into force in the area specified in the notification.

22. *Powers exercisable when Part II is in force.*—(1) Where, in the opinion of the Local Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person is or has been actively concerned in such area in any movement of the nature referred to in section 21, the Local Government may place all the materials in its possession relating to his case before a judicial officer who is qualified for appointment to a High Court and take his opinion thereon. If, after considering such opinion, the Local Government is satisfied that action under the provisions of this section is necessary, it may by order in writing contain a declaration to the effect that such person is or has been actively concerned in such area in any movement of the nature referred to in section 21, give all or any of the following directions, namely: that such person

(a) shall, within such period as may be specified in the order, execute a bond with or without sureties undertaking, for such period not exceeding one year as may be so specified, that he will not commit, or attempt or conspire to commit, or abet the commitment of, any offence against any provision of the law which is referred to in the Schedule;

(b) shall notify his residence and any change of residence to such authority as may be so specified;

(c) shall remain or reside in any area in British India so specified:

Provided that, if the area so specified is outside the province, the concurrence of the Local Government of that area to the making of the order shall first have been obtained;

(d) shall abstain from any act so specified which, in the opinion of the Local Government, is calculated to disturb the public peace or is prejudicial to the public safety; and

(e) shall report himself to the officer in charge of the police station nearest to his residence at such periods as may be so specified.

(2) Any order under clauses (b) to (e) of sub-section (1) may also be made to take effect upon default by the person concerned in complying with an order under clause (a) of that sub-section.

23. *Service of orders under section 22.*—An order made under section 22 shall be served on the person in respect of whom it is made in the manner provided in the Code for service of summons and upon such service such person shall be deemed to have due notice thereof.

24. *Enforcement of orders.*—The Local Government and every officer of Government to whom a copy of any order made under section 22 may be directed by, or under the general or special authority of, the Local Government, may use all means reasonably necessary to enforce compliance with the same.

25. *Interim nature of order made by Local Government.*—An order made under section 22 shall only continue in force for a period of one month, unless it is extended by the Local Government as hereinafter provided in this Part.

26. *Reference to investigating authority.*—(1) When the Local Government makes an order under section 22, such Government shall, as soon as may be, forward to the investigating authority to be constituted under this Act a concise statement in writing setting forth plainly the grounds on which the Government considered it necessary that the order should be made, and shall lay before the investigating authority all material facts and circumstances in its possession relevant to the inquiry.

(2) The investigating authority shall then hold an inquiry *in camera* for the purpose of ascertaining what, in its opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances adduced by the Government, appears against the person in respect of whom the order has been made. Such authority shall in every case allow the person in question a reasonable opportunity of appearing before it at some stage in its proceedings and shall, if he so appears, explain to him the nature of the charge made against him and shall hear any explanation he may have to offer, and shall make such further investigation (if any) as appears to such authority to be relevant and reasonable:

Provided that—

- (a) nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to entitle the person whose case is before the investigating authority to appear or to be represented before it by pleader, nor shall the Local Government be so entitled;
- (b) the investigating authority shall not disclose to the person in question, any fact the communication of which might endanger the public safety or the safety of any individual;
- (c) if the person in question requests the investigating authority to secure the attendance of any person or the production of any document or thing, such authority shall, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing it deems it necessary so to do, cause such person to attend or such

document or thing to be produced, and for that purpose shall have all the powers conferred on a District Magistrate in respect of those matters by the Code.

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the inquiry shall be conducted in such manner as the investigating authority considers best suited to elicit the facts of the case; and in making the inquiry, such authority shall not be bound to observe the rules of the law of evidence.

(4) Any statement made to an investigating authority by any person other than the person whose case is under investigation shall be deemed to be information given to a public servant within the meaning of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

(5) On the completion of the inquiry, the investigating authority shall report in writing to the Local Government the conclusions at which it has arrived, and shall adduce reasons in support thereof. In so reporting the investigating authority shall state whether or not, in its opinion, the person whose case is under investigation is or has been actively concerned in any movement of the nature referred to in section 21.

(6) If the investigating authority has not completed the inquiry within the period for which the duration of the order is limited by section 25, such authority may recommend to the Local Government that the period of duration of the order shall be extended for such period as it may consider necessary, and on such a recommendation the Local Government may extend the duration of the order accordingly.

*27. Disposal of report of investigating authority.*—(1) On receipt of the report of the investigating authority, the Local Government may discharge the order made under section 22, or may make any order which is authorised by that section:

Provided that—

- (a) any order so made shall recite the conclusions of the investigating authority as reported by that authority; and
- (b) a copy of such order shall be furnished to person in respect of whom it is made.

(2) No order made under sub-section (1) shall continue in force for more than one year from the date of the order made under section 22.

(3) On the expiry of an order made under sub-section (1), the Local Government may, if it is satisfied that such a course is necessary in the interests of the public safety, again make in respect of the person to whom such order related any order which is authorised by section 22:

Provided that, before an order is made under this sub-section, a copy of the order which it is proposed to make shall be furnished to the person concerned, who may submit to the Local Government a representation in regard to such order. Any such representation shall be forwarded by the

Local Government to the investigating authority for inquiry and report, and such authority after inquiry conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 26, shall report thereon, and the Local Government shall consider such report:

Provided further that no order made under this sub-section shall continue in force for more than a year from the date on which it was made.

(4) Any other order made under this section may at any time be discharged or may be altered by the substitution of any other order authorised by section 22:

Provided that no such alteration shall have the effect of prolonging the period for which such order would have been in force

(5) *Penalty for disobedience to order.*—The provisions of section 24 shall apply to the enforcement of orders made under this section.

28. If any person fails to comply with, or attempts to evade, any order (other than an order to furnish security) made under section 22 or section 27, he shall, on conviction by a Magistrate, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

29. *Provisions as to bonds.*—The provisions of section 514 of the Code shall apply to bonds executed under the provisions of this Part, with this modification that the powers conferred by the section on the Court shall be exercisable by any District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate, on application made on behalf of the Local Government.

30. *Investigating authority.*—(1) As soon as may be after a notification has been issued bringing this Part into force, the Local Government shall appoint one or more investigating authorities for the purpose of this Part, and may appoint additional investigating authorities when necessary.

(2) Every investigating authority shall be appointed by order in writing, and shall consist of three persons, of whom two shall be persons having held judicial office not inferior to that of a District and Sessions Judge, and one shall be a person not in the service of the Crown in India.

(3) The Local Government may by like order appoint persons to fill casual vacancies occurring by reason of death, resignation of office or otherwise on any investigating authority, but in so doing shall observe the provisions of sub-section (2).

31. *Visiting Committees.*—(1) The Local Government shall by order in writing appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Visiting Committees to report upon the welfare and treatment of persons under restraint under this Part, and shall by rules prescribe the functions which these Committees shall exercise:

Provided that, in making such rules, provisions shall be made for periodical visits to persons under restraint under the provisions of this Part:

Provided further that a person in respect of whom an order has been made under section 22 or section 27 requiring him to abstain from any

specified act or to report himself to the police shall not be deemed to be under restraint for the purposes of this section.

(2) All rules made under sub-section (1) shall be published in the local official Gazette, and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Part.

*32. Power to make rules by Local Government.*—(1) The Local Government may make rules prescribing the authorities before whom and the manner in which bonds under this Part shall be executed, and providing for the procedure to be followed regarding the notification of residence and reports to the police by persons in respect of whom orders have been made under section 22 or section 27.

(2) All rules made under sub-section (1) shall be published in the local official Gazette, and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Part.

### PART III

*33. Condition of application of Part III.*—If the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that in the whole or any part of British India anarchical or revolutionary movements are being promoted and that scheduled offences in connection with such movements are prevalent to such an extent as to endanger the public safety, he may, by notification in the Gazette of India, make a declaration to that effect, and thereupon the provisions of this part shall come into force in the area specified in the notification.

*34. Powers exercisable when Part III is in force.*—(1) Where, in the opinion of the Local Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person has been or is concerned in such area in any scheduled offence, the Local Government may place all the materials in its possession relating to his case before a judicial officer who is qualified for appointment to a High Court and take his opinion thereon. If after considering such opinion the Local Government is satisfied that such action is necessary, it may make in respect of such person any order authorised by section 22, and may further by order in writing direct—

- (a) the arrest of any such person without warrant;
- (b) the confinement of any such person in such place and under such conditions and restrictions as it may specify:

Provided that no such person shall be confined in that part of a prison or other place which is used for the confinement of convicted criminal prisoners as defined in the Prisons Act, 1894 (IX of 1894); and

- (c) the search of any place specified in the order which, in the opinion of the Local Government, has been, is being, or is about to be, used by any such person for any purpose connected with any anarchical or

revolutionary movement.

(2) The arrest of any person in pursuance of an order under clause (a) of sub-section (1) may be effected at any place where he may be found by any police officer or by any other officer of Government to whom the order may be directed.

(3) An order for confinement under clause (b) or for search under clause (c) of sub-section (1) may be carried out by any officer of Government to whom the order may be directed, and such officer may use all means reasonably necessary to enforce the same.

35. *Arrest.*—Any person making an arrest in pursuance of an order under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 34 shall forthwith report the fact to the Local Government and, pending receipt of the orders of the Local Government, may by order in writing commit any person so arrested to such custody as the Local Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf:

Provided that no person shall be detained in such custody for a period exceeding seven days unless the Local Government so directs, and in no case shall such detention exceed fifteen days.

36. *Search.*—An order for the search of any place issued under the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 34 shall be deemed to be a search warrant issued by the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in the place specified therein, and shall be sufficient authority for the seizure of anything found in such place which the person executing the order has reason to believe is being used, or is likely to be used, for any purpose prejudicial to the public safety, and the provisions of the Code, so far as they can be made applicable, shall apply to searches made under the authority of any such order and to the disposal of any property seized in any such search.

37. *Application of Part II procedure.*—Where an order (other than an order for arrest or search) has been made under section 34, the provisions of sections 23 to 27 shall apply in the same way as if the order were an order made under section 22, save that, on receipt of the report of the investigating authority, the Local Government may, subject to the conditions prescribed by section 27, make any order which is authorised by section 34, and sections 23 to 27 and 29 to 32 shall be deemed to be included in this Part.

#### PART IV

38. *Persons already under executive control.*—(1) On the expiration of the Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915, every person in respect of whom an order under rule 3 of the Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules, 1915 (IV of 1915), was in force immediately before the expira-

tion of that Act, and who has in the opinion of the Local Government been concerned in any scheduled offence, shall be deemed to be a person resident in an area in which a notification under section 21 is in force, and the provisions of Part II shall apply to every such person accordingly; and every person who is on such expiration in confinement in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818 (III of 1818), shall be deemed to be a person resident in an area in which a notification under section 33 is in force, and the provisions of Part III shall apply to every such person accordingly:

Provided that, within one month from the expiration of the Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915 (IV of 1915), the Local Government may, subject to the conditions prescribed in the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 27 as made applicable by section 37, make any order of restraint which is authorised by Part III in respect of any person who is in confinement in accordance with the provisions of the said Regulation, and if such an order is so made it shall be deemed to be an order made under sub-section (3) of section 27 as made applicable by section 37, and the provisions of that Part regarding such an order shall apply accordingly.

(2) On the expiration of the Ingress into India Ordinance, 1914 (V of 1914), as continued in force by the Emergency Legislation Continuance Act, 1915, any person in respect of whom an order was in force immediately before such expiration under section 2 of that Ordinance read with clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Foreigners Ordinance, 1914 (III of 1914), shall be deemed to be a person resident in an area in which a notification under section 21 is in force, and the provisions of Part II shall apply to every such person accordingly:

Provided that, within one month from the expiration of the Ingress into India Ordinance, 1914 (V of 1914), the Local Government may, subject to the conditions prescribed in the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 27, make any order of restraint which is authorised by that Part in respect of any such person, and if such an order is so made it shall be deemed to be an order made under sub-section (3) of section 27, and the provisions of that Part regarding such an order shall apply accordingly.

## PART V

**39. Effect of Cancellation of notifications under section 3, 21, or 33.—**When a notification issued under section 3 or section 21 or section 33 is cancelled, such cancellation shall not affect any trial, investigation or order commenced or made under this Act, and such trial, investigation or order may be continued or enforced, and on the completion of any such investigation, any order which might otherwise have been made, may be made and

enforced, as if such notification had not been cancelled.

40. *Effect of orders made under Parts II and III outside notified area.*—(1) An order made under Part II or Part III directing a person to remain or reside in any area in British India outside the area in which such Part is in force, shall be as valid, and enforceable in like manner, as if such Part were in force throughout British India.

(2) An order made under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 34 for the arrest of any person may be executed at any place in British India outside the area in which Part III is in force, and the same procedure shall be followed as if Part III was in force throughout British India:

Provided that, if the arrest is made outside the province of the Local Government which made the order, the report required by section 35 shall be made to that Local Government, and the maximum period of detention limited by the proviso to that section shall be extended to twenty-one days.

41. *Orders under this Act not to be called in question by the Courts.*—No order under this Act shall be called in question in any Court, and no suit or prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.

42. *Powers of Act to be commulative.*—All powers given by this Act, shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other powers conferred by or under any enactment, and all such powers may be exercised in the same manner and by the same authority as if this Act has not been passed.

#### THE SCHEDULE (See section 2)

(1) Any offence under the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely: sections 121, 121-A, 122, 123, 124, 131 and 132.

(2) Any of the following offences, if, in the opinion of Government, such offence is connected with any anarchical or revolutionary movement, namely:

(a) any offence under sections 124-A, 148, 153-A, 302, 304, 326, 327, 329, 332, 333, 385, 386, 387, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 431, 435, 436, 437, 438, 440, 454, 455, 457, 458, 459, 460, and 506 of Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860);  
 (b) any offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (VI of 1908);  
 (c) any offence under section 20 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878.

(3) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit or any abetment of any of the above offences.

## 52. Satyagrah Movement<sup>1</sup>

The arrival of Mr. Gandhi in our midst in connection with the *Satyagraha* movement ought to rouse the public to a sense of what it owes to self-respect, in the matter of the highhanded invasion of its liberties. There is, it is true, a section of opinion which considers passive resistance unwise, inexpedient and futile. The gospel of cowardice may often be wise with the wisdom of expediency, but it can never be popular. . . . Whether *Satya-graha* succeeds or fails it is due to our self-respect as the only form of protest left us.

## 53. The Black Bills<sup>2</sup>

Tuesday the 18th March 1919 will ever be known in the history of India as the Black Bill No. 1 becomes the Black Act of India and from this day onwards, till it is finally repealed and repealed it shall be—it will blacken the Statute Book of India. . . . Never in the whole history of India was such great defiance led against such a powerful and united voice of the country. Never were the peoples' representatives more cavalierly treated by the tin-gods in power. Never did we realise, as we do realise now, that the angle of vision has really changed for the worse. . . . Gentlemen, laugh on, but, pray do not forget that they laugh best who laugh last, and we can assure you that in this great struggle which has been needlessly provoked, India is determined that she shall have the last laugh, in the end.

## 54. Public Fury on the Rowlatt Act<sup>3</sup>

*Mother Bharata* has lost her crown and ornaments and is now suffering from the pinch of poverty. This law, which resembles a deadly poison will hamper even her present life and it looks as if she will be subjected to frequent attacks of severe disease. . . . The Viceroy, who did not pay heed even to Mr. Gandhi is not going to listen to the words of anyone hereafter. The conduct of Mr. Sarma<sup>4</sup> who has resigned will gladden the heart of

<sup>1</sup>*The Hindu* (Madras), 18 March 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in Madras 1919, p. 446.

<sup>2</sup>*Vartman* (Bombay), 18 March 1919, Report on Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 376.

<sup>3</sup>*Deshbaktam* (Madras), 19 March 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers of Madras, 1919, p. 517.

<sup>4</sup>B.N. Sarma (1867-1932) : Social reformer, lawyer and politician; Chairman, Visakhapatnam Municipality, 1905-9; Member, Madras Legislative Council 1906; Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1920.

**the Madrasis.** Why have not the other members sent in their resignations yet? . . . Even now the false patriots styling themselves moderates, the traitors to the country who kill their conscience for the sake of titles, the selfish people who seek the favours of the bureaucrats for securing appointments, have signed a manifesto against passive resistance. It is these moderates that spoil the progress of the country. When will this class cease to be? . . . The only way of making the Rowlatt Act ineffective and getting rid of eventually is to take to *Satyagraha* vow of Mr. Gandhi. Every patriot should consider that this law would affect him and regard all artificial pleasures and miseries. He should deem the prison to be his home. . . .

### 55. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri to S.G. Vaze,<sup>1</sup> 20 March 1919

[B.N.] Sarma was persuaded by H.E. at last night's dinner [to] withdraw his resignation. He has agreed.

Panditji [B.N. Sarma] says he will resign on Viceroy's assent being given. God alone knows whether he will do so.

Jinnah has authorised Sarma by wire to announce his (Jinnah's) resolve to resign if Viceroy and Montagu assent. Precise effect not clear, as Montagu need not assent.

[V.J.] Patel had a letter of resignation in pocket but thought himself of the difficulty of re-election and the Bills he had gathered. Khaparde left Delhi on 18th morning, in disgust as he will say.

Sir Michael has gone to Agra, and will be back tomorrow morning.

[Sir William] Vincent complains—bitter, unaccountably so, in my speech.

Viceroy says existence of Act sufficient to keep the anarchists in check. He does not expect to apply it even in Bengal.

[Sir George] Lowndes told me he had lost faith even in Panditji's straightforwardness. If he had not thought very well of him at first his disappointment and disillusionment would not be half so keen.

I must say Panditji is a bit crazy with thought and care. His behaviour is that of a big elite crying for the unattainable, and doing silly little things. . . .

### 56. Tilak's Political Activities in England,<sup>1</sup> March 1919

Mr. Tilak is now trying to deliver a few addresses on Indian Reforms

<sup>1</sup>V.S. Srinivasa Sastri Papers, No 312, NAI. Private letter.

<sup>2</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, file 1-4, NAI. This unsigned note is a part of the Khaparde Papers.

under the auspices of some associations here. He hopes to deliver four or five lectures in the next month. He addressed a meeting of some parliamentary members last week and it is expected that a Parliamentary Committee may be soon formed for furthering the cause of Indian constitutional Reforms as demanded by the Indian People.

We have as yet not succeeded in obtaining space in English<sup>\*</sup> papers for our propaganda.

### **57. Ronaldshay to Montagu,<sup>1</sup> 21 March 1919**

. . . Turning to political matter there is naturally a good deal of agitation in political circles just now over the passage of the Rowlatt Bills, though curiously enough a more excitement seems to prevail in Bombay than in Calcutta. Mr. Gandhi has started a passive resistance movement, but it is difficult to say to what extent this will catch on. The moderate politicians have issued a manifesto against the movement. . . .

### **58. Breaking of Laws<sup>2</sup>**

In what way is the suffering to be invited, beyond the general idea of breaking the certain selected laws, has not been made known. The principle of such breaking is, to my mind, against good citizenship while the motive of a real Satyagrahi, as conceived by Mr. Gandhi, is noble and selfless. As an education of individual character the vow should be useful, but if widely adopted it will be civilly dangerous.

### **59. Sir George Lloyd to Chelmsford,<sup>3</sup> March 1919**

I write a brief line to tell you my impressions of the progress of the passive resistance movement in Bombay up to date.

Horniman is still rather hysterical in the *Chronicle* and is doing his utmost to get signatories to the *Satyagrah* movement, but the general impression is that things are not going too well in this direction in Bombay, and that the whole movement is now on the turn of failure or success. The share

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, 1919, Vol. 30, Roll No. 4, NMML.

<sup>2</sup>The Commonweal (Madras), 21 March 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in Madras, 1919, p. 495.

<sup>3</sup>Chelmsford Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 154, NMML.

and cloth markets closed for one day, the day before yesterday, as a protest against the passage of Rowlatt Bills, but their obvious disinclination to lose money for the sake of the movement resulted in their re-opening on the following day as has excited ridicule rather than respect. I think that during the next week or ten days we shall be able to judge fairly accurately whether their attempts shall succeed or fail as regards popular support.

#### **60. Public Reaction on the Rowlatt Act<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The struggle lasted for two days and two nights in the Legislative Council during the last weeks and the valiant Indian champions of liberty and justice fought bravely and fought by every inch of ground before they had to yield under the pressure of the solid Anglo-Indian block. . . . But after all it was a losing game, and as the non-officials were in a minority, they had to encounter defeat in every stage from the statutory majority of the official block. Their defeat in the defence of liberty is, however, more glorious and more enviable than the official success in creating a standing menace to liberty and in spite of the defeat, the vanquished will be more honoured and respected than the un-British Anglo-Indians in the Council. . . . The atmosphere is already surcharged with the news of passive resistance in which all the Moderates and the Nationalists will commingle. . . This will severely fan the dying flames of revolutionary activities and the object for which the law is intended will be totally frustrated. . . .

#### **61. Gandhi's Instructions on Satyagraha Pledge to Volunteers<sup>2</sup>, 23 March 1919**

Volunteers shall read and explain the *Satyagraha* pledge to every intending signatory before taking his signature to the vow. The pledge is in three parts: The first lays down the objects of the pledge. It declares that the signatories are of opinion that the Rowlatt Bills are "unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals." In order to be able to make this statement, one must fully understand the Rowlatt Bills; hence it is the duty of the volunteers to explain the Bills clearly to the intending signatory.

<sup>1</sup>*Mahratta*, 23 March 1919, Report on Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 370. *Mahratta*, a weekly of Poona, was published every Sunday.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 313.

The vow forms the second part of the pledge. Hence the signatory solemnly affirms that he will refuse civilly to disobey certain laws. Volunteers must explain to the signatory the full significance of the word "civilly". For instance, to break moral laws is not civil disobedience. Nor is it civil disobedience to be discourteous to officials with whom one may have to deal, while disobeying laws. On the other hand, the possession and distribution to the public of literature proscribed by Government and which one sincerely believes to be harmless, would be civil disobedience. Volunteers must explain to the would be signatory, with the help of such illustrations, the full significance of the pledge.

Volunteers must explain to every intending signatory that he must be prepared to bear every kind of suffering and to sacrifice, if necessary, both his person and property. He should also be made to understand that he must be prepared to carry on the struggle single-handed even if left alone. The volunteer must accept the signature only after satisfying himself that the signatory is prepared to take all these risks.

The third part of the pledge declares that the Satyagrahi will, during the struggle, fearlessly adhere to truth and *Ahimsa*, for instance, he must not misrepresent anything or hurt anybody's feelings. Volunteers must urge upon people the necessity of fully realising the grave responsibility of adhering to truth and *Ahimsa* before signing the pledge. Volunteers must not speak of things they do not understand and must not hold out false hopes to anybody. If they find themselves unable to explain anything they must consult the Committee or refer the would be signatory to it. *Ahimsa* includes "*Avesha*". Volunteers therefore must never resort to unfair criticism of the opponents of the movement. If in performing their duties they are obstructed by the police or others, they must not lose their temper but must courteously explain to those opposing them their (Volunteers) duty and their determination under any circumstances to perform the same.

## 62. Gandhi's Hartal Declaration,<sup>1</sup> 23 March 1919

*Satyagraha*, as I have endeavoured to explain at several meetings, is essentially a religious movement. It is a process of purification and penance. It seeks to secure reforms or redress of grievances by self-suffering. I therefore venture to suggest that the second Sunday after the publication of the Viceregal assent to Bill No. 2 of 1919 may be observed as a day of

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 147.

humiliation and prayer . . . . A twenty-four hours fast, counting from the last meal of the preceding night, should be observed by all adults unless prevented from doing so by consideration of religion or health. The fast is not to be regarded in any shape or form in the nature of hunger-strike or designed to put any pressure upon Government. It is to be regarded for Satyagrahis as a necessary discipline to fit them for the civil disobedience contemplated in their pledge and for all others as some slight token of the intensity of their wounded feelings.

All work except such as may be necessary in the public interests should be suspended for the day. Markets and other business places should be closed. Employees who are required to work even on Sundays may only suspend work after obtaining previous leave. I do not hesitate to recommend these two suggestions for adoption by public servants for, though it is an unquestionably right thing for them not to take part in political discussions and gatherings, in my opinion they have the undoubted right to express upon vital matters their feelings in the very limited manner herein suggested. Public meetings should be held on that day in all parts of India not excluding villages at which a resolution praying for the withdrawal of the measures should be passed. If my advice is deemed worthy of acceptance, the responsibility will lie in the first instance on various *Satyagraha* Associations for undertaking this demonstration a success.

### **63. C.F. Andrews to J.L. Maffey,<sup>1</sup> 25 March 1919**

. . . Will you tell His Excellency that I feel that a very grave harm is being done by hurrying through the Rowlatt Bill No. 1 in the face of united opposition of Indian Members of all classes?

### **64. Opposition to the Rowlatt Act,<sup>2</sup> 26 March 1919**

Let Lord Chelmsford and his Government entertain no delusion. The responsibility is theirs for what has been done and for what will come out of it. Roses cannot grow from thistles and the gruesome episode of the

<sup>1</sup>C.F. Andrews (1875-1940) : Anglican priest; associate and friend of Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi.

<sup>2</sup>The *Bombay Chronicle* (Bombay), Report on Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 407.

*The Bombay Chronicle* was the most popular English paper in the Bombay Presidency. Mr. B.G. Horniman was its first editor who was deported by the Government in May 1919.

passing of Rowlatt Bill cannot be closed with a quotation about the renewal of love between faithful friends who have fallen out. . . . We are as keen as the Viceroy himself that a spirit of friendship and co-operation should prevail over our public life, but he must realise that the nature of the Rowlatt Bill and the way in which it has been forced through make friendship and co-operation impossible. A fine phrase has never reconciled a nation to the virtual loss of its liberties. It may be that the falling out of faithful friends is an opportunity for the renewal of friendship. A time may come for it, but that time is not yet when the wounds are raw.

#### **65. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye<sup>1</sup>, 27 March 1919**

I have sent my usual report to Mr. Baptista who has been requested to show it to you or would . . . . In spite of the adverse verdict, I am doing my other work as zealously as I am. The idea of appeal is given up. Nobody advises it. As the matters stand it means a heavy pecuniary loss to us. But there is no help.

#### **66. M.A. Jinnah to Chelmsford,<sup>2</sup> 28 March 1919**

The passing of the Rowlatt Bill by the Government of India and the assent given to it by your Excellency as Governor-General against the will of the people has severely shaken the trust reposed by them in British justice. Further it has clearly demonstrated the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council which is a legislature but in name—a machine propelled by a foreign executive. Neither the unanimous opinion of the non-official Indian Members nor the entire public opinion and feeling outside has met with the least respect.

Besides by passing this Bill your Excellency's Government have actively negatived every argument they advanced, but a year ago when they appealed to India for help at the War Conference had ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war.

The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State by an over-fretful and incompetent bureaucracy, which is neither responsible to the people, nor in touch with real public opinion and their sole plea is that the powers when they are assumed will not be abused.

<sup>1</sup>Dr. D.D. Sathaye's Papers, No. 91.

<sup>2</sup>Chelmsford Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 171.

I, therefore, as a protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed, tender my resignation as a Member of the Imperial Legislative Council, for I feel that under the prevailing conditions I can be of no use to my people, nor consistently with one's self-respect is co-operation possible with a Government that shows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people in the Council Chamber and for the feelings and sentiments of the people outside.

In my opinion a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilised government and I still hope that the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu will advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this black Act.

#### **67. Gandhi's Letter to the<sup>b</sup> Press on the Delhi Riots,<sup>1</sup> 3 April 1919**

. . . I hope that the next Sunday [at] *Satyagraha* meetings all speeches will be free from passion, anger or resentment. The movement depends for its success entirely upon perfect self-possession, self-restraint, absolute adherence to truth and unlimited capacity for self-suffering.

Before closing this letter I would add that in opposing the Rowlatt legislation, Satyagrahis are resisting the spirit of the terrorist which lies behind it and of which it is the most glaring symptom. The Delhi Tragedy imposes added responsibility upon Satyagrahis of steeling their hearts and going on with their struggle until the Rowlatt legislation is withdrawn.

#### **68. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>2</sup> 4 April 1919**

Having given the matter my most anxious and careful consideration, I regret I have been driven to the conclusion that, in view of the attitude which the government considered it necessary to adopt in the matter of what is known as the Rowlatt Bill, and the proceedings of the Council in relation thereto, I ought not to continue to be an Additional Member of the Council as it is constituted at present. I, therefore, beg respectfully, and with deep regret, to resign my office as such Member.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, February 1920, 373; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 168. This letter was originally written by Gandhi from Bombay to Editor, *The Bombay Chronicle* on 3 April 1919 and was published on 4 April 1919. It appeared in *The Tribune* on 5 April.

<sup>2</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 186, NAI.

### **69. The Government Repression<sup>1</sup>**

In Bombay strikes many a time it was on police advice that the mills were closed in order to prevent trouble and it was not unusual thing for the police to release those arrested in order to calm the excited crowd. But the authorities in Delhi brought and bred up in another school relied on machine-guns and rifles. Was civil force used to disperse the mob before the military was requisitioned? What was the attitude of the people of Delhi? Did they assist civil forces and barricade the streets? Did they take up a threatening attitude endangering peace and property? Were the leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement called in to pacify the people before extreme measures were resorted to? . . . The Delhi tragedy has a lesson for the people and for the bureaucracy as well. The bureaucracy would do well to realise that the days of martial law and no damned nonsense are gone for ever. The people are now conscious of their rights and privileges and they are ready to suffer for them. The old ways and old methods of governance can no longer be adhered to . . . The *Satyagraha* movement is both spiritual and political, but no anxiety need be felt that reforms will be neglected as is expressed in certain quarters. Only for the sake of certain reforms, which may or may not come, the country cannot reconcile itself to a loss of fundamental and elementary rights.

### **70. Unjust Law<sup>2</sup>**

The 6th April will remain memorable in the history of India's fight for freedom. Liberty has been enchain'd by the passing of the Rowlatt Act and the Passive Resistance Movement started by Mahatma Gandhi is intended to break these chains. . . . A trial of strength, not necessarily physical, is an indispensable preliminary . . . If the Rowlatt Act can be repealed by Passive Resistance, what act is there, old or new, which can stand the force of such an opposition? And if we can repeal any unjust law why cannot we by the same process get necessary legislation passed? And what is that but self-government? The fact is that Mahatma Gandhi is laying the most *pucca* foundation on which the Indian nation is to be built.

<sup>1</sup>*The Bombay Chronicle*, 4 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 423.

<sup>2</sup>*Home Ruler*, 5 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 455.

### **71. Indissoluble Union<sup>1</sup>**

The *Satyagraha* movement has now been sealed with the blood of its first martyrs. Indians will not only steel their hearts but will accept the vow with faith and good cheer . . . this tragedy has linked Hindus and Muhammadans with bonds of indissoluble union.

### **72. Firing in Delhi<sup>2</sup>**

. . . Calcutta, the former capital of the Government of India, was proud of the fact that the blood of the martyrs had been shed there but the new Imperial capital has not lagged behind. It is a cruel irony of fate that such bloody incident occurred in quick succession among the people whose loyalty has been proved by means of heavy sacrifice of money and life during the war. The world is amazed at the spectacle of a Peace Conference setting in Paris and a shower of bullets from rifles and machine guns falling on the unarmed people of India and Egypt.

### **73. A Plea for Inquiry<sup>3</sup>**

Even if machine guns were not used is it any pleasure to be killed by the bullets of an ordinary rifle. People were only demanding the release of their arrested brethren at the station and that could be no justification for the action of the authorities. But for the presence of Swami Shraddhanand, and the inspiration of Mr. Gandhi which preserved the true satyagrahee spirit, official arbitrariness would have gone to far greater lengths and more innocent blood would have been shed. Government should immediately order a thorough investigation into the whole affair by impartial and reliable men.

### **74. Sir Michael O'Dwyer on Arrests in the Punjab,<sup>4</sup> 7 April 1919**

. . . A year ago there were 84 persons restricted under the Defence of India Act. Seven were so restricted during the year making a total of 91, but

<sup>1</sup>*Independence* (Allahabad), 5 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 130. The *Independence* was a nationalist daily founded by Motilal Nehru in 1919.

<sup>2</sup>*Medina* (Bijnor), 6 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 130.

<sup>3</sup>*Pratap* (Kanpur), 7 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 130.

<sup>4</sup>Sir Michael O'Dwyer (1864-1940); Entered I.C.S. 1885; I.t.-Governor of Punjab, 1913-19.

64 were released and there are now only 24 under restriction and 13 of these are only under the obligation to report their movements. There were also on 1st April, 5 persons and 2 newspapers excluded from the Province and 1 newspaper in the Province under an order of precensorship.

. . . The cases of 61 persons restricted under the Defence of India Act were examined by two Judges of the Chief Court during the year and their conclusion was that in all cases the orders were fully justified. They recommended relaxation of restriction owing to improved conditions in 14 cases, but government had already anticipated their suggestions and even went far beyond them after hostilities ceased.

. . . A year ago there were 29 persons interned under the Ingress Ordinances; 14 more were interned during the year but 36 were released, and there are now only 7 interned. These few left are dangerous revolutionaries who have yet not satisfied us that they have changed their views and can satisfy us that they have changed their views and can safely be released. A year ago there were 628 restricted to their villages under the Ordinance-160; more were so restricted during the year, but no less than 524 have been released and there now only 124 restricted exclusively of 37 released on probation. I would remind the Council that from the beginning of the War we have had nearly 10,000 returned emigrants to deal with, the majority of whom on their return were found to have been infected by the enemy's propaganda with revolutionary ideas. Altogether about 400 were at one time or another interned in jail. The number is now only 7. These were the most desperate characters. Some 3,000 who were less dangerous were restricted to their villages, and in regard to the rest no special measure, beyond the salutary influences of their own people, were deemed necessary. It is clear therefore that as the internal situation improved, government did not delay to relax restrictions and even to take risks.

I would ask in all seriousness in this the calm and reasonable atmosphere which is needed to prepare the way for Constitutional Reforms? It certainly is not—and those who are creating that unhealthy atmosphere are the most dangerous enemies of the cause of reform which they propose to champion. Fortunately, their influence does not correspond to the noise they make. They do not speak with the voice of the Punjab.

. . . In pursuance of those obligations, this government has strongly supported the proposal in the Reform Scheme for separate representation of the Sikhs who hitherto, in spite of their historic position, material record and the great stake in the province have rarely succeeded in getting an elected representative in this Council.

Government has also put forward suggestions to adjust the balance between rural and urban interests which do not always coincide, and in this matter has been glad to find itself in substantial agreement with the great majority of non-official members of this Council.

### **75. Reaction in Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Karachi closed its shops and centres of business; when did such stupendous thing happen in the history of the city? . . . One was impressed at yesterday's function with one soul-stirring fact—the disappearance of communal, parochial and sectarian impulses. There were 'Hindus', 'Muhammadans', 'Parsis', 'Khojas', 'Jains' yesterday; but they all felt that they belonged to one *community*, the Indian; they all felt that there was the one Religion in various religions, the Religion of Self-respect, the Religion of guarding Indian's Rights, for the service of Humanity. . . . The Pathans (who roast meat in the Toria bazar) closed their shops as did the Khojas and Hindus on the Bunder Road; the Parsis and Khojas and Muslims in the camp.

### **76. Gandhi's Instructions to Satyagrahis,<sup>2</sup> 8 April 1919**

We are now in a position to expect to be arrested at any moment. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that if anyone is arrested, he should without causing any difficulty allow himself to be arrested, and if summoned to appear before court he should do so. No defence should be offered and no pleaders engaged in the matter. If a fine is imposed with an alternative of imprisonment, imprisonment should be accepted; if only a fine is imposed it ought not be paid, but his property, if he has any, should be allowed to be sold. There should be no demonstration of grief or otherwise made by the remaining Satyagrahis by reason of the arrest and imprisonment of their comrade. It cannot be too often repeated that we court imprisonment and we may not complain of it when we actually receive it. When once imprisoned it is our duty to conform to all prison regulations, as prison reform is no part of our campaign at the present moment. A Satyagrahi may not resort to surreptitious practices of which ordinary prisoners are often found to be guilty. All that a Satyagrahi does can only and must be done openly.

### **77. The Secretary, Home Department, Government of India to Private Secretary to Viceroy,<sup>3</sup> 9 April 1919**

Clear the line, No. 499 on the question of Gandhi's entering Delhi and

<sup>1</sup>*New Times* (Sind), 8 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 457.

The *New Times* was an English daily of Sind, edited by T.K. Jeswani.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 183. Originally this pamphlet was published in the first issue of the *Satyagrahi* weekly (unregistered) on 7 April 1919.

<sup>3</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 195, Telegram.

the Punjab. [William] Vincent has been in telephonic communication with O'Dwyer and [C.A.] Barron today and has also consulted [W.H.] Hailey. On the evening of the 8th instant Gandhi is reported to have left Bombay for Delhi. In the opinion of O'Dwyer the situation is now serious and it is advisable that Gandhi should under Regulation of III of 1818 be deported to Burma. In 1907 similar deportation of Lajpat Rai was very effective. O'Dwyer thinks that the prosecution of Gandhi in Bombay under Press Act would be playing into his hands. Leading men in Lahore, including many of Congress Party, have been consulted by O'Dwyer and they think that the position is very serious and that matters have now passed out of their control. O'Dwyer considers that the Government of India should take action immediately. Barron considers it very dangerous at present to allow Gandhi into Delhi, as it is probable that he would break the law and would have to be arrested and tried for an offence there. This would create disturbance and probably mean recurrence of recent rioting. Barron is therefore issuing an order prohibiting Gandhi from entering Delhi Province.

The Government of the Punjab have already prohibited Gandhi from entering their province and propose, if he disobeys order as he will probably do *en route* from Bombay to Delhi, to arrest him. Vincent at any rate at present does not agree with O'Dwyer as to expediency of deportation, as sympathy of many who do not approve Gandhi's conduct would be alienated by such action. In Egypt recent doings show deportation might cause general conflagration. After consulting Sir James Meston<sup>1</sup> and Sir George Lowndes the Home Member has telegraphed to the Punjab and the United Provinces Governments and the Chief Commissioner, Delhi sanctioning the issue by them of an order under Rule 3(4), Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules, directing Gandhi to remain in Bombay Presidency and informing them that it will be their duty to use all reasonable means to enforce this order. All other local Governments have been informed of this, and the Government of Bombay have been informed that they may, if they think it necessary, issue further order of restriction after Gandhi's return to that Presidency, but that Government of India would prefer his prosecution under Press Act if that can be expedited. The Government of the Punjab and the Chief Commissioner of Delhi have been requested to avoid so far as possible all use of force to Gandhi and treat him with all consideration. He is to be informed that if his visit to Delhi is not for inaugurating a campaign to break the law, and if he will be given an undertaking not to promote any such violation, Government of India will reconsider question of allowing him to enter Delhi later, but that his going there under present circumstances would cause disturbances and cannot be permitted, and that the Government of India trust therefore that he

<sup>1</sup>Sir James Meston (later 1st Barron Meston), (1865-1943). Entered I.C.S., 1885; Lt. Governor of U.P., 1912-18,

will carry out orders now issued and return to Bombay quietly. Vincent considers that it will be impossible for him to go to Delhi on 12th instant unless and until the situation improves.

### 78. Gandhi's Message,<sup>1</sup> 9 April 1919

To my Countrymen.

It is matter of the highest concern to me as I hope to you, that I have received an order from the Punjab Government not to enter that province, and another from the Delhi Government not to enter Delhi, while an order of the Government of India which was served on me immediately after restricts me to Bombay. I had no hesitation in saying to the officer who served the order on me that I was bound in virtue of the pledge to disregard it, which I have done and I shall presently find myself a freeman, my body being taken by them in their custody.

It was galling to remain free whilst the Rowlatt legislation disfigured the Statute Book. My arrest makes me free. It now remains for you to do your duty which is clearly stated in the *Satyagraha* pledge. Follow it and you will find it will be your *Kamadhenu*. I hope there will be no resentment about my arrest. I have received what I was seeking, either the withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation or imprisonment. . . .

I hope the Hindu-Muslim unity, which seems now to have taken a firm hold of the people, will become a reality. . . . The responsibility of the Hindus in this matter is greater than that of the Muhammadans, they being in minority, and I hope they will discharge their responsibility in a manner worthy of their country.

I have also made certain suggestions regarding the proposed Swadeshi vow. I commend them to your serious attention and you will find that as your ideas of *Satyagraha* become mature the Hindu-Muslim unity are but parts of *Satyagraha*. Finally it is my firm belief that we shall obtain salvation only through suffering and not by reforms dropping on us from England, no matter how unhesitatingly they might be granted. . . .

We are groaning under suffering which we would avoid if we could, because we have swerved from the path laid down for us by the ancient civilization.

I hope that Hindus, Muhammadans, Sikhs, Parsees, Christians, Jews and all who are born in India or who made India their land of adoption will fully participate in these national observations and I hope, too, that women will take therein as full a share as men.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373; The Collected works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 197. Gandhi delivered this message after being prevented from entering the Punjab

### 79. The Delhi Affray<sup>1</sup>

The bureaucracy have not let any grass grow under their feet but have been judging from all accounts anxious to nip in the bud, a movement conceived by them to be a nuisance. The full measure of arbitrary power which would be enjoyed by the executive in future under the Black Law can hardly be realised at the moment, but the tragedy at Delhi comes as a foretaste of what is in store for the public. It must have been expected by the Government that the protest against the arbitrary passage of the Bill through the Legislative Council, the character of the new law, and the method of carrying it through was bound to be universal and shared by everyone in the community and it goes without saying that they would not exactly approve of such a protest, however, respectfully and in an orderly manner it may be made, because the current theory and the accepted tradition of the Indian Government all that the public should be always grateful to them whatever their gift may be, whether it is bread or whether it be stone or whether, as in this case, it is iron chains calculated to emasculate and perpetually to enslave the people of this country. The exponents of passive resistance believe neither in brickbats nor in bullets, but while they will warn the public for their own and for the good will of the country scrupulously to refrain from any manifestation of hatred or violence even on those whom they love and whom they consider to be misguided, they would also warn the Government against the use of bullets, against the use of guns of military force.

. . . An anonymous correspondent discusses at length the Delhi affray and concludes . . . "The crowning lie which detracts from any value which the official vision may have had, is that no boys were killed. It is now known in Delhi beyond doubt that at least two boys were killed on the spot at Chandni Chowk and several more among those injured or wounded died since. No trace is found of those who were killed at the railway station. . . . The proper authority to exonerate them would have been an independent commission and evidently the Government know their own weakness too well to entertain such an idea for a single minute. . . .

### 80. Chelmsford's Failure<sup>2</sup>

Lord Chelmsford has failed to understand the psychology of the people's mind. Here lies the real danger. No Government in the world, however

<sup>1</sup>*Young India*, 9 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 467.

<sup>2</sup>*The Bombay Chronicle*, 9 April 1919; Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 457.

autocratic it may be, will dare to disregard the universal feelings of a whole nation when the governed lose trust in the Government and the Government becomes suspicious about the people, an atmosphere of distrust prevails everywhere. The good relations which ought to subsist between the rulers and the ruled become strained. Needless sufferings follow—but the victory ultimately remains with the people. That is the lesson of history which should not be lost sight of . . . .

### **81. Demonstrations in Bombay<sup>1</sup>**

No one could have witnessed the extraordinary scenes on the day of national mourning and protest, enacted in the city of Bombay or could have read the accounts which are pouring in from all sides of unprecedented demonstrations held on Sunday last without feeling that this was the beginning of a new era in Indian political life . . . . We, however, realise that this is only the beginning. What is still wanted is to steel our hearts against violence which is bound to proceed from exasperated officials and others whose notion of prestige would be rudely shocked at all these demonstrations and these fraternisations and at the public protests . . . . The next step that is indicated by Mahatma Gandhi is the adoption of the Swadeshi vow.

For those who cannot tolerate injustice and untruth and who by their inner courage, temperament and social condition are prepared to put in bigger efforts in this direction, Mahatma Gandhi has extended the invitation to join the *Satyagraha Sabha*. The object of this Sabha has been over and over again misrepresented both by friends and by foes. We cannot help pointing out, how very objectionable the attitude of the Moderate politician is in regard to the black law. The scarred hearts of the public is none of their concern, but their eyes seemed to be turned to the reforms under which they are going to have a few more officers and a few more emoluments. To the man in the street, the whole question of reforms has become altogether secondary and a mockery while the Government persist in their unjust attitude about the black law. With that law on the Statute Book no honest man would have any scope for public work of any kind . . . .

Mahatma Gandhi and his followers do not press anybody to do anything without the fullest thought and consideration, but the public is entitled to know what is the alternative programme of these political parties if they are not going to come and join in *Satyagraha* movement.

<sup>1</sup>Young India, 9 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 455.

## 82. India on Trial<sup>1</sup>

He [Gandhi] has now received what he was seeking—either the withdrawal of the Rowlatt Legislation or imprisonment. He has done his duty. And now he asks his countrymen to do their duty. To his call, the country will, we have no doubt, make the fullest response in the manner as well as in substance. . . . India is now on her trial in way she has never been. For years, as he says her people have been groaning under suffering which they would avoid if they would because they have swerved from the path laid down for them by the makers of the civilization of which they are the proud inheritors. The country must rise to the full height of its opportunity. . . .

## 83. Satyagraha Movement<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Gandhi's return to Bombay was hailed by the people yesterday with feelings of the utmost joy. We are glad he is back amongst us and the huge concourse of people which met last evening at Chawpatty, gave him a welcome which was the most impressive of its kind ever witnessed in Bombay. The air is still tense with excitement. Occurrences all over India have so disturbed the atmosphere that people are in a state of painful suspense: the rumours that circulate and disquiet them. . . . The attempt to couple *Satyagraha* with shooting is as wrong as it is unjust to Mr. Gandhi. The truth is that the *Satyagraha* movement is the most effective check we have upon an agitation which was inevitable. We are convinced that there would have been more violence on the part of the Executive and more provocation on the part of the crowds if *Satyagraha* had not at every turn striven to pacify the people. The *Satyagraha* movement did not precipitate the agitation, which Govts. all over the world call negligible and manufactured, as long as they can help it. . . . The *Satyagraha* movement has been an asset of peace and is in its full strength, capable of drawing all evil consequences of repression to a narrow and prescribed channel. . . . To impeach Mr. Gandhi as the first cause, any great malefactor of every trouble is wrong, as his personality is pacifying an inevitably powerful agitation and reducing it to a smaller scale of struggle. . . .

<sup>1</sup>The *Bombay Chronicle*, 11 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 451.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 12 April 1919, p. 462.

#### **84. Satyagraha Movement<sup>1</sup>**

The movement in Bombay and several other places has degenerated into active resistance and as every day passes we obtain undesirable proof conditions assuming an ominous outlook, which certainly, if not held in timely check, would culminate into acts of violence, and a state of lawlessness and disorder. . . .

#### **85. Bureaucratic Folly<sup>2</sup>**

The bureaucracy has been so much elated by the success gained in the war that it has lost sight of the fact that the people in India are working as to whether it is prepared to enable this country in accordance to the principles enunciated by the statesmen of England during the period of the war. The mistakes of the bureaucracy are due to its having been used to the exercise of uncontrolled authority during the continuance of the war and its present desire to continue to exercise the powers enjoyed by it.

. . . The present situation has arisen owing to government having used a sledge hammer to kill a fly. Mr. Gandhi has been advocating the violations of the provisions of the Press Act. But there is nothing new in that. We have discussed the question very frequently since the passing of the Act. We would have had nothing to say against the Act if it had been put into operation against an objectionable literature, but the bureaucrats by their folly have given the people an opportunity to prove the futility of the Act.

#### **86. Official Account of Events in Amritsar,<sup>3</sup> 12 April 1919**

. . . Orders having been received for the arrest and deportation of Drs. Kitchlew<sup>4</sup> and Satyapal,<sup>5</sup> the Deputy Commissioner sent for them on the morning of April 10th to his house, from where they left in motors to

<sup>1</sup>Gujarat Mitra, 13 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspaper published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 494.

<sup>2</sup>Gujarati, 13 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 499.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. B, Deposit, June 1919, No. 23.

<sup>4</sup>Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew (1883-1963); Lawyer and politician; took leading part in Anti-Rowlatt Bills Agitation; arrested and deported to Dharmshala on 10 April 1919; participated in Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements.

<sup>5</sup>Dr. Satyapal; prominent leader of Amritsar; participated in Anti-Rowlatt Bills Agitation; deported to Dharmshala on 10 April 1919.

Dharmshala at about 10.35 with an escort, in charge of Mr. Rehill, Superintendent of Police. By about 11 a.m. the news of the arrests became known in the city and ardent followers of the deportees went round urging the people to close their shops and assemble in the Aitchison Park with the intention of proceeding to the Deputy Commissioner's house and demanding their release.

As it was expected that the arrests of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal would cause a certain amount of excitement, it had been previously arranged that the officer commanding the station would have a force of British infantry and some mounted men from the Ammunition column in the Ram Bagh with which he was to hold the railway foot-bridge, the railway over-bridge and the hospital level-crossing, while the police lines level-crossing was to be held by the police. There was an armed police reserve of 75 men at the city Kotwali under the orders of Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the Civil Inspector. . . .

At about 11.30 a.m. the city inspector informed Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, by telephone that crowds were proceeding to Aitchison Park. This officer immediately informed the Police Commissioner at the *kutchery*, and while there he received a second message to the effect that the mobs were being led by Ratto<sup>1</sup> and Bugga,<sup>2</sup> Kitchlew's lieutenants, and intended going to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to demand the release of Kitchlew and Satyapal.

#### *Mob's First Appearance*

Mr. Plomer immediately galloped to inform the Officer Commanding Troops, who was outposting mounted piquets at the points he was to hold, and eventually he found him at the railway station. Leaving Officer Commanding Troops with his infantry in the RamBagh, Mr. Plomer went on to the Police Lines, where he had a spare armed reserve of 25 men and a few mounted police, with whom he hurried to the railway foot-bridge, the railway lines and the road near Madan's shop. The mounted piquet was stoned by the mob, when the police arrived. The mob fell back to the foot-bridge, with police facing them with the bayonets fixed and at the ready position, when some members of the local bar rushed forward and asked Mr. Plomer not to fire and that they would take the mob back to the city. That was agreed to as the infantry was not yet in sight.

The mob was induced to retire and by the time the infantry piquets arrived the foot-bridge and railway lines was practically clear of it. The foot- and over-bridges were immediately taken over by the military, and hospital crossing by the police piquet. In the meanwhile a mob had entered the

<sup>1</sup>Mahashe Rattan Chand; social reformer and politician.

<sup>2</sup>Chaudhry Bugga Mal; a political worker of Amritsar; arrested on 12 April 1919 in Anti-Rowlatt Bills Agitation.

railway goods yard and assaulted Mr. Bennett, the Station Superintendent, who had a very narrow escape. Guard Robinson, who was in the yard, was less fortunate, and was overtaken and beaten to death with *lathis*.

#### *Attack on Telegraph Office*

Another large crowd attacked the Telegraph Office from two sides, and smashed the telephone switch-board to bits, and destroyed the furniture in the Telegraph Master's quarters. Mr. Pinto, the Telegraph Master, was seized, and was being dragged out of his bedroom in the presence of his wife, when he was rescued by two men of the 54th Sikhs (Muhammadans) a small party of whom had been sent from the railway station to protect the Telegraph Office. About this time Sergeant Rowlands, electrician, who was on his way on foot to the Municipal Power House from the Fort, was chased, overtaken and beaten to death near the Rego Bridge.

#### *Murder and Outrage in the City*

Another mob of some thousands made a determined attempt to cross into the civil lines by the railway over-bridge, and began stoning the infantry piquet holding it. It was eventually fired on by order of the District Magistrate, dispersed and driven into the city. About this time columns of smoke began to rise inside the city, and it became evident that the mob thwarted in its attempt to burn and pillage the civil lines, had begun to wreck its vengeance on British Banks and Christian religious buildings inside the city to murder every Britisher they came across.

The National Bank of India was attacked, and its Manager, Mr. Stewart, was brutally murdered in one room, and his assistant Mr. Scott, was done to death in an adjoining one. The office furniture was heaped on the bodies and set on fire. The bank building was set fire too, and the store godowns were burst open and their contents (piecegoods) looted.

The Charted Bank was then attacked and the furniture and fittings then smashed up, but every effort to break open the safe failed. The Manager J.W. Thomson, and his Assistant, Mr. Ross, were hiding at the top of a staircase and were rescued by a party of police from the *Kotwali*, which is not more than 50 yards away. The mob [was] looting on their approach.

The Alliance Bank was similarly attacked, the mob breaking open the door, rushed upstairs into the office room. Mr. G.M. Thompson, the Manager, fired through a crevice in the door and killed one of the rioters. He then ran up the steps to the top of the roof, where he was followed by the mob, who went up by another staircase in the piece-goods market. Driven from the roof he came down the steps leading to his office, where he was seized, beaten and left for dead. Hearing that he was still alive the mob rushed up again and finished him off, and threw his body into the street below, where they heaped office furniture on it and set fire to it. The Bank safe was burst open and the contents, notes and cash were looted. Mr.

Thompson's body was removed later on by the police to the *Kotwali*.

The Religious Society's Book Depot and Hall were burnt and the Indian pastor, the Rev. Jaswant Singh and his wife, who were living in the upper storey just managed to escape in time.

The Town Hall and the Sub-Post Office attached to it were set on fire and completely gutted, while the Sub-Post Offices at the Golden Temple, Majit Mandi and Dahab Basti Ram were looted.

#### *Attack on Mission ladies*

The Zenana Hospital was attacked and every effort was made by the mob to find the lady doctor. Mrs. Easdon, who was hiding upstairs and had she been found she would have most certainly lost her life. Later on she was guided to the house of a police constable, by whom she was taken at night to the military piquet, at the foot-bridge in a *Burka*.

Miss Sherwood,<sup>1</sup> a mission lady, was caught in the heart of the city while on her way to a girls school and was beaten with shoes and sticks till she fell down exhausted when she was rescued by some Hindus living in the same quarter and carried to their house. From there she was taken to Dr. Lamb's hospital by Dr. Balwant Singh, a private practitioner who took her out of the hospital the same night to the railway station, whence she was conveyed to the Fort.

Outside the city the mob set fire to the Indian Christian Church, the bare walls of which only remain standing.

The Normal Girls schools was attacked, and cloth and books etc., set on fire to a culvert and was dispersed on the arrival of the Calcutta Down Mail, which had an armed railway Police guard on board, who fired on the mob. The dispersal of this mob was the saving of the water works machinery, and the lives of the European Engineer and his family, who live on the spot.

The railway station of Bhagtanwala on the Tarn Taran line was burnt down and looted also.

#### *Arrival of reinforcement*

Fortunately about 2 p.m. a train with 270 gurkhas on board arrived from Jullundur side. The men were immediately detrained and made use of to protect the railway station and the civil lines from any further attack.

Later on in the evening troops arrived from Jullundur and Lahore.

About midnight a strong force of military entered the city by the Ram Bagh gate, with Mr. Plower, Deputy Superintendent of Police, as guide, and went on as far as the city *Kotwali*, and returned to military headquarters at the railway station, bringing both Messrs. Thompson and Ross

<sup>1</sup>Miss Francis Sherwood: A Missionary Doctor and Superintendent of the Mission Schools at Amritsar. On 10 August 1919, she was attacked by the mob.

of Charted Bank, Jarman, Municipal Engineer and Sergeant Rowlands and T. Crops (six) all of whom had taken refuge at the *Kotwali*, and also the charred remain of Messrs. Stewart and Scott of the National Bank and Thomson of the Allied Bank.

The European women and children in the civil lines and the cantonment had all been conveyed to the Fort by evening.

#### **87. Resolution of the Government of India on the Political Situation,<sup>1</sup> 14 April 1919**

The present situation arising out of the agitation against the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act commonly called the Rowlatt Act renders it imperative on the Governor-General in Council to define the attitude of the Government on the subject of that agitation and the serious disorders which have resulted therefrom and to indicate the nature of the concerted action which it is necessary now to take for the preservation of law and order.

When the Bill was under discussion, its opponents publically stated that if it passed into law, a campaign of agitation against it, on a scale hitherto unattempted would be organised throughout India and a section of them indicated that they would support that campaign by resort to what is known as 'Passive Resistance'. No one cognizant of the condition of India could have been ignorant at the time of the dangers of initiating a widespread movement of this nature. They were clearly pointed out by many publicmen of moderate views, and the representatives of the government did not fail during the debates on the bill, to emphasise the serious consequences to the public peace which would follow from an agitation such as was then threatened.

... The agitation has followed a double line of action, namely direct criticism of the Act by means of public speeches and publications and the initiation of the threatened movement of 'Passive Resistance'. The latter movement was ushered in by a demonstration consisting of the observance of a day of fasting and the closing of shops and places of business. Such a demonstration was not in itself illegal but there is ample evidence to prove that in more than one place those locally responsible for organisation overstepped the limits of lawful persuasion and resorted to direct interference with the business of many who were not interested in the movement and its forcible obstruction of the traffic in the public streets. But the indirect consequences of this aspect of the agitation have been far more mischievous in that it promoted a sense of unrest and of excitement which

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, September 1919, No. 196.

was bound to react and has reacted on the more inflammable and ignorant sections of the population. The campaign of criticism has included in many quarters the use of most flagrant misrepresentations regarding the character of the Act. It is clear that large number of ignorant people have been deliberately led to believe that the new law gives the police unfettered authority to interfere with public meetings not only of a political, but of a religious and social nature and to arrest, summarily persons engaged in political work, and that it empowers the executive authorities to imprison without trial any person criticising the action of government.

The Governor-General in Council thinks it necessary to reiterate here the following salient fact concerning the Act. It is specifically directed against anarchical and revolutionary crime and can only be brought into force in any locality whom it has been proved to be the satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council that such crimes or movements tending to such crime exist. It has not so far been brought into operation in any part of India. Its first part merely provides for the speedy trial of certain grave offences. In the second and third parts provision is made for preventive action similar to, but much more restricted in scope than that now provided by the rules under the Defence of India Act, against persons, suspected of revolutionary or anarchical crime. Action cannot, however, be taken against any individual without the previous order of the local government. There is nothing, therefore, which can justify the widespread rumours for which the promoters of the agitation must be held responsible, that unusual, or even extended powers have been given to the police. Nor is there anything which needs cause fear or apprehension to any person other than the revolutionary or anarchists. Not only do the terms of the Act definitely exclude its use in any case not falling within the definition of anarchical or revolutionary conspiracy; but government has given the most categorical pledge (which the Governor-General in Council takes the opportunity to reiterate) that the tenor and intention of the Act will be scrupulously safeguarded should occasion arise to put it into operation.

The Governor-General in Council considers it unnecessary to detail here the deplorable occurrences resulting from the agitation against this Act. The offences which have occurred at Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Lahore have one common feature, the unprovoked attempt of violent and unruly mobs to hamper or obstruct those charged with the duty of maintaining order at public places. At Amritsar and Ahmedabad they have taken a far graver form, a murderous attack on defenceless individuals and a wholesale and wanton destruction of private and public property. The Governor-General in Council thinks it right to take that at Amritsar the loss of life might have been greater, but for the protection afforded by unofficial Indians to those who were threatened by the mob, and he takes this opportunity of expressing the gratitude of government for this conspicuous example of loyalty and human feeling.

It remains for the Governor-General in Council to reassert in the clearest manner the intention of government to prevent by all means, however, drastic, any recurrence of these drastic excesses. He will not hesitate to employ the ample military resources at his disposal to suppress organised outrage, rioting or concerted opposition to the maintenance of law and order; and has already sanctioned the application of the State Offences Regulation, 1804 in a modified form to certain districts in the Punjab. He will further use all preventive measures provided by the Statutes to check disorder at its source, and in Regulation III of 1818, and the corresponding Regulation applicable to Bombay and Madras and in the rules under the Defence of India Act, he has powers which will enable him to deal efficiently with those who promote disorder. He has sanctioned the extension of the provisions of the Sedition Meetings Act to the districts of Lahore and Amritsar in the Punjab, and will authorize a similar extension to other areas in which the local government see reason to require it. The Police Act of 1861 enables a local government to quarter additional police on any locality which is guilty of organised offences against the public peace, at the charge of the inhabitants, and to levy from the latter compensation for those who have suffered from injury to their property. The Governor-General in Council will advise local governments to make a free use of these provisions where necessary.

The Governor-General in Council feels that many of those who inaugurated this agitation must regret the consequences which have ensued the loss of life and property and the damage to the reputation of India. He now appeals to all loyal subjects of the Crown and to all those who have an interest in the maintenance of law and the protection of property, both to disassociate themselves publicly from the movement and to exert themselves in quieting the unrest and preventing disorder to all those who render such assistance to the cause of the public and the State, and to those servants of government who are charged with the onerous responsibility of suppressing excesses against public peace and tranquillity the Governor-General in Council extends fullest assurance of countenance and support.

#### **88. Report on the Disturbances in Calcutta,<sup>1</sup> 14 April 1919**

. . . At about 11 a.m. on the 11th April 1919, the majority of the shops in the northern part of the town and as far south as Bow Bazar Street were closed and remained closed throughout the day. In the Barra Bazar area,

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, May 1919, Nos. 514-15.

This report was sent by J.P.R. Clarke, Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, to Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal.

all shops were completely closed. Leaflets were circulated urging people to agitate for the release of Mr. Gandhi and continue to urge the repeal to the Rowlatt Bill.

3. The tramway service in the northern part of the town was seriously interfered with and all passengers were asked to get down. Most of the offenders were small boys of the Marwari and Bhatia castes with a sprinkling of Muhammadans, but they were incited by others of more mature age who kept in the background. Bengali Hindus took no part in these demonstrations. The occupants of taxis, private cars . . . were also asked to get down and in many cases they had left their conveyances and continued on foot. Several Europeans who were similarly treated, were abused and hooted for failing to comply. No case of assault on any European was reported, but stones were thrown at passing motor-cars. At first, persuasive means were adopted by the demonstrators, but as time wore on more force was used and people were dragged out on to the road and forced to continue on foot. In several cases, tram-drivers were prevented from proceeding until the cars had been cleared of passengers.

4. In the early afternoon, a large crowd collected at the Nakhuda Mosque composed of Marwaris and Bhatias with a sprinkling of Muhammadans who had invited the others into the courtyard of the mosque where they were served with refreshments. No distinctions of caste were observed. Mr. B. Chakravarty<sup>1</sup> visited the mosque and addressed the crowd, telling them there would be a meeting at 5.45 p.m. at Beaden Square and asking them all to attend. Hira Lal Gandhi, the son of Mahatma Gandhi, is also reported to have visited the mosque. He is a *Hundi* broker at 4, Pollock Street. Shortly afterwards, the crowd dispersed towards Beadan Square to attend the meeting, where about 6,000 people assembled mostly Marwaris, Bhatias and up-countrymen. . . .

5. After the meeting, there was some rowdyism amongst the dispersing crowds. The ejection of passengers from tram and vehicles continued and at 10 p.m., it was necessary to clear College Street and Bow Bazar Street of the crowds which had collected for this purpose. A few arrests were made and the crowds dispersed.

6. The military authorities had been asked to be in readiness to render assistance, but were only able to assemble some 200 British troops. Early on the morning of the 12th, they were again asked to be ready to move out if required. At about 8 a.m., the Manager of the Indian Motor Taxi Company reported that only four of his drivers had turned up to take out their cars. Arrangements were immediately set on foot to collect volunteers to drive these cars, as on previous occasions, when disturbances were appre-

<sup>1</sup>Byomkesh Chakravarty (1855-1929) : Theosophist, educationalist, politician; President, Bengal Provincial Conference, 1904; Vice-President, Indian Association, 1914-17; joined Anti-Rowlatt Bill *Satyagraha* and Non-cooperation Movement.

hended, care had been taken to mobilize a certain number of taxi-cars for the transport of the Police and Military. By this means, taxi-cars were obtained from the Indian Motor Taxi Company and used throughout the day, and, as usual, were of the greatest use.

7. On the second day, fewer shops were closed until about 10.30 a.m., when the same demonstrations as on the previous day again broke out. The Tram Company stopped their services north of Bow Bazar Street after cars on these lines had been interfered with. Motor cars and other conveyances were also stopped and their passengers ejected. At about 11.15 a.m. it was considered advisable to send out Police Motor patrols in the affected areas, i.e Strand Road, Harrison Road, Chitpur Road, Canning Street and Cornwallis Street. By this time, larger crowds had collected in this area especially on Harrison Road and at the junctions of Strand and Harrison Roads and Chitpur Road. As soon as Police patrols appeared, they were pelted with bricks, stones and other missiles, some officers and men receiving injuries.

8. Shortly after 12 noon Mr. Wilson, the Deputy Commissioner of the headquarters, motored out to obtain information as to the actual position of affairs. He motored down Chitpur Road from Lal Bazar and when approaching Zakeriah Street, his car was pelted with bricks and loose metal. The road was under repair at this spot. Mr. Wilson stopped the car, got out and spoke to the people who appeared to be trying to control the crowd which was mostly composed of Muhammadan youth with a sprinkling of Marwaris. He told them that this behaviour could not be allowed to continue and that, if they were not able to hold their own men in check, it would be necessary to use stern measures to put down rowdyism. Stones continued to be thrown and Mr. Wilson restarted the car which was the target for a fusillade of stones, one of which struck Mr. Cook, the Asstt. Commissioner, Headquarters Force, who accompanied Mr. Wilson, on the face and caused a deep cut. Other stones struck Mr. Wilson and the other occupants of the car, who were, however, not hurt. Mr. Wilson then proceeded down Harrison Road which was full of people, practically all Marwaris, who, however, offered no obstruction to the car, but merely shouted and jeered. On Mr. Wilson's return by Strand Road, I decided that it was necessary to place Armed Police. They were given orders to carry buckshot, but told not to fire unless attacked by the demonstrators or unless ordered to do so by a superior officer.

9. The crowds increased and grew turbulent towards the Howrah Bridge, the end of Harrison Road. Reinforcements were sent out by taxi to the Civil Police piquet stationed at the end of the Howrah Bridge. On the arrival of this reinforcement the crowd apparently attacked the piquet which withdrew as least it could. One Sergeant was injured and his helmet captured. A constable who stopped down to render assistance to one of the mob who had been wounded by a brick thrown from behind was stabbed

on the back in two places. The mob then overturned the car which had brought up reinforcements and set it on fire. The Fire Brigade received intimation from John King and Co., and Mullick Ghat Pumping Station and engines were despatched which were heavily stoned on their arrival, but succeeded in putting out the fire, only after three European Officers and three Indian firemen had been injured. Shortly afterwards, another engine proceeding to a fire in Howrah was badly stoned and three Indian firemen injured. On its return over Howrah Bridge, the mob closed the level-crossing gate, but the engine dashed through the gate and got away through a shower of stones in which a European Officer was hit.

10. Shortly after 1 p.m., Mr. Wilson went out to see the Armed Police piquets posted. He was accompanied by Captain E. Studd, who had volunteered his services, a European Sub-Inspector and an orderly. Three Armed Police piquets, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and the ten sepoys were posted at the Canning Street-Chitpur Road crossing, opposite the Nakhuda Mosque and at the Harrison Road-Chitpur Road crossing. The Inspector, Armed Police, was ordered to patrol in between these piquets with the remainder of the men. Chitpur Road was then quiet and a large portion of the crowd had evidently dispersed on the arrival of Armed Police. Mr. Wilson then turned down Harrison Road which appeared to be in the same condition as an hour previously. Towards the western end, however, the crowd which had burnt the car referred to above was still assembled and immediately commenced to attack Mr. Wilson's car with bricks, stones and sticks, evidently with the intention of wrecking the car and injuring its occupants. Mr. Wilson was injured by a stone on his head and cut in other places. Mr. Studd was hit several times, but luckily escaped unhurt and the other two occupants were both wounded. Mr. Wilson who was driving, accelerated the car and just got through after knocking down and running over one of the mob. This attack, like the one an hour previously in Chitpur Road, was absolutely unprovoked and, if the car had not got through, there is little doubt, but that all its occupants would have been very severely injured, if not killed.

11. On Mr. Wilson's return, I immediately communicated with Fort William and asked for troops to be despatched to Lal Bazar. At 2 p.m. a party of 100 rank and file of the Lincolns and Somersets under the command of Major Cooper arrived. This party was subsequently reinforced by 50 more men. The Military were divided into four parties and despatched to the affected area as under:

One party to move up Chitpur Road from Lal Bazar; another by taxi-cab to Strand Road and thence to move up to Howrah Bridge and along Harrison Road from the west; another by taxi-cab to the College Street-Harrison Road crossing to move up Harrison Road from the east and the fourth by taxi-cab round Cornwallis Street, Beadon Street, and Nimtolla Ghat Street to move down Strand Road from the north. A gazetted Police

Officer was attached to each party. Orders were given to each party not to fire unless obstructed and attacked and then to fire one round independent only. The troops encountered no obstruction and eventually took up their positions as follows; after moving through the affected street:

A machine-gun and 25 men under a British Officer at the Howrah Bridge approach.

A machine-gun and 50 men under two British officers at the Harrison Road-Chitpur Road crossing. Fifteen men near the Harrison Road branch of the Bank of Bengal. Fifteen men at the Chitpur Road-Zakerian Street crossing.

The remaining men were withdrawn and kept in reserve. The disposition of Calcutta Armed Police was also changed and two Sergeants and 20 men posted at the Chitpur Road-Harrison Road crossing and a party of the same strength at the Howrah Bridge end of Harrison Road.

The Military authorities were asked to mobilize the Indian Defence Force units at their respective headquarters, to detail the armoured car section for patrol duty in the affected area with headquarters at Lal Bazar and to send out patrols of the Calcutta Light Horse after 5 p.m. till dark. Volunteer drivers from the Indian Defence Force units were also provided with taxi-cabs for use by their respective units.

12. After midday prayers, about 800 persons, of whom about half were Marwaris, Bhatias, Jains and up-country Hindus and the remainder illiterate Muhammadans, assembled at the Nakhuda Mosque. The meeting was addressed by four up-country Hindus, one Muhammadan and one Bengali and all the speakers spoke in Hindustani. The Hindus urged unity between the two communities and commented on the help India had given England during the war, in return for which the Rowlatt Bill had been passed. The Muhammadan speaker Syed Ahmad Hossain,<sup>1</sup> said that there was no point in closing shops while work in Government offices was allowed to proceed without interference. He suggested that all Government employees should be approached and told to refuse to work, which the speaker felt sure they would do. Some of the audience applauded this speaker who told them not to clap their hands, as it was an English custom. The speaker was followed by a Bengali, who gave his name as U.K. Das, a Vakil of the High Court and a Zamindar of Khulna. He referred to the assassination of the late Amir of Afghanistan who was wrong in refusing to receive the Turko-German Mission and thus prevented the Muhammadans of India and the rest of the Eastern world from joining hands with their brothers in Turkey. He hinted that the late Amir had received a large sum of money from the British Government. His assassination was a result of divine retaliation. The speaker was followed by a Marwari who is a priest

<sup>1</sup>Syed Ahmad Hossain: A Muhammadan speaker who participated in Anti-Rowlatt Bill Agitation.

in the Marwari Dharmasala. The men stood up and shouted "Sultan ki jai" after which the meeting terminated at 3.45 p.m.

13. Meanwhile, and perhaps as a consequence of this meeting, the crowds round the Military piquet assumed a more threatening attitude. Shortly before 4 p.m. the piquet at the Harrison Road-Chitpur Road crossing was attacked with stones and other missiles thrown not only by the mob on the streets, but also from the roofs and windows of the adjacent houses. The officer-in charge was hit with stones on the helmet and back, the machine-gun was hit. . . . The officer-incharge (Lt. Hobbs) ordered the machine-gun to fire . . . the first few shots were too high, but the remaining shots of the eight fired caused several casualties. The mob immediately withdrew and dispersed. Three bodies were noticed lying still on the ground and three others were seen being carried off in the direction of the Nakhu-dha Mosque. This is borne out by the fact that three bodies were actually taken into the mosque. Two were of Marwaris and were immediately removed and the third of a Muhammadan was removed from the mosque and buried later on. Fourteen rifle shots were also fired by the piquet, mostly at the roofs of houses from which stones were being thrown. It is not known if there were any casualties as a result of these shots. The Calcutta Armed Police did not take part in the firing.

14. Shortly after this incident, Mr. B.C. Chakravarty came along and addressed the crowd on Chitpur Road, north of the Harrison Road-Chitpur Road crossing. The mob then moved off in the direction of Beadon Square to attend the meeting which was to be held there at 5.30 p.m. In the Square, were assembled about 2000 to 3000 persons, of whom about half were Marwaris and up-country Hindus, a third Bengalis and the rest Muhammadians. The meeting was presided over by Mr. Byomkesh Chakravarty. . . . The President, who spoke in Bengali said that the *Satyagraha* vow was successful in as much as Mr. Gandhi had been released and that the audience might now resume their ordinary business. The Speaker referred to the shooting incident on Harrison Road and exhorted the audience not to lose their heads. He stated that a non-official committee would be immediately appointed to enquire into the incident. Mr. S. Roy<sup>1</sup> abused the soldiers and said that Govt. should not have placed British troops on the Harrison Road. The troops did not understand the Indian languages and if the crowd shouted about "Gandhi ki jai" they construed it as abuse and retaliated by firing on innocent and unarmed persons. . . . A Marwari then spoke. He said his brother had been killed by the soldiers and he demanded vengeance. A Muhammadan speaker named Muhammed Gaffur said that all shope should be kept closed in memory of the dead and that processions of Hindus and Muhammadans should go to the burning-ghat and burial ground. . . . Three up-country Hindus also spoke and stated that they

<sup>1</sup>S. Roy : A local leader.

would take revenge for the shooting incident, not by brute force, but according to Mr. Gandhi's dictates.

15. No disturbance of any kind were reported and as the streets were clear and all rowdy elements had disappeared, the Indian Defence Force units were allowed at about 8 p.m. to dismiss and give orders to return to their headquarters the following morning at 7 a.m. Previous to this, 25 men had been withdrawn from the piquet at the Harrison Road-Chitpur Road crossing but the armoured car patrols and Police taxi-cab patrols were continued up till 1.30 a.m.

16. Six dead bodies were taken to the Nimtollah burning-ghat during the night. Arrangements were made for Police Sergeant to hold *postmortem* examinations at the ghat and for the Coroner and his Jury to view the bodies early in the morning of the 13th. The bodies were those of two Marwaris, two of up-country Hindus, one Bhatia and one Bengali and five of them were identified by the relatives of the deceased. The *postmortem* examinations were held by the Police Surgeon at 8 a.m. and the bodies were viewed by Coroner and the Jury shortly afterwards. The Coroner's permission to the relatives of the deceased to take charge of the bodies and the cremation ceremonies were proceeded with. No demonstration took place at the burning-ghat.

17. At about 8 a.m. on the 13th, shops were being opened along Harrison Road and the streets in the Burra Bazar area presented their usual appearance. . . .

18. Two of the injured men, one Bengali and one Marwari, died at the Marwari and Mayo Hospitals during the day. The following morning, the usual *postmortem* examinations were held at the Nimtolla burning-ghat and the Coroner and Jury viewed the bodies which were then made over to the relatives for cremation. No disturbances were reported during the night of 13th and the Indian Defence Force were demobilized at 8 a.m. this morning. . . .

#### **89. Ronaldshay to Montagu on Rioting in India,<sup>1</sup> 14 April 1919**

Following upon rioting in other parts of India, I am sorry to say that there has been an outbreak in Calcutta. I learned the week before last that the promoters of Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* movement in Calcutta intended to regard Sunday the 6th as a day of humiliation and mourning and amongst other things to hold a big mass meeting on the Maidan. At that time public feeling here was friendly, quiet and decided to allow the demons-

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 2, p. 32, NMML.

tration to be held. I sent for Mr. C.R. Das<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Bayomkesh Chakravarty on the 4th and told that I had no wish to interfere with their meeting, but expected them to exercise discretion in the language used by the speakers and to take no action which could be in any way calculated to lead to a breach of the peace. They told me that they were very willing to see that the speeches were moderate in tone, and, in order to ensure this, would have them written out beforehand. The meeting took place and apart from one or two minor incidents when the crowd was dispersing after the meeting, no untoward event occurred. On the 10th rumour spread throughout Calcutta that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested and imprisoned. This at once created a certain amount of excitement and the supporters of the *Satyagraha* movement decided to hold demonstrations during the remainder of the week. During the 11th these did not take a very serious form. Traffic was interrupted, shops were closed, and individual citizens were put to a good deal of inconveniences, but there was no outbreak of serious character and so long nothing worse than this took place. The Commissioner of Police refrained from resorting to force. On the 12th, however, the situation rapidly developed. A wave of unruly mob collected in the northern part of the town, individuals were forcibly interfered with, an attack was made on a branch of the Bank of Bengal and 2 European Police Officers on patrol duty were roughly handled and stoned. The occupants of a taxi-cab were ejected and the vehicle burnt by the mob. At the stage the Armed Police and military were called out and the Indian Defence Force were mobilized. The most serious event subsequent to this was the attempt of the crowd to overwhelm a military picket in charge of a machine-gun. The picket were compelled to fire and 8 rounds in all were fired. There was a responsible senior officer present with the picket at that time. This had a salutary effect and the mob began to disperse. Apart from this there was very little firing, the whole amount being confined to one or two occasional rifle shots by patrols who were being stoned by the mob or having missiles thrown at them by individuals from roofs of houses. The total number of deaths, so far we have at present been able to ascertain, is seven. A peculiarity of the recent disturbance is that they appear to have been instigated almost entirely by Marwaris who have been fraternizing with the Muhammadans. The Bengalis themselves—apart from the extremist politicians who are pulling the wires from behind the scenes have taken little part in the disturbances. Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement appears to have found most of his advocates amongst the Marwaris and Bhatia communities. I summoned representatives of the Marwaris community to Government House yesterday and told them very plainly of the grave danger. . . . I pointed out to them that if mob rule was to gain

<sup>1</sup>C.R. Das (1870-1925); lawyer and politician; entered politics in response to prospect of constitutional reform, 1919; allied with Gandhi, 1920.

the upper hand, they themselves would be the first persons to suffer. Since Saturday night, things have been quiet here, and business and traffic today are normal. The European population is of course very deeply incensed at the murder of a number of Europeans at Amritsar, and it is not easy to restrain the feelings of the younger men amongst them. I have been in consultation with the Chairman of the European Asscn. [Association] and he is doing his best to avoid having to hold a meeting of the European Asscn., at the present time. At the same time he tells me that opinion amongst the European population is generally compelling him to take some action. He has a meeting of the local Asscn. [Association] this evening and the proposal is that the Council should instruct a deputation to proceed to Simla to make certain representation to the Viceroy . . . .

I hope that we are of the worst of the trouble here, at any rate for the present, but it is of course difficult to say what further trouble there may be if it is found necessary by the authorities in other parts of India to take drastic action against Mr. Gandhi and his associates. . . .

#### **90. Fortnightly Report on the Political Situation in the Central Provinces for the First Half of April 1919<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The Commissioner of Berar's report on the situation may be quoted as it is of interest. There has been a good deal of public activity during the fortnight connected with the *Satyagraha* campaign against the Rowlatt Act. Attempts were made in most large towns to close all shops on the 6th, but no intimidation was used, and the efforts were not very successful. . . . In Ellichpur no attempt was made at all to close the shops, although the district conference under the Presidency of the Hon'ble Mr. G.S. Khaparde had met at that place four or five days previously. I understand that a considerable number of the politicians in Berar are not in favour of pushing *Satyagraha*. . . . It is significant that the leading politicians have not been presiding at *Satyagraha* meetings. This was so noticeable that W.G. Joshi<sup>2</sup> (a prominent Berar extremist) thought it necessary to try and explain this which he did by saying that in all battles light forces took the field first and the main strength was held in reserve. B.G. Khaparde (son of the Hon'ble Mr. G.S. Khaparde) has lately started a set of lectures (Home Rule series) on Bahishkar (Literally throwing or casting out). His first lecture was somewhat obscurely expressed, but appears to indicate that he intends to advocate the expulsion of everything foreign from India.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. Deposit, July 1919, No. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Waman G. Joshi : Organiser of the *hartals* at Akola and Amravoti on 6 April 1919.

**91. Montagu to George Lloyd,<sup>1</sup> 15 April 1919**

. . . I must now turn for a moment to the grave political troubles with which you have had to deal in those last few days. It is hard that you should be confronted with these fresh troubles so soon after the settlement of your strikes. I need hardly say that I have every confidence in your handling of the situation, and I only wish I could be of some assistance to you. When you have time I should be glad if you would let me have your diagnosis of the position, in particular how far you ascribe the disturbances to the high prices, sympathies with the Turks and to the general unrest which is now making itself felt all over the world. I should of course welcome also any general comments you care to make.

**92. Report on the Situation in Delhi in Connection with the Satyagraha Movement,<sup>2</sup> 17 April 1919**

. . . On the morning of the 1st April, after the burial the evening before most of the men who fell on the 30th March, the streets assumed a more normal appearance but some roughs were moving about the Chandni Chowk, molesting the shopkeepers who had opened their shops. Cavalry patrols were sent to clear the street and met with fair success. At 4 O'clock in the afternoon the situation was much improved and number of shops were opened. On the 2nd April order was so far restored that we arranged for the withdrawal of all troops from the city, except a guard of 25 native infantry at the Railway Station. Nothing remarkable occurred on the 3rd April, but learning in the evening that specially large prayers were being arranged at the Juma Masjid on Friday, the 4th, the police were directed to take up their emergency posts early that morning. On the 4th the Juma Masjid prayer meeting passed off without any disturbance, but was remarkable for the fact that a number of Hindus were invited into the Mosque and the Arya Samaji Munshi Ram (Swami Shardhanand) was allowed to address the assembly from the pulpit. The possible consequences of this step have I think only been realised by a few of the more farsighted Muhammadans.

On the 5th situation was normal except for the fact that the tramways were being boycotted and *tongas* were carrying people at much reduced fares. No definite information would be obtained as to whether the *Satya-*

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 2, p. 17, NMML. Private letters.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. Deposit, May 1919, No. 5. This report was sent by C.A. Barron, Chief Commissioner of Delhi to Sir J.H. DuBouly, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

*graха Hartal* on Sunday the 6th was to be observed in Delhi or not. Late at night, however, the District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police came to the conclusion that the leader had lost control of their followers and that the lower class Muhammadans had taken charge and were out of hand. It was decided with the General Officer Commanding to have troops at their previously arranged emergency station by an early hour next morning.

On the morning of 6th all the shops in the city were again closed but the prayer meeting at the Fatehpur Mosque only lasted for a short time and dispersed quietly. The day passed without disturbance and in the evening the British troops at the Town Hall and at the station were withdrawn.

The situation was normal on the 7th, the Indian troops being withdrawn in the forenoon and the police pickets after dark. On the 8th though outwardly all was calm. We were rendered anxious by the news that Gandhi intended to come to Delhi on Friday. The situation here was, as I informed you by telephone, rendered more difficult through the fact that the Punjab Government had issued an order excluding him from the Punjab which I have been asked to cause served upon him should he come to Delhi and express the intention of proceeding towards Punjab. As Gandhi had only the day before deliberately defied the law in Bombay we anticipated some similar defiance in Delhi and could only foresee serious trouble if he had to be arrested here. I suggested that perhaps the best course would be if the Bombay Government could be induced to prevent his leaving the Presidency for some weeks.

In the evening we received definite information that Gandhi had already left Bombay and as you are aware, the Government of India on the morning of 9th sanctioned the issue of order directing his return to Bombay. I need not detail the successful arrangements made to serve the Punjab and Delhi orders upon him with the result that he went back to the Presidency. The news of his non-arrival became known of course when the train arrived in the evening without him. Only about fifty men came to the station to meet him and they left quietly after ascertaining the fact from his servants. . . .

By the morning of 10th the news of Gandhi's arrest spread throughout the city. A general *Hartal* was declared and a mass meeting arranged at the burning Ghats on the Jamuna. This passed off quietly with a few speeches, but the shops in the main bazars remained closed though it was reported that business was being done by back doors and in the side bazars. The situation, however, remained quite and in the evening on receipt of a report that at a big meeting at Ansaris' it had been resolved that there should be no *Hartal* the next day, though the Satyagrahis should remain firm, it was arranged to allow the cavalry to return to cantonment and withdraw the police from their emergency pickets keeping them however concentrated. These arrangements were promptly cancelled on the receipt at dinner-time of a private message announcing the catastrophe at Amritsar.

Early on the 11th it was evident that the shops were again to be closed and as the temper of the crowd appeared unpleasant and news of the outbreak at Lahore had also arrived, it was decided to strengthen the Queen's Garden with a 100 native Infantry and to picket the Delhi station with British troops. The day, however, passed without any incident though the Friday prayers at the Juma Masjid was attended with some excitement. In the evening the District Magistrate had interviewed a number of leading men who are genuinely horrified at the news from Amritsar and promised to stop the *Hartal*.

... On the 12th the shops remained closed, but the tone of the crowd appeared to be a little better. In the evening Beadon, Scott and I interviewed Hakim Ajmal Khan<sup>1</sup> who regretted his inability to control the butchers and secure the opening of the slaughter house which is of course first business to be started in the early morning. He advised that no authoritative action should be taken on Sunday the 13th with reference to the *Hartal*, which he hoped would come to an end on Monday. Sunday was a very quiet day in the city, many of the people being engaged in the *Basakhi* holiday. In view of the fact that all the shops remained closed the military and police arrangements were continued.

Early in the morning of the 14th news arrived of the strike at Shakurpur goods station on the Southern Punjab Railway. The mail train which left Delhi the evening before had to be brought back in the morning. During the course of the morning a good many reports were received of intimidation of persons going to their work in their offices and at the Delhi Railway station and of shopkeepers who ventured to open their shops. We therefore decided to issue an order under section 188 IPC forbidding such intimidation and it was arranged to announce this from the Town Hall in the afternoon. One of the English Banks reported that the clerks were unwilling to work and in consultation with the Bank of Bengal, and other Banks who represented that if one closed all must close. I decided to declare the day a public holiday under the Negotiable Instrument Act. This holiday had to be maintained on the 15th and 16th.

At the meeting at 3 p.m. on the 14th at Town Hall, with the leading members of the Home Rule Party who were the only persons who appeared to have retained any authority in the city, we decided to give time till 10 O'clock next morning to see whether influence could bring the *Hartal* to a close. Soon after this meeting had ended a very unfortunate incident took place at the King Edward Park where two Central Intelligence Dept. Sub-Inspectors attending a *Satyagraha* meeting officially were assaulted by one of them rather seriously. This meeting was dispersed by the District Magistrate with a troop of cavalry.

<sup>1</sup>Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1927): Physician and politician; "President, All-India Muslim League, 1910-1913 and 1916-1919.

On the morning of the 15th there were no signs of the *Hartal* stopping. At the meeting at 10 a.m. with the Home Rule leaders I impressed upon them the gravity of the position, rendered still more grave by the news which had arrived of the loss of life at Amritsar and Ahmedabad in riots arising from a similar situation. I read to them the Govt. of India, Home Dept., resolution dated 15th April which I had just received, and I also informed them of Gandhi's pronouncements dated 14th instant deprecating all violence, *Hartals* and disobedience of police order which I had just received by telegram. They evidently realised the seriousness of the occasion but said that 10 or 12 of them were not sufficient to bring about the end of the *Hartal*. They therefore advised the collection of a number of leading men of all the trades of Delhi in the afternoon. Accordingly at 3 p.m. another meeting was summoned which was attended by about 150 tradesmen. During this meeting the news arrived that the leaders had been successful in getting the butchers to open the Slaughter House and to kill a few animals to show that their *Hartal* was at an end. The *chaudries* of the butchers assured the District Magistrate and myself that the Slaughter House would certainly be opened next morning. Most of the Muhammadan shopkeepers and many of the Hindus agreed to open their shops though there was evidently a recalcitrant element among the Hindu cloth merchants, and provided they did not succeed during the night in upsetting the arrangements arrived at there appeared to be a fair prospect of the Bazar opening next morning.

Towards the close both of these meetings there was an element of danger in the presence in the street outside of a large crowd who it appeared had collected on the rumour that leading men were about to be arrested. A certain number of this crowd in the morning had *lathis* but the evening crowd was much large and the *lathiwalas* were very conspicuous. There was, however, no collision with the police or the military and the crowd dispersed with Munshi Ram [Sharddhanand], Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. [M.A.] Ansari<sup>1</sup> and the other leaders when they left the meeting.

At the second meeting I was informed that the only reason for the second *Hartal* was the order issued against Gandhi, and I was urged to withdraw the order as far as Delhi was concerned. I pointed out the impossibility of this and also how ineffectual it would be, as Gandhi has been confined to the Bombay Presidency by an order issued there. In the end I undertook to convey to the Govt. of India the reasons for the second *Hartal* which I did by telephone that evening. In order to bring that meeting to some conclusion I issued a notice containing this promise and also stating that there was no foundation for the suspicion said to be entertained

<sup>1</sup>Dr. M.A. Ansari (1880-1936): Doctor and physician; led Crescent Mission to Turkey, 1912-13; formed Delhi Home Rule League, 1917; Khilafat leader and Muslim Nationalist.

by the crowd that it was the intention of the authorities to arrest the leaders with whom the Deputy Commissioner and I had been in conference for the past few days. The notice also announced to the people that butchers had that afternoon opened their Slaughter House, and that meat was for sale in the Sadar Bazar, and I pointed out the danger of this amount of progress being lost if the Hindu shopkeepers failed to carry out their part of the undertaking and did not open their shops at once. Later in the day a certain number of shops were opened for a short time and the prospects of the *Hartal* being brought to a close appeared better than they had been at any time during the past six days.

On the morning of the 16th these good hopes were however dismally falsified. The Slaughter House did not open in early morning and the shops in the bazar remained closed throughout the day . . . . The tone of the city was bad and the danger which appeared to me most to be feared was that while quiet was maintained we might be placed in the false position of having created a conflagration. The situation remained very tense and serious.

This morning to our just relief the efforts of the friendly leaders at last bore fruit and during the course of the morning a large number of shops were opened in the Chandhi Chowk and several of the smaller bazars being fully opened. Arrangements had been made to assist these efforts by police patrols to control any interference. The police had orders in one or two localities to arrest any person molesting people going to their work. The English Bank in the Chowk also reopened at my request in order to set an example in the bazar generally. The unruly elements in the mob however collected gradually and attempted to destroy the good work which was being done. The situation became a threatening one at 12.30 p.m. . . . One head-constable was very seriously wounded on the head by *lathi* blows and other members of the police force were struck. The police had to fire the rioters and it is now known that 15 were wounded. . . . A few arrests were made including that of a boy dressed in *sadhu* clothes, who has been very prominent in the disorder throughout and who was, I am informed, identified as having been present at the riot at the Railway Station on the 30th March. The cavalry demonstration took place at about 1 p.m. and a body of Indian Infantry also participated, but the troops were not called upon to fire owing to the rapid dispersal of the mob. Quiet was restored in a very short time, and has been maintained throughout the afternoon. All the shops in the Chandni Chowk had of course closed at the commencement of the disturbance.

The efforts made in the past few days to restore law and order through the people themselves have miserably failed first as there appeared a prospect of their succeeding. The sudden temper of the mob makes it extremely doubtful whether order can be restored without very forcible methods. The District Magistrate has been arranging for the arrest of certain persons

known to be fomenting trouble and has appointed several of the prominent citizens, special police officers under section XVII of the Police Act. I applied this afternoon for the extension of the Seditious Meetings Act, 1911 to the province and under the sanction just received. I am issuing a notification under Section II thereof. The history of the past week renders it doubtful whether law and order can really be restored without the extension of Martial law in the city. . . .

### 93. Gandhi on Satyagraha,<sup>1</sup> 18 April 1919

It is not without sorrow that I feel compelled to advise the temporary suspension of civil disobedience. I give this advice not because I have less faith now in its efficacy but because I have, if possible, greater faith than before. It is my perception of the law of *Satyagraha* which impels me to suggest suspension. I am sorry that when I embarked upon a mass movement, I underrated the forces of evil and I must now pause and consider how best to meet the situation. But whilst doing so, I wish to say that from a careful examination of the tragedy at Ahamadabad and Viramgam, I am convinced that *Satyagraha* had nothing to do with the violence of the mob, and that many swarmed round the banner of mischief largely because of their affection for Ansuyabehna<sup>2</sup> and myself. Had the Government, in an unwise manner, not prevented me from entering Delhi and so compelled me to disobey their orders, I feel certain that Ahamadabad and Viramgam would have remained free from the horrors of the last week. In other words, *Satyagraha* has neither been the cause nor the occasion of the upheaval. If anything, the presence of *Satyagraha* has acted as a check, ever so slight, upon the previously existing lawless elements. As regards the events in the Punjab, it is admitted that they are unconnected with the *Satyagraha* movement. . . . I would be untrue to *Satyagraha* if I allowed it by any action of mine to be used as an occasion for feeding violence, for embittering the relations between the English and the Indians. . . . My attitude towards the Rowlatt legislation remains unchanged. Indeed, I do feel that the Rowlatt legislation is one of the many causes of the present unrest. But in a surcharged atmosphere, I must refrain from examining these causes. The main and only purpose of this letter is to advise all *Satyagabis* to temporary suspend civil disobedience, to give the Government effective cooperation in restoring order, and by preaching and practice

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373.

<sup>2</sup>Miss Ansuyabehna Sarabhai : Sister of Seth Ambalal Sarabhai; Secretary, Ladies Branch of Home Rule League, Ahamadabad 1917; allied with Gandhi since the textile dispute, Ahamadabad 1918.

to gain adherence to the fundamental principles mentioned above.

#### **94. Report on Disturbances in Bihar and Orissa,<sup>1</sup> 18 April 1919**

... The development of the *Satyagraha* movement has been the main political event of the fortnight. When I last wrote it seemed doubtful whether the local politicians of whom the most prominent members are Messers Hasan Imam<sup>2</sup>, Mazhar-ul-Haq, Sachchidananda Sinha,<sup>3</sup> Rajindra Prasad<sup>4</sup> and Parmendu Narayan Sinha<sup>5</sup> would give their adhesion to the movement. The *Searchlight*, however, which is their organ has continued to foster the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill and to support Mr. Gandhi's campaign, to all details of which the greatest prominence has been given in its columns. The decision to participate in "humiliation day" was taken at a meeting held on the 4th April, when Mr. Hasan Imam took the leading part. It is noteworthy that at this meeting great emphasis was laid on the Delhi incidents as sealing the bond between the Hindus and the Muhammadans. Thereafter the preparation went on apace and the leaders went round the bazar of Patna inducing persons of all persuasion to take part in the programme arranged for the 6th. The personal influence of Mr. Hasan Iman in Patna is very great and from the moment he decided to throw this weight into the scale, the success of the demonstration was assured. Estimates varying from 10,000 to 1,00,000 have been made of the numbers who took part in the procession and meeting of the 6th. The latter figure was claimed by Mr. Hasan Iman, who led the procession and sent a telegraphic version of the day's events to the Local Govt. . . . Outside Patna the only place at which demonstrations of any size took place were Muzaffarpur, Chapra, Monghyer and Gaya.

It was even at this stage uncertain whether Patna politicians would definitely identify themselves with the *Satyagraha* movement but the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi seems to have turned the scale. Much promi-

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. Deposit, July 1919, No. 46.

This report was sent by H. McPherson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orrisa to J.H. DuBoulay, Secretary to the Government of India.

<sup>2</sup>Syed Hasan Imam (1871-1933) : Younger brother of Sir Ali Imam; lawyer and politician; Judge, Calcutta High Court, 1912-16; President, Indian National Congress, 1918.

<sup>3</sup>Sachchidananda Sinha (1817-1950) : Lawyer, journalist, educationist and administrator; founder of the *Hindustan Review*, 1901; organised Bihar Provincial Conference, 1908; Member, Imperial Legislative Council; started the *Searchlight* (Patna), 1918.

<sup>4</sup>Rajindra Prasad (1884-1963) : Lawyer and politician, cooperated with Gandhi in Champaran.

<sup>5</sup>Parmendu Narayan Sinha (Rai Bahadur) : Vice-President, Home Rule League, Bankipur, 1916; took active part in Anti-Rowlatt Bill Agitation.

nence was given to this in the *Searchlight* and on the evening of the 11th, a meeting was held at which, Mr. Hasan Iman publicly took the vow. Mr. Mazhar-ul-Haq and others had taken it before the meeting, and Babu Rajendra Prasad had opened a registration centre at his house. It was given out that the local politicians would follow the lead of Mr. Gandhi in breaking the Press laws, but up to date no overt act of disobedience has been reported. Mr. Hasan Imam left on the morning of the 12th for Darjeeling, where he has a house, and Mr. Mazhar-ul-Haq took his family on the same day to Chapra. The former is not expected back till the 21st, and it is probable that his followers will suspend action till he returns. Meanwhile the Hon'ble Sir Ali Imam<sup>1</sup> has gone to Patna with the object of getting into touch with the local politicians and endeavouring to dissuade them from participation in active demonstrations.

Mr. Ryland, Deputy Inspector-General, Crime reports that strenuous efforts are being made to secure the co-operation of the Muhammadan masses. . . . A leading Muhammadan who was questioned as to the attitude of the Muhammadans said openly that they were waiting to see what Govt. would do with men like Mazhar-ul-Haq, Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Hasan Imam, who intended to set the law at defiance.

## 95. Atrocities Condemned<sup>2</sup>

The Govt. of India in their resolution say that the present situation has arisen out of the agitation against the Rowlatt Act which, as they say, 'followed a double line of action', namely, direct criticism of the Act by means of public speeches and publications and the initiation of the threatened movement of Passive Resistance. They further accuse the opponents of the Bill, who had publicly stated that a campaign of agitation, on an unprecedented scale, would be followed, and they thus lay all the blame at the doors of these four classes of the opponents of the Bill, namely, those who had the temerity to criticise the Bill, and secondly, those who waged the campaign of Passive Resistance. . . . The honest and fair critics and honest Satyagrahis cannot be charged with misrepresentation of the law or misdirection to the people. They know its real import, and after having thoroughly studied it, and passed many a sleepless night over it, they decided to oppose by all constitutional means. . . . And when, to top all, the

<sup>1</sup>Sir Ali Imam: Elder brother of Syed Hasan Imam; judge and politician; President of the First Session of the All India Muslim League at Amritsar 1908; Member, Muslim League Deputation to England, 1909; Member, Executive Council of Bihar and Orissa 1918; President, Executive Council of the Government of Hyderabad, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>*Mahratta*, 20 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency 1919, p. 494.

news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi reached that unhappy place, popular indignation began to blaze, and riot, arson, murder and other heinous outrages upon innocent Indians and Englishmen followed. The situation, we think, can only be thus explained. But regrettable though the mistakes of the authorities are, they do not justify the people to cross the limits of constitutional agitation, and commit most horrible atrocities. We have no patience with those who have done that: we abhor them, we condemn them in the most emphatic manner possible. Such outrages must be stopped, therefore the immediate and the most important question before the people and the Govt. is by what means peace and order can be restored in the country. In this both are equally concerned in using all means within their power to attain that end. . . . Ahamadabad was the hotbed of disturbances for some days. Co-operation with Gandhi and other leaders and immediate withdrawal of Martial law at Ahamadabad had the most salutary effect in quelling the disturbances.

#### **96. Report on the Disturbances in Bombay in April 1919<sup>1</sup>**

. . . Apart from the occurrences of the 11th April, in which there were several critical movements from which the gravest consequences might have ensued, a casual observer might have regarded them as demonstrations rather than disorders. They were attended by no fatal casualties or extensive destruction of private or public property. There was no suspension of normal course of administration or of civil control over law and order. Offences committed in the course of the disturbances were dealt with by the permanent magisterial courts. There was no serious dislocation for any considerable period of the normal life of the city. The circumstances which distinguish these events, apart from the unprecedented dimensions of the crowds of demonstrators and rioters, was that they synchronised with others of a more disastrous character elsewhere; what their proximate causes were not local or occasional; and that their connection with preceding events, all presenting certain significant elements of unity and cohesion is clear and unmistakable. Certain factors from which perhaps no social organism in the world was exempt were present in full operation. The acute economical situation, the general neurotic reaction from the strain of the war, the slow, but spasmodic and violent progress towards a social and political settlement in all relations, international, imperial or local, a general sense of abnormality and *malaise*, all contributed to form an atmosphere which a spark might explode. Another element was necessary to give concentration, impulse and direction to these formidable but extant and diffused

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, Jan. 1920, Nos. 283-92 and K.W.

forces. That element was supplied by the policy, methods and expedient of an extremist group, whose design was to turn to their own purposes all these predisposing factors of unrest and the adoption, as an immediate objective of the agitation against the Rowlatt legislation.

The first incident of considerable importance in this campaign was the agitation over the so-called "Reign of Terror in Dadar", which, like all the similar instances subsequently to be narrated, was largely engineered by means of articles and letters in *The Bombay Chronicle*. The Editor of this paper was Mr. B.G. Horniman. It is a somewhat remarkable, though by no means unprecedented fact, that the protagonist of the extremist group of an ostensible nationalist propaganda should have been an Englishman. It is nevertheless the case that he completely dominated the group and his career as a journalist and politician, terminating in his deportation under the Defence of India Act on 26th April, 1919 coincides with ascending and descending arcs of the wave of intensive agitation and its most violent manifestations in Bombay. . . . His principal and most active associates were Mr. Omar Sobhani,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkdas,<sup>2</sup> Mr. S.G. Bunker,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Lakmidas Parsee<sup>4</sup> and Dr. Sathaye. He was prepared to co-operate with Mrs. Besant and Mr. Gandhi so far as the policies they advocated conducted to his own schemes. In the same system Mr. Jinnah was a cautious and subsidiary satellite. . . .

In January 1919 there broke out the largest general strike of mill-hands ever experienced in Bombay. In its initial stages there are grounds for believing that Home Rulers were concerned in the organisation of this as of previous strikes. . . . A mass meeting was called when the strike had been in progress for two days at which certain "popular leaders" were advertised as speakers. Jamnadas Dwarkadas addressed the meeting but he was hooted and could not control his audience. The meeting broke up with the clearly expressed intention of attacking a group of mills, which were still at work. When a posse of unarmed policemen attempted to frustrate this move, the strikers attacked them with unbridled violence, killing one policeman, seriously injuring 5, and less seriously injuring 20 others. The timely arrival of reinforcements saved the police from further casualties, but this incident led to the calling out of the military and to a clear "declaration of war" between the strikers and the forces of law and order.

There is no doubt that this episode had brought home to the Home Rulers the fact that they were unloosing forces which they were unable to control and from that point onwards they did not take a prominent part in

<sup>1</sup>Omar Sobhani (1886-1926) : Managing Director, *The Bombay Chronicle*; Member, All-India Congress Committee

<sup>2</sup>Jamnadas Dwarkadas : Member of Home Rule League.

<sup>3</sup>S.G. Bunker : Publisher of the *Young India* and allied with Gandhi in the strike by Ahmedabad Mills.

<sup>4</sup>Lakmidas Parsee : Member of the Home Rule League.

organising the strike. . . . Nevertheless Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and H.P. Mandevple among others kept in very close touch with the situation and visited the mill area with regularity. A lady known as Miss Anusuyabehn, a sister of Mr. Ambalal Sarbhail<sup>1</sup> of Ahamadabad and a friend of Mr. Gandhi, as well of the Bombay Home Rulers, also made herself prominent by visiting the mill-hands, especially those who had been wounded in encounters with the police or the military. . . . He (Omar Sobhani) asked permission of the Commissioner of Police to announce to the crowds that Mr. Gandhi was in Bombay a freeman and that he would address a public meeting at Chowpatti that evening. Permission for the proposed meeting having been given Mr. Omar Sobhani announced the fact from the running board of his car. There was at once a general cry to Chowpatti but few moved. At this juncture the cavalry patrol arrived. There appearance was a signal for a fresh outburst of stone-throwing and a number of troopers were hit. The cavalry continued to patrol the streets for some two hours and were on occasion compelled to charge the mob, pratically when they were belabouring a British officer and two troopers who had been unhorsed. Shortly after the incident, Mr. Gandhi himself appeared at Pydhowne in a motor car. His attempt to control the crowd was futile and appearance had little or no effect on their rowdyism. He announced that he was shortly to address a gathering at Chowpatti and left Pydhowne for Abdul Rehman Street. A cordon of armed police had earlier in the day been drawn up across the road at this point with orders to permit no one to enter Abdul Rehman Street. When Mr. Gandhi was held up, the crowds were extremely angry, and Police Officer in charge of the armed police, seeing the road clear and the cavalry in possession, used his discretion and allowed him to pass. When the cavalry saw the excited crowd coming down they assumed that the police had been overwhelmed and charged the crowd. Mr. Gandhi escaped from him motor into a neighbouring house and the crowd dispersed in all directions. Reports show that the crowd at this moment was in a state of frenzy. They were dancing along with Mr. Gandhi's car, waving their arms and shouting with all the appearance of fanatics. From this point the disturbance gradually lessened in intensity until about 5 p.m. when conditions became more or less normal in this locality.

At 5.15 p.m. report; were received that the crowd was attacking tram cars on Girgaun and Charni Roads, police reinforcement were despatched from the local reserve and order was quickly restored, four arrest being made. After this episode the Trainways company withdrew their cars to the sheds where military guards were posted.

Meanwhile reports showed that a crowd of enormous proportions was assembling on Chowpatti sands and was eagerly awaiting Mr. Gandhi's

<sup>1</sup> Ambalal Sarbhail :Mill-owner of Ahamadabad.

arrival. Adequate military arrangements were made in the locality to deal with any development that might arise, but there was no display of force beyond the customary police arrangements for regulating heavy traffic of such a nature. The meeting passed off without incident. Mr. Gandhi being the only speaker. The crowd was on the whole very orderly. A large proportion were mere sight-seers, hundreds of whom streamed away to the city after seeing Mr. Gandhi's arrival without waiting for the actual meeting.

An outstanding feature of the rioting was the combination of Hindus and Muhammadans in attacking the police and the troops with showers of stones. The Muhammadans were deliberately incited by the Hindus who spread the report that the Rowlatt Bills were intended to enable government to coerce the Muhammadans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to facilitate the dismemberment of Turkey. The shouts of "Hindu-Mussalman Ki Jai" repeatedly raised by the crowd had this significance.

Forty-two rioters were arrested and on conviction, received sentences varying from a fine of Rs.2 to six month's rigorous imprisonment. In connection the damage done to the property . . . the Chief Presidency Magistrate . . . directed compensation to the amount of Rs.4,552.80.

. . . News of the disastrous occurrences in the Punjab and at Ahmedabad and Viramgam in this Presidency were received with bewilderment and consternation. . . . The general body of the public capable of receiving any distinct impressions of the situation realised that the extremist agitators had unchained forces which they could not control if they would; that the reckless campaign of invective and incitement to violence had at last reached its logical and disastrous conclusions in acts of rebellion. . . . There was a movement of resentment against the extremist leaders, who themselves contemplated their handiwork in its actual manifestation with terrified surprise. Even *The Bombay Chronicle* adopted for a brief interval a note of suspended judgement and detachment. Meanwhile Mr. Ganchi had gone to Ahmedabad. On April 17th he disseminated handbills counselling moderation and obedience to authority. On the 18th he returned to Bombay and after an interview with Mr. Horniman, he announced to the press the suspension of the *Satyagraha* movement.

#### 97. Report on Disturbances in Madras,<sup>1</sup> 20 April 1919

. . . The celebrations on *Satyagraha* day (6th April 1919) in Madras City included processions and meetings on the beach which were attended by

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. Deposit, July 1919, No. 46.

This report was written by A.Y. Campbell, Chief Secretary of the Govt. of Madras to Sir James DuBoulay, Secretary, Government of India.

an unprecedentedly large assemblage estimated at about 1,00,000 persons. Shops were closed but there was no serious breach of the peace. There appears to have been much misrepresentation regarding the reasons for the celebration and regarding the effects of the Rowlatt Bills and the incident at Delhi. One man addressing a labour meeting the other day, said that if a policeman coveted a handsome woman he would get the husband out of the way by means of the Rowlatt Act. At one of the beach meetings a speaker said that the British Government would pass a law making woman common property as in Russia. . . . Mr. Gandhi visited Tuticorin in the Tinnevelly District on the 27th March 1919 and lectured on the *Satyagraha* movement. He visited Negapatam in the Tanjore District on the 29th March and spoke on capital and labour, the Rowlatt Bills and Satyagraha. Mr. Gandhi also addressed a meeting at Bezwada where he attracted a much larger audience than Mr. Bepin Chandra Pal<sup>1</sup> who visited the same place about the same time. The arrest of Mr. Gandhi on his way to Delhi has been the subject of much comment in the press.

Mr. B.C. Pal addressed a meeting at Nellore on the 26th and 27th March when he spoke on the Rowlatt Act and Passive Resistance, the Reform Scheme and local Self-Government. He also addressed meetings at Bezwada Masulipatam and Ellora in the Kistna district, at Guntur and the Rajahmundry and Cocanada in the Godavari District. He was at Rajahmundry on *Satyagraha* day. . . .

#### **98. Resolutions of the Indian National Congress<sup>2</sup>, 20 and 21 April 1919**

. . . Resolved that in view of the present political situation some gentleman should be asked to proceed at once to England, whereupon the Hon'ble Mr. V.J. Patel and Mr. N.C. Kelkar<sup>3</sup> offered to sail by the next steamer. It was also resolved that steps should be taken to strengthen the Congress Deputation and the question be considered at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee to be convened at an early date after the notice.

VI. Resolved that the All India Congress Committee empathetically protests against the passing of what it commonly known as the Rowlatt Act, and in view of the fact that the entire Indian public opinion is strongly opposed to the measure, the Committee urges the Secretary of State for

<sup>1</sup>Bepin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) : Politician, social reformer and journalist; started a weekly, *New India*, 1902, and a daily Paper, *Bande Matram*, 1906; criticised C.R. Das and opposed the Non-cooperation Movement.

<sup>2</sup>A.-I.C.C. Papers 1919, File No. 6, NMML.

<sup>3</sup>Narasimha, Chintaman Kelkar (1872-1947) : Maharashtrian journalist, politician, follower of Tilak; Editor of *Mahratta*, 1896-1918; Poona Municipal Councillor.

India to advise His Majesty the King-Emperor to disallow it.

VII. Resolved that the All India Congress Committee deplores and condemns all acts of violence against person and property, and life recently committed at Amritsar, Ahmedabad, Viramgam and other places, and appeals to the people to maintain law and order and help in the restoration of public tranquility, and it requests the Government to deal with the situation in a sympathetic and conciliatory manner immediately reversing the present policy of repression.

VIII. Resolved that the All India Congress Committee places on record its strong condemnation of orders passed under the Defence of India Act by the Government of Punjab, administrator of Delhi and the Government of India against a person of such well-known noble character and antecedents as of Mr. M.K. Gandhi. The Committee cannot help feeling that, if these orders had not been passed, some of the regrettable events which followed them, may not have happened. The Committee requests the Government of India to withdraw its own order and ask the local Governments in question to do the same.

Resolved that a Committee consisting of the gentlemen below viz:

1. The President<sup>1</sup>
2. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
3. Mr. M.R. Jayakar<sup>2</sup>
4. Mr. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar<sup>3</sup>
5. The Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru<sup>4</sup> and
6. The Hon'ble Mr. V.J. Patel

be appointed to prepare a statement

- (a) Relying to the communique issued by the Government of India, dated the 14th instant, in which they justified the Rowlatt Act, condemned the agitation against it and characterised it as a calculated to mislead people;
- (b) Stating various causes that have led up to the present grave and deplorable state of things all over the country; and
- (c) Making a demand for a public enquiry into the events that have happened in Delhi, the Punjab, Bombay and Calcutta, drawing particular attention to certain measures reported to have been taken by the Execu-

<sup>1</sup>Madan Mohan Malaviya.

<sup>2</sup>Dr. M.R. Jayakar (1873-1959): Bombay lawyer and politician; associated with the Sub-Committee appointed by the AICC to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances.

<sup>3</sup>S. Kasturi Ranga Iyenger (1859-1923) : Lawyer, politician, social reformer and journalist; Editor, *The Hindu* (Madras); joined Rowlatt Satyagraha and Non-cooperation Movement.

<sup>4</sup>Motilal Nehru (1861-1931) : Lawyer and politician, Member of the U.P. Council, 1909; President of the Allahabad Branch of the Home Rule League, 1917; started a daily paper, *Independent*; President, All-India National Congress, 1919.

tive, which seem obviously objectionable, such as the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes, use of machine-guns and whipping, and submit it to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for India, the Under-Secretary of State and the Viceroy.

### **99. C.F. Andrews to Viceroy,<sup>1</sup> 21 April 1919**

The news I heard about the Public whipping in Lahore, and wrote about to Mr. Maffey, must be only too true; for I have just had with me a Lahore student who has seen it with his own eyes. This is not the time to pause and hesitate and after the account I have just heard I should fail in my duty if I did not point out to the utmost in my power to you personally, who alone can intervene, what this will mean, if it is not stopped at the outset. I cannot exactly explain to you wherein the depth of the sentiment lies about this special form of punishment in this country, but I have lived among Indians so long that I have the instinct in me the loathing, the hatred against the oppressor that it engenders, the sense of shame at the uncovering in public of a person's nakedness. I cannot explain it, but it is a universal instinct and not to be lightly treated.

I know the provocation of the outrages on Europeans in Amritsar, but this public whipping is being done in cold blood.

I trust you will forgive the vehemence and reiteration of my plea.

### **100. O'Dwyerism<sup>2</sup>**

We earnestly entreat Govt. to lay the lessons of the tragic happenings in the Punjab to heart. And what is that lesson? It is that, whatever be the causes and the character of the present upheaval—we repeat we have no authentic information regarding either—the root cause is to be formed in the O'Dwyerism which has flourished unfettered and uncontrolled in that province throughout the last four or five years. The Govt. of India can lay that lesson to heart only if they realise that the true way to that situation is conciliation.

### **101. Suspension of the Civil Disobedience<sup>3</sup>**

The letter addressed by Mr. Gandhi to the Secretary of the *Satyagraha*

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 240.

<sup>2</sup>The *Bombay Chronicle*, 21 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 523.

<sup>3</sup>New Time, 22 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 534.

Sabha is timidly, sober and dictated entirely by considerations of humanity and difficulties of Govt. . . . The temporary suspension of civil disobedience does not come with any surprise. We consider it to be the wisest course under the circumstances, for it cannot be denied that acts of violence were committed which set at naught the very principles inculcated by the *Satyagraha* creed.

**102. James DuBoulay to the Chief Secretary of Delhi on Delhi Riots,<sup>1</sup> 23 April 1919**

. . . You are aware, from the Home Department and telegram of the 20th April, that the Govt. of India are being pressed to declare martial law in Delhi. You have, however, reported that the city is now quiet and the shops open. The Govt. of India agree with you that there is no justification at the moment for this drastic step. They cannot however ignore the fact that in view of the temper that has recently shown itself in Delhi and elsewhere the arrest of leading citizens or even minor measures taken for the preservation of the peace might provoke a dangerous outbreak. . . .

**103. An Appeal for Inquiry<sup>2</sup>**

We hope that there will be an impartial enquiry, and that it would be interpreted as the demand of the pestilential agitator. In the meanwhile, we earnestly appeal to the Govt. of India and to Lord Chelmsford, in particular, not to remain as a passive spectator of the Govt. of the Panjab, but begin to relax the sternness of the O'Dwyer regime, and open a policy of justice and humanity for ending a situation which undoubtedly was largely originated by the hand of recent lessons and of provocation which has been appearing in the Panjab during the last six years.

**104. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>3</sup> 24 April 1919**

During the last week India and Indian questions have attracted considerable attention from the newspapers in this country owing to riots, passive

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, June 1919, Nos. 144-62.

<sup>2</sup>The Bombay Chronicle, 23 April 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 524.

<sup>3</sup>Khaparde Papers, file 1-7. NAI. Tilak was in London at that time.

**106. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>1</sup> 1 May 1919**

... Today there is a great labour demonstration in Hyde Park. It will be attended by thousands and thousands. We have made arrangements to have distributed at the demonstration about ten thousand copies of the manifesto signed by Messrs [Robert] Smillie, [Roberts] Williams and [George] Lansbury a copy of which was posted to you by last mail. Resolution on the same lines about the Rowlatt Act will also be put forward, and passed at this demonstration. The Indians here propose to hold a public meeting in London on 12th condemning the Rowlatt Act and praying the Crown to disallow it. Mr. J.M. Parekh will preside on the occasion. The British Congress Committee and the Britain [British] and India and such other societies interested in India will follow suit and hold another public meeting for the same purpose. The date is not yet fixed.

**107. Montagu to George Lloyd,<sup>2</sup> 1 May 1919**

... I had hoped that your time would be devoted almost exclusively to this fascinating problem. Beginning with strikes and going through to rebellion has, I fear, sorely dislocated your programme and seriously deflected your activities. Never mind you have established a reputation in India and in England for patient, though firm, wise, though vigorous, handling of your difficulties . . . . I very much want to know how far the actual violence in your presidency was attributable to the alleged arrest of Gandhi in the Punjab. You are well quit of Horniman and Bombay will be all the quieter until the next political adventurer from this country seeks to emulate the excitement of his life.

I cannot help thinking that the asses call strong Govt. is very largely responsible for what has occurred. Sitting on the barometer, stifling discussion, interfering with the free movement of people, eases the situation at the moment but brings its reward, and it is strange to me that Bengal should have remained so quiet or rather that Bengalese should have taken so little part in these disturbances, unless the peculiar conditions of the Punjab in the last 5 years have not had more to do with the situation than the Mohammedanism or the Rowlatt Bills—although of course there must be several and complex causes to all occurrences of this kind.

Meanwhile I am eagerly looking forward to the introduction of my Bill and anxiously praying for a short and successful passage. Alas! however, there are so many cross-currents of opinion.

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File 1-8, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Montagu Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 2, p. 18, NMML. Private Letter.

### **108. Public Discontent<sup>1</sup>**

Our quarrel with Government is not that its action is too violent in putting down a revolt; but that in an alarmist fashion it is calling up vision of rebellion and setting itself to subdue it when in fact it has to cope with a situation of a different order and much less alarming tenor. If the Govt. had really to encounter rebellion there would be no question that the whole body of intellectuals in India would support all measures, however severe, which the Govt. might think it necessary to adopt . . . . Whatever the proximate causes of the disturbances and they must be closely enquired into—it is clear that the public mind is exceedingly uneasy and a substantial factor of this uneasiness consists in the unsatisfied political aspiration of the Indians. The remarkable utterances of [Kamakshi] Natarajan<sup>2</sup> the other day in Bombay, should be a warning to those officials who wish to see a contented India. Even if the reforms came in their integrity he said they would hereafter cease to inspire the people. . . . At such a time statesmanship consists not in whittling down but in extending the reforms . . . .

### **109. Horniman's Deportation<sup>3</sup>**

In all the circumstances and in the absence of any specific allegations of offence by Govt. it must hold that the deportation of Mr. Horniman and the pre-censorship of the paper are acts of despotic authority for which there was no occasion and in which there is no justice. The directors are to be congratulated in their decision not to accept the humiliating conditions of publications imposed on them.

### **110. Indian Unrest<sup>4</sup>**

The troubles that have attended the initiative of a movement like *Satyagraha* must have served as a clue to the true sentiments of the country.

<sup>1</sup>*Servant of India*, 1 May 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 558.

<sup>2</sup>Kamakshi Natarajan : Journalist and social reformer; Asstt. Editor, *The Hindu*; President, Madras Provincial Social Conference, Kurnool, 1911; President, Bombay Provincial Social Conference, Bijapur, 1918.

<sup>3</sup>*Leader*, 1 May 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup>*Bhavishya*, 2 May 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 163.

The real causes of Indians indignation and unrest are her dire poverty, the ruin of her commerce and industry, the unsympathetic attitude of her authorities and the severe repression with which all efforts to ameliorate the condition of Indians are always met.

**111. A Note by the Home Department on the Political Situation in India,<sup>1</sup> 3 May 1919**

The difficulty of dealing with the alleged propaganda of sedition from Delhi in the neighbouring districts is very great. The United Provinces Govt. do not ask us to take any action. The Punjab do and failing the proclamation of martial law ask for the most drastic measures against all promoters of disaffection in Delhi. The allegations made are generally vague and it appears that timely information is not sent to Delhi by the neighbouring district of the Punjab. This has been put right now, but all should I think as both the U.P. [United Provinces] and the Punjab officially to give the information at once of any emissaries from Delhi together with their names. We should at the same time point out the position of Delhi as a large commercial centre and explain the difficulties of ascertaining in Delhi what everybody going out from the city proposes to do. One should also explain to the local Govts. of the U.P. and the Punjab that they can now arrest persons suspected of promoting rebellion under the new Defence of India Rules. Mr. Barron should also be told to exercise utmost vigilance in this matter and to take action against any person believed to be emissary by prohibiting them from leaving Delhi and if necessary by precensoring their correspondence . . . .

**112. O'Dwyer's Regime<sup>2</sup>**

. . . The people of the Punjab, whose loyalty and splendid services were the theme of admiration from Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Nadirshah of this age, are now sobbing under the fetters of unjust and uncivilized orders and restrictions. The authorities have a guilty conscience and they are, therefore, trying to justify themselves by using communiques from time to time.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, June 1919, Nos. 144-62.

<sup>2</sup>Pratap (Kanpur), 5 May 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 165.

**113. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>1</sup> 8 May 1919**

We have already written to you that we had made arrangements to have a resolution about the Rowlatt Act passed at the Labour demonstration held in Hide Park on May 1st. We enclose herewith a copy of the resolution passed, the substance of which was also telegraphed to India. It was a successful demonstration attended by 3 lacs of people. There were eight platforms from which the resolution was moved and passed unanimously, Mr. [George] Lansbury himself speaking from one of the platforms. Arrangements were also made to distribute amongst the people about 6 to 10 thousand copies of the circular issued by Messrs [Robert] Smillie, [Robert] William and [George] Lansbury copies of which are enclosed.

... Another important event of the week was a meeting arranged for Mr. Tilak to address by the British and India Society on May 3rd at Caxton Hall. Mrs. Ransome, the Secretary of British and Indian Society, had sent about 300 invitations and the Hall was over-full there being more Englishmen than Indians. Tilak had prepared a written address to be read at the gathering as he was unable to attend owing to his sprained foot. But Mrs. Ransome insisted on carrying him to the seat in the Hall and he did go being lifted out of taxi to his seat in the Hall. Colonel Wedgwood<sup>2</sup> was in the chair and introduced Mr. Tilak in apt terms (*see Report in the Daily Herald*). Mr. Tilak then orally addressed the meeting; answering point by point the objections raised against in Congress proposals in Sir William Duke's<sup>3</sup> address delivered in the same Hall about 5 or 6 months ago. St. Nihal Singh<sup>4</sup> has sent a detailed report of the proceedings to the *New India* which you will see published therein. Enough here to say that the address was most impressive and the meeting most successful of all hitherto held here. Copies of leaflet comparing the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme with Congress proposals were also distributed at the meeting . . . .

**114. Meeting of London Indians on the Khilafat and Rowlatt Act,<sup>5</sup> 14 May 1919**

Mr. Tilak has been able now to walk though not very well. He addressed

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File No. 1, S. No. 9, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Josiah Clement Wedgwood [First Baron Wedgwood, (1872-1943)] : Politician and Liberal M.P., New Castle, 1906-1919; left the Liberal Party for Labour in 1919.

Sir Frederick William Duke (1863-1924) : Indian Civil Servant; Magistrate at Howrah, 1897-1902; Commissioner of Orissa, 1905; Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, 1909; Acting Lt. Governor, Bengal, 1911; appointed Member of the Council of India, 1914; Under Secretary of State for India, 1920.

<sup>3</sup>St. Nihal Singh : Journalist; visited Japan, America, and Canada, edited the *Bohemian Magazine*; left for England in 1910; contributed articles to *The Nineteenth Century*, *The Fortnightly Review* and the *Westminster Gazette*, etc.

<sup>4</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File No. 1, S. No. 9, NAI.

a meeting at Essex Hall under the auspices of Fabian Society<sup>1</sup> on 9th instt. The meeting was well attended, Mr. Bernard Shaw<sup>2</sup> being in the chair. Mr. Tilak's address was also impressive. He dwelt upon the necessity of ungrudgingly granting the rights of self-government to the people of India, according to the Congress proposals, not those of Lucknow but of those of Delhi. (Here it may be stated that Mr. Tilak never advocated the Lucknow scheme and that it is here misrepresentation of his attitude by some interested parties, whether here or in India). After Mr. Tilak's address there was discussion in which Mr. Ratcliff, the late Editor of 'India' tried to represent the views of Indian Moderates on the subject. But he was answered point by point by Barister [J.M.] Parekh, and Mr. Chamanlal,<sup>3</sup> and finally by Mr. Tilak. Another important feature of the meeting was that Captain J.M. Kenworthy,<sup>4</sup> Liberal M.P., who was in the audience went to the platform and there expressed his sympathy with the Congress proposals. Mr. Bernard Shaw was, of course, sympathetic in his introductory as well as the closing remarks. This meeting was also a great success, and its coming soon after the Caxton Hall meeting has done considerable good to our cause.

#### **115. B.G. Tilak to Dr. D.D. Sathaye,<sup>5</sup> 15 May 1919**

Herewith my usual weekly report. I have already written before that we should fully support Mr. Gandhi. It is impossible to give you any more detailed advice from here, for by the time it reaches India it is stale and useless. Besides, Mr. Baptista is on the spot now and he will be able to give you proper advice.

Please remember me to friends. I am sorry for Mrs. Besant's attitude. But I cannot do anything from here. If she comes here I hope [to] have all differences settled.

#### **116. Montagu on the Disturbances in India,<sup>6</sup> 22 May 1919**

What were the causes of these troubles, troubles which have resulted so

<sup>1</sup>A Socialist Society founded in 1883-84 'to reconstruct society in accordance with the best moral possibilities'. It helped to organise a separate Labour Representative Committee which became the Labour Party in 1906.

<sup>2</sup>George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) : Eminent Writer who was awarded Nobel Prize, 1925.

<sup>3</sup>D. Chaman Lal : Labour Leader; Assistant Editor, *The Bombay Chronicle*; founded the All India Trade Union Congress.

<sup>4</sup>Captain J.M. Kenworthy : A Liberal M.P.; Member of Mrs. Annie Besant's Home Rule for India League at London in 1916.

<sup>5</sup>Dr. D.D. Sathaye's Papers, NAI.

<sup>6</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 September to 23 December, 1919, Cols. 90-106.

far as I can make out in the loss of nine European and something like 40 Indian lives? I am not going to deal with the obvious, I am not going to deal with re-action from the strain of the war, or with general unrest which is current throughout the world, but I want to deal with the direct causes, economic and political. The economic causes are very considerable. India has suffered this past year, for the first time I am glad to say for some years past, from a failure of the rains. There has been a consequent great diminution in food supplies and prices have arisen to a very great extent indeed. People have gone short of food despite the strenuous efforts made by the Government to ensure better distribution and to make available grain from Australia. Further than that two other things have been accentuating the distress. Recruitment for the Army, which has gone on in parts particularly affected by these disturbances with such zeal and enthusiasm that I think there is reason to believe many a family was left without its bread winner or bread winners, and consequently the area under cultivation has been diminished. Lastly, there was the scourge of influenza which removed many of the most vigorous people in the prime of life, because this disease seems to attack by preference people of the breadwinning age. Between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 people died of influenza in India last winter. Between 50 per cent and 80 per cent on an average two-thirds of the total population suffered from influenza during the visitation of this plague with its consequent removal from industry, or from agriculture, which is more important, and the enfeebling after results. These, I think, are the main economic causes.

I will now turn to the political. I put first among the political causes the perturbation and perplexity caused to the Mohammedan world by the discussions arising out of the defeat of Turkey. This subject was discussed in the House last week . . . . Very much the same circumstances exist in India, where Indian soliders, including among their best, Mohammedan soldiers, claim that they have had a predominant part in the defeat of Turkey, in full confidence that the war was a war of liberation and equality of treatment, of national settlement and of self-determination, and when they read of rumours and acts which led to fears that our Mussulman enemy will be partitioned up to satisfy conflicting claims, when they read that this part is to be allotted to this European nation and that to another—mere rumours, but alarming rumours—when they read that as a signal of victory there are those who advocate there consecration of an important Mohammedan mosque is to be wondered at that there are signs of unrest among the Mohammedan people of the world?

I now come to two other political causes—causes more indirect because they only affect the politically-minded part of the population, but causes which must be reckoned with. One is a fear based upon the ceaseless activities of the Indo-British Association, that the reforms pro-

mised on the 20th August, 1917<sup>1</sup> will not be carried out in an acceptable form. This is an association formed with the most laudable motives which has carried on a ceaseless campaign against those reforms ever since the announcement was made. They have slandered and libelled whole sections of the Indian population. They have very often hardly paid to the facts the respect to which facts are entitled, and they have provoked the suspicion that the British Parliament intends to go back upon that pronouncement, or at least not to carry it out in an adequate way. Lastly, there is the Rowlatt Act, which has caused widespread, I would almost say, universal opposition throughout India . . . . I am still convinced that in the circumstances as passed, as it is now on the Statute Book, for it has been left to its operation, the Rowlatt Act was necessary, ought to have been passed and could not have been avoided. Evidence accumulates every day that there is in India a small body of men who are the enemies of government, men whom any government, bureaucratic or democratic, alien or indigenous, if it is worthy the name of Government, must deal with. I cannot do better, in describing this body of men, than quote the words of a very great and distinguished Indian, Mr. Gandhi. There is no man who offers such perplexity to a government as Mr. Gandhi, a man of the highest motives and of the finest character, a man whom his worst enemy, if he has any enemies, would agree is of the most disinterested ambitions that it is possible to conceive, a man who has deserved well of his country by the services he has rendered, both in India and outside it, and yet a man who his friends, and I would count myself as one of them, would wish, would exercise his great powers with a greater sense of responsibility and would realize in time that there are forces beyond his control and outside his influence who use the opportunities afforded by his name and reputation. My Hon'ble and gallant friend (Colonel Wedgwood) will realize that Mr. Gandhi is not the only man who, despite the most laudable motives, sometimes shows a lack of political wisdom . . . .

He [Gandhi] realised that there were clever men behind all and some organisation beyond his ken.

That is the real revolutionary, the man who lurks in dark corners, whom nothing can locate or convert, who is subject to the influences of an organisation ramifying throughout the world with its secret emissaries and influences, men who are a danger to any country, and against whom the Government of India are determined to do unceasing battle until they have been extirpated. The Defence of India Act has helped us to do much with regard to these men.

. . . This Bill [Rowlatt] was never intended by the Government of India

<sup>1</sup>The Declaration of 20 August 1917 by Montagu had put down the British Policy towards India as being the gradual development of self-government with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government.

to be a permanent measure. It was introduced in a permanent form, but I hope everybody will look forward to its being unnecessary and to its eventual repeal . . . . No Government is entitled to put a statute of this kind as a permanent measure upon the Statute Book. If you can justify previous action by what has occurred subsequently, there are dangers that justify this emergent and exceptional power at a period of the close of the War with all the difficulties of peace . . . . and when Bolshevism . . . is still a force to be reckoned with.

This act will not be used except to cope with anarchical and revolutionary movement. There is no danger whatever of its being used for any other purpose. . . .

We intend to maintain order in India, and we intend to safeguard it because we believe that that is the only atmosphere in which nationality can grow uninterruptedly, surely, and swiftly. I quote the opinion of one who cannot be described as a thick and thin supporter of the Government of India in all that is done—Mrs. Besant. She stated in public that the Rowlatt Act as amended contains nothing that a good citizen should resist. This act need never be used if there is no occasion to use it . . .

. . . and I come now to what I venture to suggest are the remedies. There seems to me to be two alternative policies. The first is to do nothing to ride the storm, to stifle political aspirations by the Rowlatt Act and comparable legislation, to prevent those who would stir strong political ambitions from speaking in India or in England, to give the advocates of political opinions and reform no passports so as to lay their case before the Government at home, to keep political leaders from the platform, and govern by emergency legislation through the police. That is what I believe is called in club smoking rooms firm and strong government. Sir, we are not dealing with a cattle-yard. We are dealing with men, and thinking men, and business men, men who desire opportunities for their aspirations. The sort of policy I have referred to is described in some eloquent words by the man under whose leadership I entered the field of Indian politics, who has been my inspiration since I had anything to do with him. Lord Morley<sup>1</sup> said: "The shortcomings of Government lead to outbreaks. Outbreaks have to be put down. Reformers have to bear the blame, and their reforms are stopped. Reaction triumphs, and the mischief goes on as before, only worse".

That is not the policy of the Government of India. It is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is not the policy that I am here to advocate. There are, I believe, in India some men, opponents of all government, who are incurably evilly disposed. There are others whose grievances must be investigated with a view to removing their cause. Much has been done recently . . . . The steadily increased association of Indians with the affairs

<sup>1</sup>John Morley (1838-1923) : Liberal Leader and a protagonist of Irish Home Rule; Secretary of State for India, 1905-10.

of Government such small reforms as the grant of commissions in His Majesty's Army to Indians, and their removal at last of the racial discrimination in the Arms Act Schedule—all these will have effect and are having their effect.

But more than this is required. As regards these troubles which I have been describing, questions have been asked from time to time, and resolutions have been moved demanding an inquiry. The Viceroy has always contemplated an inquiry. You cannot have disturbances of this kind and of this magnitude without an inquiry into the causes of and the measures taken to cope with these disturbances, but no announcement has been made of any inquiry upto this moment, for this reason let us talk of an inquiry when we have put the fire out.

... You must transfer the power from the officials to the people. You must make a beginning, and you must go on doing it. That is what is meant by the progressive realisation of responsible government. There is a great part to play for the civil servant, English and Indian in India today, greater almost than the great part he has played in the past. But so far as responsibility for policy goes the pronouncement of 20th August meant nothing if it did not mean that the power of directing policy should first in some things and then in others, until finally in all, be transferred to the elected representatives of the people of India . . . . Therefore, it will be seen that the Bill I shall introduce, I hope shortly, will in substance, carry out the proposals which the Viceroy and I submitted to Parliament a year ago. It will be seen in the despatch of the Government of India that certain Amendments have been suggested. Of these Amendments some have been incorporated in the Bill, others I shall invite the Joint Committee to decide against . . . .

The policy which I have attempted to advocate is that which many of, I think all my predecessors have advocated. It can be summed up in a sentence. I would put first the maintenance of order. Secondly, a searching and tireless effort to investigate the causes of disorder and discontent, to remove those which are removable, to eradicate the sources of disturbances and disorder, and to go on with a determination, courageous, unhesitating, zealous, to make of India what may be very loosely described as a Union of great self-governing countries, entrusted with the custody of their own well-being, partners in the great freedom-loving British Commonwealth.

### 117. Sir J.D. Rees on the Disturbances in India,<sup>1</sup> 22 May 1919

They [Indians] exported foodstuffs at controlled cheap prices, and raw

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 September to 23 December 1919, Cols. 113-14. Sir John Davis Rees (1854-1922) : I.C.S.; pressed for the Indian reformers; M.P. from East Nottingham, 1918.

material for munitions and equipment. Their war exports during the conflict were valued at about £ 100,000,000 a year. India was the base for the War in Mesopotamia and the East, which could hardly have been carried on without her. They exported teak, hemp, rubber and tea. Three million tons of wheat were exported to the Allies. The Royal Wheat Commission purchased £ 43,000,000 of wheat from India, which also exported 2,500,000 tons of oil seed, valued, at £ 31,000,000 wolfram and manganese (without which steel could not have been made for carrying on the War) to the value of £5,000,000 . . . Saltpetre, without which there would not have been any powder for the Prussians, was sent here for the making of powder. Raw jute, without which sandbags, which played so great a part in the War, would have been lacking, and also bags for the transport of food and other articles were exported to the extent of 2,000,000 tons, and 2,800,000,000 bags and 4,500,000,000 other products of jute. Army blankets were also sent. Morphia, derivative of opium, which I have often heard unintelligent- ly criticised with such prejudiced denunciation in this House, served to alleviate the pains of our wounded soldiers. Tanned hides were exported in enormous quantities, and that trade came under British control which had previously been very much under the control of the Germans, for some obscure reason, which, I hope, my right Hon. Friend [Montagu] will not allow to escape him. The Indian *Lascars* were always prepared to . . . lay down their lives freely, and many of them are now prisoners in Germany. India prospered during the War, and she gave freely of her prosperity to this country in men, money and raw material.

#### **118. Wedgwood on the Disturbances in India,<sup>1</sup> 22 May 1919**

When a law is passed against the unanimous vote of every single elected Member of Parliament, a country is not likely to take it lying down and to accept the law, whether it be good or bad. I do not suppose there is one man in 1,00,000 in India who knows what the Rowlatt Act is, but they do know that their elected representatives voted against it to a man, and what in spite of that it was forced on the country. That, I believe, is the principal reason of the late riots—this absolute disregard of all those British traditions which are always upon our lips, but which we do not always conform to when it comes to dealing with people whom we have governed for their good for so long. The fact that you are legislating against the unanimous wish of the people, whether it be good or bad legislation, is bound to damn that legislation and to give it no possible chance of

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 September to 23 December 1919, Cols. 136-38.

operating with success.

This Rowlatt Act is the most lawless law, to use the word of Mr. [S.N.] Banerjea in the Indian Parliament, ever passed into law. It is not a law; it is simply an administrative instruction. . . .

The Rowlatt Bills are not only against law, but they are against the people. It is these reasons which caused the explosion in India recently. I do protest, and the Government must understand that the repression of these riots by means of bombs from aeroplanes and machine-guns have produced an even worse effect than the original passage of the Rowlatt Act. Now there is not a single moderate Indian but who protests against the way in which these riots have been put down. . . . Gandhi is regarded as a saint in India. He went to Delhi to suppress the riots. When he got to Delhi he was arrested and sent back. It was the arrest of Gandhi which caused the revolt at Lahore. It is unfortunate incidents like this which must be inquired into. If peace and settlement are to come to India there will have to be inquiry into these riots. Why are they so concentrated in Delhi and the Punjab? The Punjab six years ago was the most peaceful part of India. It is the home of the Sikhs, the best soldiers. The reason is that they have had, obviously, during the last six years some of that firm, resolute rule which the right Hon. Gentleman [Montagu] terms the right method of governing India. Sir Michael O'Dwyer six years ago when he went to the Punjab, found it a perfectly quiet country. He has bequeathed it to his successor a revolutionary spirit which runs from one end to the other.

### **119. Bennett on Disturbances in India,<sup>1</sup> 22 May 1919**

I want to speak very frankly on one point. What are the relations between the Government of India and the people? Have they improved or have they gone back? To be frank they have not improved; they have gone back. . . . You are not going to improve things simply by a policy of repression, by a policy of asserting law and order. . . . If in India we on the one hand firmly assert the law, as the right Hon. Gentleman [Montagu] assured us he means to do, and on the other hand, meet the legitimate aspirations of the people and show them that we are in sympathy with their progressive ideas, then I believe that the problem will be solved. . . . We are being told that the Moderates in India have no real loyalty towards the Government. To my mind the most harmful thing that has been done lately is the attempt to discredit the loyalty of the Moderates in India.

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919. 13 September to 23 December 1919, Cols. 145-46.

Sir Thomas Jewel Bennett (1852-1925) : Principal proprietor of the *Times of India*, visited India in 1901, Member of Parliament, 1918-23.

**120. Montagu on the Rowlatt Act,<sup>1</sup> 22 May 1919**

.... On the one hand, against this minority, the numbers of which are small and which I hope will become smaller, we must have legislation of this character; but for India as a whole, for the great patriotic nationalist people of India, we want another and a totally different policy and so far as we achieve that other policy so far will we withdraw from the numbers of those who may be tempted to join the ranks of the infinitesimally small proportion that will be subject to the Rowlatt Act .... The Rowlatt Act is to maintain the order of the country whilst all these great reforms are going through.... Are we to let the bomb-thrower and the assassin loose on society.... Therefore, your choice is between exceptional legislation of this kind and allowing the criminal to go scot-free....

I invite this house to watch the operations of the Act. If it ever does operate, which I hope it will not, and to bring to the notice of Parliament the first case in which it is thought that there is any room for the suspicion that the Act is being used against men except those to control whose movements and operations it was passed. The other charge against the Rowlatt Act is this, that it is an answer to the loyalty of India and an answer to the evils from which we have suffered. That is not its purport. It is only a part, a small part, a temporary part, a necessary incident in the immediate life our real policy, the policy of economic development, of education and reform with which we intend to go on.

**121. An Open Rebellion<sup>2</sup>**

Instead of calm consideration of popular objection steamers were held in readiness to deport people, the mouths of guns were opened, "an open state of rebellion" was declared, and every effort was made to prove the Black Act to be white one.

**122. Reports on Gandhi's Further Activities and His Proposal to Renew Civil Disobedience,<sup>3</sup> 26 May 1919**

2. With reference to Gandhi, I enclose a note by the District Magistrate,

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 September to 23 December 1919, Cols. 157-60.

<sup>2</sup>Ukhawat, 24 May 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919, p. 186.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll, A, August 1919, Nos. 261-7 and K.W.

This report was sent by L. Robertson, Inspector General of Police, Bombay, to Sir Cleveland, Director, Central Intelligence.

Ahamadabad, with covering remarks by the Commissioner, Northern Division, which gives an account of an interview that the District Magistrate had with Gandhi on the subject of the latter's men giving evidence.

3. He does not exactly give them order not to give evidence, but he makes it impossible for them to do so without breaking from him.

4. Gandhi's attitude is quite inexplicable by any ordinary standard. He would do nothing to resist the punishment of an unrepentant criminal, but he would persuade criminals to repent, to confess and undergo willingly any punishment that might be inflicted. It is quite impossible to work with a man whose ideas are so twisted.

5. Recently Rao Bahadur Chunilal Setalvad,<sup>1</sup> 2nd Presidency Magistrate, who knows Gandhi well and who used to bring him to serve when he first arrived from South Africa, told me that he (Setalvad) was convinced that Gandhi was going mad. I am not so sure of that but I am certain that Gandhi's moral fibre has been weakened by the adultration with which he is surrounded. In April last, Gurudev<sup>2</sup> went to see Gandhi at the Ashram and was rather surprised to find good looking young women about who waited on Gandhi bringing him food and drink while Gurdev was talking to him. . . .

7. I am inclined to the view that Gandhi's movement will soon break up and that all clever politicians will leave him, but he has undoubtedly obtained a hold on the imagination of the mass in Gujarat and any action we may take against him will be the signal for disorder. I think that we can deal with it easily, but the conflict will leave behind a sense of bitterness.

8. As regards the causes for the recent outrages, I am glad to hear that you can find no trace of organised conspiracy planned from without, because I was beginning to fear that my C.I.D. was too inefficient to detect it. My view of the causes of the outbreaks is substantially the same as yours.

9. I was interested to read Cock's<sup>3</sup> letter in your weekly, dated the 12th instant. I am constantly told that the working and cultivating classes were much antagonized by the wrong-doing of inferior Govt. servants in the matter of recruiting and the monied classes were similarly antagonized in the matter of war-loans and war fund subscription. These causes are stated to have been at work in the Punjab, but they have undoubtedly had some effect in Bombay. It is beside the point to argue that there was no real wrong-doing. The people believe that there was.

<sup>1</sup>Chuni Lal Setalvad (1866-1947) : Vice-Chancellor, Bombay University, 1917-29; Advocate of the High Court of Bombay.

<sup>2</sup>Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941): Poet and Writer; awarded Nobel Prize in literature, 1913; returned his Knighthood as a protest against the Jallianwala Bagh massacre

<sup>3</sup>G.G. Cocks : Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Lahore.

**123. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup> 27 May 1919**

. . . The fact is that the rural classes from where 95% or more of our recruits were drawn back took no part in the disturbances; the Rawalpindi Division in which recruiting was most vigorous and spontaneous was absolutely free from disturbances, except in two or three towns and railway centres; the Multan Division, on the other hand, was the area in which we had most trouble and some riots and bloodshed over the attempts to recruit the loyal but ignorant *Jungly* tribes. Here, if anywhere, one might expect to find the disturbances spread. But not only was there no disturbance at all (outside two or three urban areas in Lyallpur which were tainted by Delhi and Amritsar), but these very *jungly* tribes, who were inclined to be truculent a year ago, were the first to come forward to guard the railway and, in Lyallpur, to form a mounted escort for the Deputy Commissioner who had to deal with a seditious urban element. Our disturbances had many points of resemblance to those in Egypt—lawyers, students, pan-Islamists rapprochement between different religions are found in both cases. . . . The urban classes, who as a body failed us in the War, were the main factors in the seditious movement, the rural classes were our support in both cases. . . .

**124. Colonel Wedgwood's Question in the House of Commons and Montagu's Reply,<sup>2</sup> 28 May 1919**

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can yet give the total civilian casualties in the recent Indian riots in Delhi, in the Punjab and elsewhere, specifying whether men, women or children.

*Montagu's Reply*

Montagu Replies I have received final figures, but I understand that the total number of deaths in the Punjab, Delhi, Ahamadabad and Calcutta is estimated at about 400, and the number of injured at about the same number. Eight or nine Europeans were murdered. The damage done by rioters in the Punjab may amount to something far short of £ 1,000,000.

**125. Sir Rabindranath Tagore to Lord Chelmsford on the Renunciation of his Title,<sup>3</sup> 31 May 1919**

Your Excellency,

The enormity of measures taken by the Government in the Punjab for

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 519, p. 547.

<sup>2</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 September to 23 December, 1919, Col. 179.

<sup>3</sup>Chelmsford Papers, 1919, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10, No. 554 (a).

quelling some local disturbances has, with a rude shock, revealed to our mind the helplessness of our position as British subjects in India. The disproportionate severity of punishments inflicted upon the unfortunate people and the methods of carrying them out, were a convinced, are without parallel in history of the civilized government, barring some conspicuous exceptions, recent and remote. Considering that such treatment has been meted out to a population, disarmed and resourceless, by a power which has the most terribly efficient organisation for destruction of human lives, we must strongly assert that it can claim no political expediency far less moral justification. The accounts of insults and sufferings undergone by our brothers in the Punjab have trickled through the gagged silence, reaching every corner of India and the universal agony of indignation roused in the hearts of our people has been ignored by our rulers—possibly congratulating themselves for what they imagine as salutary lessons. This callousness has been praised by most of the Anglo-Indian papers, which have in some cases gone to the brutal length of making fun of our sufferings, without receiving the least check from same authority, relentlessly careful in smothering every cry of pain and expression of judgement from the organs representing the sufferers. Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is blinding the nobler vision of statesmanship in our Government, which could so easily afford to be magnanimous as befitting its physical strength and moral tradition, the very least that I can do for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen suppressed into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honour make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of humiliation, and I, for my part, wish to stand, shorn of all special distinctions by the side of those of my countrymen who, for their so-called insignificance, are liable to suffer degradation not fit for human beings.

These are the reasons which have painfully compelled me to ask your Excellency with due deference and regret, to relieve me of my title of Knighthood, which I had the honour to accept from His Majesty the King at the hands of your predecessor, for whose nobleness of heart I still entertain great admiration.

## 126. Rabindranath Tagore's Action Hailed<sup>1</sup>

Sir Rabindranath Tagore has written to the Viceroy protesting against the draconian style in which the Govt. have taken action in the Punjab,

<sup>1</sup>Young India, 4 June 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 710

and renouncing his Knighthood as a sign of remonstrance. We congratulate him on the step he has taken. For an ordinary man to think of the state of the Punjab is to give way to despair. Till the bona fides of British justice is vindicated in the Punjab, it is useless to compose with the assurance that all is well. All is not well. And we are not surprised that Rabindranath Tagore after mature reflection came to think that his title is to him an oppression and a mockery, when hundreds of his fellow-subjects are crying for justice. For a poet of his eminence, a title was never worth having or worth retaining. We wonder if the Govt. would find some leisure to think and realise the sense of alienation that has come over the people and would preserve till all these who are instrumental in the working of the trouble are brought to justice—irrespective of their high office. The wrong must be undone so far as it is possible today. It is significant of the topsy-turvydom prevailing that on a day when eager aspirants jump at honours, there should come the announcement that one of the foremost Indians of the time has resigned his own title.

### **127. Montagu's Lip Sympathy<sup>1</sup>**

He [Montagu] has patted Mr. Gandhi at the back, but at the same time he has charged him with having been a victim of evil-minded man. Mr. Gandhi, however, has better knowledge of India than Mr. Montagu and he is wise enough not to be deceived by others. His failure in certain matters is due to the misrepresentations to which his noble aims are subjected in some quarters. As regards the military commissions and equality of treatment to Indians in all parts of the Empire Mr. Montagu has not gone beyond sweet words. Other British politicians do not indulge in sweet words while Mr. Montagu indulges in them as far as possible. This seems to be the only difference between them. His defence of what the Govt. of India has done during the last two months in connection with the Rowlatt Act clearly shows what respect he had paid to Indian public opinion. Our delegates who are just now in England will have to exercise much skill in doing their duty there. They should all act in union and instead of being deluded by sweet words secure the amendment of the new scheme in important directions.

### **128. Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the All-India Congress Committee on the Events of April in the Punjab,<sup>2</sup> 8 June 1919**

The Sub-Committee was appointed in order:

(a) to arrange for the conduct of an enquiry into the recent occurrences in

<sup>1</sup>Surya, 5 June 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 703.

<sup>2</sup>A-I.C.C. Papers, File No. 2, 1919.

the Punjab and other places, through agency as they may determine; (b) to take such legal or other proceedings in relation thereto in India or England as may be necessary, and to collect funds for the purpose by public subscription.

The Sub-Committee has held four meetings to date.

*The Enquiry*

In pursuance of the resolution, Pandit Motilal Nehru, Swami Shraddhananda and I came to the Punjab in the last week of June with a view to enquire into the events of April last. Babu Purshottam Das Tandon,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and subsequently Mr. Gandhi joined us. We were assisted by Mr. Ganpat Rai,<sup>2</sup> Sheik Umar Bakhsh,<sup>3</sup> Bakshi Tek Chand,<sup>4</sup> Mr. K. Santhanam<sup>5</sup> and Lala Mulk Raj<sup>6</sup> in our work. We began taking statements from persons who knew of the occurrences. We were most materially helped by Mr. C.F. Andrews in our work.

In the initial stages we found among the people the greatest amount of reticence. Many were afraid even to talk to us, or to give us any information lest they might be molested by the police. Some even were under an apprehension that some of our workers themselves might be members of the secret service.

But as time went on and as the information about the nature of our work filtered down to the half educated or uneducated people, we began to have visits from all and sundry.

Meanwhile the announcement of an official Committee was made and our work therefore assumed a somewhat different character and we began preparations to marshal evidence with a view to assisting the proposed official Committee.

In due course the composition of the Committee and the terms of reference were announced.

The manner of appointment of the said Committee and the terms of reference fell far short of the request of the All-India Congress Committee that met at Allahabad on the 8th June 1919, the first resolution of which was as follows:

<sup>1</sup>Purshottam Das Tandon (1882-1961) : Lawyer and politician; joined Indian National Congress, 1899; Law Minister in Nabha State, 1914; resigned in 1917.

<sup>2</sup>Ganpat Rai : A resident of Amritsar, who witnessed the people crawling.

<sup>3</sup>Sheikh Umar Bakhsh : A senior lawyer of Amritsar; Secretary, Anjuman-i-Traqqi-i-Talim Musalman, Amritsar.

<sup>4</sup>Bakshi Tek Chand : Lawyer ; participated in a public meeting held on 20 March 1907 at Lyallpur.

<sup>5</sup>Krishnamachari Santhanam (1885-1980) : Lawyer, politician, journalist and scholar ; left legal profession in November 1920 in response to Non-cooperation; Secretary, Punjab Inquiry Committee, 1919-20.

<sup>6</sup>Lala Mulk Raj : A resident of Amritsar.

"The Committee note with satisfaction that the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu have recognised the necessity of an enquiry into the causes of unrest and into the complaints against the authorities of the use of excessive and unlawful force in relation to the recent occurrences in the Punjab: but in view of the fact that the policy of the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab is inseparably connected with such unrest and complaint and must form the subjects of investigation, this Committee earnestly request His Majesty's Government to constitute a Parliamentary Committee or a Commission of persons wholly unconnected with the formulation, sanction or carrying out of the said policy. The Committee urge that the following among other matters be included within the scope of the enquiry:

1. the policy of the Government of India and the Punjab government in dealing with the recent disturbances;
2. Sir Michael O'Dwyer's regime in the Punjab, with special reference to the methods of recruitment for the Indian Army and the Labour Corps, the raising of the War Loan, the administration of Martial Law and the complaints of excessive and unlawful force by the authorities;
3. the recent occurrences in Delhi and other places. The Committee further urge that the interests of justice and good government demand that an enquiry should begin at an early date."

### **129. Repression in Punjab<sup>1</sup>**

That province has always been one of the most peaceful provinces in India. The people are law-abiding, peaceful and industrious. Sir Michael O'Dwyer ignored these facts and treated the people, especially the educated class, as if they were inimical to the Govt. There was not a shadow of justification for the policy he adopted from the beginning of his administration.... The dumb terror of which Rabindranath Tagore speaks does not imply that the country does not feel because on the whole it is more or less silent. Indeed, the whole country is filled with a sense of horror such as it has not known since 1857. The monstrous sentences passed by the courts constituted under Martial Law have produced the most intensive indignation from one end of India to the other.... The whole country is particularly anxious that Sir Ed. Maclagan should signalise the beginning of his administration by intervening in the cases of the leading men of Lahore and Amritsar, who have been charged with the most serious offences.

<sup>1</sup>*Praja Mitra*, 10 June 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 741.

**130. Montagu to Ronaldshay,<sup>1</sup> 11 June 1919**

The deportation [of Horniman] itself has given rise to practically no criticism here, nor, so far as I can judge, in India. There may be attempts made to revive interest and stimulate indignation at the steps you took, when Horniman has been able to rally his forces in this country—if he is ever able to rally them, but I am confident any that such attempts will meet with poor success.

I am having our suggestion for the extension of D. of I. Act [Defence of India Act] considered in the dept. and you may be sure that whatever decision is taken, it shall support you in doing my best, to prevent you being saddled with Horniman again.

2. I was much interested in what you tell me as to your views on the underlying causes of the recent disturbances, and I think your estimate is entirely correct. I only hope that, with the introduction of the Reform Bill things will really take a definite turn for the better, and so you are concerned, I trust that you will soon find outlet from the almost incessant anxieties which have beset you since you arrived in India.

I saw Mrs. Besant last night. She has announced in the papers here as she told you, that her object in coming to England is to assist me. I am afraid that I found no great promise of any practical assistance in my interview yesterday, but I suppose we must count it to the good that she has apparently dropped the attitude of active hostility. . . .

**131. Gandhi's Instructions for Satyagrahis in terms of the Resolution passed by the Committee of the Satyagraha Sabha,<sup>2</sup> 15 June 1919**

(1) As it is or should be the belief of *Satyagraha* that those are the best fitted for offering civil disobedience who are the most free from anger, untruth and ill-will or hatred, and as I consider myself to be from this point of view the best fitted amongst the Satyagrahis, I have decided that I should be the first to offer civil disobedience.

(2) The manner in which I propose to offer civil obedience about the beginning of July is by disobeying the order against me of internment and exterrnent.

(3) I firmly believe that our victory lies in the nation preserving perfect peace and equanimity at the time of, after and during my incarceration.

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, Vol. 22, Roll 3, p. 28, NMML. Private Letter.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll, B, Feb. 1920, No. 373; The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XV, No. 375.

Such preservation will be the best way of bringing about the Rowlatt legislation.

(4) I therefore advise upon my incarceration. There should be no demonstration of any kind whatsoever, no hartal and no mass meetings.

(5) I advise that civil disobedience by the other Satyagrahis not resumed at least for one month after the day of my incarceration as distinguished from my arrest or some such final act on the part of Government.

(6) This month should be treated as one of discipline and preparation for civil disobedience, and assuming that no disturbances take place after my incarceration, it should be devoted to the following constructive programme:

- (a) The preaching of the cardinal principles of the doctrine of *Satyagraha*, namely, the necessity of strict adherence to Truth and Ahimsa and the duty of civil disobedience, its natural corollary and the equally paramount duty of refraining from criminal disobedience, and with this end in view literature such as Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience*, *Hind Swaraj*, *Defence of Socrates* by me, Tolstoy's *Letter to Russian Liberals* and *Ruskin's unto this last* should be widely distributed. It is true that we sold some of this literature as part of the plan of actual civil disobedience. But now we have the knowledge that the Government have been advised that reprints and sale prohibited literature is not an offence except in so far as such of any literature may be covered by section 124-A. We should, therefore, now sell this literature as part of our propaganda but not as an act rendering us liable to penalty for breach of any law.
- (b) Propaganda of Swadeshi should be taken upon an intensive and extensive scale. It should cover as far as possible the whole of India. Propaganda should be free from all bitterness and from even a suspicion of boycott, Swadeshi being regarded as an economic, political and even religious necessity for all time. And this propaganda should include in an equal degree both the presentation of the different pledges to the public for acceptance and activity for the new production of cotton cloth principally by the encouragement of hand-spinning and weaving even though it may be for the time being at a loss.
- (c) The advocating of the Hindu-Muslim unity not by means of public speeches but by concerted acts of help and kindness on the part of Hindus towards Muhammadans and on the part of the latter towards the former. Hindus would therefore naturally give enthusiastic support to the Muhammadans in their just claims regarding the retention of Turkey as a Muhammadan Sovereign State with full regard to their feelings as to the Holy Places and the Caliphate.
- (d) Meetings should be held to pass resolutions praying for the repeal of the Rowlatt legislation, the appointment of an independent impartial committee of inquiry with the power to inquire into the causes of the Punjab

disturbances, the administration of Martial law and to revise the sentences passed by the Punjab Martial Law Tribunals, the release of Babu Kalinath Roy<sup>1</sup> without the necessity of an enquiry, and cancellation of the order of deportation against Mr. Horniman.

(7) If full peace is observed for one month as per paragraph 3 and it has been ascertained that the people have understood the doctrine of *Satyagraha*, time will have arrived for offering further civil disobedience assuming of course that the Rowlatt legislation has not been repealed.

(8) Civil disobedience may then be offered by those who may be selected by the leaders appointed in paragraph 14. I, however, advise that no more than two at a time should offer civil disobedience from any one centre nor should civil disobedience be commenced simultaneously at all the centres . . . But the effect of resumption of civil disobedience in one or more centres of the public mind should be watched before resuming it in the other ventures.

(9) The recommending of the laws of civil disobedience is a most difficult task. In the present state of the country when it is highly debatable whether the spirit of civil disobedience replacing and entirely superseding criminal disobedience has been understood by the masses, I am unable to advise civil disobedience of the Revenue Laws, i.e. the salt tax, the land tax, and the forest laws.

(10) The income-tax is a feasible proposition on the ground of safety from any violent disturbance, but I am more than doubtful as to any response being made by those who pay the income-tax. There remain, therefore, the political laws and only the Press Act lends itself to unlicensed printing presses. But I am not confident as to the efficacy of establishing unlicensed presses for the purpose of inviting imprisonment.

(11) I can, therefore, only advise that individual *Satyagraha* when they receive orders of internment or orders prohibiting them from speaking or publishing any matter which the Government may consider to be obnoxious but which from the *Satyagraha* standpoint may be flawless such orders should be disregarded.

(12) It may be that the Government may not view with indifference the propaganda of the doctrine of reprint of prohibited literature although such literature from the moral, i.e. *Satyagraha* standpoint, is perfectly innocent. In that event civil disobedience is offered in the easiest and most dignified way. It is open, however, to the leaders to add to the ways above-mentioned by thinking our other laws which may have escaped my notice.

But it will be no fault in them to confine themselves to the limits mentioned in paragraph 3, but it would be considered a grave indiscretion on their

<sup>1</sup>Kalinath Roy: Journalist, joined the *Bengalee* as Sub-Editor; Editor, *Panjabee*, 1915-17; Editor, *The Tribune*, since 1917; prosecuted for sedition in April 1919 in connection with Martial Law and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment.

part if they select laws which do not hold proper matter for civil disobedience or a civil breach of which is likely to lead a criminal breach.

(13) In the event of a prosecution for civil disodedience, a Satyagrahi if he has committed it, should plead guilty, offer no defence and invite the severest penalty. If he is falsely charged with civil disobedience he should make that statement but not enter upon any further defence and accept the penalty he received. If a Satyagrahi is prosecuted for criminal breach as for instance for actually uttered sedition or incited to sedition he should make a statement denying the guilt and producing his witnesses. It is open to him also to engage a lawyer if he wishes lawyers, as the essence of *Satyagraha* lies in inviting penalty, for deliberate civil disobedience and in accepting penalty where one is falsely charged with criminal disobedience because a Satyagrahi is indifferent to the pain of imprisonment. He glories in it when it is self-invited and resigns to it when a false and malicious charge has been brought against him. That he may not by making effort to get the best lawyer possible be found guilty not only by the court but be considered such by the public should not concern a Satyagrahi. The voice of a clear disciplined conscience is the final arbiter for him.

(14) I have come to the conclusion that it is better to divide the Bombay Presidency into so many independent self-sustained centres, each seeking cooperation with and advice from the rest, but none being under the orders of any, and I select Bombay, Surat, Broach, Nadiad and Ahamadabad as such centres. . . .

(15) I, therefore, propose to give separate brief instructions using this as a basis to be adopted by the centres outside the Presidency. The centres appointed under this paragraph will be responsible each for its own district. . . . I advise the leaders to form small committees and for their guidance and others consult the feeling of fellow Satyagrahis.

(16) All along I have assumed that there will be no disturbance. If, however, the worst happens and there is a disturbance every Satyagrahi living in the disturbed centre will be expected to lose life in preventing loss of other lives whether English or Indian. He will, at the same peril, prevent destruction of property and if he thought there was shooting of innocent men he will offer himself also to be shot.

### **132. Sir George Lloyd to Viceroy,<sup>1</sup> 17 June 1919**

I am once more rather anxious about things here, for Gandhi is beginning to get very restless and tiresome. He has some game on with the Punjab but exactly what it is we have not yet succeeded in finding out. His meetings

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll, A, August 1919, Nos. 261-72 and K.W.

are not well attended and his followers are very disgruntled and cross with Gandhi but such precautions are now taken to prevent any but the most faithfull Satyagrahis from getting into the meeting. . . . The mere deportation of Gandhi will raise a considerable storm, whilst his prosecution, coupled with wide publicity on the terms of that letter—arguments pros and cons as to the Holy places and the like—is a course that I cannot contemplate with any great satisfaction but I do not see how we could ignore such action or let it go by unchecked. His further programme appears to be in connection with revenue and he intends to advise all his followers to refuse payment of taxes. He is in correspondence with Horniman and Mrs. [Sarojini] Naidu in England. For the rest the Home Rule party is completely split up in this presidency. It has suffered severe blows in the resignation of several important leaders. The most conspicuous of which is Jamanadas Dwarkadass who has been to see me and expressed his regret at past occurrences and his desire to work with Government in future. If it were not for Gandhi all would be extremely well here, but he is a great nuisance and a real danger point. . . .

**133. C.F. Andrews to Editor, "The Statesman", on the  
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre,<sup>1</sup> 18 June 1919**

In reply to your editorial comments on my letter, I shall be as brief as possible and only take up one point which appears to me to be of considerable practical importance. If has reference to Jallianwala Bagh. During the latter half of April and the earlier part of May I was in Delhi, and those whom I met from the Punjab who knew the facts, told me clearly that the incident at the Bagh had been far more serious than the report of it in the papers would lead one to suppose. It was not all difficult, especially for military man to reckon up, from the number of shots fired, what the casualties were likely to have been. Two such military officers told me independently, at different times, that the casualties were probably over a thousand. But in the official reports, in order to avoid excitement, the true facts were kept carefully concealed. Indeed, the general impression among Indians was, that independent persons were prevented from coming into the Punjab from outside because it was not desirable that the whole truth should be revealed.

However, much I may detest General Dyer's<sup>2</sup> act, his evidence before

<sup>1</sup>C.F. Andrews Papers 1/D-16, NAI.

General Reginald Edward Henry Dyer (1864-1927) : Commissioned to Queen's Royal Regiment, 1885; transferred to Indian Army; commanded training brigade at Jullundur, 1916; Brigadier-General; was compulsorily retired for his firing at Jallianwala Bagh massacre in 1920.

the Commission shows that he tells the truth. At the commission, if my memory is correct, he agreed that the casualties might have been anything between 1500 and 2000. It was this statement which came with terrible shock of surprise in England. I cannot myself believe that General Dyer reported to the Punjab Government such a minimising estimate as 200 casualties, or even as 200 killed. The Government of India, in their laborious explanation with regard to what General Dyer was doing during May, June, July and August, do not touch the real point at all. For General Dyer must have sent in his estimate of casualties that very night of April 13th, while the whole scene was burnt freshly into his mind. The event was far too grave for any delay. At that time of year, April 13th, the light must have been quite clear between 5 p. m. and 5.30 p. m. The centre of the square of the Bagh, according to General Dyer's evidence, was only 50 or 60 yards away from the raised platform whercon his soldiers stood to fire. He himself directed the fire into the thickest parts of the crowd. He saw everything beginning to end with his own eyes. He knew exactly how many rounds had been fired, and how the shots had taken effect. It is, therefore, almost inconceivable to me that he was responsible for the official version which deceived the rest of India and the civilized world for so many months.

The statistics, which the Government of India has received from the Punjab Government and published, as though they were finally trustworthy, are vitiated through and through by two outstanding facts of first-rate importance. (i) Very many of the Amritsar people, on account of the excessive fear of the police, have been unwilling to come forward even before the Seva Samiti,<sup>1</sup> with the names of the dead and wounded. (ii) Villagers had crowded into Amritsar on *Baisakhi* Day, and many of them were in the Bagh. It is impossible to trace all their dead and wounded.

To show how hopeless the task is to find out the truth along this line of inquiry, let us only for a moment consider the absurdity of the final figure for the wounded, which you have quoted. This figure was sent to the Government of India, after scrutiny of the Seva Samiti lists, by the Punjab officials. This number for the wounded is given as 192. That is to say, according to these figures there were 379 killed and 192 wounded in the Bagh after 1650 rifle bullets had been fired at close range and after very many had been trampled to death. Also, according to these statistics, two men were killed by the rifle fire for every one that had been wounded—an impossible proportion.

The explanation of those statistics is easy to find. Much as the Amritsar people disliked telling the names of their dear, they disliked telling the names of their wounded, who were still living and could be molested by the police.

I am not writing this from theory. During the last part of September, the

<sup>1</sup>A social welfare association, founded in 1915 at Allahabad.

whole of October and half of November, I lived in the Punjab carrying on enquiries in conjunction with the Seva Samiti workers. Furthermore, I had constant communication with the officials while carrying on my inquiries. This double environment gave me a unique opportunity of getting at the real facts To my mind, the Government of India has not helped the cause it was advocating by publishing, as though they were reliable or trustworthy, these figures about Jallianwala Bagh, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer has not improved his position by his amazing statement that nothing was minimised or concealed.

#### **134. Sir Sankaran Nair's Resignation<sup>1</sup>**

Sir Sankaran Nair has resigned not only because he had difference with the other members of State Govt. on the question of Martial Law but he was wholly opposed to the present repressive policy of the Govt. of India when even Sir Sankran Nair has no faith in the present policy of Govt. how can other Indians be expected to be satisfied with it?

#### **135. On the Punjab Sentences<sup>2</sup>**

The fact that such a dispassionate and cool-minded man like Mr. C.F. Andrews has been constrained to use severe expression, which he very rarely does, in regard to the sentences in the Punjab and especially in the cruel injustice that has been done to Babu Kalinath Roy, is a measure of the intensity of public feeling in the country. To try to dissect Col. Irvine's judgement in *The Tribune* case amounts to something like flogging a dead horse. It has been already torn into shreds by no less an authority than Mr. Gandhi who took the signal step of reproducing in *Young India* all the offending articles in *The Tribune* to convince the public that they are a model of balanced and responsible journalism, and that in convicting Mr. Kalinath Roy, on those articles, a wrong has been done to him and to the country at large. That such a conviction should have been allowed to stand and that all appeals for mercy—where the case is not one of mercy but clearly of justice—should have been lost on the authorities demonstrates the perversity in which the authorities in the Punjab still persist.

<sup>1</sup>*Bharat Bandhu* (Hathras), 18 June 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the United Provinces, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>*The Bombay Chronicle*, 19 June 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency 1919, p. 781.

**136. Montagu To Ronaldshay,<sup>1</sup> 25 June 1919**

... The latter [Mrs. Annine Besant] is a strong woman. What she will do during her stay here I do not know.

I do not know really what to make of events in India, but I wish you would write to me on one subject. Is it possible, do you think—I don't want you to criticise the Viceroy, but I want you as a politician to give me advice which he cannot give me—would it be possible to make the head of the Govt. of India more personal? Take this Rowlatt Act agitation. So far start as I can see during the whole of the debate in his Legislative Council, during the whole of the riots and outrages, the Viceroy made no speech himself. Govt. communiques were issued. Sir William Vincent conducted the Bill with extraordinary skill, and I feel quite sure that Lord Chelmsford maintained throughout the dignity of the Viceroyalty. But the idea strikes an English politician that an intervention in the debate by the Viceroy himself what we should call a speech by P.M., a public meeting, an appeal might have had great effect. Am I wrong? Would such procedure be regarded as undignified, would the effect be evil, would it merely lead to criticism of the head of the Govt. and the King's representative? I only want to know, and I should like very much to be guided by your advice . . . .

Oh! for a couple of hours conversation with you! My own view is that the S/S [Secretary of State] should go every year to spend a week at least with the head of every province and a week with the Viceroy. Great Heavens above, if I were to suggest that policy! How furious would every body in India be. At the same time I am very much worried by the difficulty of explaining oneself. I feel all the time that I am working feverishly, strangely caring nothing for anything but India; that those with whom and through whom I have to work are suspicious and, I fear, sometimes hostile. Nothing that I can do now will ever give the public service any confidence in me. They regard the present S/S [Secretary of State for India] as their enemy. That is bad enough. But when you couple with it the traditional hostility of the Govt. of India to the India office you have a state of affairs that can only be cured it seems to me, by a realisation that we are all part of one machine. That can only be done by intimate association.

**137. On the Inquiry into Punjab Troubles<sup>2</sup>**

The promised inquiry into the Punjab troubles is long in coming and the obstinate refusal of the Government of India to suspend the death sentences

<sup>1</sup>Montague Papers, Vol. 22, Roll 2, p. 28, NMML. Private Letter.

<sup>2</sup>Young India, 9 July 1919, Report of the Native Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency, 1919, p. 580.

pending enquiry makes the people restive and restless. The date for the commencement of the enquiry may be announced later but the public should know immediately the scope and the personnel of the Committee. The public want to feel sure that the forthcoming enquiry will include the power to revise the sentences passed. We have never been able to agree with the view sometimes expressed that Martial Law is never a necessity nor the sentences pronounced by a Martial Law tribunal had necessarily be bad or severe . . . .

Many of our publicists have argued that the dropping of bombs from these hideous machines having come to stay and having been accepted as lawful methods of destruction. They will use it when the governments are alarmed . . . . The importance of the issues involved makes delay dangerous and strength and impartiality in the enquiry by tribunal a necessity.

### **138. Montagu to George Lloyd<sup>1</sup> 18 July 1919**

. . . Jinnah has arrived in this country and I saw him with a small deputation from the Moslim Leagul with Yakub<sup>2</sup> [Hassan] and [G.M.] Bhurgi.<sup>3</sup> Of course, they are on their best behaviour, mainly in the hope of impressing the Joint Committee on the Bill, which is at its work . . . .

I was very glad for your sake and my own to get your telegram about Gandhi. It is difficult at this end to know how far that sort of wrong-headed innocence can be dealt with by plain reason. But I suspect myself that he finds that he cannot force your hands, without committing himself to the sort of action that is all against his principles, he should be an easier problem to tackle than when he did not understand what he was likely to be against.

### **139. Resolutions passed by the Congress at Calcutta on the events of April in the Punjab,<sup>4</sup> 20 July 1919**

The Committee passed the following resolution at Calcutta on the 20th July last :

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 3, NMML.

<sup>2</sup>Yakub Hassan : A Muslim leader who visited Constantinople in 1919; Member of the Muslim deputation to England.

<sup>3</sup>Gulam Mohammed Bhurgi : Lawyer and politician; General-Secretary, Indian National Congress, 1916; participated in Home Rule Movement, 1919; Member, Bombay Legislative Council.

<sup>4</sup>A.I.C.C. Papers, File No. 2, 1919, NMML.

That the All India Congress Committee deplores the delay in the appointment of the Commission of inquiry into the Punjab situation announced by the Secretary of State for India . . . . The Committee also reaffirms its opinion that it is essential, in the interests of justice and in order to inspire public confidence, that such a Commission should be appointed directly by His Majesty's Government, should consist of persons wholly unconnected with the Indian administration, should hold an open and public enquiry and should be invested with Legal authority to annul or revise sentences passed by the Martial Law Commissioners and other tribunals and officers specially empowered in that behalf . . . .

8. Strenuous efforts were made in the Legislative Council, as also outside by public bodies and the press to have the terms of reference widened and to have a commission appointed directly by His Majesty's Government, but the effort proved practically useless except that two more non-officials, one being English and the other Indian, were appointed on the Committee and that the appointment of two Judges for the purpose of revising the judgements of summary courts and area officers was announced.

9. In spite, however, of the disappointment it was considered advisable to co-operate with the said Committee and we did accordingly co-operate with it at Delhi and Mr. C.R. Das arrived from Calcutta and appeared on behalf of the Congress Committee before Lord Hunter's Commission, but when Lord Hunter's Commission arrived in the Punjab unexpected difficulties faced us and we were obliged most reluctantly to withdraw co-operation from the Disorders Enquiry Committee . . . . We appealed against the decision of the Punjab Government to the Government of India and the Secretary of State but the Government of India declined to interfere. We would only add that when the undersigned had the opportunity of speaking about it to our distinguished countrymen who were then imprisoned in the Lahore Central Jail, they entirely endorsed our action. We would also add that actual experience so far has proved the wisdom of the course adopted by us. Among other reasons we may mention that the restricted terms of reference to Lord Hunter's Committee would not have allowed it to entertain matters which justifiably come under the events of April last but which are unjustly excluded from the reference. But we may not anticipate.

10. We had, therefore, to fall back upon our original plan of conducting our own enquiry and the following were appointed Commissioners for the purpose of analysing, sifting and collating the evidence already collected, supplementing it where necessary and reporting upon it:

1. Mr. M. K. Gandhi
2. The Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru
3. Mr. C. R. Das

4. The Hon'ble Mr. A. K. Fazlul Haq<sup>1</sup>
- 5 Mr. Abbas [Shamsuddin] Tayabji<sup>2</sup>
6. Mr. K. Santanam was appointed Secretary.

The Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru, however, having been appointed President-elect of the Indian National Congress found it advisable and necessary to tender his resignation of the appointment as Commissioner. The Committee appreciated Pandit Motilal Nehru's position and accepted the resignation. Mr. M. R. Jayakar of the Bombay Bar was appointed in his place.

11. The Commissioners have been occupied in taking further evidence and they have very nearly completed their labours. They have visited Amritsar, Gujranwala, Wazirabad, Nizamabad, Akalgrah, Ramnagar, Hafizabad, Sangla Hill, Sheikhpura, Ghukar Kana, Syadpur, Kasur and Lahore. They have addressed various meetings at which they have invited the public to make statements, whether to corroborate or contradict the evidences already given to the Sub-Committee. Nearly 12,000 statements have been recorded though a much larger number was heard.

12. We regret that the report of the Commissioners cannot be presented during the present session of the Congress. After anxious deliberation the Commissioners and the Sub-Committee came to the conclusion that it would not be courteous or advisable to publish our report before the Hunter Committee had presented theirs. The report of our Commissioners will be published immediately after the presentation of the report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee so that both the reports will be independent each of the other.

13. But there are certain outstanding facts that have come out in the course of official evidence which it is impossible to ignore. General Dyer has given evidence before Lord Hunter's Committee which in the opinion of the Sub-Committee calls for immediate definite action by the Congress. The admissions made by him establish it beyond dispute that his action of the 13th April was nothing but a cold-blooded calculated massacre of innocent, unoffending, unarmed men and children, unparalleled for its heartless and cowardly brutality during modern times. No report of any Committee is necessary in order to enable Congress to pronounce a judgement upon it. In order, therefore, to assure the public mind that the Government dissociate themselves entirely from the inhuman and unsoldierly deed of General Dyer, it is absolutely necessary that General Dyer should be immediately relieved of his command, as a preliminary to his prosecution.

<sup>1</sup>A.K. Fazlul Haq (1873-1962): Lawyer, educationist, journalist and politician; President, All India Muslim League, 1916-21; Joint Secretary, Indian National Congress 1917; and General Secretary, Indian National Congress, 1918-19. \*

<sup>2</sup>Abbas Shamsuddin Tayabji : Judge and politician; Judge, High Court, Baroda.

14. Nor is this all. The Punjab Government admittedly was and the Government of India must have long ago been aware of the exact nature of the doings of General Dyer on the 13th April. They must, therefore, be held responsible for the delay in placing an authoritative statement of the crime before the public and His Majesty's Government. The All India Congress Committee as early as the 20th July last drew pointed attention to the delay in its resolution already quoted above. The conduct of the Punjab in relation to the occurrences of the Punjab in April last and the general attitude and conduct of the Government of India in relation thereto require the most careful consideration of the Congress. But in our opinion the proper time to deal with the matter will be when the Report of the Hunter Committee and our own Committee have been published. We are of the opinion that the cause which we all have at heart will suffer by any premature pronouncement by the Congress, and can only gain by restraint for a few months.

15. We say advisedly a few months because in our opinion the matter is of such vital importance that, as soon as may be after the publication of the reports, a special session of the Congress should be held to deal with it and to decide what action should be taken upon the whole situation, as it will then present itself to the country.

### *II. Legal Proceedings*

17. The legal proceedings hitherto taken consist wholly of appeals to the Privy Council in some cases. This branch of the work has been ably and exclusively handled by the Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru. It is expected that the hearing before the Privy Council will take place next month. Mr. Neville<sup>1</sup> who is in charge of these cases in London is now with us and has been taking deep interest in the evidence from the legal standpoint.

### *III. Relief*

18. The work of relief has been carried out through agency of the Seva Samiti of Allahabad under the supervision of Swami Shraddhanandaji who was ably assisted by Mr. V.N. Tivaraj<sup>2</sup> of the 'Servants of India Society' as a Secretary of the Sewa Samiti. This work has been by no means the least important.

### *IV. Finance*

19. The response made to the appeal of the Committee has been most

<sup>1</sup>Arthur William Neville (1884-1948) : Lawyer, a solicitor in England who, on the invitation of the Congress inquiry sub-committee, went to the Punjab in the winter of 1919 to attend the Congress session.

<sup>2</sup>V.N. Tivaraj: Member of the Servants of India Society; and Honorary Secretary, Seva Samiti, which collected figures of the victims of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in September 1919.

gratifying. High and low have all deemed it a privilege to subscribe for the relief of our countrymen. Funds have come in from Mesopotamia, Ceylon, South Africa, East Africa, and elsewhere. A statement of receipts and expenditure will be published in due course.

**140. Gandhi to the Editor of "The Bombay Chronicle",<sup>1</sup> 21 July 1919**

. . . Indeed my acceptance of the Government's advice is a further demonstration of the true nature of Civil Resistance. A civil resister never seeks to embarrass Government. He often cooperates and does not hesitate civilly to resist where Resistance becomes a duty. He attains the goal by creating goodwill, believing as he does that unfailing exercise of goodwill even in the face of unjust acts of a Government can only result in goodwill being ultimately returned by the Government. Further suspension of Civil Resistance is, therefore, nothing but a practical application of *Satyagraha*.

Yet it is no smaller matter for me to suspend Civil Resistance even for a day while Rowlatt Legislation continues to disfigure our Statute Book.

**141. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>2</sup> 23 July 1919**

In your letter of the 11th of June, you have asked me whether I do not now regret the exclusion of Gandhi from Delhi. The temper of the Delhi mob at that time were very sullen. Gandhi's avowed object was to induce men to break the law of the land, and subsequent events have made it clear that he cannot control the excitement which his appeal to the mob arouses. In such circumstances his arrest in Delhi if, he had been allowed to go there, would have been inevitable, and this would in all probabilities have led to even worse riots than actually occurred. As regards the allegation the incident was published in the form that Mr. Gandhi had been prevented from entering Delhi and had been deported under escort for an unknown destination, no such information was ever published in an official form, and it is clearly impossible to control rumours which were started by irresponsible persons. In view of the fact that Gandhi was released immediately on arrival in Bombay and appeared in a public meeting there on the 11th of April, having only been stopped on the night

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, Feb. 1920, No. 373. It was published in *The Bombay Chronicle* on 23 July 1919.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. A, August 1919, Nos. 261-72 and K.W. Private letter. ~

of the 9th it is difficult to believe that the riots in Ahmedabad or elsewhere were in any way due to the excessive reticence on the part of Govt. as to the action they had taken. Govt.'s intention in regard to Gandhi had for obvious reasons to be kept secret prior to his arrest, but I have no reason to believe that information was refused to anyone subsequent to his removal to Bombay.

I heard from Lloyd on the 22nd that Gandhi had told him that he would make a statement that he is suspending civil disobedience for the time being in response to the warning administered by Govt. Lloyd adds: Gandhi has told me privately that I may understand that the words 'for the time being' to mean 'for some months at any rate'.

#### **142. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>1</sup> 24 July 1919**

It was proposed that as a protest against the barbarous sentences in the Punjab, all deputations should refuse to give evidence before the Joint Select Committee. But the Moderates would not join this movement and at a meeting of the Congress deputation it was resolved that the Congress deputation alone should not take any action of this kind, not at any rate without the permission of the All India Congress Committee. Mr. [V.J.] Patel has therefore cabled to Pandit Madan Mohan [Malaviya] asking for instruction on the point. This news is also private.

In the *Daily News* there was an article headed 'Blindness in India' severely commenting on the Punjab incidents. The *Daily Herald* also supported us. The figures about the Punjab convictions published in the *Kesari* have been as you will find quoted in the *Daily Herald*.

#### **143. Lord Chelmsford to George Lloyd,<sup>2</sup> 2 August 1919**

Many thanks for your letter of July 27th on the subject of the warning to Gandhi and his decision to postpone civil disobedience. Let me congratulate you very cordially on the skilful manner in which you handled this troublesome "misguided saint". For the immediate future at any rate Gandhi should not be a source of embarrassment and each time he cries 'wolf' and no wolf comes, the less attention he and his *Satyagraha* attract.

The Home Department have brought to my notice a passage in the 'Bombay Weekly Letter' which comes to the Director, Central Intelligence.

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File 1-11, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll, A, August 1919, Nos. 261-72 and K.W.

It is dated July 15th, refers to the interview you had with Gandhi before my visit to Poona, and runs as follows:

He [Gandhi] understood from H.E. that the Government of India were considering the situation in the Punjab, and, although he did not say in so many words, he understood H.E. to hint that there was some hope that the question of withdrawing the Rowlatt Act was under consideration of the Government of India.

The Home Department suggests that there is danger that if the statement goes unchallenged Gandhi may come out later with a story of a definite promise and a charge of breach of faith. You will know best if this particular misrepresentation has gained such currency as to make it desirable for you to take notice of it, and I am quite content to leave it to your discretion to nail the lie to the counter or to ignore it.

**144. Mohammad Ali on the Indian Khilafat Delegation,<sup>1</sup>**  
**5 August 1919**

The Indian Khilafat delegation since they arrived in Europe, have loyally, strictly carried out the terms of the mandate with which they were charged. We based ourselves on the Manifesto which had been adopted at the All India Khilafat Conference and in accordance with it, we represented to the British, French and Italian Govts., and the representatives of the Government of Japan, the exact position of the Moslems and Indians in regard to the Turkish settlement and the future of the Khilafat. We also made clear our claims to the British, French and Italian peoples from the platform and in the press. We think we may claim that no educated person in those countries is interested in public affairs; much less any government has any excuse now for not knowing what India feels on the Turkish question and why.

Our representations have, however, yielded no tangible result in the desired direction so far as the collective action of the Allies is concerned, and in particular the British Government have not yielded to the Moslem and Indian representations one single particle of 'concession' as the Turkish Treaty about to be signed bears witness.

The delegation have exerted themselves to discharge the duty with which they were entrusted to the best of their ability. They have carried out their mission but have failed to move the Allies from their set purpose.

It now, rests with our people to initiate such further action as may be

<sup>1</sup>Dr. D.D. Sathaye's Papers, NMML.

called for and may to them appear advisable and proper. We await their commands.

#### **145. Lord Sydenham on Martial Law in India,<sup>1</sup> 6 August 1919**

... The rising in the Punjab was unlike anything which has happened since the Mutiny. It is the first time since those dark days that the cry 'Kill the English' was raised. It is also the first time that mobs have been led by English-speaking Indians, dressed in European dress. I am told from a private source that an English woman<sup>2</sup> belonging to the British Zenana Mission was caught by the mob and received six great wounds on her head. She was nearly killed. A kindly Indian said, "She is only an English Mission Miss, and she does no harm", but the mob shouted, 'She is English, kill her'. That was the kind of spirit which animated the mobs in Delhi, Amritsar, Lahore and other places. The unfortunate woman just escaped with her life, and she owes her life to the gallant Sikhs who saved a good many of our helpless fellow countrymen and countrywomen.

But for the strong action of Sir Michael O'Dwyer there might have been no Europeans left in the Punjab, and the situation might have become desperate. We ought to remember that fact in assuming at once that injustice has been done to some of the people concerned. We ought to remember that the sentences, if they were somewhat severe, may have been justified by the great gravity of the situation at the time.

#### **146. Lord Sinha on Martial Law in India,<sup>3</sup> 6 August 1919**

The original sentences were in 108 cases the death sentence. Of these, 18 have been executed, 2 having appealed, 28 out of the 108 have been reduced to transportation for life, 23 to imprisonment for 10 years, 13 to imprison for 7 years, 21 to shorter terms of imprisonment, and there are 5 cases now to be dealt with by the Privy Council. The rest of the cases are also pending in as much as the same point that had arisen in the case now under appeal

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, 1919, 4 February to 23 December 1919, Col. 191.

<sup>2</sup>Miss Francis Sherwood.

<sup>3</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, 1919, Cols. 197-98. Satyendra Prasanno Sinha (first Baron Sinha) of Raipur, (1864-1928); Barrister: Advocate-general of Bengal, 1908; Legal Member of the Governor-General's Council, 1909; President, All-India Congress 1915; Member, Bengal Executive Committee, 1917; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, 1919; piloted the Government of India Act, 1919 through the House of Lords.

also arises in them. But out of the 108 sentences awarded, only 18 were executed. And, as the Government of India informed us, the principle upon which the commutations have been granted is this—whenever there has been no factor of actual murder they have commuted the capital sentences either to imprisonment or transportation. As regards convictions by the inferior Summary Courts, there are about 1,500 of them. They are being separately reviewed cases by the local Governments, which will doubtless grant reductions on a generous scale as they have done in the other cases . . . .

#### **147. Montagu to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup> 7 August 1919**

I agree with you that Butler's suggestion of bringing His Majesty's name cannot be entertained and some enquiry, however, departmental and circumscribed is absolutely necessary. What I urge upon you is to take bitterness, if possible, out of it by early announcement of an amnesty. It could then be left to Committee to sit in *camera* when they choose.

If no amnesty were possible you must be prepared for a more comprehensive inquiry and a public one.

The composition of the Committee will depend upon the general line of action decided upon. A High Court Judge or judge of appeal are both impossible. I am making inquiries as to a Scottish Judge or as an alternative the name of Sir Walter Lawrence<sup>2</sup> is suggested. If you have [G.C.] Rankin<sup>3</sup> it may be possible, perhaps a lay chairman. Otherwise best suggestion I can make is Sir L. Jenkins.<sup>4</sup> I much prefer [E.A.] Gait<sup>5</sup> to [W.F.] Rice<sup>6</sup> and I would urge you to get him to serve. I am certain that Indians who command the confidence of the Moderates at least are essential. The Muhammadan should be, I think, [Syed] Ameer Ali,<sup>7</sup> [Abbas Ali]

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, October 1919, Nos. 187-97.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Walt Lawrence: A prominent Scottish Judge and a former member of the Indian Council.

<sup>3</sup>Sir George Claus Rankin (1877-1946): Judge, Calcutta High Court, 1918-26; Member, Disorders Enquiry Committee, 1919-20.

<sup>4</sup>Sir Lawrence Hugh Jenkins (1857-1928): Judge, High Court, Calcutta, 1896-98; Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature, Bombay, 1899; Member, Council of India, 1908; Chief Justice of Bengal, 1909; retired but appointed in the judiciary committee of Privy Council, 1916.

<sup>5</sup>Sir Edward Albert Gait (1863-1950): I.C.S., Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar and Orissa, 1915-20.

<sup>6</sup>W.F. Rice: I.C.S.; Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

<sup>7</sup>Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928): Lawyer and politician; Founder and Secretary of the Central National Muhammadan Association, 1877-90; leading member of the London branch of the All-India Muslim League, 1908-13.

Baig<sup>1</sup> or Abdur Rahim<sup>2</sup> and I prefer the second. I suggest as Hindu Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee or [C.H.] Setalvad, preferably the latter.

**148. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>3</sup> 11 August 1919**

Clear the line. Private. Inquiry into disorders. Please see your private telegram of the 7th August. We too have carefully considered the question in Council, though in view of my tour actual message has not been approved in Council. There are four points on which your suggestions differ from those placed before you previously by us. The first is that general amnesty excluding serious offenders should proceed inquiry and synchronise with indemnity bill. To this we regret we cannot agree. A general view has been taken by the local government and it has dealt with the question of remission with the utmost expectation consistent with examination of individual cases. We can assure you that its handling of the cases convicted by summary courts also will be expeditious and liberal, and as regards minor offenders will, we hope, approximate to amnesty . . . We attach importance, however, to difference between this discretionary remission after individual consideration by the head of the province, and on the other hand indiscriminating amnesty preceding inquiry, which is open to a objection already taken and will be wrongly ascribed in this country to pressure brought to bear on you in England. Those hostile to Govt. are already disseminating the view. The local Govt. is opposed to such amnesty and we are not prepared to add to its difficulties. If, therefore, you will still decide on general and immediate amnesty we hope it will be made clear by you that in doing so you overrule us.

Second and third points are scope and procedure of inquiry respectively. You warn us that if we are unable to accept antecedent amnesty, the inquiry must be more comprehensive and public. We do not see why this result should follow. We are, however, anxious to meet your wishes as far as possible and to confine our differences from you within the narrowest limits. We, therefore, agree with some misgivings to the inclusion of an investigation of the direct and immediate causes in the scope of reference, in the hope that the Chairman will be fully alive to the mischief of letting the enquiry degenerate into a general indictment of the administration. We agree also to the enquiry being public one. Indeed we are of

<sup>1</sup>Sir Abbas Ali Baig: Diwan of Junagarh State, 1906-10; Member of Council of State for India, 1915; on Special duty in Egypt in connection with the War, 1914-15; K.C. I.E., 1917.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Abdur Rahim: Judge and Member of the Royal Commission on Public Services, 1913-15; officiated as Chief Justice, Madras 1916 and 1919; Judge, Madras High Court.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. A, October 1919, Nos. 187-97.

opinion that it should be plainly understood that if the Committee find that a public inquiry is exciting ill-feeling and unrest, owing to the garbled presentment and discussion of details in the press, it should be in the competence of the Chairman to hold it *in camera* any portion of the inquiry.

The fourth point concerns the composition of the Committee. We desire in the first place to lay great stress upon selection of a suitable Chairman. It is important to secure a man of great weight, judicial acumen and independence. A Judge would be preferred by us and we note that you are still endeavouring to secure the services of a Scottish judge we should have welcomed the appointment of Lord Dunedin<sup>1</sup> if he had been available . . . We could not accept either of the names you suggest in your telegram. When in India Sir Lawrence Jenkins adopted an attitude of opposition to the executive. Sir Walter Lawrence is regarded by us in some other respects unsuitable and we could not ask Gait under him as a member. His position is essential for this reason also. If suitable Chairman is forthcoming we will ask Gait, whose willingness to serve has not been ascertained by us. It is essential that the committee should comprise some administrative officer of high status who from actual experience of conditions in northern India can appreciate the very critical situation with which you were confronted last April. We await your suggestion as regards military member. We think no better selection possible than Rankin for High Court Judge. With regard to Muhammadan member we cannot think of any of three suggestions made by you suitable. [Syed] Ameer Ali is very old and for many years has severed his direct connection with India. [Abbas Ali] Baig would carry no weight nor should have confidence in him. We regard Abdur Rahim unlikely to maintain an unbiased and judicial attitude. We, therefore, adhere to our nomination of [Abdur] Rauf<sup>2</sup> whose appointment we think, should satisfy all reasonable opinion. We prefer [N.G.] Chandavarkar<sup>3</sup> for Hindu Member, though if you prefer Setalvad we will not object to him.

We have, therefore, out of the four points in issue, acceded to your views on two and partly on the third. We are constrained to differ only as regards the amnesty. As it is, our common object is to allay bitterness and so restore normal conditions. . . .

Finally, we would add that the delay in announcing a decision is already the subject of keen criticism. The matter has now been fully discussed between us and we should ask you to pass definite orders with as little

<sup>1</sup>Viscount Dunedin, Murray Andrew Graham (1849-1942): Judge, Lord President of the Court of Session, 1905; Additional Lord of Appeals, 1913-32.

<sup>2</sup>Abdur Rauf: A Judge of the Punjab Chief Court, Lahore.

<sup>3</sup>Sir Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar : Lawyer and politician; President, Indian National Congress, 1909; Vice-Chancellor, University of Bombay, 1909-12; Judge of Bombay High Court, 1901-13; Chief Minister, Indore, 1913-14.

delay as possible and to authorise us to announce them in this country without further loss of time.

**149. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>1</sup> 21 August 1919**

There is little to report this week except the work of Joint Select Committee . . . .

The Secretary of State in Council has decided to appoint a Commission to inquiry in the Punjab affairs and not to grant general amnesty at least until the report of the Commission is out. One reason assigned for not granting general amnesty is the substantial reduction of sentences passed by the Martial Courts (Mr. Tilak had a second interview with Mr. Montagu this week). There is nothing specially to report about it. But do not publish this news about interview.

A publish meeting of the Indians in London will be soon held by the Indians in London for the consideration of Punjab affairs.

(For your information and not for publication) we may state that we are engaged in getting as many Parliamentary members on our side to move our amendments in the Parliament when the amended Bill will be introduced. We are pushing on this work as much as we can and the result will be known after a month or so. As it is a strictly diplomatic work *please do not publish this part of the news.*

**150. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>2</sup> 22 August 1919**

As I see the position it is this. At the moment no particular significance is attached to the restriction orders either by us or by Indian opinion. They are not being treated by Gandhi or the press as a grievance and there is no clear gain in cancelling them. I clearly recognise they are abnormal measures and when the announcement about the inquiry and the Indemnity Bill is made, I propose to withdraw them.

The points which I wish to emphasize concern the basis of the orders and the practical justification for them. You treat the orders as based on an avowed breaking of the law but the legal foundation for this is a reasonable belief that any person is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the country on the information received. I cannot say that grounds for such belief have disappeared.

This brings me to the second point. You treat civil disobedience as a

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File 1-15, NAI. Tilak was in London then.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. A, August 1919, Nos. 261-72 and K.W.

thing of the past, but Gandhi's suspension of his campaign is described to us as both reluctant and qualified by the Bombay Government. In his own words of July 21st, "I have decided not to resume civil disobedience for the time being. Satyagrahis will pay for its removal (i.e. of obnoxious legislation) by their lives if it cannot be removed by less means". Moreover, he announced in a signed article published on the 9th August that "if the Rowlatt Act is not repealed, Government must be prepared for civil resistance of a stubborn character."

I cannot also accept the statement about the tranquillising effect of Gandhi's intervention when conditions are disturbed, although undoubtedly on such occasion his influence has been good. . . .

The truth is that his name creates or is used by others to create excitement which neither he nor they can allay. You will remember the eighth sentence of the paragraph 150 of the Joint Report. As for South Africa, I believe that you will find that he showed exactly the same inability to control the passions that he raised about 1907 in Johannesburg.

Even if these reasons do no carry convictions to your mind, I trust that they will show you that we and the local governments are not acting without strong grounds.

### **151. Sir William Marris to Chief Commissioner of Delhi<sup>1</sup>,**

**28 August 1919**

With reference to your telegram No. 849.S.D. dated 30 June 1919 letter No. 146. C, 23rd June 1919, I am directed to state that a committee of inquiry will be shortly appointed to investigate the recent disturbances in *Bombay* Presidency . . . . I am to request that (with the permission of H.E. the Governor in Council) steps may now be taken to collect and have ready all evidence, oral and documentary, relevant to any questions to which the attention of the Committee is likely to be directed. The Committee will probably assemble about the end of October.

### **152. Jawaharlal Nehru on the Punjab Occurrences,<sup>2</sup>**

**31 August 1919**

Visited Jalianwala Bagh—walked round and saw numerous bullet marks;

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, October 1919, Nos. 187-97.

Sir William Marris was Secretary to the Government of India, and Mr. C.A. Barron was Chief Commissioner of Delhi.

<sup>2</sup>S. Gopal (Ed.) : *The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (1903-1924)*, I, p. 130.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) : Politician, associated with Gandhi since the Rowlatt Agitation.

counted 67 on one part of the one wall. There must have been at least 200 on the walls, I saw (I need not examine all walls). Changes were made in the garden walls raised—wooden planks put up. A lot of earth being thrown up, etc. Many bullet marks very high up. One bullet mark on a balcony just outside the *bagh* facing lane over or else the bullet bounced off.

Visited the lane where people were made to crawl on their bellies. Told that one respectable woman raped in a neighbouring house, general misbehaviour of tommies.

**153. Kamini Kumar Chanda's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Replies,<sup>1</sup> 3 September 1919**

**Kamini Kumar Chanda's Question**

16. (a) What is the number of Martial law Commissions lately appointed in the Punjab?
- (b) What is the total number of cases and of individuals tried by such Commissions?
- (c) Was any female accused tried by them?
- (d) How many of such individuals, male and female, were convicted and acquitted respectively?
- (e) Of those convicted, how many have been sentenced to death, how many to transportation for life, and how many to imprisonment from one year upwards?
- (f) How many such sentences have been commuted?

**Sir William Vincent's Reply**

- (a) Four.
- (b) 114 cases and 852 individuals.
- (c) Yes—one.
- (d) 580 males and 1 female were convicted and 271 male were acquitted.
- (e) 108 persons were sentenced to death, 265 to transportation for life and 183 to imprisonment from one year upwards. The figure of 183 inclu-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, p.20.

Kamini Kumar Chanda: Refused title of Rai Bahadur which Assam Government proposed to confer on him; joined Congress 1886; left Congress at Surat but rejoined at Lucknow, 1916; Member, Imperial Legislative Council.

des two persons sentenced to transportation, one for 14 years and one for 10.

(f) In 488 cases sentences have been commuted or reductions made. Of the 108 death sentences, 28 were commuted to transportation for life, 23 to imprisonment for ten years, 13 to seven years and 21 to less than seven years. In the case of sentences of transportation for life, 40 were reduced to sentences of more than five years, 48 to five years and 164 to less than five years. Five persons were released. Other sentences of transportation or imprisonment were reduced as follows: 12 to sentences of three to five years, 90 to sentences of two years, 35 to sentences of less than two years. There are a few cases pending for which no final orders have been passed by the Government of Punjab pending medical reports.

#### **154. Montagu to George Lloyd,<sup>1</sup> 8 September 1919**

I may tell you that the longer I remain in office the more receptive I become to allegations of this kind about the police methods in India. I do not blame the police, but I do blame the system upon which our government is content to rest and unless it is ruthlessly changed I predict disaster. We don't govern India by force so much as by the police. The police exists to prevent anarchy. They have no political interests. Why should they? They have even less than the civil service, and their desire is to draw the net so wide that no anarchist big or small escapes. If in the process they inflict humiliation upon a conservative politician, if in the process they make an anarchist out of a law-abiding citizen, that is not their business. Their business is to see that no anarchist escapes, and is confined to that. There I find deep-rooted suspicion and distrust and almost incurable belief in motives of revenge which is very very dangerous.

Thus, too, there is another aspect of the case. It is no use shutting our eyes to the fact that the powers that be in India—the services are wholly against us in trying to transfer India from an estate which they manage with a real living entity. Their activities are governed by statutes and by rules to the letter of these rules in a day in which their power is declining, they held high. The sensible among them see that their power must decline, that the day of camouflage is over, that, their local government is to be given to a collective body that the power of the collector to manage local officers must diminish. It is far better to be governor of Nigeria than of Western Australia.

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 3, p. 40, NMML.

**155. B.N. Sarma's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council  
and Sir William Vincent's Replies,<sup>1</sup> 10 September 1919**

**Rao Bahadur B.N. Sarma's Question**

10. (1) How many persons were tried in the Punjab by the special Martial Law tribunals, and how many of them were sentenced (a) death, (b) to transportation for life, (c) to imprisonment exceeding three years, and (d) to forfeiture of property?

(2) How many such persons have appealed or applied for mercy; and have all such petitions been disposed of by the authorities before the death sentences were executed?

(3) How many of those sentences to death have been executed?

(4) In how many cases of persons convicted by the Martial Law tribunals have (a) the sentences been reduced, and (b) orders of forfeiture of property been cancelled?

**Sir Willim Vincent's Reply**

- (1) 852 persons were tried.
- (a) 108 were sentenced to death.
- (b) 265 to transportation for life.
- (c) 104 to imprisonment exceeding three years.
- (d) 356 to forfeiture of property.

The Hon'ble Member's [B.N. Sarma] attention is drawn to the provisions of section 121 of the Indian Penal Code, under which most of these persons were convicted. The minimum sentence which can be imposed under that section is transportation for life and forfeiture of property.

2. All persons sentenced to death submitted petitions to Government, and the petitions of all the 18 persons who have been executed were duly considered before execution. The Government of India are not aware how many petitions have been presented in non-capital cases, but all cases have been received by the Local Government whether petitions were presented or not.

3. 18 persons have been executed.

4. (a) 488 sentences have been reduced.

(b) 332 sentences of forfeiture have been remitted, and in ten other cases the sentences have not been enforced.

**Rao Bahadur B.N. Sarma's Question**

16. On how many occasions were fire-arms used (i) by the military and (ii) by the police in Amritsar in March, April and May and how many were injured and how many were killed on each occasion?

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 40-41.

### **Sir William Vincent's Reply**

Fire-arms were used by the military and police in Amritsar on three occasions—twice on the 10th April and once on the 13th April. The total number killed so far as it can be ascertained is 301. Information as to the number injured is not available.

### **156. Kamini Kumar Chanda's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Replies,<sup>1</sup> 10 September 1919**

#### **Kamini Kumar Chanda's Question**

27. (a) Did the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi enrol certain prominent citizens of Delhi as special constables lately?

#### **Sir William Vincent's Reply**

(a) On the 17th April after the rioting in the Chandni Chowk (when the Police had to fire in self-protection) the District Magistrate of Delhi on the application of the Senior Superintendent of Police, appointed 14 residents of Delhi to act as special police officers under section 17 of the Police Act V of 1861.

### **157. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Commission of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances,<sup>2</sup> 10 September 1919**

My Lord, I do not agree with those who think that the Rowlatt Act agitation was responsible for those events. Nor do I agree with those who think that the *Satyagraha* movement was responsible for any evil results. The fact remains undisputed and undisputable that the great *Satyagraha* day—the 6th of the April 1919—passed off throughout the country without a single untoward incident. I believe that if some of those who were in power and whose duty it was to keep law and order, had not mismanaged the situation none of the distressing events which we deplore would have occurred . . . . I deplore more deeply the greater desecration which was committed on the living temples of God, on human beings, whether British or Indian, who were destroyed in a fit of fury or

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 74-79.

without any justification. My Lord, I mourn the death of the seven Europeans who were killed in these disturbances. I grieve for them as I would grieve for the death of my dearest and nearest. I mourn also the death of those several hundreds of persons—their number has been stated by the government today to be more than 300 and it is believed by the public to be more than a thousand. I grieve for the deaths of those who fell victim to the fury or the indiscretion of those who were charged with suppressing disorder . . . . Why then, it may be asked, is it necessary for me to take up the time of this Council by pressing this Resolution? The reason, My Lord, is this: As the expression of opinions through the press and associations has made it clear, the public are disappointed with the constitution of the Committee. Your Excellency must have noted, and other members of the Government must have noted, the chorus of dissatisfaction and disappointment with which the announcement has been received by the Indian papers . . . . My Lord, it was the Government of India, or if you please, the Governor-General in Council, who declared that there was a state of open rebellion in Lahore and Amritsar. That was the starting point of the chapter of troubles. It was the Governor-General who promulgated martial law ordinances. It was the Governor-General in Council who supported and sustained the late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir, Michael O'Dwyer, in carrying on the martial law administration there. It was the Governor-General in Council who accepted the resignation of Sir Sankaran Nair which, as a protest, a most emphatic protest against martial law . . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Order. Order. What authority has the Hon'ble Member for making that statement. I told the Council in my speech the other day that Sir Sankaran Nair had not given out publicly his reasons for resigning, and that any communication he had made were entirely private as between colleagues.

PANDIT MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYA: I beg your Lordship's pardon, my Lord, it has been said in the papers that Sir Sankaran Nair resigned on account of the administration of martial law in the Punjab. If I have erred in saying this, I beg your Excellency to pardon me.

Now, My Lord, these are facts of such an important character that there is a feeling in the public mind that the Committee of Inquiry ought to report not to the Governor-General in Council, but to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India. I disclaim, my Lord, any idea of suggesting that the Governor-General in Council will not deal fairly and squarely with the Report of the Committee. . . . But, my Lord, in this matter the Government has to pay heed to public opinion of the country, and, in view of the events which have happened, the public clearly feel that is would be right, it would be more satisfactory, if the Report went to the Secretary of State for India. . . .

I will now come to the next point by reason of which I consider that

this Committee is defective and unsatisfactory, and that is the personnel of the Committee. The Committee consists of six members including the President. Four of these are Europeans and only two are Indians. . . .

My Lord, it is deplorable that seven European lives were lost, but your Lordship is also aware from the answers given today by the Hon'ble the Home Member that several hundreds of Indian lives have been lost; and several hundreds of barristers and vakils, merchants and bankers, and other respectable Indians are rotting in the jails of the Punjab as the list laid before the Council by the Home Member discloses. Several hundreds of Indians have been subjected to indignities which should have been inconceivable when the Indian members and the Indian public cry for an inquiry into such a state of affairs, one should expect that the Government would appoint a larger number of Indians on the Committee of Inquiry than of non-Indians. Instead of doing that if the Government had put the number even as equal, it would have given more satisfaction. But they have not done this either. . . . But how does the constitution of the Committee appear to the general public. Four of its members are Europeans. They ask why should there be four Europeans as members and why only two Indians? Are not Indians more concerned in this matter than Europeans? The matter ought not to be regarded in any racial light, but it ought to be looked at from the point of view of the persons, whose faces are to be tried or whose interests are at stake, who would naturally desire in a matter like this to see that the jury consists of persons in whom they have confidence. . . . The constitution of the Committee is defective, and I certainly say that it would have been wiser on the part of the Government if they had at least made the number of Indian and European members equal. It is even now possible for the Government to equalise the number by appointing a third Indian member. . . . It is in this respect that the constitution of the Committee is considered to be defective. . . .

My Lord, my Resolution says that:

This Council recommends to the Governor-General in Council that he should request His Majesty's Government to appoint without further delay a Commission consisting of gentlemen unconnected with the Indian administration.

To support it I have to show that the Committee of Inquiry which has been announced is defective, and that the terms of reference are insufficient, and I have been endeavouring in my humble way to show it. . . .

I have visited the Lahore Central jail and Borstal jail on three occasions, and I was grieved to find that men, good men, any of whom might get a seat in this Council, men as honourable as any member of this Council, were rotting in those jails for no fault of their own, for no guilt of their own. I feel that this is a situation that calls for the most searching and impartial inquiry—an inquiry that should command complete public

confidence. . . . This demands, my Lord, a commission of the character which I have indicated. It is for these reasons that I move this Resolution, being thoroughly dissatisfied with the constitution of the Committee as announced and with its terms of reference. I hope the Government will consider the matter in the light in which I have presented it. I have no wish to embarrass the Government. I tried to modify my Resolution, but I will not speak about it now. . . .

I must press for the acceptance of my Resolution that a Commission, not a Committee, should be constituted on the lines I have indicated, with the instructions which I have indicated, including the power to recommend that any conviction might be annulled.

**158. Kamini Kumar Chanda on the Punjab Disturbances.<sup>1</sup>**  
**12 September 1919**

The Government of India is responsible for ratifying the policy adopted by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and it is a matter for grave regret that the Government do not see its way to have a Royal Commission to investigate these charges, a Commission whose verdict, whose decision would carry infinitely greater weight than that of any Commission or Committee that may be appointed in this country. . . .

A practical solution would be to ask the Committee to report not to the Government of India but to the Secretary of State. The composition of the Committee should also be revised. It cannot be denied that the composition of the Committee has not evoked much enthusiasm in the country among the Indians. Of course, I do not speak about the Anglo-Indian press which in this matter does not count. . . . If you can have an Indemnifying Bill you may as well have some measure which will enable these cases being revised. A simple process would be to vest the Committee with power to investigate the cases with power to investigate this matter, look into the judgments and then report to His Majesty in Council with recommendations for annulment of convictions. We are grateful to your Excellency and to His Honour Sir Edward Maclagan for acts of clemency in the wholesale reductions of sentences ordered. I do not know if the Government have seen an account given by a press correspondent of his interview with Kali Nath Rai [Roy] after his release from jail. It appears therefrom that these acts of clemency failed to evoke any response in the hearts of accused persons. It appears almost as a mockery to tell an innocent man that his sentence has been reduced or that he has been

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 133-34.

pardoned. In these cases what is prayed for is no clemency but justice, no favour but fair treatment. With these humble words I support the Resolution of my learned friend [Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya].

**159. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>1</sup> 15 September 1919**

Inquiry into disorders: Several Indian members in debate in Council expressed the desire that a third Indian member should be added to the Committee and intimated that they would have no objection to the addition of a member from the non-official European community if their request was granted. We have no promise, but intimated readiness to consider suggestions. We now recommend both additions which will do something to satisfy Indian and European opinion, and incidentally will dispose of the question the European Association raised. There is something to be said for the appointment of a Sikh as the Indian member; but there is a general desire for [T.B.] Sapru and in spite of the fact that he has declared himself as strongly critical, we are not disposed to raise any objection to this appointment. He knows North India and is a member of the Legislative Council. The Lt.-Governor [Sir Edward Maclagan] though he thinks a smaller committee more convenient and if it is to be enlarged, would prefer his former nominee from Patiala, recognises the force of the persons in favour of enlargement and also of Sapru's selection and acquiescence. . . .

**160. Sir William Vincent on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>2</sup>  
18 September 1919**

My Lord, I move for leave to introduce a Bill [The Indemnity Bill] to indemnify officers of Government and other persons in respect to certain acts done under martial law, and to provide for other matters in connection therewith. . . .

My Lord, wherever martial law is declared, it was recently in the Punjab, it inevitably follows that speedy and decisive action has to be taken by the executive officers of the Government for the restoration of order. Not only does this responsibility lie directly on the supreme military commander, but also on those who are subordinate to him, that is he

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, October 1919, Nos. 187-97.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 278-85.

gives orders which he thinks necessary, and it is their bounden duty to carry out those orders. It follows that frequently action which is just and proper, though not necessarily legal, is taken by these authorities.

They cannot possibly wait in such circumstances to examine the law and see whether what they propose to do is strictly legal or not, delay at such a time is fatal. . . . When martial law expires and Indemnity Act of some character is the inevitable consequence, I think members in this Council will realise that if such an Indemnity Act is not passed, no officer charged with the very irksome and responsible duty of restoring order will ever act with the confidence that is really essential for the effective handling of the situation. . . . That such an Indemnity Act is the normal consequence of any period of martial law is, I believe, accepted by all constitutional writers. . . .

My Lord, it may be said that martial law was not necessary in the Punjab and that the Government made a mistake in proclaiming it. I do not seek to argue that point now. I believe that any such course would be unfair to those concerned, primarily or indirectly concerned, until the evidence of the facts has been recorded by the Committee of Inquiry. The decision on that matter must rest with the Committee in a great measure and after their report has been received, with other authorities. But, irrespective of this question, the position of our officers must be protected. . . .

So far I have been dealing with the part of this Bill which deals with indemnifying officers of Government. The second part deals with the validating to a certain extent of a number of sentences which have been passed. I shall explain this in detail later, but it is clear, as I said before, that where military officers are given power to issue certain orders, it is essential that they should also have authority to enforce those orders. There must be some sanction behind them, some power of enforcing order speedily and effectively and in many cases—in fact, I believe that this is the normal course—Summary Courts are appointed to administer justice in such circumstances. They do not deal normally with all criminal cases, but only with cases arising out of a breach of military regulations or cases connected with the disturbances, and I believe I am right, so far as the Punjab is concerned, in saying that the duties of the Summary Courts were confined to this class of cases, but I speak subject to correction on this matter. It is sometimes supposed that these Summary Courts, however, dealt with only petty offences, such as breaches of military law regulations. That is an entirely incorrect assumption, and if Hon'ble Members will see the statement that, I think, was laid on the table here recently, if not I will have it so placed, they will see that the Summary Courts dealt with many offences of great gravity, such as arson, theft, rioting, breaches of the Railway Act—and they are really very serious and offences under the Telegraph Act, which really meant the endangering of all communications

both between the Local Government and their officers and between the Government of India and the Local Government. Many of these men are now under confinement, and I want to make it clear to the Council that unless their confinement is now ratified in some manner, then the continued detention of these men in jail is illegal. In fact, from the date on which martial law expired our only justification for retaining these men in custody was our intention to introduce an Act of this character at the earlier opportunity.

I think I have already said, or at any rate I say now, that this Bill will in no way forestall the inquiry by the Committee, and I will proceed to justify that statement. I do not think that any member of this Council will for a moment suppose that the Committee of Inquiry, which assesses the blame for these disturbances, will recommend any form of punishment for any officer of Government who has acted bona fide and in a reasonable belief that what he did was necessary. . . . This Bill protects officers against proceedings in the Courts of Justice. The report of this Committee, whatever be its value, will in no sense be evidence for the purposes of any such case; that is a matter which can only be decided on evidence in the courts. The Government of India have decided, for the satisfaction of their own conscience and to meet the public demand, to appoint a Committee to inquire into these disturbances, and their action on the report of that Committee will not be limited or barred by this Act in any way. This Bill simply deals with suits and legal proceedings, and really all that it seeks to do is to protect from legal proceedings and bona fide action taken with a reasonable belief that it was necessary to suppress disorder, and not any action taken malafide or without good reason. We make no attempt by this Bill at any rate to protect officers who have been guilty of excesses which cannot be justified by the terms of this proviso. . . .

My Lord, summarising what I have said, I want to make one or two points quite clear. First, this Bill is the inevitable consequence of martial law. Whether martial law was necessary or not, we must at least protect our officers. The bill will not in any way forestall the decision of the Committee of Inquiry. The Indemnity of officers is limited, and reasonably limited, to those who have acted bona fide, the question of bona fides will be decided by the courts, and the validating clause, to which I have referred already, does not affect either any case tried by the Commissions or any right of appeal to the Privy Council. . . . If this Council does not validate the detention in jail of these criminals, to whom I referred just now, then we shall have at once to release the whole number of these dangerous offenders on the world. I have told you that we have consulted the Punjab Government on this matter, and they were definitely of opinion that such a release was not compatible with the public safety. The men are not convicted of minor petty offences at all; they are men who were engaged in the burning and looting of stations, in the attacks on railway

lines and in the cutting of telegraph wires, guilty of theft and very many of them of arson. They are a class of men who cannot be released with safety at present, and I submit that this Council will be well-advised if they do not ask us to release them.

My Lord, I have spoken with some heat because I want to make it plain that I conceive that refusal to grant the limited protection which we ask for our officers would be a gross injustice to those whom we have solemnly undertaken to protect.

**161. Kamini Kumar Chanda on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>1</sup>**  
**18 September 1919**

My Lord, I beg to move this amendment which stands in my name and I read as follows:

That the consideration of the motion do stand over till after the submission of the report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Punjab affairs.

If you go on with this Bill [Indemnity Bill] then what is there remaining for the Committee to go into? What will remain if you now assume that there was necessity for martial law, what would remain for the Committee to inquire into? Whether there was any necessity for martial law. But we are told by the passing of this Bill that there was a necessity for the declaration of martial law. This is surely prejudging the question, it is tying the hands of the Committee, it is not fair . . . . It would not be right to ask this Council to pass this Bill at this time. We must wait for the finding of the Committee, we must wait for the decision of the Privy Council on the questions raised as to the legality of the promulgation of martial law and the giving of retrospective effect to it . . . .

The whole thing will depend upon what orders were given, how those orders were carried out. At present all that we need consider is provided for in the general law . . . . Apart from the questions arising from the fact that a Committee of Inquiry has been appointed I think we should consider that public discussion of the happenings in the Punjab are bound to create some bad blood and should, if possible, be avoided and that can be avoided if the Council does not rush through with this Bill now.

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 287-93.

**162. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>1</sup>****18 September 1919**

The cardinal point is, whether there were circumstances which justified the declaration of martial law. You cannot go on to deal with this Bill without first dealing with that cardinal point. If you think that you owe it in courtesy to the Inquiry Committee which you have constituted to leave the decision on that important matter to them, I say in fairness to every one concerned, including the Government, stay your hand, do not proceed with this Bill. Wait for the result of that inquiry. Let the facts be sifted out and when the facts have been sifted out, indemnify officers for all acts done in good faith with reasonable care and caution, for restoring order or maintaining it, wherever it might have been necessary. No sensible man would for a moment object to His Majesty's Officers or those acting under their instructions being indemnified and protected against the consequences of acts done by them in good faith with reasonable care and caution in circumstances where the existence of martial law would be justified. But where the existence of martial law is not justified, where the very foundation upon which martial law rests is non-existent, I submit, these officers have to take their chance of having their cases adjudged and determined in the light of equity and justice by ordinary courts in the country . . . . In that case I say stay, wait, do not proceed with this Bill until you have the report of the Committee of Inquiry . . . . But, my Lord, if you indemnify acts in the manner in which you are doing with the provisions in this present Bill, well may their Lordships of the Privy Council complain that you have done what no ordinary citizen is expected to do, namely, to pronounce judgement on some important aspects of the case before they have had time to deal with them. My Lord, I wish here to make it very clear that I have done all that I could as an individual Member of this Council to postpone the discussion of questions of fact and law relating to the events that have occurred. . . . The men who have lost their sons, the men who have lost their brothers, the women who have lost their brothers, the women who have lost their husbands, the mothers who have lost their sons who are mourning, the deaths of these persons who have met an untimely end, they call for the most careful consideration of this affair. They call that no decision should be arrived at and that no Act should be passed which would prejudice a proper consideration of their case. The Government cannot say that the delay of a few months will really prejudice their position.

Now my Lord, martial law as we all know was proclaimed in Amritsar, and it came into force in Lahore on the midnight of the 15th or rather at

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 318-21.

12 O'clock of the night between the 16th and the 17th. By what justification events which took place from the 13th March to the date on which martial law was proclaimed have been included in this draft of the Bill, I am unable to understand. Ordinarily, such a Bill should be confined to the period during which martial law prevailed, but this Bill goes beyond that period, and the second terminus which it fixes is the commencement of this Act. I should like to know what justification there is for that either. My Lord, the second point on which I would refer is this. This Bill says that 'provided that such acts matters or things were ordered or done in good faith in a reasonable belief that they were necessary for the said purpose.' This, my Lord, is very objectionable. All that you ought to provide for is that action should be done in good faith and were in fact reasonable, necessary or expedient. You cannot say that if a man were to shoot his fellowman he has acted in a reasonable belief or in good faith. Now is that man to be indemnified.

**163. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde,<sup>1</sup> 18 September 1919**

The work of the deputation during the last two weeks consisted mainly of propaganda by means of lectures.

**164. Major Malik Umar Hayat Khan on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>2</sup> 19 September 1919**

While welcoming the Bill (The Indemnity Bill) which is a very ordinary measure and always follows disturbances and martial law, I am of opinion that it has come rather late, and now that it has come it should be passed at once. It is a good thing that hitherto no one has sued any of those subordinates who acted under orders of their superiors and who in turn acted with the best of intentions to speedily quell a fire, the flames of which would have spread to the rural population from which the Army is recruited and that, plus the Frontier troubles at a very critical time of the year, may have proved disastrous for a while. I hope that the loyal soldiers and other officials will not be left a minute more without the protection of this most urgent Bill and that it will be passed into law.

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File No. 1-18, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, pp. 350-54.

Major Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan (1874-1940) : A landlord; Member, Provincial Recruitment Board; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1919.

. . . Meetings were convened in the mosques to unite Muhammadans. It was known that the Muhammadans had strained feelings about the Turkish affairs, and if their mosques were bombed or fired upon, it would infuriate them. Such meetings were held in Delhi, Lahore and various other places. The same thing was planned in Amritsar with regard to the Sikhs in which they succeeded to a good extent and spread all sorts of rumours about the Durbar Sahib, the Golden Temple. But it was owing to the loyalty and far-sightedness of the Sikh nation that their designs were frustrated . . . . The time of a great fair chosen to spread the propaganda with much ease was cleverly fixed where people from all the rural parts of the country assemble so that they may carry it with them to the villages. The columns of the extremist newspapers were engaged for propaganda and though we may now satisfy ourselves that the editors of some such papers were punished they had done their work. . . . Knowing that there would be trouble, I offered my services with my men and *sowars* to help the police which were accepted and from that time onward I continued to work throughout the disturbances helping the Police, Publicity Board and the military authorities . . . .

Most of the students (of Lahore) who were approached by some of their teachers were wearing the black badges of martyrs and did not attend the schools and colleges. The Railway employees had also been approached and had struck work. Apart from the various strikes at Danda Battalion with heavy clubs was in charge of Lahore city who terrorized all the peace-loving people who wanted to assume normal conditions. Free food was supplied to all these and other evil doers while the rest of the population could not get sufficient to eat, many having reached the point of starvation. The Council will have heard the sad story which Mr. [J.P.] Thompson<sup>1</sup> has just related of those children who could not get food.

A regular agency of exaggerated rumours against the Government opened. The emissaries reached Peshawar and then further on to Kabul. This will prove, I hope, the necessity of the preamble of this Bill.

In many other places all the Government stacks of fodder were being burnt and all the grass preserves were used as common property. Even His Majesty's effigies were made and burnt.

Had martial law been introduced three days earlier it would not have been necessary to continue it more than a week or two, and there would have been no necessity of constituting courts under the law nor would so many people have gone to jails . . . .

The Western Punjab next to the Frontier was so frightened by the disturbances in the east and declaration of war in the west that they all collected to form organizations to save themselves. I only put forward these few remarks at the end to throw some light on the real state of

<sup>1</sup>The Chief Secretary of the Punjab Government, 1916-21.

things, and with these remarks I support the Bill.

### 165. W.M. Hailey on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>1</sup> 19 September 1919

I think, my Lord, we must admit that those who originated the agitation which we hold led to these disturbances, those who originated that agitation, had no intention of producing rebellion. When in this Council we were threatened with an agitation which would disturb the good relations between the Government and the people, and when that threatened agitation was followed up [in the press and on platforms throughout the country, then I think those who promoted it had no idea of producing an open rebellion against the Crown. But I maintain they produced an atmosphere which was in itself dangerous and liable to bring about a rebellion. If they did so, it was not without warning from their own friends.

. . . People were circulating rumours that the land-owning class was to lose its status; that men who had previously been proprietors were to become tenants; that land-revenue was to be raised; that produce was to be taken instead of cash; and these are exactly the type of rumours which are likely to produce among a vigorous population and cultivators trouble the end of which no man can foresee. The population at large then had been told that the Act involved such consequences, and they had learnt that there was only one man in India that could help them in the situation. I do not think Mr. Gandhi was known personally in the Punjab, but he had acquired there the reputation, as somebody said (I think it is mentioned in one of the judgments), the reputation of a *rishi* and a *wali*. I certainly have read one speech in which the coming of Mr. Gandhi was compared to the coming of Christ, to the coming of Muhammad and to the coming of Krishna. Now, that was the man who, if I should use the words of a speaker at Amritsar, was to break the power of the bureaucracy; that was the man around whom the whole of the agitation centred; that was the man who by his new device of passive resistance was to relieve the people of the burden with which they were threatened. They understood nothing of the real meaning of passive resistance. So little did they understand the meaning of this peaceful movement of Mr. Gandhi's that, as Mrs. Besant afterwards said, people who committed arson and assaulted women did so with the name of Mr. Gandhi upon

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, p. 357.

Sir William Malcolm Hailey: I.C.S., Secretary, Punjab Government 1907, Deputy Secretary, Government of India, 1908; Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 1912-19; Finance Member, 1919-22.

their lips. We have been told—I have seen it stated in the newspapers—that Mr. Gandhi's action in coming to the Punjab was a peaceful one, that had he gone there he would have stilled all angry passions, and restored tranquility. My Lord, I think I am right in saying that Mr. Gandhi could not even address a Punjab crowd in a language which would be understood by them. How then was he to still those angry passions? What possible effect would Mr. Gandhi's arrival in the Punjab have had except to make people believe that there was truth in these sinister rumours to make people believe that he had come their to continue the fight against Government? with a population such as that which I have described, a belief of that sort would have been bound to lead to fresh disaster. I maintain that no one with any feeling for the security of the province could have safely allowed Mr. Gandhi to have arrived in the Punjab at that juncture.

#### **166. H. McPherson on the Indemnity Bill,<sup>1</sup> 19 September 1919**

My Lord, the lives of these innocent victims in the Punjab lie at the door, not of the military and the police who only did their duty, but of the law-breakers who composed the mobs and still more of the recreants who pulled the strings from behind and worked the mobs to fury. We must not forget that had these lawless crowds not been sternly checked, their example would have spread desolation throughout the length and breadth of India, when the question would have been one not of hundreds but of thousands or tens of thousands of lives, and the growing prosperity of this great land would have received a blow from which it would never have recovered.

#### **167. Sir William Vincent on Gandhi,<sup>2</sup> 25 September 1919**

. . . I think that the Council might like to know the views of one who has taken a great interest, both in these disorders and in the measures which have been taken to suppress them. I refer to Mr. Gandhi. There are different opinions about this gentleman. Some look on him as dangerous crank with an extraordinary amount of that Scotch quality, a good conceit of himself. There are others, persons whose opinion is equally en-

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, LVIII, p. 375.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 536-37.

titled to great weight, who believe him to be a man of saintlike character, selfless disposition and almost superhuman insight. Mr. Montagu himself in a recent debate described him as a man of the highest motives and the finest character, a man whom his worst enemy, if he has any enemies (he is very lucky if he has not) would agree is of the most disinterested ambitions it is possible to conceive. Well, my Lord, it is probable that a correct estimate of the character of Mr. Gandhi would lie between these various extremes, but I hope that the Council will not in any way acquire the impression that in offering these observations I am seeking to convey my own opinion about him, or the opinion of the Government. An expression of opinion would be improper. At the same time, there are certain characteristics in Mr. Gandhi which all will admit. He is not in any way predisposed to favour the policy of Government. That is certain. He has also got what is not very often found in this country, the full courage of his convictions. If he thinks anything he never hesitates to tell either the government or any one else what his views are, and for that reason, I think, it would interest the Council to hear what a leading Indian of this position and character thinks about the Bill. So far as the question of indemnity is concerned, Mr. Gandhi would go very much further than we have done. He does not refer to all to bonafide or reasonable belief. He assumes these, and says, "I would therefore say that rather than complain that the Bill (the Indemnity Bill) has been prematurely brought in, we should give our best attention to the provisions of the Bill. Thus, for instance, we would allow a provision to the effect that such officers as may have given orders of firing shall not be criminally triable for murder or civilly liable for damages. Then he goes on to say that such officers where in fault should be dealt with administratively.

Members of this Council will see that our Bill does not go nearly as far as that. In a later letter in which he answers various persons who have attacked the Bill he writes as follows: I am quoting from 'Young India' of the 20th September, a paper which I believe, is now controlled by Mr. Gandhi.

I must respectfully dissent from the view that such a bill can only be properly passed after a Commission has reported. I venture to submit that the Bill as published is almost harmless and it is a Bill we shall be bound to pass as it is even after the Commission has reported.

#### **168. Gandhi to S.R. Hignell,<sup>1</sup> 30 September 1919**

As his excellency is aware, there are orders against me which, among

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 23, Roll No. 10, No. 416.

S.R. Hignell was Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

others, prohibit me from entering the Punjab and from leaving the Bombay Presidency. Hitherto I have not heard about the orders being withdrawn, if any because, so long as the Government persists in retaining on the Statute Book the Rowlatt Act, so long must my civil resistance continue in *esse* or in *posse*. But the situation has altered somewhat now. In my opinion it is necessary for me to be in the Punjab when and some time before the forthcoming committees begin their sittings. I claim that my presence can only help to elucidate truth. There is an urgent demand from the Punjab that I should be in that province, before and at the time of the Inquiry, I see that so many things are alleged to have happened in my name that I am naturally interested in the proceedings. I hope, therefore, that the orders against me so far as the Punjab is concerned, will be removed.

**169. P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer to V.S. Srinivasa Sastri,<sup>1</sup>**  
**September 1919**

We were very pleased to see in the paper that your evidence before the Joint Committee made an exceedingly favourable impression. You might have seen the report of the Viceroy's speech announcing the intention of the Govt. of India to introduce an Indemnity Bill for the relief of the officers concerned in the administration of Martial Law in the Punjab. An indemnity Bill is no doubt ordinarily passed whenever Martial Law has been introduced, but there are special circumstances, in the present case which render the introduction of the Bill undesirable at the present stage. There is a strong feeling in the country that there was no necessity for the introduction of Martial Law in the country at all and even if there was any such necessity for the purpose of suppressing the disturbances it was needlessly continued and there was no justification for the resort to martial law for the trial and punishment of offenders. . . .

As regards the composition of the Commission of Inquiry, it is most disappointing. The Chairman Lord Hunter<sup>1</sup> may be a good man, but nobody ever heard of his existence before this appointment. . . . the association of Mr. Rice, a civilian and of the Mahommadan gentleman of whom we know nothing is not reassuring. Very probably, they thought the Indians were likely to take a biased view and therefore appointed a civilian and a

<sup>1</sup>P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer Papers, S.N. 4729, NAI. Undated. Sir. P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer (1864-1946) : Advocate-General and later Member, Madras Governor's Executive Council; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1920; President of the National Liberal Federation, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>Lord Hunter (William Hunter) : A Lord of Session in Scotland 1911-36; Chairman of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20.

military man to neutralise them; the two judges [Lord] Hunter and [G.C.] Rankin being supposed to be umpires. . . . A Royal Commission would have been the most appropriate machinery. Probably, here also Mr. Montagu has been obliged to yield to the Government of India to save their faces.

**170. Montagu to George Lloyd,<sup>1</sup> 2 October 1919**

George, my dear, do not let your heart break. The Indian system of administration is beyond belief. My heart was broken long time ago. I have battled against it for six years and the only possible solution is devolution. I quite hope that before the end of the year provincial autonomy will be such that no Govt. will be able to interfere with you unless you are doing things which you cannot persuade your Legislative Council to agree to, and I am quite sure that you will get your programme carried out.

Now I come to your letter of the 5th Sept. I am quite convinced in my own mind that the only possible way to deal with the Punjab situation was an Enquiry and I do not think you have anything to fear. . . . Nothing makes an Indian despair so much as being a victim of an action against which he can get no redress. I think Indians are forgiving people, and I believe that if they know that there is somewhere some authority to which they can appeal with a certainty that their grievances will be redressed, they will put up with a lot; whereas if we support blunders, if we say that the Govt. is right even when it is wrong we get despair from those who are willing to trust us. But I cannot interfere with your discretion.

**171. Jawaharlal Nehru to the Editor, "The Bombay Chronicle",<sup>2</sup> 2 October 1919**

. . . It is no business of mine to consider here what, if any, was the justification for the firing in the Jallianwala Bagh. I am only concerned here with the subsequent conduct of the Punjab authorities. Under what code of morality or even necessity can they justify the total lack of medical arrangements on the spot before and after that most terrible of tragedies? Evidence shows that after killing people by the hundreds they left the dead and dying unattended and uncared for, to be carted away by

<sup>1</sup>Montagu Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 3, NMML. Private Letter.

<sup>2</sup>S. Gopal (Ed.), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1, pp. 148-49.

sorrowing relatives and members of the local Sewa Samiti who had the courage to stir out in those dark days. General Hudson<sup>1</sup> was the special apologist of the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy in Council. He is a high officer in an honourable and gallant service and I put it to him if he would have treated even a vanquished foe in this manner.

Mr. Thompson tells us that sub-registrars were appointed to register deaths. Who are these persons who have been glorified by the name of sub-registrar? Are they not mere *patwaris* whose word requires considerable corroboration before a Court of Law? Again, Mr. Thompson must know or ought to know that April 13 was the great *Baisakhi* day at Amritsar when thousands of visitors came from all parts of the Punjab and some even from Sind and Afghanistan. What did these so-called sub-registrars do to find the names of the dead from other districts? Does Mr. Thompson know how many hundreds of bullets were fired at the Jallianwala Bagh? If not, let him inquire. Does he know how many persons one regulation bullet will pierce if fired at short range into a dense crowd? If not, let him seek the information from a military friend. And when Mr. Thompson has added to his stock of knowledge, he will perhaps realise that the casualty figures given by the Sewa Samiti are nearer the mark than the official figure. He may be painfully surprised to learn that even the Sewa Samiti figures are far from complete and are being added to as fresh information comes in.

**172. Jawaharlal Nehru to the Editor, "The Bombay Chronicle",<sup>2</sup>  
6 October 1919**

... There appears to be some misapprehension as to the crawling order which was enforced in the Kauriyanwala Khuh in Amritsar. Mr. Gandhi refers to it in the issue of *Young India* of the 27th September as the "hands and knees" order. The evidence of respectable citizens of Amritsar shows that people were made to crawl not on their hands and knees but on their bellies after the manner of snakes and worms. I need hardly add that General Hudson's amazing supposition that people indulged in the pleasant pastime voluntarily and for the sake of gaining notoriety and martyrdom is not borne out by the statements of those who were forced to do it by the military.

May I also refer you to the question relating to this incident of which Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya gave notice but which was disallowed by

<sup>1</sup>General Sir Hanelock Hudson (1862-1944) : Adjutant-General of India, 1917-1920.

<sup>2</sup>S. Gopal (Ed.), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1, p. 149.

This letter was written on 1 October 1919.

the Viceroy? The question ran as follows:

- (a) Will the Government be pleased to state if it is a fact that in the lane known as the Duggalan-ki-gali in the quarter known as Kaurivan-wali-Khuh, where Miss Sherwood was assaulted, every Indian irrespective of age and position in life, wishing to pass through the lane was made to crawl on his belly through the whole length of the lane and British soldiers were posted from morning to 8.00 p.m. to enforce the observance of this order?
- (b) Whether as a consequence of the enforcement of this order, houses in the lane remained unscavenged for many days?

**173. G.N. Mishra to V.J. Patel on the Political Situation in India,<sup>1</sup> 15 October 1919**

... The Congress arrangements are sought to be obstructed by the authorities as much as possible. You will see that the Deputy Commissioner wanted the Congress to be held not at Amritsar nor even at Lahore or other important places but only at some out of the way place. Surely the most simple-minded man will be able to see through this suggestion. Obviously the Deputy Commissioner wanted to have no Congress at all, since it is physically impossible for unimportant and small places to undertake the responsibility of holding the National assembly but the answer of the Reception Committee was firm and dignified and the only one which could be given in the circumstance. The latest news from Amritsar contained in a letter from the Secretary of the Reception Committee says that the Deputy Commissioner wants an undertaking from the Reception Committee that the question of the Punjab affairs would not be taken up at the next Congress. One wonders what on earth the Congress has to discuss about if not the Punjab question, which is the burning topic of the day and which has rendered the holding of the Congress at Amritsar this year a matter of national dignity and honour. Of course the Reception Committee or for the matter of that anybody could never give an undertaking of that character. For it is the subjects' committee that decides which question should or should not come up for the consideration of the Congress. I shall be going to Amritsar from Lahore and attend the meeting of the Reception Committee on the 19th.... I shall mention that several persons including Sir Sankaran Nair and

<sup>1</sup>A-I.C.C. Papers, File No. 3, 1919, NMML.

Gokaran Nath Mishra (1871-1929) : Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1915-20; General Secretary of the Congress, 1918; left the Congress on the issue of Non-cooperation and joined National Liberal Federation.

Pandit Motilal Nehru are being proposed for the next Presidentship. I beg to close now.

**174. C.F. Andrews on J.P. Thompson's Statement in the Imperial Legislative Council,<sup>1</sup> 16 October 1919**

I have waited in silence for many months without making any detailed reference in the press to the painful incident which occurred when I was prevented from entering the Punjab. But as Mr. Thompson's account of this matter in the Imperial [Legislative] Council, which has now been published with his own corrections in the Gazette, appears to me to be misleading, I feel it my duty to lay before the public the facts as they present themselves to my own mind. . . .

My original intention, when I reached Delhi soon after the middle of April, was to proceed direct to the Punjab. I have already explained how impossible it was for me immediately to carry out my intention. The imminent peril of martial law was hanging over Delhi itself, and every moment of my time was occupied in that city in trying to settle difficulties and relieve misunderstandings between the people and the authorities. The most crucial danger point was reached on the evening of April 24th. No one could be quite certain whether a new *hartal* would be started on the next day, April 25th, or not. That danger of April 25th was surmounted by the help of the educated classes, using their great influence with the people, and by the remarkable tact and courage of forbearance (a most difficult kind of courage) shown by Mr. C.A. Barron, the Chief Commissioner [of Delhi].

On the morning of April 26th, as far as my memory serves me the leading citizens of Delhi came to me and asked me to go, on their behalf, to Simla in order to interview the Viceroy and ask him to prevent the application of martial law to their imperial city, which was his own capital. He refused to see me on the ground that he was too busily engaged.

I saw Sir William Marris twice and also the Private Secretary of the Viceroy, Mr. J.L. Maffey. At the end of my conversation, on the former of my two visits to Sir William Marris, I consulted him with regard to my own desire to visit the Punjab.

I should be clearly understood that up to this time, I had not had any information, or hint even, that the leading Indian newspapers would wish me to go to the Punjab and obtain evidence as an impartial witness. The wish to go to the Punjab was entirely my own. I had, at that time, not one

<sup>1</sup>C.F. Andrews Papers, 1/D-24, NMML.

single word of correspondence on this subject with any newspaper editor at all.

I explained carefully to Sir William Marris that, if I went into the Punjab, I should do my utmost to relieve the terrible anxiety which was being felt down-country; that I should endeavour to contradict false rumours, wherever and whenever I found them to be false. I mentioned by name, for a typical example, a rumour that had caused the utmost distress and agitation in Delhi—the rumour that two young boys had been flogged to death. I mentioned also another rumour from Amritsar, that the wife of Dr. Satyapal had been present at a meeting and had been shot dead. I pointed out how impossible it was to contradict such rumours with any authority, by means of a censored press. I had some faith, on the other hand, that the people who were inclined to believe such rumours would have that belief shaken, if I could see with my own eyes what had happened, and could contradict as an eyewitness any rumours that were false. I stated to Sir William Marris, at the same time, that I should quite fearlessly inform the public of any actual facts which I found out to be true. That is to say, I pledged myself to be impartial.

Sir William Marris said to me that he would ask Sir William Vincent, who was the Head of the Home Department, what he thought about the matter. I received a letter the next day, marked demi-official from Sir William Marris telling me that he had referred the question to his superior, and that Sir William Vincent did not think that the Public interests would be served, at that time, by my carrying the idea of visiting the Punjab, for this purpose, into effect. I have that letter still in my possession.

I returned to Simla again on May 11th (as far as I can remember the date) and on that occasion I saw the Viceroy, who had received a telegram from the Indian Press representatives asking that I should be allowed to visit the Punjab. From his opening words I fully understood that I had his permission to go to Lahore. I also understood him to suggest that it would be well to see Sir Edward Maclagan<sup>1</sup> and Sir Michael O'Dwyer about my visit on my arrival. I sent a telegram to the Chief Secretary in Lahore asking him to see me the following morning and started for Lahore that evening.

I have no wish to dwell on the incidents of the next day when I arrived at Amritsar, except to point out that when I was arrested it was, as far as I could gather, on a telegram sent by the Chief Secretary to Amritsar from Lahore. I was afterwards told that I was to be placed under the charge and custody of General Dyer. Later in the afternoon Mr. Kitchin

<sup>1</sup>Sir Edward Douglas Maclagan: Under Secretary, Government of India, 1892; Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, 1906; Secretary to Govt. of India, 1910-14; Governor of Punjab, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>Kitchen: Commissioner of the Lahore Division, 1919.

and Mr. Miles Irving<sup>1</sup> arrived, and after some delay, I was told that General Dyer himself was in Jullundur, but that a message had come through from Lahore that I was to be deported . . . .

On my arrival at Delhi I found a telegram, waiting for me, in answer to my telegram sent from Simla to the Chief Secretary, Lahore. It ran as follows : "455 S.W. Your telegram of to-day. You have apparently misunderstood position. Under the Martial Law requests for permission to enter Martial Law area are dealt with by Military authorities. Punjab Government understand that if you attempt to enter area you will probably be arrested and dealt with under Martial Law."

I also received from the Home Department the following telegram some days later : "Your wire to Private Secretary and letter dated 18th. You are mistaken in thinking you had Viceroy's permission to enter Punjab, His Excellency, understanding that you were going, advised you to see Lieutenant-Governor and Sir Edward Maclagan; but he had no knowledge that permission had been refused and will not interfere with orders passed."

I would point out that I never received any orders passed by the Martial Law authorities at all. No order of any kind has ever reached me, either before or after my arrest. The threat in the Chief Secretary's telegram, as well as the arrest itself, was in keeping with much else that I have learnt about Martial Law since I came up to the Punjab.

These, as far as I can accurately remember, are the facts. It appears to me to be clear from them, that it was not merely on the ground that I was asked to represent certain leading Indian newspapers that my admission to the Punjab was refused. It would seem to me to be practically certain that if I had gone into the Punjab on my own account, on independent enquiries, I should have been equally refused admission.

Since the day when I saw with my own eyes the Jallianwala Bagh and the street at which the 'crawling order' was given, I have ceased to wonder why I was turned back from Amritsar Station and deported.

Until the Chief Secretary, on behalf of the Punjab Government, and Sir Havelock Hudson, on behalf of the military authorities, express regret for, instead of minimising, incidents such as these, the situation remains fraught with difficulties for those who truly desire peace.

### **175. C.F. Andrews to Jawaharlal Nehru,<sup>2</sup> 17 October 1919**

. . . The most important point I am coming at is that there is real evidence, no merely theory or surmise to prove that the disturbances of the

<sup>1</sup>Miles Irving: I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, 1919.

<sup>2</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. III, p. 1, Correspondence No. 186, NMML.

crowd were quite unorganised. To a casual observer there are signs of organisation here, but they all break down.

**176. C.F. Andrews to the Editor, "The Tribune" on the Punjab Affairs,<sup>1</sup> 7 November 1919**

Yesterday, November 4th at Amritsar, with Mahatma Gandhi, was one of the most remarkable days that I have ever spent in India. It revealed, in a light I had not seen before, the psychology of the Indian crowd during a time of intense devotional fervour and excitement. The procession through the city, which occupied altogether nearly five hours, was altogether transformed by the multitude into a religious ceremony. No one had instructed them. From first to last, it was spontaneous, in the fullest sense of the word. The thoughts of the crowd, of their own accord, turned to religion, as the one medium through which adequately to express their feelings. The acts of the crowd were the acts of religion: the devotion of religion.

In all the varied scenes, throughout the day, the women of Amritsar were, if anything, more prominent than the men. They crowded the balconies and windows and housetops to overflowing in order to perform their act of *Darshan*. They came out of their seclusion to rejoice and worship in a manner which only a great religious festival could evoke. And, on this occasion, the hearts of the Musalman women were beating in unison with those of their Hindu sisters. Of the significance of that fact there could be no doubt whatever. The whole city was one.

I was not able actually to join in the procession, as it went slowly through the city. But I saw, just beforehand, the streets along which the procession was to pass. The women, with their little children, were at every window, and behind every lattice, straining their eyes to obtain the first sight of the coming event. What was so deeply moving to behold was the look of patient endurance which marked most of the faces, the prematurely old look which so many of them bore. There was a brightening of eager expectation that morning; but there was also a sorrow, tragically deep, behind it. These women and these children had recently seen things that could never be forgotten.

Many weeks ago, when I first came up to the Punjab, I had passed down those same streets, at a time when the fear caused by martial law and punitive police was still fresh in people's minds. I had noticed then the sullen gloom upon the faces of the crowd. This one strongly marked

<sup>1</sup>C.F. Andrews Papers, 1/D-28.  
It was written on 5 November 1919.

feature of cowed submission, everywhere present, had struck me more and more each time I had passed up and down the various quarters of the city.

There was a story told me, which was vouched for as true, and I could never forget it, how, some months after the firing in Jallianwala Bagh, a group of shopkeepers and others had been seated quietly listening to a famous reciter of the *Ramayana*, when some one jumped up and called out "They have come". These were the very words which had been uttered when the Gurkhas came with loaded rifles into the Bagh. In a moment, the different members of the *Ramayana* audience fled in all directions, leaving the reciter alone.

In those days, when I first came to Amritsar, it was not at all difficult to understand that incident. I have seen with my own eyes just such a sudden rush of panic. I have seen also the police, at every corner, dominating the city. I have watched the long lines of cavalry patrolling the streets. I have understood from the lips of many witnesses, the terror which these forces have inspired.

And this terror had not been merely the natural awe, inspired by an imposing military demonstration. It had entered every nook and corner. For each shopkeeper knew perfectly well, that, if the agent or broker of even an ordinary policeman came round, with his repeated cry of 'give, give', there would be nothing else to do but to give, at once, whatever was demanded. This petty daily tyranny had broken the heart of the common people.

I was present in Delhi, last April, during the days when the *Hartal* had just ended. My memory is still vivid concerning what we then used to call, while speaking to one another about it, "The looting of Delhi". That period of police extortion in Delhi was soon brought to an end, because the military were speedily withdrawn and martial law was never declared. But in Amritsar, after the firing in the Bagh had made the populace an easy prey, the same 'looting' had gone on, not only for weeks, but for months. The people's power of passive resistance had been crushed. Day after day, the silent pressure of these unseen forces of police anarchy had been at work and the bazars had been forced into submission. I am speaking of facts, which are well known in every lane and street of Amritsar.

But the coming of Mahatma Gandhi has effectually broken this evil spell, and not a day too soon! The police can never be given such a hold over the people afresh after his entry—by the unarmed assault of peace, into their very citadel of power. Indeed his victory has been so great that it has extended over the police themselves. For the joyful news was spread from street to street, that the police were joining with the multitude on that day of universal rejoicing.

He came, he saw, he conquered, not as Imperial Caesar did, by the might of his armed legions, but by that peaceful force of the divine soul

in man, wherein alone Mahatma Gandhi puts his trust.

I had thought that the long morning triumphal procession of tumultuous rejoicing, by which the pent-up feelings of many months of anguish were transformed in a few short hours into joy, was one of the crowning acts of this eventful day. But I was mistaken. There was an act to follow that was supreme. All through the long afternoon the women of Amritsar with their little children came in their thousands to offer their hearts' devotion. . . .

As he, to whom these women gave their loving worship, stood among them in his great simplicity, clad in white homespun garments I could silently understand why it is the spiritual in man that alone can satisfy the heart of this Motherland.

#### **177. Lord Sydenham on the Forthcoming Congress Session at Amritsar,<sup>1</sup> 12 November 1919**

In spite of all these circumstances it is now arranged that there should be another meeting at Amritsar, and it is difficult to believe that this meeting is being held without a purpose. In June last the Amritsar branch of the Congress, which had taken alarm, cancelled the invitation to the Congress which it had previously given. Then followed what so often happened in India. Strong influences were brought to bear on the branch, and it changed its mind again and cancelled its former resolution. . . .

In these circumstances, therefore, to allow another meeting to be held at Amritsar does seem likely to have a very disturbing effect at a time when calm is wanted for the introduction of the new reforms into India.

. . . I think myself it is never wise to take risks in a country so inflammable as India, and I submit that in allowing this meeting to take place a risk will be run which is not justified in the circumstances I have described.

#### **178. Lord Sinha on the Forthcoming Congress Session at Amritsar,<sup>2</sup> 12 November 1919**

. . . There appears reason to believe that the local authorities are fully alive to the possibilities of the situation, and it seems probable that they

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, 1919, 4 February to 23 December 1919, Cols. 231-32.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Col. 233.

have come to the conclusion that the best course to adopt the circumstances is to allow the Congress to meet as arranged nearly a year ago; and they seem to be of opinion—it is mere inference on my part—that any action on the part of the Government that might have the appearance of suppressing or even obstructing a political gathering which has an All-India character, might have consequences the reverse of those which the noble Lord desires. In those circumstances the Secretary of State does not think it is necessary for him to take any action or even to express any opinion either to the Government of India or to the Local Government.

#### **179. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu,<sup>1</sup> 16 November 1919**

... The question of withdrawing the order prohibiting Tilak from entering the Punjab has been considered by the Govt. of India, and they have consulted the local Govt. who urged that he was first prohibited in 1917, on ground that his visit to province in support of Home Rule propaganda would be fraught with considerable danger to public tranquillity owing to interpretation placed upon such propaganda by half-educated and ignorant Panjabis. Tilak's subsequent action confirmed local Govt. in this opinion and they consider same objection still strong. Ample proof of proneness of hot-headed Panjabis to go to extremes is given by the recent disturbances and at the present time Tilak's pernicious preachings, especially his bitter attacks on officers of Govt. would, if re-enforced by his presence in the Punjab, lead to a renewed ebullition of anti-British feeling. Difficulties of administration in Punjab are acute at present, and owing to Gandhi's visit, proposed visits of Congress and Muslim Leagues at Amritsar and return of Lajpat Rai,<sup>2</sup> there are sufficient possibilities of trouble in province. Therefore, they deprecate allowing so influential an agitator as Tilak's free admission into province at present. They strongly urge that if province is to be restored to state of good feeling, it must be by gradual restoration of normal freedom of speech and movement and not by sudden abandonment of every precaution against every discontent and violence. The Govt. of India are of opinion that considerable weight must be given to Lt.-Governor's views and have accordingly decided that at present no relaxation can be made in the orders regarding Tilak. . . .

#### **180. V.J. Patel to G.N. Mishra,<sup>3</sup> 20 November 1919**

The report of the Committee is out. No essential change has been made

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A., February 1920, Nos. 295-310.

<sup>2</sup>Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) : Lawyer and politician, joined the Indian National Congress, 1888; President, Indian National Congress, 1920.

<sup>3</sup>A.I.C.C. Papers, File No. 3, 1919, NMML.

by the Committee. We shall see that the amendments on lines of the Congress Resolutions are moved.

Pamphlet containing the evidence of the Congress witnesses is issued with a foreword by Ben Spoor.<sup>1</sup> The foreword is very important and deserves to be printed and widely circulated in India as well as in this country. 10,000 copies have been sent to R.N. Mandlik<sup>2</sup> with instruction to take them to you at the Congress. I hope you will put some price over it in order to cover the cost.

It is a pity I am not there. My work in this country has been very hard and trying. I have sought it and must not complain. I wish I were there to explain to the Congress the whole situation. But as that cannot be, I want you to do one thing for me. Read the three documents carefully viz., the report of the British committee and (2) the report of the Deputation and (3) foreword of Ben Spoor and take out and put together the paragraphs regarding the work done in this Committee by the General Secretary and publish them separately at the time of the Congress and let the Congress pass any opinion about the matter as it likes. This is necessary in view of the fact that I am not there to answer any allegations that may be made by one or two individuals whom I have not been able to please. I trust you will do the best you can in the matter.

Resolutions for complete Responsible government, recall of the Viceroy and impeachment of Sir Michael will I hope be passed by the Congress.

#### **181. G.S. Khaparde's Interview with Montagu,<sup>3</sup> 8 December 1919**

Interview with Mr. Montagu at 3.30. p.m. to-day. He gave me a nice cigar to smoke and we sat down to talk. I showed him the letter of Lajpat Rai. He read it through, sent for one [of] his secretaries, saw an old file and said that there was telegram received from Lala Lajpat Rai and that he may return to India via France but he would not be permitted to visit England. Mr. Montagu said that England was in Home Secretary's jurisdiction and he himself had no jurisdiction there. Then I asked him about the removal of the restrictions on Mr. Tilak's going into Punjab. He said he knew nothing about it. He would be surprised if Mr. Tilak was not permitted to go to the Punjab for the Congress. Then came the Govt. of India Bill. He said he could not provide seats for us in the gallery of the House of Lords but Lord Sinha would do it. I said as Secretary of State he could easily do it. He laughed. He asked why I

<sup>1</sup>Ben Spoor: Labour M.P., Secretary of the British Congress Committee.

<sup>2</sup>Ram Chandra Narayan Mandlik (1881-1958): Social reformer, politician and journalist.

<sup>3</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1919, NAI.

disliked the Bill and told him that I must object to its preamble because it denies our right of self-determination. and I very much wanted our primary right . . . of citizenship. Upon this he appeared to lose his temper and said he could not convince the unconvinced. I replied all arguments were intended to convince the unconvinced else they would have no use. He said he did not wish to discuss and wished to know when I intended returning and I replied that I would return as early as I got passages for me, Patel and Dr. Sathaye. He called his secretary, made some enquiries and said nothing could be ascertained then but he would let us know later on. He asked why we objected to the Rowlatt Act and I told him some of my reasons. He said it was not put into force against me. I said that I had nothing to do with it as it was not a personal matter. That made him angry again. He said "You and I will never agree in politics." I said there may be points on which we might. We shook hands and the interview came to a close.

### **182. Motilal Nehru to P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer,<sup>1</sup> 12 December 1919**

As regards the Reform Bill I feel that it is certainly an improvement on the original bill and that it gives us substantial powers in certain departments. At the same time I must confess that I am far from satisfied with it. The recent happenings in the Punjab have convinced me that it is essential for us to provide ourselves with some really effective safeguard against their repetitions. The absence of any real improvement in the Government of India and several other features are most disappointing. We cannot of course ask for any change in the bill and by the time the Congress meets it will in all likelihood have become law. We can point out the deficiencies in the act and express our disappointment at them. After that we should utilise the new act as much as possible and try to get it improved at the earliest possible opportunity.

### **183. G.A. Natesen to Charles Roberts [Andrews],<sup>2</sup> 12 December 1919**

Now that the Reform Bill has passed the Commons and we all expect it will soon become law. May I trouble you to let me know as to what you

<sup>1</sup>P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer Papers, S.N. 4791, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>G.A. Natesen Papers, NMML.

G A. Natesen (1873-1949): Journalist; Editor, *The Indian Review*; Member, National Liberal Federation of India.

think of the measure. Any expression of opinion from such a warm and well-known friend of India like yourself, who has played no mean part in the shaping of the measure will I have no doubt be read with great interest by any countrymen.

You are aware there are some Indians who think that if this Bill had been wrecked it would have been no disaster to India. On the other hand the critics assert that the Labour Party which will ere long come into power would give us a better measure. Another class of critics complain that the present bill is not adequate to the requirements of the situation and that India could have obtained much more if all sections of Indian politicians had made a united demand for complete self-Govt. or Home Rule. They seem to think too that Mr. Montagu could have given us something more substantial.

There is yet another class which does not believe that the Bill is a substantial fulfilment of the pronouncement of Aug. 20th that Dyarchy is workable and is based on the distrust of Indians, that the bureaucracy is likely to obstruct our onward march, and as there is no option either to accept or reject the Bill we should reconcile ourselves to the situation and go no agitating for more.

There are others too who condemn the new measure wholesale, regard it as contemptible and yet would try to get into the new Councils and would not hesitate to advice boycott of officers and resort to passive resistance if necessary.

I am sorry to trouble you with this letter. But I hope you will find time to comply with my request.

#### **184. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup> 17 December 1919**

. . . I am quite willing to be examined on it, but in *camera* and at Delhi, when the Committee will be passing through.

There are, I think, two very strong reasons why I should appear before the Committee (with above provisions of course) :

- (i) I helped to set the military machine in motion, and when the soldiers have been called upon to justify their action, it would not look well if Archfiend stood aside.
- (ii) There are many matters, e.g., interviews with individuals, efforts made personally to prevent violent agitation, which I alone am in a position to relate, and I think my account of these will enormously strengthen the case for Govt. and incidentally justify the action taken by me.

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 23, Roll No. 10, pp. 591-92.

There is some rumour here of a general amnesty to "political" offenders to signalise the passing of the Reform scheme. May I, as an outsider now, venture to say that such a course must lead to involve a discrimination in favour of those who worked up the mob to outrage while themselves avoiding the risk of being shot down, and that if clemency is to be shown, such a differentiation against the ignorant dupes appears contrary to the elementary principle of British justice—the equality of all classes before the law.

I have been talking to a good many old Punjabi friends during the last fortnight, and I am convinced that the results of such a course would be to put a premium on disloyalty . . . .

### 185. The Punjab Wrongs<sup>1</sup>

For the last few days the *Englishman* has been fawning upon the Moderates and advising them to forget the Punjab incidents and be friends with whitemen. Our contemporary thus indirectly insinuates that the late incidents in the Punjab reflect no credit alike on the rulers and the ruled. But how shall we forget the Punjab incidents? Among the unheard of affairs that were perpetrated in that province the following may be forgotten after considerable efforts (1) The childishness of forcing people to *salaam*. (2) The prank of whitewashing devotees and recluses. (3) The parading of school boys and compelling them to make long marches. But never shall we forget—(1) The Jallianwala Bagh massacre. (2) The bombing of the crowd at Gujranwala from aeroplanes. (3) The ignominy of forcing every person, gentle or otherwise, to crawl on the highways. (4) The exhibition of over a hundred men in cages. (5) The whipping on the buttocks of men before prostitutes, after stripping them of their clothing. (6) The whipping of well-developed and fat boys. (7) The marching off of both ordinary and respectable persons to the *thana* with handcuffs on and ropes tied round their waists, merely on suspicion. (8) The sentences of hanging and transportation for life passed on many Punjabis. We can never forget these things—the pain and the wound have not yet healed. Do you know why we are determined not to forget the incidents? It is because the proud military witnesses, General Dyer, Colonel Johnson, Captain Deveton, Colonel MacRae etc., adopted a defiant attitude and used cruel language. Those who can utter the words they have done clearly show how they are disposed towards black men. We cannot forget the Punjab incidents nor Jallianwala Bagh.

<sup>1</sup>*Bengalee*, 21 December 1919, Report on the Indian Newspapers and periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 10.

The *Bengalee*, the organ of Moderate Party, published from Calcutta and founded by S.N. Banerjea.

### 186. The Punjab Incidents<sup>1</sup>

We are determined to ask a few questions plainly now, without caring for the consequences. How many white men and women were killed at Lahore, Amritsar, Kasur, Gujranwala and other towns and villages? Were not several Moslim gentlemen shot dead at Amritsar by white men before there were any casualties amongst the latter? How many thousand black-men did General Dyer and his party kill as a retaliatory measure? How many were the cases of loss of life due to aeroplane bombardment? How many persons were hanged, transported and subjected to confiscation? Were all those who were killed at Jallianwala Bagh by General Dyer's bullets guilty? Was the *Baisakhi mela* being held at Amritsar at the time of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre? Were not many persons from the *mela* present at the meeting? Indeed, we feel ashamed merely at the thought that there are and can be Englishmen in India to defend the Panjab incidents and even to take a pride in them. We want to make a request both to the Extremists and the Moderates. Let them give up every other business for the present and publish the evidence before the Hunter Committee in as well as that before the Non-official Committee in book form and send two or three lakh of these books to England for distribution. Let Mr. C.R. Das, Pandit Madan Mohan, Mr. Patel and others go to England and see that exact accounts of them are published in every English newspaper. They must also see that every member of Parliament may know the real facts. Our only duty now is to put the real story to the British public. And also for the Punjab!

### 187. Colonel Wedgwood on the Punjab Wrongs,<sup>2</sup> 22 December 1919

There are men lying there for two days, dying of thirst, eating the ground, bleeding to death and nobody to look after them. Those relations who lived near came and carried away some of the wounded from among the heap of dead and dying, but the unfortunate country people died there miserably of their wounds. This is what is done in 1919 in British India. An English sportsman would take any amount of trouble or time to see that a wounded partridge was put out of its misery, but these wounded people were lying there for two days dying slowly. Think what this means. There has never been anything like it before in English history, and not in the whole of our relations with India has there ever been anything of

<sup>1</sup>Nayak (Calcutta), 22 December 1919, Report of the Indian Newspapers and periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, 1919, 13 February to 23 December 1919, Cols. 710-12.

this magnitude before. If you are to find anything so damning to the British reputation you have to go back centuries. In the ordinary English primer the only thing the ordinary person learns about British rule in India is about the Blackhole of Calcutta<sup>1</sup> and the massacre of Cawnpore,<sup>2</sup> where there was a well choked with corpses. Centuries hence you will find Indian children brought up to this spot, just as they visit now the Cawnpore Well, and you can imagine the feelings of these Indians for generations over this terrible business. (An Hon. Member: What would you have done?""). I should not have committed murder. Think what all this means ! You will have a shrine erected there and every year there will be processions of Indians visiting the tombs of the martyrs and Englishmen will go there and stand bareheaded before it. By this incident you have divided for all time races, races that might otherwise have loved one another. . . .

It has not only destroyed that; but it has destroyed our reputation throughout the world. You know what will happen. All the blackguards in America when they lynch niggers, will say "Oh, you did the same in India." When butcheries take place in Russia, whether it be by White or Red Guard, they will say, "We never did anything like what you did in India" and when we tell the Turks, "You massacred the Armenians", they will say, "Yes, we wish we had the chance of getting 5,000 of them together, and then of shooting straight." That is the sort of welcome that this will get, and all the decent people in the world will think that England really likes what happened at Amritsar, and that all this sort of thing is English. Really, we know that this sort of thing is the finest Prussianism that ever took place. The Germans never did anything worse in Belgium. This damns us for all time. Whenever we put forward the humanitarian view, we shall have this tale thrown into our teeth.

. . . I do not think that I have varied from the words used by General Dyer. He is accused out of his own voice, He himself said, "I did not take thirty seconds to decide whether to shoot." He himself said that the mob might have dispersed, if he had asked them. He himself said that he fired on them because, if they had dispersed, they might have come back and laughed at him afterwards. He has made that clear. I wanted to point out the difference between suppressing a mob doing violence and

<sup>1</sup>On the night of 20 June 1756, 146 persons including one woman were kept in a small room at Calcutta with the result that in the following morning only 23 came out alive. This incident is known as the 'Black Hole of Calcutta'.

<sup>2</sup>Nana Sahib, one of the leaders of 1857, captured the fort of Kanpur on 26 June 1857. He had assured the British living in the fort that they would be treated well. The British were allowed to cross the river by boats to Allahabad, but when the British embarked on the boats, the Indian sepoys attacked them. Later, nearly 125 women and children were kept in a building known as the Bibighar, where they were hacked to death on the night of 15 July.

shooting down people who are not violent, because by that action terror might be inspired and prevent riots in the future. We have never justified the shooting down of people, not because they might do so at some future time unless they were fired on.

**188. Sir Reginald Craddock to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup>**

**23 December 1919**

. . . General Dyer's evidence before the Hunter Committee is most unfortunate. General Beynon who was over here a few days ago and who had himself been a witness before the Committee, complained that the Indian pleaders on the Committee were simply out for [sic] insulting the official witnesses and that Dyer had not a chance with astute lawyers of this kind, while Lord Hunter did nothing to save him from insult and annoyance. . . .

**189. M.R. Jayakar on the Royal Proclamation,<sup>2</sup> 24 December 1919**

King's proclamation about new Reforms and amnesty to political prisoners—finely-worded, great excitements and expectations in Lahore.

**190. Forget and Forgive<sup>3</sup>**

Age after age India had met with dire oppression. The incidents of Jallianwala Bagh, Gujranwala and Kasur are not new to India. On the other hand, such explanation on the part of the highly benevolent Emperor and his ministers is a wonderful and unthought-of thing to the three hundred million Indian subjects. Such humane, kind and sympathetic treatment the Indians never received from any of the foreign conquerors and rulers. A new era will be inaugurated when the Prince of Wales visits this country. Arrangements should be made from now for that event. As for ourselves, we are henceforth ready to act in co-operation with all, forgetting the past. In our heart henceforth enemy

<sup>1</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22, Roll No. 10. No. 848 (a), pp. 603-04. Sir Reginald Craddock was Governor of Burma.

<sup>2</sup>M.R. Jayakar's Diary, 1919, NAI.

<sup>3</sup>Nayak, 25 December 1919, Report on the Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 7.

and malice will have no place. Those whom we have pained by our writings will kindly pardon us when we have resolved to forget the Jallianwalla Bagh incident, we will forget everything, and that is not only but indeed.

**191. M.R. Jayakar on the Congress Session at Amritsar,<sup>1</sup>  
25 December 1919**

Left Lahore by special (Congress) Train at 10.45 reached at 1.  
Joined Procession of Congress President Motilal Nehru and Muslim League President Hakim Ajmal Khan. Terrible crowd.

**192. On the Turkish Problem<sup>2</sup>, 26 December 1919**

Again, the horrible repressive acts of General Dyer and O'Dwyer will not be easily forgotten. The result will be that the people will not be satisfied even with so much of Royal Grace. Besides, none of the repressive Acts had been repealed. No attempt has been made to please the Muslims as a community. The pleasure or the displeasure of the Mussalman community depends on the fate of the Turkish Empire. So the hope which inspired Mr. Montagu in this matter early will not be satisfied to the fullest extent.

**193. Pandit Motilal Nehru's Presidential Address at the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress,<sup>3</sup> 27 December 1919**

. . . Fellow delegates, You have assembled here in deep mourning over the cruel murder of hundreds of your brothers and in electing your President you have assigned him the position of Chief mourner. The position I accept in all reverence and I extremely thank for it. . . .

. . . In India the first fruits of the peace was the Rowlatt Bills and Martial Law. It was not for this that the war was fought, it was not for this that many hundreds of thousands laid their lives. Is it any wonder

<sup>1</sup>M.R. Jayakar's Diary, 1919, NAT.

<sup>2</sup>Nayak, 26 December 1919, Report on the Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Report on the 34th Session of the Indian National Congress held at Amritsar, pp. 9-47.

that the peace has aroused no enthusiasm and that the vast majority of the people of India have refused to participate in the Peace celebration?

. . . The responsibility of Sir Michael O'Dwyer for much that occurred here is admitted and established beyond doubt. I have endeavoured to show you the whole trend of administration. It would appear that he was trying to make the Punjab a kind of Ulster in relation to the rest of India, a bulwark of reaction against all reform.

#### **194. Jayakar on the Congress Session,<sup>1</sup> 27 December 1919**

Chairman's speech—good.  
President's—disappointing.  
Subjects Committee—lively.

#### **195. Resolutions of the Indian National Congress at Amritsar,<sup>2</sup> 29 December 1919 to 1 January 1920**

I. This Congress tenders its respectful thanks to His Majesty the King Emperor for his gracious Proclamation dated the 23rd of December, 1919, and welcomes the announcement that His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, will visit India next winter and assures him of a warm reception by the people of this country.

IV. That, having regard to the correspondence between His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mr. M.K. Gandhi, and between Lord Hunter and the Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, this Congress is of opinion that H.H. the Lieutenant-Governor's action in not permitting even a few of the Punjab leaders undergoing imprisonment, to attend and sit in the Committee room even as prisoners under custody to assist and instruct Counsel in the same manner as the Government Counsel was instructed by the officials whose conduct was under investigation of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, constitutes a serious injustice and that it left no other course open to the Sub-Committee of the Congress to take than the one taken by it; this Congress, therefore, endorses and approves of the firm and dignified action taken by the Sub-Committee and in appointing Commissioners to make an investigation and submit a report.

VI. That, in view of the fact that neither the Hunter Committee nor the

<sup>1</sup>M.R. Jayakar's Diary, 1919, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>A-I. C.C. Papers, File No. 1/1919, NMML.

Congress Commission has finished its examination of witnesses and issued its report, this Congress, while expressing its horror and indignation at the revelations already made and condemnation of the atrocities admitted, refrains from and urging any definite steps to be taken against the offenders, yet having regard to the cold-blooded, calculated massacre of innocent men and children, an act without parallel in modern times, it urges upon the Government of India and the Secretary of State that as a preliminary to legal proceedings being taken against him, General Dyer should be immediately relieved of his command.

Resolved further that this Congress desires to place it on record that in its opinion the Govt. of India and the Punjab government must in any event be held responsible for the inexcusable delay in placing an authoritative statement of the massacre of Jallianwala Bagh before the public and His Majesty's Government.

VII. In view of the oppressive regime of Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Punjab and the admitted fact brought out before the Hunter Committee that he approved of and endorsed General Dyer's massacre at the Jallianwala Bagh, this Congress calls upon His Majesty's Government to relieve Sir Michael O'Dwyer of his present duties in this country as a member of the Army Commission as a preliminary to necessary legal action being taken against him.

VIII. That this Congress places on records its grateful appreciation of the action taken by Sir Sankaran Nair in resigning his office as Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India as a protest against the policy pursued by the Government of India and the Government of Punjab in promulgating and maintaining Martial Law administration in the Punjab in suppression of the ordinary Courts of Justice in the Province.

IX. This Congress is firmly of opinion that there would be no real peace in the country until the Rowlatt Act which has caused unprecedented feelings is repealed and, therefore, earnestly ask the Right Hon'ble Secretary of State for India to advise His Majesty to exercise the Royal veto.

X. This Congress is of opinion that it is impossible to have real peace in India until the legislation popularly known as the Rowlatt Act which was passed in the face of the unanimous opposition in the country is repealed and it, therefore, respectfully urges upon the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India to advise His Majesty to veto the said Act or otherwise to secure its repeal.

XI. This Congress enters its emphatic protest against an action of the Government of India in prematurely passing the Indemnity Bill even though the acts in respect of which indemnity was granted were to be the subject to investigation by an official inquiry and in spite of the strong opposition by the Press, numerous public bodies and the non-official

members of the Imperial Legislative Council.

XII. In view of the fact that full effect has not yet been given to the general amnesty clause of the gracious Proclamation of His Majesty the King Emperor and that the persons in the Punjab tried by the Martial Law Commissioners, the Summary Courts, the area officers and the tribunals constituted under the Defence of India Act and the detenues, deportees and all political prisoners in Bengal and other parts of India including the Andamans have not been released, this Congress expresses the earnest hope and trusts that the fullest effect will immediately be given to the letter and spirit of the Royal Command.

XIII. In view of the fact that Lord Chelmsford has completely forfeited the confidence of the people of this country, this Congress humbly beseeches His Imperial Majesty to be graciously pleased immediately to recall His Excellency.

XIV. (a) That this Congress reiterates its declaration of last year that India is fit for full responsible Government and repudiates all assumptions and assertions to the contrary wherever made.

(b) That this Congress adheres to the resolutions passed at the Delhi Congress regarding constitutional Reforms and is of opinion that the Reforms Act is inadequate, unsatisfactory, and disappointing.

(c) That this Congress further urges that Parliament should take early steps to establish full Responsible Government in India in accordance with the principle of Self-determination.

#### *Amendments*

(a) That the Congress welcomes the Reforms Act as opening the gateway of Freedom to the Indian Nation and as giving her the power to walk on her own feet along the road to responsible Government, thus forming the first substantial stage on that road; and it earnestly begs the people to take the utmost advantage of its provisions, so as to reach the goal in the shortest possible time. It places also on record its gratitude to Mr. Montagu and Lord Sinha for their strenuous work against the greatest difficulties, both in India and Great Britain.

Substitute the following for (b) printed on the Agenda of the Congress for the 31st December, 1919.

(b) Pending such introduction this Congress begs loyally to respond to the sentiments expressed in the Royal Proclamation, namely "let it (the New Era) begin with a common determination among My people and My officers to work together for a common purpose", and trusts that both the authorities and the people will co-operate so to work the Reforms as to secure the early establishment of full Responsible Government, and this Congress offers its warmest thanks to the Right Hon'ble E.S. Montagu for his labours in connection with them.

XV. This Congress respectfully protests against the hostile attitude of

some of the British Ministers towards the Turkish and 'Khilafat' question as disclosed by their utterances and most earnestly appeals to and urges upon His Majesty's Government to settle the Turkish question in accordance with the just and legitimate sentiments of Indian Mussalmans and the solemn pledges of the Prime Ministers. . . .

XVII. This Congress is of opinion that the promotion of Swadeshi movement to its utmost extent is essential for national progress and prosperity and as over 73 per cent of the population of India is agricultural and poor, the Congress particularly recommends a revival of the ancient industry of hand-spinning and hand-weaving.

XVIII. This Congress is of opinion that, in view of the serious economic danger to country caused by the exportation to foreign country of milch cows and breeding bullocks, the Government should take immediate steps to prohibit such exportation.

XIX. This Congress records its grateful appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the Labour Party in and outside the Parliament through its office bearers, through its organisation, its prominent members and the Daily and Weekly Press and specially Mr. (B) Spoor, the accredited representative of the party in the Parliament for Indian affairs, by generally supporting the cause of Self-Government for India and particularly by pressing the Congress view about the Indian Political Reforms on the Joint Select Committee and on the occasion of the passage of the Government of India Bill in the Parliament, for its full sympathy with the demand for full Responsible Government in India and its generous assurance to advance it through its power and influence.

XX. This Congress urges its provincial Committees and other affiliated associations to promote Labour Unions throughout the country with the view of improving social, economic and political conditions of the labouring classes and securing for them a fair standard of living and a proper place in the body politic of India.

XXII. This Congress is emphatically of opinion that the time has arrived for establishing a permanent mission for its own propagandist work in England and elsewhere; and appoints a Committee of the following gentlemen to collect the necessary funds for the purpose and select the personnel of the mission of the first year:

1. Mr. B.G. Tilak (Convener)
2. Mr. S. Kasturu Ranga Iyengar
3. Mr. T. Prakasham<sup>1</sup>
4. Mr. B. Chakravarty
5. Mr. Mohammad Ali

<sup>1</sup>Tanguturi Prakasham (1872-1957) : Lawyer, administrator and politician, popularly known as Andhra Kesari.

6. Mr. S.R. Bomanji<sup>1</sup>
7. Mr. Lala Lajpat Rai
8. Mr. G.S. Khaparde
9. Mr. Syed Hasan Imam  
with power to add, if necessary.

**XXIII.** This Congress thankfully recognises the valuable services rendered by Lala Lajpat Rai to the cause of the country by his earnest and self-sacrificing efforts of constitutional agitation in the United States of America by representing the view of the Congress before proper authorities in America in the matter of the demand for Self-Government and Self-determination for India and requests Lala Lajpat Rai to continue his efforts as before.

**XXV.** This Congress thankfully records its appreciation of the assistance given by the British Congress Committee and especially Dr. Clarke,<sup>2</sup> Dr. Rutherford<sup>3</sup> and Mr. J.M. Parekh to the Congress Deputation in its work in England and views with entire satisfaction the reorganisation of the Committee as an executive body of the Congress pledged to carry on the Congress propaganda in England.

**XXVI.** This Congress records its condemnation of the unjust treatment meted out to University and School students in the Punjab under the direct or indirect instructions of Martial Law authorities, and hopes that immediate steps will be taken by the Local Government to cancel all punishments awarded against students without trial.

**XXVIII.** This Congress strongly urges that the Punjab and Bombay Governments and the Government of India should be requested to immediately cancel the orders passed under Sections 15A and 25A and B, of the Police Act V of 1861, levying certain indemnities for the injury done to person and property in various places in the Punjab and the Bombay Presidency in as much as these orders were inequitable and uncalled for.

**XXX.** This Congress demands the immediate repeal of the India Press Act.

**XXXI.** This Congress places on record its emphatic disapproval of the wholly unjustifiable deportation of Mr. B.G. Horniman and urges on the Viceroy the immediate cancellation of the order.

**XXXIII.** This Congress is of opinion that the time has arrived when the Revenue policy of the different provinces should be re-examined, and as a preliminary towards that end the Congress directs the All-India Congress Committee to investigate the systems of Revenue in vogue in different

<sup>1</sup>Savak Ratanji Bomanji: Merchant and politician; took a leading part in Home Rule Movement, contributed liberally to Indian National Congress and the Khilafat funds.

<sup>2</sup>Dr. Clarke: Member of the British Congress Committee.

<sup>3</sup>Dr. Rutherford: M.P., Member of the British Congress Committee and of Mrs. Annie

<sup>\*</sup>Besant's Home Rule League in London.

provinces and the condition of the peasantry affected by them by such agency as they may think fit.

XXXIV. That this Congress strongly recommends that Delhi should be constituted into a regulated Province, that it should have a legislative Council to assist the Chief Commissioner and that it should have at least two representatives in the Legislative Assembly.

#### **196. Ruchi Ram to G.K. Devdhar,<sup>1</sup> 30 December 1919**

. . . I have myself heard people say the Moderates have lost the Punjab . . . I am a moderate of Moderates myself and the whole Bengal holds moderate view in politics. May I beg you all to be so good as to hold a small meeting at an early date in the Province. If this is not possible, some of the leaders, including Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea should come as soon as possible and show personal sympathy with the sufferers.

#### **197. The Government of India on the Political Situation in India in 1919<sup>2</sup>**

Mr. Gandhi is generally regarded as a Tolstoyan of high ideals and complete selflessness. . . . Since his stand on behalf of the Indians in South Africa, he has commanded among his countrymen all the traditional reverence with which the East envelops a religious leader of acknowledged asceticism . . . . Since he took up his residence in Ahmedabad in the Bombay Presidency he has been actively concerned in social work of varied kinds. His readiness to take up the cudgels on behalf of any individual or class whom he regards as being oppressed has endeared him to the masses of his countrymen. In the case of the urban and rural population of many parts of the Bombay Presidency, his influence is unquestioned; and he is regarded with a reverence for which adoration is scarcely too strong a word. Believing as he does in the superiority of 'soul-force' over material might, Mr. Gandhi was led to believe that it was his duty to employ against the Rowlatt Act that weapon of passive resistance which

<sup>1</sup>P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer Papers, S.N. 4815.

Gopal Krishna Devdhar: Social reformer and educationist; first member to join the Servants of India Society, 1905; joint assistant and General Secretary of the National Social Conference, and Vice-President, Servants of India Society.

Ruchi Ram Sahni (1863-1949) : Social reformer and educationist; life Trustee of *The Tribune* and an active supporter of the non-cooperation and Gurdwara Reform movement.

<sup>2</sup>India in 1919: A Report prepared for presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of section 26 of the Govt. of India Act, pp. 29-49.

he had used effectively in South Africa. . . . Mr. Gandhi expressly condemned any resort to material force. He was confident that he would be able, by a process of passive disobedience to civil laws, to coerce the Government into abandoning the Rowlatt Act.

. . . The publication of Mr. Gandhi's pledge, coupled with the vehement denunciation of the Rowlatt Bill delivered in the Indian Council by non-official members, laid the foundation of an agitation so intensive as to be without parallel in recent years. . . .

In fact, this measure had become a sort of simulacrum which represented to every class the embodiment of the particular grievances from which it suffered. Confronted by this attitude the task of the administration was difficult indeed.

. . . It was, therefore, in a somewhat electrical atmosphere that the preparations for the 1919 Session of the Indian National Congress were made. The site was fixed at Amritsar, with the idea of focussing attention upon the Punjab troubles. And as was the case last year, the same place was also fixed for the session of the Muslim League. Certain of the more conservative Muhammadans attempted to break away from the powerful influence of the Congress by proposing to hold the session elsewhere; but in face of the opposition of extreme Muhammadan leaders nothing definite came of the attempt. . . .

On the very eve of the session of the Indian National Congress appeared the Royal Proclamation signifying the assents the Reform Bill. This is one of the most impressive declarations ever issued in the history of the connection between India and England.

**198. M.R. Jayakar on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress,<sup>1</sup> 1 January 1920**

Congress 1 day.

President's speech—Long, forcible and non-committal on non-cooperation question.

**199. G.S. Khaparde's Reactions on Nair's Appointment,<sup>2</sup> 1 January 1920**

Sir Sankaran Nair tried hard for and got a seat on the Council of the

<sup>1</sup>M.R. Jayakar's Diary, 1920, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1920, NAI.

Secretary of State for India. That Sir Sankaran was very ill-advised in that and asked what we proposed to do with the new Government of India Act recently passed. We said we shall use it and make it a stepping stone to further agitation for the rest of what we want.

#### **200. Retaliatory Measures,<sup>1</sup> 3 January 1920**

. . . The hooligans in the Punjab killed seven or eight white men. But the evidence before the Hunter Committee discloses the fact that very serious consequences resulted from the retaliatory measures that were taken. Almost every Englishman has supported O'Dwyer's policy in the Punjab. In other words, the ruling community in India and in England do not think it unjust that seven districts in the Punjab should be laid waste as a retaliatory measure for the loss of seven English lives. Any black man, who cares to speak after under-standing all this, is a fool. Bear in mind that the Rowlatt Act is still in force, and those who dragged you to the *hajat* after handcuffing you and tying ropes round your waist are still alive. If they catch hold of you again, the situation will be very serious indeed. It is our duty to do that which is consistent with the circumstances. Keep an eye open and pull yourselves up a little.

#### **201. Sir Edward Maclagan to Lord Chelmsford on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress,<sup>2</sup> 3 January 1920**

Our Peace celebrations passed off in absolute quiet, partly because no one outside the large towns had any desire to abstain from participating and partly because we had arranged to pay for everything ourselves and to confine ourselves as far as possible to illuminations, which nobody could well boycott. Our Muhammadans, especially in the large centres, feel genuinely the position of Turkey, but the political agitation on the subject is got up by outsiders. A few of our leading men have joined in, in order to save their faces, and one or two when they got on to platforms and spoke as Mohammadans are apt to do on such occasions, got into a sort of frenzy and lost control over their language. The general excitement got up by Mr. Gandhi had, however, quite died down until it was to some extent revived in the Muslim League meetings at Christmas.

<sup>1</sup>Nayak, 3 January 1920, Report of the Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal 1920, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup>Chelmsford Papers, 1920, Vol. 24, Roll No. 11, No. 12, NMML.

The Congress has passed off much as we expected. Although they were purposely kept in the background, we had plenty of troops and good arrangements, but there was not the smallest sign of disturbances and except to a small extent after Shaukat Ali arrived no apprehension of it. There was, however, a great deal of very violent talk and the attacks on your Excellency and Sir Michael O'Dwyer were especially atrocious with the exception of some remarks of Shaukat Ali's about the allegiance of Muslims to their religion rather than to Government. Nothing that has come to my notice seemed to be outside what would be allowed by a generous interpretation of the rights of free speech, and in any case I do not suppose that in the existing circumstances your Excellency would have cared for me to embark on anything in the shape of punitive action. In some ways the proceedings sound much worse in the newspapers than they were on the spot. I am told that the Congress tent was crowded with people, most of whom were talking and laughing, the speakers being usually inaudible, and that even the most violent resolutions, such as that demanding your Excellency's recall were, when put to the vote, treated by the audience more as a big joke than a serious proposition. The people of the city have treated the Congress as a big fair.

The leading politicians at the Congress have doubtless been putting their heads together as regards future action of some purpose. So far only three disquieting proposals have come to my notice and they do not at present amount to very much. One was that there was to be a supplementary Congress in the Punjab in the spring; this may or may not eventuate, but in any case cannot be very crowded. Another was that the Jallianwalla Bagh was to be bought and a memorial placed in it; but there are doubts as to whether the money will be forthcoming, and if, as has been suggested, the memorial is a hospital with no unseemly inscription, no great harm would be done. The third was the proposal to reopen the case before the Hunter Commission, and this has been already negatived by the Commission itself. There is no doubt a desire to keep the Disorders question alive as possible, and I shall be sorry if they go on and become a plank in our first elections.

The King's proclamation has been received with greater acclamation than I at first thought likely. We got the leaders out of jail with considerable promptitude, having made arrangements beforehand. We have since released about 550 men connected with the disturbances, namely, all who were doing two years' imprisonment or less and I am also releasing nearly all those who were imprisoned for three years. I hope also to recommend the release of a fair number of Ghadr prisoners, but I am unfamiliar with their cases and am consulting the officers who tried the bigger cases, so there may be a little delay as regards them . . . .

**202. Major Vivian to Lieutenant-Colonel S.F. Musprath on  
Pan-Islamic Movement in India,<sup>1</sup> 5 January 1920**

I am doing my best to ascertain more definitely the identity and plans of this group of persons who have been so constantly mentioned lately in connection with the Pan-Islamic mission to India and the East. The whole matter is rather puzzling, the telegrams are procured by agents who know nothing of such matters and without the full series of telegrams and communications, I am often left guessing as to what all it can mean. It seems perfectly clear, however, some of the responsible ministers of the Ottoman Govt. in combination with the Nationalists and Pan-Islamic elements, in and outside Turkey, are engaged in some definite scheme to introduce propaganda into India and to get into touch with Indian provinces . . . .

I hope we shall be able to extricate some sense and some result from the tangle for it seems pretty certain that a tremendous amount of Pan-Islamic activity has taken place at the present moment radiating from Turkey and all directions and that it has reached the practical stage, full information of which, might prove of the utmost importance to us. Some preparations have of course been vastly by the widespread belief in Turkey that the appearance of the Peace terms is imminent and that they are going to be severe. In consequence, the Turks appear to be moving with all energy to prepare something unpleasant for the Allies.

**203. The Bolshevik Menace<sup>2</sup>**

India today has the example of Russia before it and a knowledge of Russian methods. It is not necessary for her to import agitators from outside in order to learn this lesson. Political discontent is too obvious to require description. More deep-seated and dangerous is the economic discontent. Every day fresh strikes are reported of mill and railway workers: no sooner is one strike ended than another begins. Agrarian discontent has so far hardly appeared: the only traces are the murmuring of cultivators against landlords in a few places. The basis of all the strikes is the high cost of living. After the acute and widespread scarcity of last year considerations at present seem *prima facie* extremely favourable. But

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, February 1920, No. 315.

Lieutenant Colonel S F. Musprath: D.S.O., General Staff Branch (M.O.'s), Army Headquarters, India.

Major V. Vivian was residing at Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, Director, Central Intelligence (hereafter DCI) 5 January 1920, Home Poll. A, February, 1920, No. 52.

there is the curious fact that in spite of excellent crops having just been gathered and excellent prospects for the next crop, the price of essential foodgrains seems hardly to have fallen in any part of India. The new grain seems not to be reaching the retail trader. High prices of food naturally react on the prices of other necessities of life. So far as Delhi and Meerut, two adjacent cities are concerned, this phenomenon is attributed to speculation in grain on an enormous scale and enormous purchases for export. During the scarcity there was no excess of grain and the people knew it. Now the country is stocked with grain and prices remain at famine rates. India has no lack of agitators ready to treat the path that Lenin<sup>1</sup> and his friends followed in 1917. They know the way but their difficulties are greater, the chief one being the existence of an English Government, the raison d'etre of their Bolshevism. Against that difficulty they have declared their intention of using every weapon. They have refused to be placated by the Royal proclamation and the reforms, they are fomenting economic discontent and they are trying to improve on Russia by rousing the religious fanaticism of the most virile of the Indian population, the Muhammadans. A curiously close parallel can be drawn between India of to-day and Russia in the winter of 1917.

#### **204. Political Agitation in India<sup>2</sup>**

The main lines of his [B.G. Tilak] policy he feels should be:

- (a) Adoption of the Moderate policy—gain the confidence of the English in India.
- (b) Make friends with the Labour Party in England.

. . . The Labour Party to be assisted to bring about a revolution in England, while in India the line to be taken must be to foster unity by loyal methods and profess zeal for Imperial questions — insisting always, on every possible occasion, on loyalty to the Imperial idea. Under this cloak of loyalty to create a national feeling among the young Indians and to press for the admission to the army of all classes and for higher grades of military rank. These to be made planks in the National Congress of the future. Further, to keep up, by secret means, international communications with continental powers and especially to foster good relations with the enemies of England. Students to be sent to different countries to learn,

<sup>1</sup>N. Lenin (1870-1924): Revolutionary and statesman, joined the radical group, went to Switzerland in 1900; leader of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party; Chairman of the Bolshevik Controlled Central Executive Committee in November 1917.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 5 January 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920, No. 52.

and carry on propaganda there. Funds to be collected for all these purposes.

### **205. The Congress-League Meetings in Amritsar<sup>1</sup>**

The National Congress was altogether an extremist affair. It is quite true that there are divisions amongst the extremists themselves. In the bickerings that took place in the meeting of the Subjects Committee these differences were very prominent. There was a good deal of mutual recrimination and at some stages the leaders of the various factions very nearly came to blows. But for Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya things would have become very very unpleasant. The Congress was all processions and demonstrations. There was little or no deliberation. In the meetings of the Subjects Committee and of the Congress itself there was a lot of wild irresponsible and even seditious talk. A bitterly anti-British spirit dominated the Congress. Although there was much glib talk about the satisfaction caused by the Royal proclamation it was quite clear that it had but little visible effect on the saying and doing of Congressmen. Although both Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mr. M.K. Gandhi were very eloquent in condemning violence and racial hatred they devoted their whole time, energy and attention during the week to the proposed Jallianwalla Bagh memorial which is calculated to inflame race hatred by perpetuating it. Defiance of authority and crowing over the victory achieved by the extremists constituted the basic principles on which the various processions and demonstrations that took place were organised.

The Congress attracted large crowds. In fact it was a *mela*. Large number of persons came from Lahore, Jullundur and adjoining places—more especially from places where martial law was proclaimed in April last year. This was the reason why the whole thing became unmanageable. There was literally no management. Large numbers who had no tickets entered the *Pandal* by sheer force and thus kept out several hundreds of persons who have purchased their tickets. The volunteers who were in charge of the *pandal* were simply overwhelmed. On the very first day they were threatened and they gave in on the first show of force. As regards the accommodation for the guests who had come from outside Amritsar the inadequate and unsatisfactory arrangements made by the Reception Committee broke down completely. Those who had come from various towns in the Punjab managed to find accommodation of some sort in the city but the 'delegates' from Madras, Bombay, United

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 5 January 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920, No. 52.

Provinces, Bengal and Bihar whom the Reception Committee had undertaken to accommodate were put to much inconvenience. One of the Madras 'delegates' told me that the Congress authorities gave their guests from other provinces much less space and worse accommodation than the military authorities who administered martial law in the Punjab had given those Punjabis whom they had arrested for various offences. As regards the *pandal* it is generally stated that it was very badly constructed, that no speakers—even those whose voices were very loud—could be heard except by a very small portion of the audience. The large numbers of Punjabis present whether as 'delegates' or visitors were ignorant of English, and they were very rude and unmannerly to those who would not or could not speak in Urdu or Hindi. The President was powerless. The very first day he lost his voice, and it was impossible for him to keep or restore order. The spectacle presented by the Congress was more that of a fourth class theatre in the possession of an unruly mob than that of a deliberative assembly attended by educated men who are amenable to discipline, order and authority to listen to what are called 'strong' speeches and that is the reason why speakers who were not prepared to talk 'strongly' were shouted at and ultimately forced to sit down. As regards the 'delegates' the fact is that everybody who wanted to attend was at liberty to call himself a 'delegate' or visitor or a member of the Reception Committee. There was not the least attempt at 'election', and the registration of delegates was nothing but a farce. The arrangements made by the Reception Committee in this connection completely broke down at the very start. In fact, the whole thing was a mob affair. Democracy was let loose, every body was every body's equal and there was no attempt to keep discipline or order. Men who had paid for a Rs.50 ticket could, with difficulty, get a seat in the block reserved for those who had paid only Rs.5 for their tickets. Two days before the Congress began an incident occurred which is worth mentioning. A man named Banke Dial [Dayal]<sup>1</sup> editor of a paper, called *Jhang Sial* but now defunct went with a big stick and asked the Chairman of the Reception Committee for a Press ticket. The latter refused to accede to his request. Banke Dayal became indignant and began to abuse the Chairman and his friends in foul language. Swami Sharddhanand ordered the volunteers to turn him out. Banke Dayal showed fight and began to flourish his stick. This cowed down both Swami Sharddhanand and the volunteers and they had to give Banke Dayal a ticket.

As regards the Muslim League the attendance was smaller though of the same sort. The Muhammadan speakers at the League were, if anything, more violent in their language and defiant in their general attitude than

<sup>1</sup>Lala Banke Dayal : A Revolutionary and journalist ; associated with Sardar Ajit Singh in 1907 ; wrote the famous poem 'Pagri Sambhal Jatta', Editor, *Jhang Sial*.

the extremist Hindus at the meetings of the Congress. Anti-British spirit reigned supreme, and dominated the whole League. The speeches that Mr. Shaukat Ali and Mr. Muhammad Ali made show that they are not at all grateful for the clemency that has been shown them and that they are determined to give trouble. The conduct of Dr. Saifuddin Kichloo [Kitchlew] of Amritsar in this respect was, if anything, still more atrocious. Loyal Hindus say that the Nationalists among their co-religionists are being made fools of by designing and clever Muhammadan *badmashes* and that they are doing a great disservice to their community by dancing to the tune called by the Pan-Islamists. Loyal Muhammadans say that counting Hindu nationalists have made cat's paws of their simple but fanatical co-religionists. They add that this Khilafat business is really engineered by clever Hindus who are anxious to get Muhammadans against the British Government. The complaints made by both Hindus and Muhammadans in this connection are partially true. The combination of Pan-Islamism with political extremism is unholy, and as such it is looked upon by all loyal and law-abiding men in the two communities. As regards the prospects of a real union between Hindus and Muhammadans, sensible people either shake their heads, or merely smile. The great majority of the people among both Hindus and Muhammadans refused to take seriously what has happened and is happening and they look upon the whole thing as an interesting *tamasha* (game or play). But the more sensible among them are inclined to the view that the extravagance of language which is indulged in speeches made in connection with the Khilafat agitation is sure to lead to trouble if not checked.

**206. Motilal Nehru to Montagu on the Amritsar Congress,<sup>1</sup>**  
**8 January 1920**

Congress held Amritsar begs tender respectful thanks His Majesty King Emperor for Gracious Proclamation Twenty-third December 1919 welcomes announcement His Royal Highness Prince of Wales visit India next winter and assures warm reception by people this country. Having regard coldblooded calculated massacre innocent men children an act without parallel modern times Congress urges you to relieve General Dyer of command. In view of oppressive regime Sir Michael O'Dwyer in Punjab and the admitted fact brought out before Hunter Committee that he approved General Dyer's massacre at Jallianwalla Bagh Congress urges His Majesty's government relieve him membership Army Commission. Congress thinks impossible to have peace in India until Rowlatt Act

<sup>1</sup>A-I.C.C. Papers, File No. 1, 1919, NMML, Telegram.

passed against unanimous opposition is repealed respectfully urges your advice His Majesty veto same or otherwise secure repeal. In view Lord Chelmsford completely forfeited people's confidence Congress humbly beseeches Imperial Majesty graciously pleased recall His Excellency immediately. Congress offers thanks to you for labours connection Reforms. Congress respectfully protests against hostile attitude British Ministers Turkish Khilafat question most earnestly appeal His Majesty's Government settle same accordance, Indian Musalman sentiment and Prime Minister's solemn pledges otherwise no content among Indian people. . . .

### **207. The Moderates' Conference<sup>1</sup>**

As regards the Moderates Conference the general impression outside political circles is that though it was a much better affair than the Congress there was patent throughout the proceedings an utter lack of courage. The Moderates, it is believed, are afraid of the extremists and lack the courage to take a strong line in denouncing the extremists and their work. So long as the Moderates do not speak out their real mind and refuse to say what they really think of the extremists, they will never be an influence for power and good in the country. This is what people generally say about the conference. The reason why the Moderates lack courage is that there are among them a good many who waver in the case of some moderation is only a cloak for extremism. . . . The general impression in the country is that when the Reform Scheme is in operation the political parties in the country will be reconstituted on altogether different lines, and political agitation also will assume a changed direction. Those who are unable to secure seats in the Councils, and not a few of those who thought elected are not appointed as Ministers will turn into extremist and arrange to give trouble.

### **208. The Bombay Mills Strike<sup>2</sup>**

The most prominent topic of conversation in Bombay is the strike of the mill operatives. The strike has assumed serious proportions and the contagion is spreading to other concerns or departments which employ labour whether skilled or unskilled. The increased cost of living has hit the workmen hard; their wages have no doubt increased but the increase

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 12 January 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920, No. 52.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

has not been at all in proportion to the increase that has occurred in the cost of living during the past 4 years. The mill owners have made enormous profits during this period and their general prosperity has been phenomenal. The workmen feel that they too should get a share of these profits. The strike is due largely to economic causes, although political agitators are doing all they can to exploit the situation. Not a few mill owners in Bombay have assisted in financing extremist organisation as directed against Government in the Presidency and even in India generally. They now find themselves in an awkward fix. Their chickens are literally coming home to roost. The strikes have so far displayed no animus or feeling against Government.

**209. G.S. Khaparde on the Amritsar Session of the Indian National Congress,<sup>1</sup> 14 January 1920**

Tilak is looking very poorly. He is not half so well as he was in London. He had to fight single handed at Amritsar against Mrs. Besant and [V.S.] Shastri and Madan Mohan [Malaviya] all combined. . . . He told us in rough outline of the whole story. Mrs. Besant had not even twenty followers. In a house of 15,000 only about a spurt of people voted with her and the rest followed Lokmanya Tilak, Shastri and Madan Mohan shared the same fate. It appears Madan Mohan had a private understanding with Shastri about expressing gratitude towards Montagu and Madan Mohan agreed to have a resolution expressing it—passed by the Congress but eventually things turned out otherwise and Madan Mohan must have looked very small.

**210. The Bolshevik Menace<sup>2</sup>**

Fifty-four schools have been opened in Tashkent, mainly for propaganda purposes where Oriental languages are taught and some Indians have been engaged as instructors. Propaganda literature is also being prepared. As agents become proficient they are to be sent to India, China and all countries having a Muhammadan population. Those for India will enter mostly by Afghanistan under Afghan auspices or by sea under various disguises.

The decisions to concentrate all effort of India was recently re-affirmed

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary, 1920, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 19 January 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920. No. 52.

by the Tashent Soviets, because it is hoped to decide there the destruction of the British Empire and the future of the world proletariat. It is understood that centres where propaganda will be partly prepared are to be opened in India.

### 211. Labour Unrest in India<sup>1</sup>

Strikes are no new thing in India. In the past owing to the ignorance and lack of organisation of the strikers they have generally been led by some 'disinterested' persons often of the lawyer class and generally of advanced political views. This fact considered with the other fact that industrial unrest is now sweeping India from end to end, has led wherever strikes have occurred, to allegations being freely made that outside influence has engineered them . . . .

In the first place the economic justification of the present unrest and epidemic of strikes can hardly be denied. The enormous increase in the cost of living is patent. It is affecting Europeans and Indians alike. Economic causes alone seems insufficient to account for this increase, and that speculation and profiteering are largely contributory causes to it is the conviction of many. Even if industrial wages and allowances had increased in proportion, the enhanced cost of living would still have caused discontent.

This alone would seem a sufficient cause for industrial unrest even on the present scale, and, as might have been expected, were this the sole cause, there has been no general simultaneous strike. The movement has begun in one place and spread to neighbouring places, and in any particular place it has started in one mill and spread to others of the same industry, and from that industry to other industries.

But there are facts pointing to outside influence behind these strikes. The duration of some of the strikes and the demands put forward by the men point something more than the economic difficulty having moved them. In most places men not themselves workers have put themselves at the head of the strikers. In some cases these men have been notorious as politicians, in others they have been notorious leaders of the extremist party or local members of that party. The strike doctrine has been inoculated into Indian labour by various politicians at different times. . . . Approaching the question from the other side it was reported some time ago that Tilak and his extremist co-workers had decided to take up the Indian labour question, because on various occasions they had been taunted with the futility of their claim to represent the labouring masses of India. This is partly

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 19 January 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920, No. 52.

confirmed by the close connection known to exist between Tilak and some sections of the Labour Party in England by finding Tilak's chief lieutenant, [Joseph] Baptista, leading the Bombay strikers.

It is not that the League<sup>1</sup> seeks to uplift Indian Labour. That indeed is inevitable if India is ever to advance industrially. But the League is animated by a violent anti-British spirit and openly advocated Bolshevism. Saklatwala<sup>2</sup> and A.A. Mirza<sup>3</sup> in England have distributed Bolshevik literature and the latter at least has addressed... Bolshevik meetings... The speech of B.C. Pal, referred to above, embodied the creed of the League. Among its other members who have returned to India are Satyamurti<sup>4</sup>, V.P. Madhav Rao<sup>5</sup> and Chaman Lal.

... Proof is lacking, but the facts quoted point to the possibility of the League being behind the present labour troubles in India.

**212. Address Presented by the Mohammedan Deputation to Lord Chelmsford in connection with the Turkish Peace Terms<sup>6</sup>,  
19 January 1920**

... We, the Members of the Khilafat Deputation, authorised to this behalf by the Khilafat Conference at the very important session recently held at Amritsar, beg to approach your Excellency with a view to enlist the sympathy, and secure the fullest assistance of your Excellency's Government in a matter of vital importance in which we are confident neither the one nor the other will be withheld. The Khilafat Conference has more than once resolved that a deputation should proceed at an early date to England and lay before His Majesty the King Emperor and his Ministers a full and clear statement of the obligations imposed on every Muslim by his faith, and of the united wishes cherished by Indian Mussalmans regarding the Khilafat and cognate questions, such as those relating to Muslim control over every portion of the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, the Khilafa's wardenship

<sup>1</sup>The 'Workers Welfare League of India' was established in London in 1917. Its principal object being stated to be independently of all political movements or aims to advocate the institution in India of provision for the welfare of the working population. It was to seek the cooperation of Trade Unions to achieve its object.

<sup>2</sup>Saklatwala: Labour leader and Secretary of the Indian Committee of the Workers Welfare League of India.

<sup>3</sup>A.A. Mirza: A Communist worker.

<sup>4</sup>S. Satyamurti (1887-1943) : Lawyer, educationist and politician; visited England in 1919.

<sup>5</sup>V.P. Madhav Rao: Ex-Dewan of Travancore-Cochin, Mysore and Baroda; Member of the Congress Deputation that went to defend the Congress view before Joint Parliamentary Committee in London in 1919.

<sup>6</sup>Home Poll. A, February 1920, Nos. 413-16 and K.W.

of the Holy places and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Such a desire would have been both natural and laudable at any time; but in view of the grave situation that exists today and is fast developing into an unmistakable menace, it has acquired an urgency . . . .

After a protracted war in which almost the entire civilized world was engaged on one side or the other in which each nation vied with its neighbours in pouring out its blood and treasures on the most lavish scale in order to secure victory, and of which the ravages and the horrors have been without precedent, it was only natural that the nations engaged therein and even those indirectly yet powerful affected thereby, should experience extreme war-weariness at its close and feel intense abhorrence of the ancient method of settling the vital affairs of mankind through the arbitrament of the sword. Nor was it less natural that the world should cry with one voice for a lasting peace and conclude it with the utmost rapidity. And yet although more than a year has elapsed since the conclusion of the armistice, and more than six months have passed since the treaty of peace was signed by Germany, peace seems almost as far as ever from resuming its sway over mankind, and our own continent of Asia is not without reason apprehensive of grave developments of which no one can pretend to foresee the final end. The world seems once more to be approaching a grave crisis, and although it is not possible to speak with any degree of certainty of the regions and the races likely to be affected by the storm that is obviously brewing, it requires no great perspicacity to foretell that when it comes to burst the Muslim world will not be left unaffected.

. . . the least that we may reasonably expect from the statesmen of the Empire is that in concluding any settlement to which they attach any degree of finality they should take into the fullest consideration the most binding religious obligations and the most highly cherished sentiments of 70 millions of Indian Mussalmans and the no less ardent sympathies of 250 millions of their compatriots.

. . . Your Excellency's Government, various local Governments, and those Englishmen who had held responsible offices in India before their retirement, have gradually come to realize and appreciate in a daily increasing measure the deep concern of the Mussalmans of India and of their compatriots in the settlement to be concluded with the Ottoman Khilafat. Realizing at the same time their own responsibility for the peace and good governance of India and tranquillity of her borders. Your Excellency's Government and the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State have, we most thankfully acknowledge, made repeated representations to His Majesty's Government. But that Government is obviously so far removed from us, both in point of distance and political and religious surroundings, that neither our own voice nor the representations of this Government have apparently affected the opinions, viewpoint and preconceived ideas of

**His Majesty's Ministers** to an appreciable degree and a number of ministerial utterances can be cited to prove, if proof was necessary, that they are inclined to insist on a settlement of such worldwide interest and importance as if it was solely, or at any rate, mainly, the concern of the small fraction of His Majesty's subjects of British birth and Christian faith. From the rest they seem to expect impulsive acquiescence, if not willing submission to the dictates of their narrowly conceived and far from Imperial statesmanship.

... We have been driven to the conclusion that one final effort must be made to give timely warning to the Imperial authorities of the dangers we so clearly foresee, and respectfully entreat them to avoid the evil consequences of a settlement sought to be forced on the Mussalmans of the world contrary to the clearest commandments of their creed and the united wishes of so large a portion of humanity.

Recent experience, as well as the inherent difficulties of discussing such grave matters over the wires at the distance of seven thousand miles of land and sea, have forced us to resolve that, with your Excellency's assistance, a deputation of ours should proceed at the earliest possible opportunity to England, and place directly our humble but frank submissions before His Majesty and his Ministers. And, since, we have been repeatedly asked to remember that in arranging such a settlement Great Britain, whatever her position among her allies and associates, could not leave their interests and wishes out of consideration, we trust that our deputation will be enabled to explain to the allied and associated nations and their Governments the nature and binding force of Islamic obligations and the true character and scope of muslim aspirations.

We need not repeat here the clear conditions of future peace as set forth by the President<sup>1</sup> of the United States of America on the basis of which the Khilafat concluded the amistice, nor the unmistakable pledges of the British Premier<sup>2</sup> regarding Constantinople, Thrace, and the homelands of the Turks. We respectfully submit that no prospective territorial or political gains, whether real or only imagined, can compensate Great Britain or her allies and associates for the loss of moral credit if their pledged word is left unredeemed; and ingenious interpretations, suggested now as an after-thought by irresponsible persons, will in no way prove helpful to the responsible authorities. The shock of this blow to the moral prestige of the Empire will be felt all the more severely in consequence of the sad disillusionment with regard to the pledge of this Majesty's Government proclaimed by your Excellency's predecessor at the commencement of the war with Turkey.

But it is not because the Mussalmans of India take their stand on British and allied pledges, any more than they expect that a settlement

<sup>1</sup>Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), President of the United States, 1913-21.

<sup>2</sup>Lloyd George, Prime Minister of England, 1916-21.

with such extended and intricate ramifications can be governed by their own interests and sentiments alone, that they are so deeply agitated today when they apprehend a breach of these solemn pledges and an almost complete disregard of these universally cherished sentiments. The Mussalmans of India will entirely fail in their purpose if they cannot make it clear to those who have made themselves responsible for preserving to them their religious freedom in its entirety that their deepest concern today is that a settlement of the Khilafat and cognate questions is apparently being outlined by acceptance or acquiescence in without jeopardising his eternal salvation. This is the one governing consideration on which attention must be focussed. . .

The preservation of the Khilafat as a temporal no less than a spiritual institution is not so much a part of their faith as the very essence thereof. . . Temporal power is of the very essence of the institution of the Khilafat, and Mussalmans can never agree to any change in its character or to the dismemberment of its Empire.

The no less important question of the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, over no portion of which can any kind of non-Muslim control be tolerated, is equally clearly not one of Muslim sentiment but of Islamic faith.

. . . And it is the logical consequences of Islamic brotherhood that all Mussalmans should share the sorrows and sufferings of their brothers in every corner of the world, and should see to it that principles of such universal application as that of self-determination should be applied to the Muslim no less than to the Christian, and to the Asiatic no less than to the European.

It is true that a great part of Europe and Christendom charges the Ottoman Turks with religious injustice and political ineptitude. But it is permissible to argue that those who do so are neither free from old standing prejudices nor from a bitterness of later growth; and we are confident that the verdict of history would be pronounced in due course with full regard for the difficult position in which the Ottoman Turks have stood for centuries, and that it would vindicate alike the basic toleration of Islam and the essential humanity of the Turk.

The loyalty of Indian Mussalmans, no less than that of other communities of India, to their Sovereign has been an abiding asset acknowledged as well as proclaimed throughout the history of British rule in India. . . . But now that the policy of the allied and associated powers and the dictates of Islam seems to run counter to each other, we respectfully submit that justice and expediency alike demand that what is unalterable by human hand, and has never been so altered throughout the thirteen centuries of Islam, shall remain unaltered; and what is susceptible to change, and is essentially changeable with every change in circumstances and surroundings, should, when necessary, change. Even the most cherished Muslim sentiment may be sacrificed in subservience to Imperial demands; though we

humbly submit that true Imperialism should give proportionate consideration to the wishes and sentiments of every member of the Empire. But the requirements of Islamic law are so definite and of such a binding nature that they cannot be reduced by a hair's breadth to suit the desires of allied and associated powers any more than they can be enlarged to further the mundane ambitions of Mussalmans themselves. These are the limits set by Allah and none shall transgress them.

... We shall beseech the Imperial authorities not to under-rate the worth and value of Islamic friendship and Indian loyalty. A settlement unacceptable alike to Muslim and non-Muslim Indians, now happily returned and standing shoulder to shoulder, will bring no peace, because it will bring no sense of justice and no contentment. No Mussalman who hopes and prays for salvation would thenceforward know and rest; and he could only aspire to salvation by following the dictates of Islam, however, painful the consequences may be.

But if, on the contrary, the heart of India is won by a generous recognition of her fitness for managing her own affairs as a member of the British Commonwealth, and the Muslim world is reconciled by a just appreciation of Islamic responsibilities and obligations and Muslim sentiments, half the world would be at the back of Great Britain, and no power in the world could dare to deny to her the rights that are hers and her Empire's. The menace that now looms so large would then shrink into nothingness without a blow being struck in wrath or a drop of human blood being shed in vain warfare. The world would then be truly safe not only for democracy, but for God and the Truth; and it is in this spirit that we desire to send our mission with your Excellency's assistance to Great Britain and the allied and associated countries.

We are also confident that once the success of our mission is assured, it would set itself with equal zeal to reassure the Muslim world, and reconcile those who have parted, may be in anger, may be in sorrow, but in any case through misunderstanding of their common interests which everyone anxious to promote the peace of the world should endeavour to remove. May it be given through the grace of a Merciful Province to us and to your Excellency's Government to accomplish this humane and sacred purpose.

We beg to subscribe ourselves,

Yours Excellency's most obedient servants,

*Names of Gentlemen proposed for the Khilafat Deputations*

1. Mr. Shaukat Ali, B.A. (Aligrah), Khilafat Conference, Amristar (Arrived).
2. Mr. Mohamad Ali, B.A. (Oxon), United Provinces (Arrived).
3. Mahib-ul-Mulk Hakim Mohamed Ajmal Khan Sahib, Delhi (Arrived).

4. Dr. M.A. Ansari, Delhi (Arrived).
5. Hon'ble Sir Fazulbhoy Curimbhoy,<sup>1</sup> Kt. Bombay (Arriving).
6. Maulana Abdul Bari Sahib,<sup>2</sup> Lucknow (Arriving).
7. Seth Mian Mohamed Chotani,<sup>3</sup> Bombay (Arriving).
8. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Sahib,<sup>4</sup> (Arrived).
9. Seth Abdullah Haroon Sahib,<sup>5</sup> Karachi (Arrived).
10. Maulana Kifayat Ullah Sahib,<sup>6</sup> Delhi (Arrived).
11. Maulana Sanaullah Sahib,<sup>7</sup> Amritsar (Expected).
12. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, Ph.D., Barrister-at-Law. Amritsar (Arrived).
13. Mr. Ghulam Mohayuddin [Mohiuddin] Khan,<sup>8</sup> B.A., LL B., Pleader, Kasur (Arrived).
14. Mr. Agha Mohammed Safdar,<sup>9</sup> B.A., LL.B., Pleader, Sialkot (Arrived).
15. Mahatma Gandhi Ji, Ahmedabad (Arriving).
16. Swami Shraddhanand.
17. Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru, Allahabad, (Unable).
18. Pandit Rambuj Dutt Chaudhari Sahib, Lahore<sup>10</sup> (Arriving).
19. Haji Moosa [Musa] Khan Sahib Rais, Aligarh.<sup>11</sup>
20. Mr. Hasan Imam, Barrister-at-Law, Patna.
21. The Hon'ble Raja Sir Mohamed Ali Mohamed Khan of Mahmudabad, Lucknow.

<sup>1</sup>Sir Fazulbhoy Curimbhoy: Merchant and Millowner, Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1910-12, and Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1913-16.

<sup>2</sup>Maulana Abdul Bari Sahib (1878-1926). Politician, and founder of Ulema-i-Hind; organised Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1914; favoured cooperation with the Indian National Congress and opposed the Rowlatt Act.

<sup>3</sup>Mian Mohamed Chotani: A prosperous government contractor and timber merchant; President, Central Khilafat Committee of India.

<sup>4</sup>Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) : Theologist and politician; Editor, *Al Hilal*, 1912-14 and of the *Al-Baglah*, 1915-16

<sup>5</sup>Seth Abdullah Haroon Sahib: Merchant and landlord; President, Sind Provincial Conference, 1919; President, Khilafat Committee, Karachi, 1922.

<sup>6</sup>Maulana Kifayat Ullah Sahib (1872-1952). Founder of Jamaat-i-Ulema in 1919 and its President, 1919-42.

<sup>7</sup>Maulana Sanaullah Sahib: Muslim Acting Chairman of the Reception Committee of the All-India Muslim League session, Amritsar in 1919.

<sup>8</sup>Ghulam Mohiuddin Khan: Lawyer and Khilafat leader of Kasur, who contributed liberally and collected funds for the Turkish problem.

<sup>9</sup>Agha Mohamed Safdar: Lawyer and politician; suspended practice on account of Non-cooperation, Councillor of All-India Muslim League.

<sup>10</sup>Pandit Rambuj Dutt Chaudhari : Lawyer and politician; conducted *Hindustan*, the famous Urdu journal; deported on 14 April 1919 to Dera Gazikhān and arrested on 6 May 1919; a staunch Home Ruler and social reformer.

<sup>11</sup>Haji Musa Khan (of Aligarh): Secretary of Foundation Committee of the National University at Aligarh, 1920.

22. The Hon'ble Raja Tasadduq Rasul Khan, Lucknow.<sup>1</sup>
23. Mr. Syed Hussain, Bombay (Arriving).<sup>2</sup>
24. The Hon'ble Mr. Fazlul Haq, Calcutta.
25. Mr. Sayed Zahur Ahmed, Secretary, All India Muslim League, Lucknow (Arriving).
26. Mr. Mumtaz Husain, Barrister-at-Law, Lucknow<sup>3</sup> (Arriving).
27. The Hon'ble Mr. Abdul Kasim, Burdwan.<sup>4</sup>
28. Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Barrister-at-Law, Bombay.
29. The Hon'ble Mr. Syed Riza Ali,<sup>5</sup> Allahabad (Unable).
30. Maulana Mohamed Ali Sahib, M.A., Lahore (Arriving).
31. Maulana Hasrat Mohani Sahib,<sup>6</sup> B.A., Aligarh.
32. Maulana Abdul Majid Sahib,<sup>7</sup> Budaun.
33. Maulana Mohamed Fakhir,<sup>8</sup> Allahabad.
34. Mr. Abbas Tayyab Ji, Baroda.

**213. Lord Chelmsford's Reply to the Mohamedan Deputation,<sup>9</sup>  
19 January 1920**

I am glad to meet you here today not only because it enables me to hear from own lips your views on the subject of the Turkish peace terms, but also because it affords me an opportunity of explaining to you and to the Mahomedan Community in India the attitude of the Government of India on this question: the efforts which have been made by them and by the Secretary of State to secure that the opinions and feelings of Indian Mahomedans are adequately placed before the Peace Conference; and the genuine sympathy which the Secretary of State and the Government of India alike feel for the Muslim subjects of His Majesty the King Emperor in their present very difficult position.

<sup>1</sup>Tassaduq Rasul Khan, Raja of Jehangirabad (1851-1921) : Landlord and politician; Vice-President, All-India Muslim League, 1909; Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1909-12.

<sup>2</sup>Syed Hussain (1886-1949): Journalist; Editor, *The Independent*, (founded by Motilal Nehru), 1919.

<sup>3</sup>Mumtaz Hussain: Lawyer and politician; Khilafat leader of Lucknow.

<sup>4</sup>Abdul Kasim : Khilafat leader and Member of the Khilafat deputation to Europe in 1919.

<sup>5</sup>Syed Riza Ali: Lawyer and politician; Member of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, 1912-25; leader of the Khilafat agitation in Allahabad in 1919 and early 1920.

<sup>6</sup>Maulana Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951) : Journalist and politician; joined the Congress; imprisoned for sedition and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in 1908.

<sup>7</sup>Maulana Abdul Majid (1885-1962) : Politician and educationist; Trustee of the MAO College, Aligarh; joined the Congress in 1915.

<sup>8</sup>Maulana Mohamed Fakhir: A Prominent Muslim leader.

<sup>9</sup>Home Poll A, February 1920, Nos. 413-16 and K.W.

At the outset I desire to make it clear that neither I nor my colleagues in the Government are possessed of any secret information regarding the nature of decision at which the Peace Conference will arrive. The reason is that no conclusions have yet, so far as I am aware, been reached. . . . I would ask you to attach no importance to the cabled opinions of home newspapers which do not in any sense represent the opinions of His Majesty's Ministers. What we do know for certain is that there have been recent deliberations in London and that the Secretary of State is at this moment in Paris with the Prime Minister and is pressing the views of India Moslems with his accustomed energy and force before the final conference at which a decision will be made on this grave issue. The announcement of the decision may be, for all we know, a matter of a few days and it is at this juncture I desire again to assure the Mahomedans of India that no effort has been spared, no stone left unturned, to place before those, with whom the decision will rest, the plea of Indian Muslims for the most favourable possible treatment of Turkey. . . .

I must, however, be candid and say that I cannot admit the validity of all your contentions. But no advantage would be gained were I to examine your memorial paragraph by paragraph in an argumentative spirit. What I do fully recognise is that the Mahomedans of India feel very deeply on this subject and that the occasion is not one for unprofitable controversy, particularly on religious points, but for helpful cooperation. . . .

**214. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Turkish Peace Terms,<sup>1</sup>**  
**19 January 1919**

. . . Abstract of my reply will follow.  
 Representation expresses views of extremist section but it is undoubtedly that all Moslem India feels very deeply on this Turkish question and sympathises very largely with the general views expressed on the future of Turkey.

**215. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Rejoinder of Khilafat  
 Deputation,<sup>2</sup> 28 January 1920**

*Clear the line*

Following is rejoinder of Khilafat Deputation to His Excellency's reply of 20th instant:

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll A, February 1920, Nos. 413-16 and K.W.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Telegram.

*Begins:* Viceroy's reply, whilst perfectly courteous, was equally disappointing in that His Excellency said in emphatic language that Turkey when she had her choice deliberately drew sword against Allied Powers and must take consequences. We consider this means punishment to Turkey for having joined Central Powers contrary to solemn declarations made by Mr. [H.H.] Asquith<sup>1</sup> then Prime Minister, after Turkey had so made her choice. His Excellency hoped that whatever the decision Indian Muslims' loyalty would remain as staunch as ever. We desire to place on record our firm conviction, that should the peace terms result unfavourably to Muslim religion and sentiments they would place undue strain upon Muslim loyalty, and knowing as we do universal feeling in India, as men with full sense of responsibility, it is not possible for us to give assurance His Excellency expected. It is due to Peace Conference now sitting, to ourselves and to Empire to which we desire to remain loyal, to state in explicit language minimum that will satisfy Muslim sentiments. Arbia as delimited by Moslim authorities and holy places of Islam must remain under control of Khalifa, full guarantees being taken consistently with dignity of sovereign state for genuine Arabian Self-Government should Arabs desire it. We advisedly used word "genuine" because present arrangement is thoroughly distrusted by overwhelming majority of intelligent Muslim opinion. Islam has never associated temporal power with Khilafat. We, therefore, consider that to make Sultan mere puppet would add insult to injury and would only be understood by Indian Muslims as affront given them by combination of Christian Powers. Whilst, therefore, we must insist upon pledge given by Mr. Lloyd George on 5th January 1918, being fulfilled in order to show that we desire no more than strictest justice, we concede right of Allied Powers to ask for such guarantees as may be considered necessary for full protection of non-Muslim races living under Sultan. We hope, even at this eleventh hour, that British Ministers will give us weight to and appreciate Muslim sentiment in India supported as it is by practically whole of enlightened Hindu opinion. His Excellency has stated that it is just possible Peace terms may be completed and declared within few days and we can only hope that it is not yet too late to mend what mistake may have been committed. We claim that British Imperial Government is as much trustee for Muslim and Indian interests as for Christian. Therefore, not enough that our sentiment and wishes are placed before League, but essential that British Ministers make our case their own.

*Ends.*

<sup>1</sup>Herbert Henry Asquith, Earl of Oxford and Asquith (1852-1922); Statesman; Prime Minister of England, 1908-16.

**216. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde on the C.I.D. Reports,<sup>1</sup> 28 January 1920**

I send you herewith a copy of the statement I have sent to Col. Wedgewood and B. Spoor by the last mail. I forgot to mention that matter to you when you were here. It is an important matter and I wish we have it first moved in Parliament as so you need not take any action upon it here just now. My information is that the C.I.D. reports give a true account of the whole affair. The Government of India found them inconvenient . . . . These reports are not placed before the Hunter Committee. My information, you may rest assured, is perfectly reliable. These C.I.D. reports also implicate the district police in the thefts of the Bank property. It is said—and I believe it that Sir Charles Cleveland<sup>2</sup> refused when he found that these reports were ignored and the Govt. of India was averse to carry out his suggested action on them. If these facts come out the Govt. of India is doomed . . . .

**217. B.G. Tilak to G.S. Khaparde on the Hunter Committee Report,<sup>3</sup> 28 January 1920**

The Hunter Committee is expected to publish its report very soon and it is desirable to bring to your notice certain facts and information which has been withheld from the Hunter Committee and which if published will disclose the horrors of Punjab atrocities from the official records themselves. No one in India entertains any doubt regarding these horrors and atrocities. It is also plain to every body here that the massacre of innocent men, women and children at Jallianwala was a deliberate act of unprovoked terrorism intended simply to cow down the people of Punjab into abject submission. It was and is a disgrace to any civilized administration, much more to the British. And the Hunter Committee's report will doubtlessly unmask the greater part of the brutality of this massacre. But there is much more irrefutable evidence in the Government record itself of the horrible details of this massacre which in the interest of the fair name of British must be brought to light and it is for this purpose that the following information is supplied to you with a view that the Secretary of State for India may be asked to lay on the table of the House the papers and report mentioned below.

There are two departments of Police : (1) The provincial which locally investigates in all offences, riots or disturbances in the district of the

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File 2-52, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Charles Cleveland : I.C.S., Director, Central Intelligence Department, 1919.

<sup>3</sup>G.S. Khaparde Papers, File 1-22, NAI.

Province to which it belongs, (2) a general Police inquiry department for the whole of India called the Central Information Department located at Delhi and having charge also of the Criminal Investigation Department which investigates into noted crimes and disturbances, independently of the provincial police by means of officers who are in no way subordinate to provincial administration. Any riot or disturbance of the place is then doubly investigated by two authorities independent of each other; the Provincial Police and the Central Information Dept, both of which serve as a check on each other in the complicated system of police in our administration. The head of the provincial police is called the Inspector-General of Police having his head office at chief town in the province and the head of the C.I.D., i.e. Central information as well as Criminal Investigation Depts. with his head office at Delhi. Sir Charles Cleveland, I.C.S., who is now on leave preparatory to retirement was hitherto the head of the Central Information Department and was so when the Punjab massacre took place.

After the Jallianwala massacre and the burning and the looting of the Bank at Amritsar in April last, the C.I.D. at Delhi through its own officers made thorough inquiries into these incidents independently of the district or the Provincial Police. The officers entrusted with the work of inquiry were of superior grade and had, it is understood faithfully, reported on all details of these disturbances to their head, the Director-General of Police. There are several such reports sent from time to time by these officers to Delhi. These reports were, of course, confidential but there are reliable grounds to believe that they accurately described some startling incidents in these disturbances. The Director-General of Police in due course placed these reports before the Government of India, and the Government of India without taking any independent action on them as they should have done simply referred them both to the Punjab Government for report. It is not yet known what the Punjab Govt. reported, and the C.I.D. officers who made the inquiry have not been produced as witnesses before the the Hunter Committee, nor their reports have been submitted, so far as known to the Committee. It is further said that Sir Charles Cleveland is so dissatisfied with the procedure that he means to retire and is already on leave preparatory to retirement. In short, the C.I.D. was anxious to bring to light the atrocities in Punjab and the Govt. of India seems to have screened the Provincial Government by refusing to take action on the C.I.D. reports. To say the least, this is simply scandalous and as stated above it requires to be thoroughly exposed. The India Office probably knows nothing about it. But, if so, it need not stand in the way of exposure.

The whole of this matter must be brought to light and it can only be done by Parliamentary actions. It would not be advisable to go into detail, though every fact stated above is prefectly true. It is, therefore,

suggested that action may be taken by interpellating the Secretary of State and asking him to place these reports on the table of the House. With this view the following questions are suggested:

(i) Will His Majesty's Secretary of State for India be pleased to state whether the reports made by the officers of the Central Information Department from time to time in Jallianwala Bagh massacre and other incidents in the Punjab disturbances were placed before the Hunter Committee and the said officers examined as witnesses before the Committee. If not, will the Secretary of State place the same on the table of this House together with a report as to what action was taken on them by the Government of India or by India Office and with what results?

The question may be altered, if necessary, and supplementary questions may be asked on the basis of the information supplied above.

## 218. Bolshevism in India<sup>1</sup>

As Government has openly identified itself with anti-Bolshevism, it seems possible that the opponents of Governments will adopt pro-Bolshevism. . . As in former agitations the leaders will be able to keep in the background and without professing and calling themselves Bolshevik will be able to spread the doctrines of revolutionary communism among the masses of agriculturists and mill and other workers. To the type of extremist politician to which India has long been accustomed, irresponsible and with nothing to lose such a career no doubt offers much profit. What seems to be the first example of this phenomenon is reported from the United Provinces where during January the first number of a new Hindi monthly entitled "Prabha" has been produced. Its editors are Ganesh Shanker Vidyarthi<sup>2</sup> and Deva Dat,<sup>3</sup> and the first number was printed at the Pratap Press, Cawnpore [Kanpur]. The periodical describes itself as a nationalist organ covering political, social, religious, historical, industrial, educational and general subjects. The first number among a number of Nationalist features, one condemning the reforms as inadequate has an article on Bolshevism and its authors Lenin and Trotsky.<sup>4</sup> In this

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 2 February 1920, Home Poll Deposit, February 1920, No 75.

<sup>2</sup>Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi (1890-1931): Journalist, educationist and politician, active member of the Indian National Congress and of the Home Rule Movement ; Editor, *Pratap*, 1913-31.

<sup>3</sup>Deva Dat: One of the editors of a Hindi monthly *Prabha* published at Kanpur from January 1920.

<sup>4</sup>Leon Trotsky *alias* Lev Davidovich Bronstein (1879-1940): A radical thinker and one of Lenin's ablest Lieutenants.

the writer says that the condemnation of Bolshevism appears to be one-sided. The magazine is illustrated by a picture of soldier flogging a woman with Gandhi looking on which is said to represent the Punjab under Martial Law. There is also a portrait of Motilal Nehru surrounded by National leaders. The third picture is of Lenin and Trotsky.

In the middle of January it was reported from Amritsar that Bolshevism is the topic of the day everywhere. "The people disbelieve the atrocities attributed to the Bolsheviks. Its rapid progress in Muslim countries is believed to be due to its doctrines of liberty, equality and fraternity which are said to be in strict accordance with the tenets of Islam."

At the same time the Bombay Government reported as follows:

Much discontent is still prevalent amongst the public on account of the high prices and the new currency which is unfavourably received. Government is blamed for both. Gloomy rumours regarding the advent of Bolshevism are going the rounds. People ask why political agitators do not agitate for low prices instead of Home Rule. No relief is expected from the efforts of the agitators, for they, equally with Government, are in favour of heavier taxation.

It has been clear for some time past that popular curiosity as to Bolshevism, if not sympathy with it, was growing. This seems to have arisen partly from economic discontent, partly from threatening reports of Bolshevik success abroad and reports of speeches by influential persons on the menace to civilisation, and possibly partly owing to more sinister causes.

It would appear that the Bolshevik danger on the frontier is becoming more and more real or is being realised as such. British officers and armies are silently proceeding to the frontier in larger numbers. The East Indian Railway and other railway notices refusing extra accommodation to the pilgrims to Prayag and other sacred places on the score of heavy military traffic have also created the same impression on the people. News is circulating fast that large number of Bolsheviks have reached the Afghan territory. Some Christian preachers and Europeans (ladies and gentlemen both) have been lecturing at Dehra Dun and other places against the dangers of Bolshevism and warning people against joining or tolerating them; but this has had the effect of convincing the people that the danger of their coming to India is not considered to be quite a remote one. It has even led not a few people to think that there must be another side of the picture, and if Bolsheviks are gathering force there must be some virtue in their doctrines which has enabled them to gather round them such a large number of followers and has made them invincible against the combined efforts of the Allies.

## 219. The Khilafat Agitation in India<sup>1</sup>

The course of this agitation is too well known to require description here. It is not yet clear how far the public reappearance of the Ali brothers has really added strength to the movement. . . . What does seem to have synchronised with their release is an outburst of violent speech. The brothers themselves in their several triumphal tours have uttered the most virulent Pan-Islamism. The Pan-Islamists of Sindh have followed their example. I have received from the Special Departments, Bombay, a long report of the Sind Provincial Khilafat Conference which is summarised below:

The Conference was held at Hyderabad on the 4th-5th January. The audience numbered about 2,000 and included, besides about 50 Hindus, men of standing from all parts of India. The Conference was remarkable for the proposal that Muhammadans should adopt the Swadeshi movement and the boycotting of foreign goods (originally proposed at Delhi in November and afterwards believed to have been dropped) and for the vehemence of the speeches. More than half the time was spent in a denunciation of the "intrigues of those infidels" who had written against the Sultan of Turkey being accepted as Khilafat of Islam. "It was resolved that if Government failed to take suitable action against them, Muhammadans would have to deal with them according to the tenets of their religion." As the speeches played on the religious feelings of the audience, the proceedings were marked with much excitement and emotion. It was on the second resolution declaring the Sultan of Turkey Khilafat-ul-Musalmi that violent language was used. One speaker declared that the British were the bitterest enemies of Islam and that, if the decisions with Turkey were not satisfactory, they would be compelled to obey the Koran and declare *jehad*. Another declared that at Amritsar he had learned with horror of British atrocities and said that it was better to die than to leave the holy places of Mesopotamia in the hand of *Kafirs*. A third declared that it behoved true Mussalmans to die for their faith. The Conference agreed with enthusiasm to this resolution being cabled to the Sultan, and adopted another resolution that, if the decision regarding Turkey and the Khalifate was opposed to Moslem wishes, Great Britain would be responsible for the subsequent acts of Moslems and would forfeit for ever their goodwill. The plan for violent speaking was taken by one Maulvi Haji Ahmad of Larkana who declared that everything he had seen abroad confirmed his opinion that the British were Islam's bitterest enemies and that he could not understand why the *Ulema* were delaying the declaration of *jehad*. He added more in the same strain despite his audience's attempt to stop him.

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 2 February 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, February 1920, No. 75.

## 220. Bolshevism and Islam in India<sup>1</sup>

The Criminal Investigation Department, United Provinces, has sent the following:

A correspondent reports that the extremist Muhammadans believe that the triumph of Bolshevism in Asia would save Turkey from the land-grabbing greed of France, Italy and Great Britain. A son-in-law of Maulana Abdul Bari, who is said to be a book-worm and to take very little part in politics, though he is a member of the *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba* and a devoted follower of Muhammad Ali, is stated to have described Bolshevism as a purer form of spiritualism than even Islam itself. He admitted the destructive tendencies of Bolshevism in Russia, but contended that the British Government had cleverly withheld from the people of India the real and original Bolshevik teachings and allowed only distorted information about Bolshevism to reach India such as might discredit the movement. He thought that Bolshevism would make headway more easily among Muhammadans than among followers of any other creed. . . . The correspondent notes that the accounts appearing in the press of the progress on Bolshevism in Asia are eagerly read both by Hindus and Musalmans and he says that the same people believe that unless Government takes early steps to counteract the writings of the extremist press by extensive propaganda the masses will be infected with Bolshevism sooner or later. High prices and the growing poverty of the masses are likely to precipitate this.

## 221. Gandhi in the Punjab<sup>2</sup>

Mr. M.K. Gandhi is still in Lahore. Pandit Rambhaj Dutt Chaudhri, in whose house he is staying, says that he will remain in Lahore for another month or five weeks. The impression that I have taken from talks with those who have met Mr. Gandhi in these days is that he intends to make Lahore his headquarters for some time to come. Northern India, particularly Punjab, appears to have fascinated Mr. Gandhi, who thinks that the Punjabis (Hindus as well as Muhammadans) are very credulous people among whom his *Satyagraha* movement will take root and flourish. It is well-known that the *Satyagraha* movement of Mr. Gandhi is to all practical intents and purposes discredited in the Bombay Presidency. That is the reason why he now relies on the Punjab. He thinks that the Muhammadans of Upper India can be very easily worked

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 2 February 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, February 1920, No. 75.  
<sup>2</sup>*Ibid*

up in the interests of his propaganda, particularly over the Khilafat question. Not a few persons are, however, of opinion that it will not be long before Mr. Gandhi will be disillusioned. Lala Hans Raj,<sup>1</sup> head of the college section of the Arya Samaj movement in the Punjab, is of opinion that if Mr. Gandhi stays six months or a year in the Punjab, he will become an unknown and quite obscure person. Mr. Gandhi is busy with the preparation of the report of the Congress Enquiry Sub-Committee, which will be published soon after the report of Lord Hunter's Committee is with the Government of India.

## **222. P. Siva Rao on the Royal Proclamation,<sup>2</sup> 5 February 1920**

. . . The royal proclamation<sup>3</sup> has been acclaimed by the Indian people through the length and breadth of our country. It has sent a thrill of joy throughout India. It has profoundly touched the hearts of the people. It had tranquillized the situation beyond all words. It is full of noble sentiments and lofty principles and indicates a liberal policy for the future Government of India. It exhorts officials and non-officials to make the Reform a thorough success. For the first time in the annals of the Indian Empire it lays down the goal of British rule in India, viz. self-government within the Empire. It proclaims that the object of the British Government is to infuse a feeling of nationality into the minds of the Indian people and also to raise India in the scale of nations. It lays down that India shall no longer be a subordinate but a partner, and equal partner, in the Commonwealth of the Empire. She was allowed representation in the War and Peace Conferences. As for the Reform Act I have no hesitation to say that it is a very great step forward. India has been shifted from her old moorings and placed on the path of responsible Govt. For the first time we are receiving a glimpse of parliamentary institutions in India.

## **223 On Bolshevism<sup>4</sup>**

A feature of the Bombay strikes was the meetings called by such people, meetings at which lists of often impossible demands were read out and

<sup>1</sup>Hansraj (1864-1938) Honorary Principal of the DAV College, Lahore, 1889-1911; President of the DAV College Managing Committee, 1912-18, known as 'Mahatma'.

<sup>2</sup>Proceedings of the Madras Legislative Council, July 1919 to June 1920, XLVII, p. 224

<sup>3</sup>It was made on the 23 December 1919.

<sup>4</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 16 February 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, February 1920, No. 75.

the men were asked to agree to them. From whatever party these political busy-bodies come they all agree in urging the formation of strong unions. The second fact is the amalgamation of local unions under central committees which appears to be the present stage of labour politics in Madras and Cawnpore [Kanpur].

The politicians who have come to notice in connection with the Labour unrest are Baptista in Bombay; Ganesh Shanker Vidyarthi in Cawnpore [Kanpur] where he is also editor of the violently extremist paper "Pratap" and the pro-Bolshevik weekly paper, the "Prabha", and connected with the Kisan Sabha movement; in Madras Labour appears to have disowned the extremists especially Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, but G.S. Arundale<sup>1</sup> is working with the Unions. The three individuals on whom the hopes of the Welfare League are built are all in India. Mukundi Lal<sup>2</sup> is not known to be doing anything, and Chaman Lal, an admitted Bolshevik who associated with Litvinoff<sup>3</sup> in London, has only recently arrived in the Punjab. Satyamurthi reached Madras on January 31st and left on the 3rd instant on a propagandist tour of southern districts. He is devoting much attention to Labour questions and was to attend a Labour meeting on the 15th instant at Madura where there is a large industrial population. In his recent speeches he has referred frequently to the Khilafat question with a view, it is said, to popularise his labour doctrines among Muhammadan mill-hands. It is also said that Srinivasa Iyengar<sup>4</sup> who recently resigned the office of Advocate-General is secretly supporting him. Yakub Hassan, who was also behind Satyamurthi in England, arrived in Madras at the end of January. His wife, a Turkish lady, is to join him in India after a flying visit to Constantinople. Yakub Hassan in England numbered among his associates: A.A. Mirza, Nazir Ahmad,<sup>5</sup> [Mushir Hussain] Kidwai<sup>6</sup> and Pickthall.<sup>7</sup> Of these the first two at least are professed Bolsheviks and Mirza is now trying to make his way to Russia to be "trained" for work in India. Not unnaturally Yakub Hassan's

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Arundale (1878-1945): Educationist and politician; Honorary Principal of the Central Hindu College, Benaras; Organising Secretary, Home Rule League, 1916; interned along with Mrs Annie Besant in 1917; presided over the Bombay Presidency Student's Convention, 1918.

<sup>2</sup>Mukundi Lal: A prominent labour leader.

<sup>3</sup>Litvinoff. An active member of the Bolshevik Party.

<sup>4</sup>S. Srinivasa Iyengar (1874-1941): Lawyer, social reformer and politician; Fellow, Madras University, 1912-16; President, Madras Social Reform Association; President of the Congress, Gauhati, 1926.

<sup>5</sup>Nazir Ahmad, Political worker.

<sup>6</sup>Mushir Hussain Kidwai: Journalist and politician; Member, All India Congress Committee, 1911; founder of the Organisation Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba in 1914 who wrote pro-Turkish pamphlets, protested the moderate attitude of the Central Khilafat leaders.

<sup>7</sup>Muhammad Marmaduke William Pickthall: Author and journalist; President, Anglo-Ottoman Society, London, 1916; Editor, *The Bombay Chronicle* since 1920.

conversation at present is reported to be largely on the twin subjects of Bolshevism and the Khilafat. It is said that Bolshevism is the chief conversational topic of the day in Indian society. If so, this interest is well reflected in, or stimulated by, the Indian press. The number of articles on the subjects is increasing daily as might be expected of a press in which a new idea, even a new phrase, spreads from journal to journal like a forest fire. . . .

**224. Mr. McPherson's Reply on the Punjab Disturbances,<sup>1</sup>**  
**24 February 1920**

The total number of persons convicted in connection with the Punjab disturbances was 1,779, of these, 712 had served their sentences by 1st January, 241 were released under orders passed before that date, 92 were released in connection with the proposals of the Reviewing Judges, 638 have been released under the amnesty, and 96 remain in jail.

**225. Sir Michael O'Dwyer to Lord Chelmsford<sup>2</sup> on the Amritsar Cases,<sup>2</sup> 26 February 1920**

It is very satisfactory to see that the Privy Council have upheld the decision in the Amritsar murder cases. Personally I never had any doubt of the result.

But I fancy now there will be the usual clamour by a section here in India for further clemency. . . .

When I saw the European women and children, including the widow of one of the murdered men, and the friends and dependants of others, in Amritsar Fort on 20th April, they were all unanimous in demanding immediate [sic] and speedy justice on the murderers, and said that would be our guarantee of the safety of isolated Europeans in future. I promised them that Government would spare no pains to bring the criminals to justice and to make the country safe again for Europeans.

We succeed in bringing the worst of the murderers to justice. Their petitions for clemency have been already dealt with by the Punjab Government and the Government of India, and I think in one or two cases the death penalty has been commuted; all then appealed to the Privy Council which have rejected their appeal. Much clemency has already been shown to

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1919 to March 1920, XLVIII, p. 935.

<sup>2</sup>Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 24, Roll No. 11, No. 273, NMML.

political criminals in Amritsar and Lahore with not very encouraging results. May I urge that in the case of those men, the law should now be allowed to take its course? I urge this in view of the assurances I gave to the Europeans at Amritsar on 20th April, and, because I am convinced that if the process of law is interfered with further, the Indian criminal and revolutionary will think it is a light matter to murder innocent Europeans, and there would, I believe, be a serious agitation among non-official Europeans against Government for denying them the full protection afforded by the law, i.e. the adequate punishment of men convicted of murder accompanied with the worst features of brutality. Further clemency would also, I think, support the argument which is being so sedulously propagated, but which we know to be wrong, viz. that the Amritsar affair was not nearly so serious as the Punjab Government at the time made out.

I hope your Excellency will realise that my object in writing is to bring out the assurances I, as Lieut. Governor, gave—and I think rightly, to the European community in Amritsar just after the murders, and which, I think, Government would be charged with failing to fulfil, if clemency is shown to criminals who do not deserve it.

#### **226. On Bolshevism,<sup>1</sup> 27 February 1920**

. . . As to other literature we shall naturally welcome anything the Secretary of State can send us. As he has asked if there is anything else we require we might perhaps ask him to send us any interesting books, blue (or white) books. Pamphlets, etc. as they appear, dealing with Bolshevism in any of its phases—especially economic. If he could arrange for some specialist or professor in economics to write a pamphlet refuting the Bolshevik economic doctrine it would be valuable. Mr. [Edmund] Candler<sup>2</sup> is at present engaged upon something of the kind but he does not profess to be a specialist on the subject and his booklet will be rather popular than scientific. But I think a scientific exposition would also be useful in certain quarters.

I have seen both the Times articles before. I will take the matter with Dr. Rushbrook Williams<sup>3</sup> and see whether they can be further utilized or not.

#### **227. On Bolshevism<sup>4</sup>**

The opinion to be formed from a study of articles and speeches on the

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, March 1920, Nos. 151-61 and K.W.

<sup>2</sup>Edmund Candler: A prominent British journalist who wrote an open letter to Gandhi.

<sup>3</sup>L.F. Rushbrook Williams: Director of the Central Bureau of Information, Government of India, 1920-25.

<sup>4</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 4 March 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, March 1920, No. 89.

subject is that the extremist politician is becoming more and more inclined to dabble in extreme socialism. Whatever may be the individual view of socialism there can be little doubt that its doctrines combined with existing conditions in India form a dangerously inflammable mixture.

The chief exponents of Bolshevism in the press at the moment are the 'Hindus' of Hyderabad (Sindh) and the small group of extremist journalists at Cawnpore [Kanpur] who are connected with the 'Pratap' and the 'Prabha'. This group has been noticed in recent issues of this report. The "Prabha" remains openly Bolshevik. Now the "Maryada" has been inoculated with the virus. This paper belongs to Madan Mohan Malaviya whose nephew Krishan Kant Malaviya<sup>1</sup> is the editor. Its circulation is about 1,600 and it is printed at the same press as the 'Abhyudaya' which has a circulation of 3,500.

On February 2nd Jethmal Farsaram, a notorious Sindh agitator lectured on Socialism to an audience of 300. The speaker's argument was difficult to follow, coloured as it was with facts distorted to suit his argument. He concluded by saying:

We should get more rights of Home Rule. Officers, you are only few. It is our country and you should give us the reins. India is not yours. Seventy-five per cent of Indians are poor, and if you have the reins they will starve. These poor men you should care for. When they get the votes they will trouble you very much. What you call Bolshevism is really hunger.

In reporting the lecture the Bombay Special Branch remarked that the lecture was significant for two reasons: It shows firstly, how the extremists are deliberately fostering industrial discontent, and secondly, how they or at any rate a section of them are prepared to welcome Bolshevism for the furtherance of their own ends. The reporting Sub-Inspector notes that the whole trend of the lecture was to dispose the audience favourably towards Bolshevism.

## 228. The Khilafat Agitation<sup>2</sup>

The Intelligence Branch, CID, Bengal, has recently reported the circulation of two leaflets of a similar nature. The first in Urdu beginning "Oh my tribe, respond to the call urging you to the way of God", states that all Muhammadan troops who fought against Turkey are guilty of heinous sin because they assisted in destroying the Khalifate and the brotherhood of Islam

<sup>1</sup>Krishan Kant Malaviya: Journalist and politician; Editor, *Abhyudaya* (Allahabad).

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 4 March 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, March 1920, No. 89.

and in desecrating the Holy places. It asserts that Enver,<sup>1</sup> Mustapha Kamal,<sup>2</sup> Amirs of Bokhra, Khiva and Afghanistan and other prominent Mussulman and Bolshevik leaders are gathering a large army to fight the British. It warns every Mussulman to render no help to the enemies of Islam. The second leaflet is headed "Jehad Jehad" and signed by the President, All-India Jehad Committee. It asserts that the Muhammadan leaders have proclaimed a *Jehad* and that Enver Pasha, cooperating with the Bolsheviks, is about to invade India and urges Indian Muhammadans to murder the British.

**229. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Questions in the Punjab Legislative Council and Mr. French's Replies,<sup>3</sup> 6 March 1920**

*Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Question*

43. Will Government be pleased to state against how many newspapers and persons orders prohibiting entry into the Punjab have been cancelled since 1st October, 1919?

*Mr. French's Reply*

Since 1st October, 1919, orders prohibiting entry into the Punjab have been cancelled in respect of 5 newspapers and 4 persons.

*Mian Fazl-I-Hussain's Question*

44. Will Government be pleased to state against how many persons and newspapers, if any, orders prohibiting entry into the Punjab are now in force?

*Mr. French's Reply*

No persons are at present excluded from entering into the Punjab. Six newspapers are excluded.

*Mian Fazl-I-Hussain's Question*

45. Will Government be pleased to state the total number of persons:

- (a) under orders of internment,
- (b) in Jail

<sup>1</sup>Enver Pasha: A leading Turkish politician and statesman.

<sup>2</sup>Mustapha Kamal (1880:1938): Elected President as well as Commander-in-Chief of the National Army in April 1920. of Turkey.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, 1920, XI, p. 17.

Mian Fazl-i-Hussain (1873-1936): Lawyer and politician; later Chief organiser of the Unionist Party in the Punjab.

L. French: Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

in connection with the Punjab disturbances of 1919, at the time of the issue of the Royal Proclamation and on 4th March 1920 respectively?

*Mr. French's Reply*

The figures are as follows:

	At the time of issue of proclamation	On the 4th March 1920
Number under orders of internment	143	5
Number in jail in connection with disturbances	828	90

**230. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Questions in Punjab Legislative Council and Mr. French's Replies,<sup>1</sup> 7 March 1920**

*Mian Fazl-i-Hussain's Question*

. With reference to the answers to questions 43 and 44 given in the meeting of the Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on Saturday, the 6th of March, 1920, will Government be pleased to state the names of the newspapers against which orders prohibiting entry into the Punjab are now in force:

*Mr. French's Reply*

The newspapers excluded from the Punjab are:

1. *Independent* (Allahabad).
2. *Congress* (Delhi).
3. *Vijya* (Delhi).

Orders also still exist excluding the following three papers which are defunct:

1. *Ukhawat* (Lucknow).
2. *Inqilab* (Delhi).
3. *Qaum* (Delhi).

**231. On Bolshevism<sup>2</sup>**

*Specimens of pro-Bolshevik and other speeches in India*

Speaking at a Khilafat meeting at Lahore on February 8th last Goverdhan

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, 1920, XI, p. 204.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 9 March 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, March 1920, No. 89.

Das,<sup>1</sup> ex-convict is reported to have praised the Bolsheviks and said that the rich has no right to live so comfortably when the poor were in trouble. He described Bolshevik principles as quite natural and praiseworthy and advocated them as worth following. He wished, he said, to see Bolshevism preached and acted upon in India.

Addressing a meeting of 400 Hindus and 100 Muhammadans at Dera Ismail Khan of February 15th last one Tahl Ram Ganga Ram,<sup>2</sup> a resident of that place, criticised government for instituting a special department to check the spread of Bolshevism. He declared it to be a waste of money because Bolshevism could only be stopped by three measures (i) Wholesale distribution of arms among the people, (ii) reduction of the cost of foodstuffs in India, and (iii) Home Rule in India.

Speaking at a Home Rule League meeting at Amraoti on February 15th one Purshotam Gopal Joshi<sup>3</sup> gave a history of Bolshevism and explained that it was due to the oppression of the Tsar and the throttling of the press. True information about Bolshevism he said could not be obtained, as the English Press was in the hands of anti-Bolsheviks, but in his opinion Bolshevism would do India more good than the Reform Scheme which was given under pressure of Bolshevism.

### **232. The Khilafat Agitation in India<sup>4</sup>**

Special Branch Bombay, reported under dated March 3rd the receipt of the following telegram :

From: Abul Kalam Azad, Mushir Hussain-Kidwai, Shaukat Ali, Calcutta.

To : [M.M.] Chotani, Bombay.

"One lac sixteen thousand announced first instalment Friday 19th March fixed for final All India protest against dismemberment of Turkey. Friends decide to start propaganda work with headquarters at Calcutta. Take Committees sanction."

This is taken to indicate the intention of the Muslim Extremists definitely to break loose from the control of the Bombay moderates. The reference to the final All India protest means the general *hartal* fixed for March 19th. So far as Bombay is concerned it is reported that arrangements are in progress to make it a really big affair in which Hindus are to be as conspicuous as Muhammadans.

<sup>1</sup>Goverdhan Das: A prominent leader of Lahore.

<sup>2</sup>Tahl Ram Ganga Ram: Arya Samaj preacher who propagated the boycott of foreign goods in 1905.

<sup>3</sup>Purshotam Gopal Joshi: A Home Rule agitator and labour leader.

<sup>4</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 9 March 1920, Home Poll Deposit, March 1920, No. 89.

### **233. The Khilafat Agitation<sup>1</sup>**

The Khilafat agitation which was gradually subsiding will in all probability obtain a new lease of life in view of the agitation that has been set on foot in England against the settlement arrived at by the Peace Conference that the Sultan should be allowed to remain in Constantinople. Those who are carrying on this (Khilafat) agitation in this country feel that it was their agitation that forced the hands of the British Ministers and made them agree to the retention by Turkey of Constantinople and that they should revive and renew the agitation in order to strengthen the hands of the Government. The impression that the thing was being overdone was spreading among Muhammadans in increasing numbers and now Pan-Islamists tell their co-religionists that further agitation on the same lines is necessary in order to show to the people of England that Muhammadans all over the world would keenly resent the expulsion of the Turks, from Europe. I shall not, therefore, be at all surprised under the circumstances, if the Pan-Islamists decide to take to the Khilafat agitation with renewed vigor.

### **234. Gandh's Manifesto on the Khilafat Question,<sup>2</sup> 9 March 1920**

The Khilafat question has now become a question of questions. It has become an imperial question of the first magnitude. The great prelates of England and the Mahomedan leaders combined have brought the question to the fore. The prelates threw down the challenge. The Muslim leaders have taken it up.

I trust the Hindus will realise that the Khilafat question overshadows the Reform and everything else. If the Muslims claim was unjust, apart from the Muslims scriptures, one might hesitate to support it merely on scriptural authority. But when a just claim is supported by the scriptures it becomes irresistible.

Briefly put the claim is that the Turks should retain European Turkey subject to full guarantees for the protection of non-Muslim races under the Turkish Empire and that the Sultan should control the Holy places of Islam and should have suzerainty over *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, i.e. Arabia, as defined by the Muslim savnats, subject to self-governing rights being given to the Arabs if they so desire. This was what was promised by Mr. Lloyd

<sup>1</sup> Weekly Report, DCI, 9 March 1920, Home Poll Deposit, March 1920, No. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Home Poll, A, August 1920, Nos. 235-49.

George,<sup>1</sup> and this was what Lord Hardinge<sup>2</sup> had contemplated. The Mahomedan soldiers would not have fought to deprive Turkey of her possessions. To deprive the Khalifa of this suzerainty of Arabia is to reduce the Khilafat to a nullity.

To restore to Turkey, subject to necessary guarantee, what was hers before the war is a Christian solution. To wrest any of her 'possessions from her for the sake of punishing her is a gunpowder solution. The Allies or England in the hour of her triumph must be scrupulously just. To reduce the Turks to impotence would be not only unjust; it would be a breach of solemn declarations and promises. It is to be wished that the Viceroy will take his courage in both his hands and place himself at the head of the Khilafat agitation as Lord Hardinge did at the time of the South African passive resistance struggle, and thus like his predecessor give a clear and emphatic direction to an agitation which under impulsive or faulty leadership may lead to disastrous consequences. But the situation rests more with us Hindus and Mahomedans than with the Viceroy and still more with the Muslim leaders than with the Hindus or the Viceroy. There are signs already of impatience on the part of Muslim friends and impatience may any day be reduced to madness and the latter must inevitably lead to violence. And I wish I could persuade everyone to see that violence is suicide.

Supposing the Muslim demands are not granted by the Allies or say England, I see nothing but hope in Mr. Montagu's brave defence of the Muslim position and Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation of his own declaration. True, the latter is halting but he can secure full justice under it. But we must suppose the worst and expect and strive for the best. How to strive is the question. What we may not do is clear enough.

- (i) There should be no violence in thought, speech or deed.
- (ii) Therefore, there should be no boycott of British goods by way of revenge or punishment. Boycott, in my opinion, is a form of violence. Moreover, even if it were desirable it is totally impracticable.
- (iii) There should be no rest till the minimum is achieved.
- (iv) There should be no mixing up of other questions with the Kailafat, e.g. the Egyptian question. Let us see what must be done.

(1) The cessation of business on the 19th instant and expression of the minimum demand by means of one single resolution is a necessary first step provided that the *hartal* is absolutely voluntary and the employees are not asked to leave their work unless they receive permission from their employers. I would strongly urge that the mill-hands should be left untouched. The further provision is that there should be no violence

<sup>1</sup>David Lloyd George 'First Earl Lloyd-George' of Dwyfor (1863-1945): Statesman, Prime Minister of England, 1916-22.

<sup>2</sup>Charles Hardinge, Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944): Statesman, Viceroy of India, 1910-16.

accompanying the *hartal*. I have been often told that the CID sometimes provoke violence. I do not believe in it as a general change. But even if it be true our discipline should make it impossible. Our success depends solely on our ability to control, guide and discipline the masses.

But a word as to what may be done if the demands are not granted. The barbarous method is warfare open or secret. This must be ruled out if only because it is impracticable. If I could but persuade everyone that it is always bad, we should gain all lawful ends much quicker. The power that an individual or a nation forswearing violence generates is a power that is irresistible. But my argument today against violence is based upon pure experience, i. e. its utter futility.

Non-co-operation is, therefore, the only remedy left open to us. It is the clearest remedy as it is the most effective when it is absolutely free from all violence. It becomes a duty when cooperation means degradation or humiliation or an injury to one's cherished religious sentiments. England cannot expect a meek submission by us to an unjust suspension of rights which to Mussalmans means matters of life and death. We may, therefore, begin at the top as also the bottom. Those who are holding offices of honours or emolument ought to give them up. Those who belong to the menial services under the Government should do likewise. Non-cooperation does not apply to service under private individuals. I cannot approve of the threat of ostracism against those who do not adopt the remedy on non-cooperation. It is only a voluntary withdrawal which is effective. For voluntary withdrawal alone is a test of popular feelings and dissatisfaction. Advice to the soldiery to refuse to serve is premature. It is the last not the first step. We should be entitled to take that step when the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and the Premier desert us. Moreover, every step in withdrawing cooperation has to be taken with the greatest deliberation. We must proceed slowly so as to ensure retention of self-control under the fiercest heat. Many look upon the Calcutta resolutions with the deepest alarm. They scent in them a preparation for violence. I do not look upon them in that light, though I do not approve of the tone of some of them. I have already mentioned those whose subject matters I wholly dislike.

Can Hindus accept all the resolutions is the question addressed by some. I can only speak for myself. I will cooperate whole-heartedly with the Muslim friends in the presentation of their just demands so long as they act with sufficient restraint and so long as I feel sure that they do not wish to resort to or countenance violence. I should cease to cooperate and advise every Hindu and for that matter every one else to cease to cooperate the moment there was violence actually done, advised or countenanced. I would, therefore, urge upon all speakers the exercise of the greatest restraint under the greatest provocation. There is certainty of recklessness . . . I shall resist them with my life even if I should stand

alone. My goal is friendship with the world and I can combine the greatest love with the greatest opposition to wrong.

### **235. On Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism in India<sup>1</sup>**

Non-a-days no one may venture to doubt exsistence of Pan-Islamism in India, so vociferous are its prophets. We have some evidence that the Khilafat agitation is worked from abroad. The Central Islamic Society of London was, it is known, inspired from Turkey and in its turn, pulled the strings in India. Ispahain, one of its leading figures, is a Persian whose family is domiciled to Madras, who himself lives in London. But it was not till the Ali brothers were released from Jail that the agitation went to extremists and Kidwai, a stalwart of the present agitation, some proof of whose relations with Mustapha Kamal had come to light, plucked up courage to return to India. Now Pan-Islamism is abroad and *jehad* openly preached in the land. A speaker in Berlin quoted above declares that propaganda had been thoroughly organised in India . . . .

### **236. The Bolshevik Menace<sup>2</sup>**

Following is a summary of the directions sent by wireless on the 21st February by the Central Communist Committee, Moscow, to all the Party Committees and Political Departments regarding work amongst Moslem people :

The Communist Party everywhere aims at organising the proletariat and the most indigent peasantry on the basis of trade union and Soviet. Methods of workers amongst the Moslem people must be adapted to the backward condition of the Eastern population, and they must remember that the religious prejudices of such peoples, who are still united closely with their civil and family life, are much stronger than those of people like Russians and the other Europeans, whose economic development has proceeded further. It is, therefore, advisable not to combat their religious prejudices by directly repudiating their religion, but to undermine them by education, by teaching them history of other countries, and by laying stress on the 'class character of the organisations of the Moslem clerical class', and its rapacious attitude towards the poor. Moslem rulers in the past have used Moslem fanaticism for purposes of military aggression, and even now they use the Pan-Islamic idea just as pan-slav

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 15 March 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, March 1920. No. 89.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 20 March 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, March 1920, No. 35.

ideas were utilized by the Russian Czars. The Proletariat should be shown by workers how Moslem ruling class exploits them by religious means.

**237. Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee by the Indian National Congress,<sup>1</sup> 25 March 1920**

We believe that had Mr. Gandhi not been arrested whilst he was on his way to Delhi and the Punjab, and had Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal not been arrested and deported, innocent English lives would have been saved, and valuable property, including Christian churches, not destroyed. These two acts of the Punjab Government were uncalled for, and served like matches applied to material rendered inflammable by previous processes. We summarize below our other conclusions:

1. The people of the Punjab were incensed against Sir M. O'Dwyer's administration by reason of his studied contempt and distrust of the educated classes, and by reason of the cruel and compulsory methods, adopted during war, for obtaining recruits and monetary contributions and by his suppression of public opinion by gagging the local press and shutting out nationalist newspapers from outside the Punjab.
2. The Rowlatt agitation disturbed the public mind and shook public confidence in the goodwill of the Govt. This was shared by the Punjab in a fuller measure, perhaps, than elsewhere, because of the use made by Sir. M. O'Dwyer of the Defence of India Act for purposes of stifling public movements.
3. The *Satyagraha* movement and the *hartal* which was designed as a precursor of it, whilst they vitalised the whole country into activity, saved it from more awful and more widespread calamities, by restraining the violent tendencies and passions of the people.
4. The Rowlatt agitation was not conceived in an anti-British spirit, and the *Satyagraha* movement was conceived and conducted in a spirit entirely free from ill-will and violence.
5. There was no conspiracy to overthrow the government in the Punjab.
6. The arrest and internment of Mr. Gandhi, and the arrests and deportations of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were unjustifiable and were the only direct cause of hysterical popular excitement.
7. The mob violence which began at Amritsar was directly due to the firing at the Railway overbridge, and the sight of the dead and wounded at a time when the excitement had reached white heat.
8. Whatever the cause of provocation, the mob excesses are deeply to be regretted and condemned.

<sup>1</sup>Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress, I, pp. 156-60.

9. So far as the facts are publicly known, no reasonable cause had been shown to justify the introduction of Martial Law.
- 10 In each case, Martial Law was proclaimed after order had been completely restored.
11. Even if it be held that the introduction of Martial Law was a state necessity, it was unduly prolonged.
12. Most of the measures taken under Martial Law, in all the five districts, were unnecessary, cruel, oppressive and in utter disregard of the feelings of the people affected by them.
13. In Lahore, Akalgarh, Ramnagar, Gujarat, Jalapur, Jattan, Lyallpur and Sheikhupura, there were no mob excesses at all worthy of the name.
14. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre was a calculated piece of inhumanity towards utterly innocent and unarmed men, including children, and unparalleled for its ferocity in the history of modern British administration.
15. The Martial Law Tribunals and the Summary Courts were made the means of harassing innocent people, and resulted in abortion of justice on a wide scale, and under the name of justice caused moral and material sufferings to hundreds of men and women.
16. The crawling order and other fancy punishments were unworthy of a civilized administration, and were symptomatic of the moral degradation of their inventors.
17. The imposition of indemnity and of punitive police at various places, notwithstanding exemplary and vindictive punishments meted out, through nearly two long months, mostly to innocent men, and the exaction of fines and illegal impositions were an uncalled for, unjust and added injury.
18. The corruption and bribery, that took place during Martial Law, form a separate chapter of grievances which could have been easily avoided under a sympathetic administration.
19. The measures necessary for redressing the wrong done to the people, for the purification of the administration and for preventing a repetition in future of official lawlessness are:
  - (a) Repeal of the Rowlatt Act.
  - (b) Relieving Sir M. O'Dwyer of any responsible office under the Crown.
  - (c) Relieving General Dyer, Col. Johnson,<sup>1</sup> Col. O'Brien,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Bosworth Smith,<sup>3</sup> Rai Sahib Sri Ram Sud<sup>4</sup> and Malik Sahib Khan<sup>5</sup> of any position of responsibility under the Crown

<sup>1</sup>Colonel Frank Johnson was in command of the Lahore Martial Law area.

<sup>2</sup>Lieutenant-Colonel A J O' Brien: Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala District.

<sup>3</sup>Mr. Bosworth Smith: I.C S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura and Gujranwala District.

<sup>4</sup>Rai Sahib Sri Ram Sud: Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura.

<sup>5</sup>Malik Sahib Khan: A loyalist who helped O'Brien, D.C. Gujranwala during the Martial Law at Akalgarh, Ramnagar, etc.

- (d) Local inquiry into corrupt practices of the minor officials whose names have been mentioned in the statements published by us, as their dismissal or proof of their guilt.
- (e) Recall of His Excellency the Viceroy.
- (f) Refund of the fines collected from people who were convicted by the Special Tribunals and Summary Courts, remission of all indemnity imposed on the cities affected, refund thereof where it has already been collected and removal of punitive police.

It is our deliberate opinion that Sir M. O'Dwyer, General Dyer, Col. Johnson, Col. O'Brien, Mr. Bosworth Smith, Rai Sahib Shri Ram Sud and Malik Sahib Khan have been guilty of such illegalities that they deserve to be impeached, but we purposely refrain from advising any such course, because we believe that India can only gain by waiving the right. Future purity will be sufficiently guaranteed by the dismissal of the officials concerned.

We believe that Col. MacRae<sup>1</sup> and Capt. Doveton<sup>2</sup> have failed equally with Col. O'Brien and others to carry out their trust but we have purposely refrained from advising any public action against them as unlike the others, mentioned by us, these two officers were inexperienced and their brutality was not so studied and calculated and as that of the experienced officers.

M.K. Gandhi  
C.R. Das  
Abbas S. Tayabji  
M.R. Jayakar

### **238. Statement of Ratan Devi of Amritsar<sup>3</sup>**

I was in my house near Jallianwala Bagh when I heard shots fired. I was then lying down. I got up at once as I was anxious, because my husband had gone to the Bagh. I began to cry, and went to the place accompanied by two women to help me. There I saw heaps of dead bodies

<sup>1</sup>Col. MacRae: Incharge of Martial Law administration in Kasur Sub-division.

<sup>2</sup>Capt. Doveton: Incharge of Martial Law administration in Kasur Sub-division after Col. MacRae.

<sup>3</sup>Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress, Evidence, 11, pp. 116-18.

Ratan Devi: A brave woman, weeping over the corpse of her dead husband after the firing in the Jallianwala Bagh.

and I began to search for my husband. After passing through that heap, I found the dead body of my husband. The way towards it was full of blood and of dead bodies. After a short time, both the sons of Lala Sunder Das<sup>1</sup> came there, and I asked them to bring a *charpai* (cot) to carry the dead body of my husband home. The boys accordingly went home and I sent away the two women also. . . . By this time it was 8 O'clock and no one could stir out of his house, because of the curfew order. I stood on waiting and crying. At about 8.30, a Sikh gentleman came. There were others who were looking for something amongst the dead. I did not know them. I entreated the Sikh gentleman to help me in removing my husband's body to a dry place for that place was overflowing with blood. He caught the body by the head and I by the legs, and we carried it to a dry place and laid it down on a wooden block. I waited upto 10 p.m. but no one arrived there. I got up and started towards Alluwalia Katra. I thought of asking some student from the Thakurdwara to help me in carrying my husband home. I had not gone far, when some man sitting in the window in an adjacent house asked me where I was going at that late hour. I said, I wanted some men to carry my husband's dead body home. He said, he was attending a wounded man and as it was past 8 p.m. no body could help me then. Then I started towards Katra and another man asked me the same question. I made the same appeal to him and he gave me the same answer. I had gone hardly three or four steps when I saw an old man smoking and some people sleeping by his side. I repeated the whole of my said story to him with hands folded. He took great pity upon me and asked those men to go with me. They said it was 10 o'clock, that they would not like to be shot down. That was no time to stir out; how could they go out so far. So I went back and seated myself by the side of my dead husband. Accidentally, I found a bamboo stick which I kept in my hand to keep off dogs. I saw three men writhing in agony, a buffalo struggling in great pain; and a boy about 12 years old, in agony entreated me not to leave his place. I told him that I could not go anywhere leaving the dead body of my husband. I asked him if he wanted any wrap, and if he was feeling cold, I could spread it over him. He asked for water, but water could not be procured at that place.

I heard the clock striking at regular intervals of one hour. At 2 o'clock, a jat, belonging to Sultan village, who was lying entangled in a wall, asked me to go near him and to raise his leg. I got up and taking hold of his clothes drenched in blood, raised his leg up. After that no one else came till half past five. At about six, Lala Sunder Das, his sons and some people from my street came there with a *charpai*, and I brought my husband home. I saw other people at the Bagh in search of their relatives. I passed my whole night there. It is impossible for me to describe what

<sup>1</sup>Lala Sunder Das: A resident of Amritsar.

I felt. Heaps of dead bodies lay there, some on their backs and some with their faces upturned. A number of them were poor innocent children. I shall never forget the sight. I was all alone the whole night in that solitary jungle. Nothing but the barking of dogs, or the braying of donkeys was audible. Amidst hundreds of corpses, I passed my night, crying and watching. I cannot say more. What I experienced that night is known to me and to God.

**239. Dr. Gokal Chand Narang's Statement on the Punjab Disturbances<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The Lieut.-Governor's great personal unpopularity which was due to several causes, some of which may be noted below:

- (c) The ruthless application of the Defence of India Act, under which a large number of returned emigrants and others were tried and sentenced to death or transportation for life. Among these trials, the one that created the greatest sensation and resentment was that of Bhai Parmanand<sup>2</sup> who was universally respected for the nobility.
- (d) The methods adopted during the war for recruitment and for raising the war loan [sic]. The latter especially affected the town people. Even Judicial officers were entrusted with this work, and were liable to exert undue influence on the litigants to get contributions for the War Loans.

The action of the Lieut.-Governor in shutting out a number of political leaders, like Mr. Gandhi, and the prohibition of certain newspapers was another cause of irritation.

- (f) Sir Michael O'Dwyer was always nervous about political agitation, however moderate and constitutional, and hardly lost any opportunity to discourage it in the Punjab.
- (g) The late Lieut.-Governor was believed to be opposed to any substantial reform in the system of Government. . . .

<sup>1</sup>Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress, Evidence, 11, pp. 211-12.

Dr Gokal Chand Narang (1878-1969): Associated with the Arya Samaj; condemned the Amritsar Massacre in 1919 and was arrested; Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1920.

<sup>2</sup>Bhai Parmanand: Revolutionary and reformer; Chancellor of the Punjab Vidyapith; arrested in connection with the First Lahore Conspiracy Case and imprisoned in the Andaman Islands till 1920.

#### **240. M.R. Jayakar on the Punjab Disturbances<sup>1</sup>**

The evidence before us seems to establish that the Jallianwala Bagh meeting was a plan of revenge worked through Hansraj<sup>2</sup>. There is no doubt that the Europeans in Amritsar desired to avenge the murder of the 10th by bombarding the city or by taking an equally drastic measure. The stopping of the electric supply, and the cutting of the water connection on the 11th, though there are no disturbances of any kind on that day or the next, are indications in that direction. It is also in evidence that Hansraj, who afterwards became an approver in the Amritsar conspiracy case was responsible for the announcement at the Dhab Katikan metting—that another meeting would be held the next day in the afternoon, at the Jallianwala Bagh, and that Lala Kanahya Lal<sup>3</sup> would preside over that meeting. He further asked the people present to communicate this announcement to their friends and relations and added that he would have the matter announced, the next day, by beat of drum. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th, the meeting was announced. Brij Lal has stated before us that he knew Hansraj and he was asked to announce the meeting. Hukam Chand, a friend of Hansraj, and one of his associates, Hansraj used to live in the same neighbourhood as the boy Brij Lal and the boy has stated his impression that the announcement was made at the instance of Hansraj. The notification by the military authorities, which followed the announcement to the effect that Martial Law was introduced, and that all meetings were prohibited. It is clear from the evidence before [that it] did not reach the bulk of the people of Amritsar. It appears to have been proclaimed only in the following places. (1) near Hathi gate (2) Logarh square (3) Dhab Katikan (4) Khatri Sant Singh (5) Khatri Safaid (6) Khatri Karam Singh (7) Lakkar Mandi (8) Quila Bhanagyan (9) Bagh Jandha Singh (10) Hall Bazar. Thus, the more popular places appear to have been left out.

About the Jallianwala Bagh meeting [which] was to have come at 5 O'clock, we find Hansraj at Jallianwala Bagh, at about 2 p.m. He appears to have taken an unprecedented amount of interest in this meeting. He arranged the platform, had the place swept by sweepers, and made every thing ready for the meeting. Two CID officers are present there at this time, and they take Hansraj aside, for a time, away from his friends, who has given evidence before us to carry on conversation which the friend was not able to hear.

Just about this time, a cattle fair, an annual function in Amritsar, is stopped by the police a long time before the usual hour with the result that thousands of people set free the fair wander into the Bagh.

<sup>1</sup>Mr. M.R. Jayakar Collections, Correspondence, File No. 477 (Punjab Inquiry-11).

<sup>2</sup>Hansraj: A resident of Amritsar who became an approver in the Amritsar conspiracy case.

<sup>3</sup>Kanahya Lal; A respectable citizen of Amritsar and senior lawyer of Amritsar.

At the meeting, actually held before the appointment time, Hansraj, takes an important part in the proceedings and makes a speech at about 4.30, an aeroplane was hovering over the Bagh. At about 5 o'clock soldiers entered the Bagh through the main gate. At their sight, there was naturally a stir among the people, and many of them, seated on all sides of the platform, got up to run away.

He told them that Government would never fire on them, an assurance, which assumed a lurid significance in the light of the massacre followed. With these words he waved his handkerchief, came down from the platform and, on the pretext of proceeding to speak to the military, disappeared in the direction of the soldiers, leaving no traces to show where he went or how he saved himself.

Further, there is evidence that the CID Officers came before the time of the meeting and concealed themselves in some of the surrounding houses. They appear to have known beforehand of the impending catastrophe; for they warned witnesses examined before as not to remain in the garden, as the soldiers would come and fire on the people.

The evidence further proves that some of the people, who were trying to leave the garden before the arrival of the soldiers, were held by the CID not to go away, as Kanayha Lal was coming shortly. Likewise, after the arrival of the soldiers and before the firing started, a few cautious individuals, who were trying to run away through the main gate were pressed back into the garden. The circumstances relating to the firing, some of which we have already detailed, also *confirm the suspicions that the carnage was premeditated and intended to be complete and revengeful*. The firing began without a warning, continued for 10 or 15 minutes with only two intervals of a second or two. Most of the people were killed, or wounded near the exits. A great many were shot from behind. Soldiers went to the length of pursuing fugitives through the Hansli Gate and actually shot them, before they had reached the end of the street. Even persons seeking shelter on a tree were fired at some places, fell in the well to the East and a manhole in the narrow passage of the Hansli was full of living and the dead. Though the firing must have been to be imminent, no arrangement was made to render first-aid or procure medical assistance for the wounded. The authorities must have known that the curfew order would interfere largely with the obtaining of medical assistance. The firing was so terrific and the slaughter so complete that it took two days to remove the dead and the wounded; and the walls of surrounding houses, specially towards the South and the East were riddled with bullets.

It should further be noticed that there was a picket of soldiers at the Sultanwind gate, which is at a considerable distance from the Jallianwala Bagh. The picket had been apparently posted, to deal with stragglers who might have successfully escaped from the carnage in the Bagh. As a matter

of fact we find that some individuals running away through the gate were fired upon.

We have also to remember in this connection, the answers by General Dyer before Lord Hunter's Committee about the leisurely way in which he and his party proceeded to the Bagh and also the absence of any measures to prevent the holding of this meeting, although he must have been aware of its gradual formation.

The character and antecedents of Hansraj are worth recording in this connection. The evidence shows that he was dismissed from the posts, which he had held for the defalcation and, for some months before the Jallianwala Bagh incident, he had been without any ostensible means of livelihood. The evidence suggests that he was living on his wife and mother, and was also in the pay of the police. For a month before the occurrence, he had been often seen in the company of a Sikh Sub-Inspector with whom apparently he was on terms of friendship. His conduct at this meeting was, to say the least, very suspicious. He announced the meeting on the 12th, apparently on his own initiative, mentions a popular pleader's name, without his consent, obviously to act as a powerful attraction, had the meeting proclaimed once more on the morning of the 13th, arranges everything about the meeting even to the minute details of sweeping, goes to the Bagh at 2 p.m., is seen speaking to the C.I.D. Inspector, then is drawn aside into conversation, pacifies the crowd, at the first appearance of fright at the sight of the aeroplane, and at the most critical moment obviously waves his handkerchief as a sign and skulks away under the pretext of having a talk with the military, leaving no traces as how he escaped.

On all these facts it is suggested that the meeting had been planned by Hansraj and his associates, with the view of making a large number of people gather at the Bagh. Whether the authorities at Amritsar were parties to this plan and yielded to it in their desire for revenge, we are unable to say, as we have not enough evidence before us to support a definite finding. But it is at any rate perfectly clear that General Dyer took the fullest advantage of the meeting, in effecting on the inhabitants of Amritsar as condign and complete a punishment as was needed to satisfy their lust for revenge.

#### **241. On Bolshevism<sup>1</sup>**

... That the Bolshevik Government is thoroughly earnest in its hope to provoke revolution in India, as the best means of weakening the British empire, has I think been so proved as to leave not the slightest doubt in

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 5 April 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, April 1920, No. 103.

anybody who is open to conviction. Bolshevik speakers and writers have openly proclaimed their intentions and spread their announcements over the world. From every direction have come secret reports of plans and intrigues undertaken to give effect to these designs. Every revolutionary party or society seems secure in its hope of financial and other assistance from Lenin and his friends. The distinction, therefore, which is made for clearness in this report, between revolutionary bodies and Bolshevik agencies, is a false distinction because now-a-days every revolutionary organisation whatever its origin seeks alliance with Bolshevism.

The important question then is by what method the Bolsheviks can hope to execute their plans in India. They can rely either on an invasion from Central Asia of forces raised by themselves, or on indigenous agencies in India, or on a combination of the two. Indigenous agencies are certainly hard at work to promote disaffection against Government. Their methods are certainly skilful and such as are likely to rot the core of Government's strength by disaffecting its servants, military, and civil and by destroying the influence of the more conservative elements of Indian society through the promotion of a sort of dictatorship of the proletariat. That their methods are disguised as Khilafat agitation or election campaign need not affect their result.

As regards the likelihood of invasion this seems more remote. But the latest intelligence shows that the work of organisation and propaganda in Central Asia proceeds *pari passu* with the military measures requisite to make a reality of the Bolshevik Pan-Islamic entente.

#### **242. The Khilafat Conference<sup>1</sup>**

. . . At the Khilafat Conference meeting held on 24th instant at Meerut Mr. M.K. Gandhi is reported to have announced that at the informal conference held at Delhi on the 22nd instant it had been decided that if the Turkish settlement was not as they wanted it to be, both Hindus and Muhammadans would be advised to resign all civil offices, all jobs in the army and the police, to renounce all the titles and other honorary distinctions, and to refuse to pay taxes and all other dues to Government. Speeches more or less on these lines have been made since then in Lahore, Amritsar and other places. So far as expressions of public opinion on the announcement made by Mr. Gandhi at Meerut are concerned, very few people are disposed to take it seriously. The Government servants resent it and say that whilst they are asked to resign their offices, the pleaders are allowed to carry on their work in the courts and rich contractors and others who make

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report DCI, 5 April 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, April 1920, No. 103.

large sums of money out of Government are not even referred to in the announcement. The general feeling is that the Khilafat agitators are overdoing the thing. . . .

Bolshevism as a creed does not and will not appeal to the people of India. But those anxious to promote it in this country will keep it in the background so far as enunciation of principles is concerned. They will try to carry favour with the local agitators by endorsing their anti-government programme. This is what is thought by loyal and intelligent Indians in connection with the spread of Bolshevism in this country.

#### **243. The Turkish Question<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The first signs of the coming storm were seen in the receptions given to the Ali brothers on their journey from Betul to Amritsar to take part in the Congress and Muslim League meetings. These meetings gave the Pan-Islamists an opportunity to link themselves with the Hindu extremists, to join in torrents of vilification of Government, and to make a bold bid for general Hindu support by causing the Muslim League to make a public renunciation of cow sacrifice. Sure of support, the Pan-Islamists then began extended tours in which they indulged in much violent speaking. This culminated in the Calcutta Conference, which gave practical expression to the doctrine of contingent disloyalty and placed in violent terms the Christian-Moslem issue before the country.

#### **244. Lord Chelmsford to Montagu on the Action Taken on the Report of the Hunter Committee,<sup>2</sup> 3 May 1920**

We submit for your information and for any orders His Majesty's Government may desire to issue on the report which was presented on the 8th March 1920 by the Disorders Committee, together with our review of the report and our conclusions thereon. In the ordinary course the report would have been published with a resolution of the Government of India in the Home Department, but we consider the subject so important that after discussion with you we have decided that it is best to communicate to you our views and findings on the report for the information of His Majesty's Government. We desire to add that our views and conclusions are unanimous, except on those points where the dissent of our Hon'ble

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 12 April 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, April 1920, No. 103.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. A, June 1920, Nos. 126-64 and K.W.

colleague, Mr. [Mohammad] Shafi has been expressly indicated. We may also state that our Hon'ble colleague Sir George Lowndes, now on leave, concurred in all the conclusions we had reached upto the time of his departure.

2. In Resolution No. 2168, dated the 14th October 1919, the Governor-General in Council with the approval of the Secretary of State appointed a Committee to investigate the disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and the Punjab, their causes, and the measures taken to cope with them. The Hon'ble Lord Hunter, lately Solicitor-General for Scotland and now Senator of the College of Justice in Scotland, was appointed President of the Committee, which consisted of the following members:

- (1) The Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.C. Rankin, Judge of the High Court, Calcutta.
- (2) The Hon'ble Mr. W.F. Rice, C.S.I., I.C.S., Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.
- (3) Major-General Sir George Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., I.A., Commanding the Peshawar Division.
- (4) The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan, B.A., Member of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces.
- (5) The Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith, Member of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces.
- (6) Sir Chiman Lal Harilal Setalvad, KT., Advocate of the High Court, Bombay.
- (7) Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan, Muntazim-ud-Doula, M.A., LL.M. (Cantb), Bar-at-Law, Member for Appeals, Gwalior State.

The Committee began its sittings on the 29th October 1919 and after hearing evidence at Delhi, Lahore, Ahamadabad, and Bombay finished its labours in the first week of March 1920, when its report was presented to the Government of India.

3. In order to obtain a general view of the character of the disturbances and of the scope of the enquiry it will be useful to explain briefly the relative geographical position of the chief centres of disorder and to refer to a few salient dates which indicate the sequence of events in point of time. It was at Delhi—the Capital of India and from its historical and commercial importance a determining factor of considerable weight in the attitude of the rest of Northern India—that disturbances first occurred on the 30th March. They were of such a character as required the use of the Military to restore order and before this was achieved it became necessary to fire twice on the mob. On the 10th April violent rioting took place at Amritsar and Lahore in the Punjab, and at Ahmedabad in the Presidency of Bombay, and distinct unrest manifested itself in a minor degree at places as far distant as Calcutta and Bombay. Lahore is a city of 230,000 inhabitants and the capital of the Punjab. Amritsar which is 20 miles east of Lahore is a town

of more than 150,000 inhabitants and of great commercial importance . . . . The situation in the Punjab after the 10th April rapidly deteriorated and Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th April in the districts of Lahore and Amritsar, and shortly after in three other districts. About two weeks later a thunder cloud on the frontier burst and the mobilization of troops for the Afghan war began on the 4th May. This seriously affected the general situation in the Punjab and it was not found possible to withdraw Martial Law from all the districts concerned before the 12th June nor from railway lands still at a later date. These were briefly the events which with their causes and consequences formed the subject matter of the Committee's enquiry.

4. The next point to which the Government of India wish to advert is the decision of the All-India Congress Committee of Enquiry. As explained by Lord Hunter in his letter of the 8th March forwarding the Report of the Committee, all persons desirous of giving evidence were invited to submit their names and addresses, together with a brief memorandum of the points on which they desired to give evidence, and it was left to the Committee to decide what evidence they would hear. Lord Hunter has described the circumstances in which the Congress Committee declined after the 12th November further to assist the Committee of Enquiry by appearing before it and tendering evidence, the offer which the same body made on the 30th December to produce their evidence and reopen the enquiry, and the reasons which led Lord Hunter to reject that offer. . . .

7. Chapter I deals with the disturbances at Delhi. The Committee are unanimous in finding that the authorities handled the situation in an adequate and reasonable manner, that there was no provocative or unnecessary display of military force, and that the firing was justified on the three occasions on which it was found necessary to resort to this extreme measure. The actual collisions between the police and mobs are found to be the bye-products of the *Satyagraha* movement. The majority recognize that Mr. Gandhi's visit to Delhi after the first outbreak, if not prevented, would have been a serious embarrassment to the executive authorities there and might well have proved a source of great danger. The minority, while doubtful of the expediency of his exclusion and, while thinking that his presence might have had a beneficial result, does not deny the possibility of developments endangering the public peace. The only criticism passed by the Committee on the measures adopted by the local authorities is that the Deputy Commissioner made a mistake in enrolling a number of leading citizens as special constables, though, as they point out, these persons were not called on to render any services.

We accept these conclusions. . . . We do not consider that any blame attaches to the Deputy Commissioner for his appointment of special constables, as he acted in accordance with the established practice. We have, however, decided to address local Governments on the question whether the orders now obtaining on the subject in the various provinces require modifi-

cation or revision. This is the more necessary as it appears that leading citizens were enrolled as special constables at other disturbed centres besides Delhi.

The Government of India consider that the events described in this chapter have an important bearing on the rest of the report, for they were the first fruits of the *Satyagraha* movements, the first collision between the forces of order and the adherents of the passive resistance or civil disobedience movement. The behaviour of the crowd on the 30th March, which rendered it necessary for the military and police to fire on two occasions, cannot be ascribed to any action taken against Mr. Gandhi or local politicians. Such action has been pleaded in excuse of later mob excesses, but the internment order against Mr. Gandhi was not passed till ten days after the first outbreak of disorder at Delhi.

13. We accept the unanimous findings of the Committee regarding the disorders in the Bombay Presidency. We also endorse the opinions which have been expressed regarding the valuable services of the local officers and the admirable behaviour of the troops engaged in the suppression of the disturbances. . . . A perusal of that document [the report] is necessary to appreciate correctly the cruelty of the mob, which was immediately directed against Europeans and Government servants. We desire to place on record our deep sympathy with all those who suffered at the hands of the mob and in particular with the relations of the magistrate and two police officers who were done to death in so dastardly a manner. . . .

We desire at this point to review the situation and the measures taken at Amritsar upto and including the 12th April. We endorse the finding of the Committee that the situation was one of great difficulty and consider that the action taken by the authorities was generally justified. We think, however, it is to be regretted that the civil authorities considered it incumbent upon them, before the proclamation of Martial Law, to hand over control to the military in such terms as to suggest that they did not intend to exercise supervision or guidance over the action of the military commander. The result was to place the latter in a position of great difficulty and to impose upon him a grave responsibility which, in the opinion of the Government of India, should have continued to be shared by the civil authorities up to a later stage. It is not clear who was actually responsible for the complete abdication of civil authority. . . .

The Government of India agree with the Committee that General Dyer should have given warning to the crowd before opening fire. It is true that he had only a small force with him and that in view of this circumstance and the previous successes of the forces of disorder it is most improbable that an excited and defiant mob would have dispersed on a mere warning, but those ignorant of the order, including the villagers who had come to visit the *Baisakhi* fair, and indeed others would have had an opportunity of leaving the assembly if reasonable notice had been given to them. The Government

of India agree that there was not such an emergency existing as to render this precaution impossible.

General Dyer's action in continuing to fire on the crowd after it had begun to disperse was, in the opinion of the Government of India, indefensible. He fired continuously for ten minutes during which time 1,650 rounds were expended. It is probable that General Dyer's action so intimidated the lawless elements in the population of Amritsar and neighbouring districts of the Central Punjab as to prevent further manifestations of disorder. The Government of India cannot, however, accept this as a justification of the continued firing which greatly exceeded the necessity of the occasion. The dispersal of the crowd was indeed a matter of vital importance in view of the situation which then existed in Amritsar and stern measures to effect this end were certainly required. In our opinion, however, much more restricted military force would have sufficed to produce this effect and General Dyer's action has undoubtedly left behind bitterness of feeling which will take long to pass away. He was no doubt faced with a position of great difficulty; he was apprehensive of Amritsar being isolated and he had before him the danger of allowing mob rule to continue after the terrible events of the 10th. Giving all due weight to these considerations, the deliberate conclusion at which we have arrived is that General Dyer exceeded the reasonable requirements of the case and showed a misconception of his duty which resulted in a lamentable and unnecessary loss of life. Although we are constrained to this decision, we are convinced that General Dyer acted honestly in the belief that he was doing what was right and we think that in the result his action at the time checked the spread of the disturbances to an extent which it is difficult now to estimate. This was the opinion of many intelligent observers in the Punjab. There remains the question of the failure to arrange for medical aid after the firing at Jallianwala Bagh. Here too we must express our great regret that no action was taken either by the civil or the military authorities to remove the dead or give aid to the wounded. The minority criticised Sir Michael O'Dwyer for expressing approval of the action taken at Jallianwala Bagh. On this point the Government of India have little to add to the account given by the late Lieutenant-Governor of the circumstances in which his approval was conveyed, but making every allowance for the difficult position in which Sir Michael O'Dwyer was placed, the Government of India think that he would have acted more wisely, if before expressing any approval of General Dyer's action on this occasion, he had taken steps to ascertain the facts and circumstances of the firing more fully.

We desire to add here that our Honourable colleague Mr. Shafi agrees generally with the minority in their findings of fact as regards Amritsar and the inferences deduced therefrom where these differ from the findings and conclusions of the majority. He rejects the theory that General Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh saved the situation in the Punjab and averted a

rebellion on a scale similar to that of the Mutiny. In his opinion the disturbances on and after the 14th of April in the districts of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur were the results of the commotion caused by the Jallianwala Bagh affair.

#### **245. The Government of India Act, 1919<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The most notable feature of the propagandist work that is just now in progress in various parts of the country in connection with the Reform Act is that those who are the loudest in denouncing the Reform Act as disappointing and unsatisfactory and the endorsing the proposals of the Khilafat agitators relating to the withdrawal of all cooperation with Government are the most strenuous in their efforts to secure the support of the voters that are to be. Everywhere and among all classes and communities there is a strong desire to make the most of the Reform Act. Propagandist work is no doubt in progress; but it is fitful and not at all properly organised. The extremists and the Moderates are fighting everywhere. Their mutual relations are getting more and more strained. The differences that divide them are being carried into private life which is in consequences considerably embittered. One result of these squabbles is an increasing want of public confidence in politicians as a class.

#### **246. R.A. Graham to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department on Shaukat Ali's Political Activity,<sup>2</sup> 4 May 1920**

Reports have, however, now been received from Madras clearly showing the immense enthusiasm which this man [Shaukat Ali] appears to arouse in his audiences. There is no doubt that he is a fanatic of a virulent type with a hatred of the British which nothing will influence. He is also a fluent orator in Urdu and his speeches were able to move his audiences in an extraordinary manner, so much so that the immediate effect was seen in tears and curse on the British and generally in hysterical behaviour. However, in his visit to Madras, Shaukat Ali has been merely paving the way for his return. He has not asked his audiences to take any action, as the peace terms with Turkey have not actually been published and time for

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 3 May 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, June 1920, No. 78.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll B, May 1920, Nos. 172-76. R.A. Graham was Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras.

"progressive non-cooperation" has not yet arrived. It is, therefore, possible that with his departure, things may become normal and that his visit may have no permanent effect provided that he does not return and propaganda is not started to keep the agitation alive. . . .

His Excellency is aware that the Government of India consider that since the policy of abstention from interference has so far been justified it should be continued as far as possible in order to avoid making martyrs of fanatical leaders and precipitating disorder. The Government of India, on the other hand, state that should local outbursts or acts of individual fanaticism occur, expeditious and decisive action would be imperative. His Excellency the Governor in Council considers that so far as this Presidency [Madras] is concerned, it would be unwise to a degree to wait till agitators have been allowed to create disorder and then to step in and quell it. It is, on the one hand, practically certain that if the Mahomedans in this Presidency are left to themselves they will have neither the courage nor the inclination to proceed to acts of open disloyalty. On the other hand, it is as certain that no one of them has the courage to stand up against Shaukat Ali in person and oppose him, and it is not improbable that he may by the fervour of his eloquence be able to incite them to acts which they would not be capable of when left to themselves. It is impossible to say what might be the effect of this on the Police and the Military.

#### **247. On the Revolutionary Parties<sup>1</sup>**

. . . With Lajpat Rai in the Punjab is associated the notorious Chaman Lal, accredited representative of the Bolsheviks in England who are connected with the London Worker's Welfare League and of whom the best known is the professed Bolshevik [S.J.] Saklatvala. Chaman Lal is Secretary of the Labour Association which has provoked the present strike on the North Western Railway. Assuming this information and the assumptions herein made from it are correct, and there is no reason to doubt either, there are two Bolshevik agents, who already enjoy considerable political influence, at work in one of the most disturbed provinces in India. . . .

#### **248. On Pan-Islamism<sup>2</sup>**

Gandhi has long been associated with the Central Khilafat Committee in

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 10 May 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, June 1920, No. 78.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Bombay and with some courage has sought to dominate the councils of the Muhammadan extremists. His acceptance of the office of President of Tilak's Home Rule League has now made him the leader of the Hindu extremists. He, therefore; occupies a unique position as the leader of the two sections of the Indian population most opposed to the British Indian Government and the British connection, and his position gives to his public utterances an unusual interest. From them one gathers that he seeks to restrain the Muhammadans, while keeping alive their anti-British feelings, and that he wishes to divert the energies of the Hindu politicians to a programme more productive of results than mere blind hostility to Government. In short, he desires to unite extremists of every class, despite their divergent interests, into a solid opposition under his own leadership. But while all politicians profess adulation and lip loyalty to the 'Mahatma'<sup>1</sup>, they have not expressed a similar agreement in approving his published policies. His manifesto on accepting the Presidency of the Home Rule League, has been criticised in several Hindu nationalist papers. Muhammadans have not criticised in print his suggested boycott of Government; but in their meetings, some have condemned his proposals as impracticable and others have gone far beyond anything which Gandhi proposes.

Unfortunately Gandhi's is a personality which in the past his professed followers have found it easy to exploit for purposes which were not professedly his of which the *Satyagraha* campaign is a striking example. Some form of *Satyagraha* appears to be his only panacea for every ill, and in spite of the experiences of the past year, he is suggesting it now as a solution of the Khilafat problem. The association of Gandhi with any movement is a great asset, because his name is one to conjure with among the ignorant masses. Hence, Shaukat Ali and his disciples claim Gandhi as their *guru* and profess to be guided entirely by his advice, knowing all the time that his personality is plastic and his principles pliable. Gandhi himself, in dealing with Khilafat problem, has two conditions to fulfil: he has to retain Muhammadan loyalty to his own leadership, and he had to find a programme for practice which squares with his own policy and fulfils the Islamic zeal of his extremist friends. The last condition is the most urgent and has driven him to what may be described as a minimum programme, the minimum, that is which the extremists can accept as an appropriate outlet for their fanaticism. The programme which he has adopted is non-cooperation, boycott and *Swadeshi*, including the non-payment of taxes and interference with the loyalty of Government servants, civil, police and military. His scheme is obviously comprehensive and easily stretched into something far more than passive resistance. Using the glamour of Gandhi's name and their own weapon of religious fanaticism, the most ardent and revolutionary Pan-Islamist can work at this scheme. . . .

<sup>1</sup>The word used for Gandhi.

That Gandhi is a retarding agent and that Muhammadan extremists are adapting his programme to their own purposes is easily proved. . . .

**249. Badruddin Abdulla Koor to M.M. Chotani on his Resignation,<sup>1</sup> 12 May 1920**

. . . It was just after the armistice was signed that I began to write in the local press on the question of the Khilafat and the protection of the Holy places of Islam. My first letter on the question of the Khilafat was addressed by me to the Raj Saheb of Mahmudabad who was then acting as President of the Moslem League. A session of the Moslem League was held in December 1918 at Delhi. At that session, I believe my letter was placed before the members present. . . .

I do maintain that Mussalmans should always be ready to make great sacrifices for the defence of their Holy Faith but if by making certain sacrifices there is no possibility of corresponding advantage to them, then I submit that it is futile to go in for embarking on rash and indiscreet acts that would surely prove injurious to the best interests of the Mussalman community.

We Indian Mussalmans, in our present condition, cannot afford to have continuous friction with the British Government. And if you embark on this ruinous course, I am afraid we may have to suffer even long after the Khilafat controversy terminates. It is clear that the non-cooperation report emphasises that the Indian Mussalmans should refrain from violence and bloodshed. But those who are fully acquainted with Mussalman temperament and feeling and who see that the Indian atmosphere is at present charged with religious incitement and fervour will hesitate to believe that this advice will be acted upon if non-cooperation is to be made a living factor. It is possible for an intellectual personality like that of Mr. Gandhi to control his passions but I do not expect that a large and unwieldy community of uneducated and highly sensitive people goaded to disappointment and despair by the apathy of Great Britain and its Allies in the Khilafat question will ever do so. The risk, therefore is clear. I firmly believe that by putting the progressive stages of non-cooperation into operation our country will be submerged into chaos and confusion and the substantial work hitherto done by the Khilafat committee on constitutional lines will all be undone.

In conclusion I pray that our agitation should be continued on constitu-

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. Deposit, June 1920, No. 112. Badruddin Abdulla Koor: Prominent Muslim leader; first Honorary Secretary to Bombay Khilafat Committee; first Honorary Secretary to Central Khilafat Committee; resigned as a protest on the resolution to support the Non-cooperation movement.

tional lines and our campaign against the injustice done to the Moslem cause by Great Britain and the Allies should continue till our just aims and objects are attained. . . .

**250. Cape's Questions in the House of Commons and Montagu's Replies,<sup>1</sup> 13 May 1920**

Mr. Cape asked the Secretary of State for India what newspapers edited outside the Punjab were prevented from being circulated in the Punjab during Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration; from how many newspapers security was demanded; and in how many cases security already deposited was forfeited during that period?

*Montagu's Reply*

From 1914 to 1918 eight newspapers, including the "Sadaqat", "Jamhur" and "Naqqash" of Calcutta, and "New India" of Madras, were kept outside the Punjab. In 1919 twelve such orders were passed, namely, against the "Congress", "Vijaya", "Inqilab" and "Qaum" of Delhi, the "Medina" of Moradabad, the "Al Khalil" and "Yathrib" of Bijnor, the "Independent" of Allahabad, the "Hamdam" and "Ukhuwat" of Lucknow, the "Swadesi" of Gorakhpur, and the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" of Calcutta. To the best of my information, security was demanded during Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration from fourteen newspapers and twenty-four presses. Forfeiture was ordered in the case of one newspaper and four presses. But I am not quite sure that these figures are complete.

**251. The Khilafat Agitation in India<sup>2</sup>**

Gandhi and [M.M.] Chotani have thus on paper bought unity at the price of their moderation. Undeterred by this defeat Gandhi is still following his delaying tactics, evidence of which is his published statement explaining how non-cooperation is to be worked. Non-cooperation, he explains, is adopted because the people cannot be parties to a broken pledge. It has four definite stages. The first, the resignation of titles and honorary posts, is to be adopted immediately. But the second, third and fourth are to succeed each other more remotely. The arrangement is required, because no public servants are

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons 1919, col. 113. Thomas Cape (1868-1947): Labour leader; M.P., 1918-45.

<sup>2</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 17 May 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, June 1920, No. 78.

to be called out unless they can support themselves or can be supported. No pressure is to be used and no private servants are to be affected. Resignation from police and army is the third stage and non-payment of taxes the fourth. The fourth is described as "still more remote", because 'fraught with the greatest danger'. . . .

It is generally believed that the announcement of the peace terms and the encouragement of the Amir of Afghanistan will provoke a crisis. Hitherto the agitators were trying to bluff Government by passing threatening resolutions, practical and otherwise, in crowded meeting. But the Amir's encouragement has given a new meaning to *Hijrat*.<sup>1</sup> Hijrat committees have been formed all over the Punjab, and canvassing is understood to be going on in the villages. The Afghan delegation at Mussorrie<sup>2</sup> is believed to have succeeded in spreading many misleading reports and rumours during its stay in India. What is the extent of this propaganda it is difficult to guess, much of it referring to the Amir's devotion to the Khilafat is well known; but how much more has there been of the type of the rumour, said to be circulating among Indian troops at Amritsar, that any Muhammadan in military service would receive double pay from the Amir if he deserted to Afghanistan? Loyal Muhammadans are being threatened by their fanatical co-religionists and are apprehensive of danger.

## **252. The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report on the Causes and General Unrest in India<sup>3</sup>**

... An adequate explanation, however, of the general and widespread outbreak in the Punjab against constituted authority, of the attack on Europeans, on Government property and on the railway and telegraph system must be sought in the causes of a general state of unrest and discontent among the people, particularly the inhabitants of the larger towns.

2. *Home Rule and Self-determination Principles*.—We have already noted in our narrative of events the increased interest shown in certain parts of the Punjab in political agitation. This is largely due no doubt to the Home Rule movement started several years ago. . . .

3. *Defence of India Act*.—. . . But the Defence of India Act, 1915, and the rules made thereunder did trench upon the ordinary measure of liberty. Important examples of this interference with individual liberty were the power

<sup>1</sup>The word 'Hijrat' means leaving one's country in order to avoid continuous repression.

<sup>2</sup>It was headed by Mahmood Tarzi. It aimed at securing just and honourable peace terms for Turkey.

<sup>3</sup>The Disorders (Hunter) Committee Report (majority), 1920, pp. 64-72. It was released on 26 May 1920.

to order "deportation" on individuals from a given locality and to confine or intern them in a particular place, the power to create and authorise the creation of new offences; the power to set up special tribunals; and the power to exclude newspapers from special provinces or control the press. . . . It may be that restrictions upon political agitation, whether on the press or on the platform, were all the more necessary but they were all the more galling to the educated classes, who in India are composed largely of the various lawyer classes. . . .

4. *Situation in the Punjab.*—. . . It is important to remember that in 1918 the need for more men was not lessening but increasing. Already in February 1918 the strain began to be severely felt and the pace was slackened. The appeal of the Prime Minister of England in consequence of the altered military situation resulting from the German offensive was answered by an endeavour to produce half a million combatants in the year commencing on 1st June, 1918. The Central Recruitment Board fixed the Punjab quota of combatants at 180,000 and a Punjab Provincial Conference held on the 4th May resolved to answer this demand and to find 20,000 non-combatants as well. When the armistice was signed in November the Punjab was found to have made good more than a proportion part of the demand made upon it. . . .

5. *Country districts.*—These times of stress were, therefore, specially different among the high spirited and martial people of the country districts. The towns had their own problems, but political activity by and among the educated classes there had possibilities of immediate danger if it infected the rural population with antipathy to Government or with disbelief in its power. . . .

Sir Michael O'Dwyer explained to us in detail his reasons for regarding the situation in the province as critical and the necessity for his dealing promptly with any manifestations of hostility to Government. It seems clear that the cumulative effect of taking action under special powers would be in any case to make the contrast broader and more evident between the new notions of liberty for India and the practice of the moment.

6. *Period subsequent to Armistice.*—. . . If the Defence of India Act was necessary before to make certain that the Empire in her supreme struggle for existence would not break down in India, India was now expectant of special recognition—not because she had not failed the Empire—but because she confidently considered that she had played her part to maintain it. The politically minded classes were bound to re-act to such stimuli as these and there were many others. The war had brought high prices and new problems as to export of foodstuffs; the war and the peace alike meant dislocation of existing conditions.

7. *Post-war questions.*—The anxiety of Muhammadans over the fate of Turkey was a direct consequence of the war and seemed full of possibilities of trouble. The return of troops would produce acute problems in many parts.

Forces of mischief had been pent up by emergency legislation to which it seemed hardly reasonable that the flood gates should be thrown open all at once, though it was certain that the continued exercise of special powers by the Executive would now be looked upon with redoubled suspicion, and as the degeneracy of a war measure into an abuse.

8. *Position in beginning of 1919.*— . . . It is, however, important to observe that the position of affairs in India early in 1919 was such that political interests were bound to affect the masses before long at least in the towns. Much, therefore, depended upon the educated classes and more upon the power of those who were minded to be reasonable to compete in influence with others whose only contribution to any difficulty would be complaint of Government and hostility veiled at best . . . to the British Raj.

9. *Rowlatt Bills.*—The agitation against the action of the Government in pressing forward and passing the Rowlatt Bill must be particularly noticed as it was in our opinion largely, if not mainly, responsible for creating the feeling against Government which promoted such serious disorder in the Punjab.

. . . It was maintained that the Defence of India Act clothed the Government with all the authority they would get under the new legislation and that there was, therefore, every reason for delay and for conceding an adjournment asked by the Indian members of the Legislative Council. The agitation against Government action took an acute form in the months of February and March both in the press and on public platforms.

10. *Press criticism.*—The criticism of Government in newspapers voicing extreme nationalist sentiments was particularly bitter and determined . . .

11. *False rumours.*—Many false rumours as to the object and purpose of the Rowlatt Act were extensively circulated in the Punjab. As illustrations of these rumours the following may be noticed. It was said that people assembling to the number of 5 would be liable to be arrested by the police, that property would, to a substantial extent, be confiscated by the Government, that excessive fees would be levied on the occasion of marriages and that their personal liberty would be interfered with in other ways . . . The people believed the rumours and their indignation against Government increased. To them the Rowlatt Act became known as the Black Act, an Act which would seriously curtail their personal and individual freedom.

12. *Passive Resistance.*—This [Passive Resistance] proposal met with an enthusiastic reception although it was gradually realised that opposition confined to passive resistance would, in the case of the Rowlatt legislation, be ineffective . . .

15. *All-India hartal, 30th March, 6th April.*—In furtherance of his *Satyagraha* movement against the Rowlatt legislation, Mr. Gandhi resolved to have a *hartal* throughout India. A day was to be set apart as a day of general mourning when no business was to be done. The day so fixed by him was to be the second Sunday, after the publication of the Viceregal

assent was given to the passing of the Rowlatt Act. For those who came to know immediately after this assent was given, the day would be the 30th March, for others the 6th April. On discovering that the *hartal* might in this way be held on different dates, Mr. Gandhi sent out telegrams fixing the 6th April. As we have already described, a *hartal* took place in several places on the 30th March, among others at Delhi where serious rioting occurred.

The observance of the *hartal* on 6th April was very general and extended over a great many provinces. Large mass meetings of people were held in different towns and though no actual conflict between the police and the crowds occurred, there were many signs of growing excitement and unrest among the people. It seems, however, to have been hoped by the Government that with the successful conclusion of the *hartal* and the day of fasting on the 6th, agitation had achieved its objects and that no further demonstration would occur.

16. On the 8th of April, however, the Government of India received news from the Government of Bombay that Mr. Gandhi had announced to the Commissioner of Police that he had issued an unregistered newspaper and that a committee was sitting to decide what further laws were to be disobeyed. Instructions were sent to the Government of Bombay that if Mr. Gandhi and other leaders were guilty of a clear breach of law they should be arrested and prosecuted. On the 9th April, similar instructions were sent to other Local Governments and suggestions made that if the passive resistance movement showed dangerous symptoms in any province, the local Government might issue a manifesto regarding the necessity, object and scope of the Rowlatt Act, condemning those who seek notoriety by embarrassing Government, pointing to the moral of the Delhi incident, calling upon all sober-minded people to discourage the policy of embarrassing the Government, whatever their views might be on the Act, and making it clear that the Government was determined to carry out the duty of maintaining the laws of the country and dealing rigorously with all movements that endanger the peace and prosperity of the great body of citizens.

17. *Gandhi sent back to Bombay, 8th April.*—Mr. Gandhi left Bombay for Delhi on 8th April with the object of furthering his *Satyagraha* movement there and in the Punjab. The Government of India on learning of this journey by Mr. Gandhi communicated with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. Both these gentlemen agreed that it would be extremely imprudent, not to say dangerous, to allow Mr. Gandhi to enter the territories under their jurisdiction. He had announced that part of his programme consisted in breaking the law and they had no knowledge what laws he might choose to break . . . As had already been pointed out by some of the prominent leaders of moderate opinion in India the promotion of the *Satyagraha* movement was likely to promote disorder and breach of the peace. In these circumstances, the Government of India authorised the Local Government of the United Provinces, the Punjab and

Delhi to issue orders under Rule 3(b) of the Defence of India Rules (which requires the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council) directing Gandhi to remain in the Bombay Presidency.

. . . He was to be informed that although at present his entering the Punjab or Delhi would be likely to promote disturbance and, therefore, could not be allowed, the Government of India would be willing to reconsider the position later, should he give an explicit undertaking to refrain from inaugurating a campaign to break the law and undertake not to promote such violation . . .

18. *Effects of Gandhi's arrest.*—Following upon his arrest a *hartal* took place in many different towns, and the violent outbreaks to which we have referred occurred. A serious outbreak also occurred at Ahmedabad. . . On hearing of the events at that place, Mr. Gandhi was greatly shocked and declared for the time being a suspension of his civil disobedience and expressed his readiness to obey all Government orders. With the permission of the Commissioner of Police he issued hand bills inviting the police and the mill-hands of Ahmedabad to return to work. This advice was taken and order was rapidly restored there. In the Punjab, however, as we have seen *hartals* continued to be held and outrages and acts of violence to be committed. In an open letter to Mr. Gandhi from Swami Shraddhananda, a follower or colleague of his at Delhi, occurs the significant message: "I am, therefore, convinced that under the present conditions in India. the civil breaking of laws without producing an upheaval among the masses (for which neither you nor any satyagrahi is morally responsible) is impossible".

In Mr. Gandhi's own manifesto . . . of the 18th April advising temporary suspension of civil disobedience he states : "I am sorry that when I embarked upon a mass movement I underrated the forces of evil and I must now pause and consider how best to meet the situation." Another passage is "we have found by bitter experience that whilst in an atmosphere of lawlessness, civil disobedience found ready acceptance, *satya* (truth) and *ahimsa* (non-violence) from which alone civil disobedience can worthily spring, have commanded little or no respect" . . .

19. *Peace terms with Turkey.*— . . . The Turkish peace terms involving such questions as the integrity of the holy places of Islam and the Khilafat have roused keen interest among the Muhammadan population . . .

20. *High Prices* .— . . . The continued high prices of the necessities of life has been a cause of great discontent in the more densely populated towns. It was expected that when fighting ceased, prices would return to the normal figures prevailing before the war. In their disappointment at finding prices tending to rise, rather than fall after the armistice, people blamed the Government. The situation was aggravated by the bad harvest of 1919 caused by a failure of the monsoon . . . We may note that in such a district as Gujranwala, Colonel O'Brien, the Deputy Commissioner, did not consider that unrest was to be attributed in any degree to economic conditions.

21. *Recruiting*.—It has been suggested that the methods of recruiting for the army sanctioned by the Punjab Government were largely responsible for the unrest in the province previous to the outbreaks. In our opinion, this proposition is not established or well-founded . . . Large numbers of demobilised men were returning to their homes in April and they do not seem to have shown any sympathy with the agitation. As regards methods of recruiting, it would appear that an intensive campaign was conducted in many districts by the district officers, and there were instances of reprehensible means of securing recruits having been adopted by overzealous individuals. In the cases that were referred to us it was shown that such methods when brought to the notice of the higher officials were discountenanced . . . The recruiting details were largely left to the local authorities. The system by which a quota was fixed for each village and the methods employed in some cases to secure the requisite number were entirely a local, not a Government arrangement.

22. *War Loans*.—There is even less ground for attributing unrest in the province to any action taken by the Government connection with the war loan . . . There is no ground for alleging, as appears to have been done, that with Government sanction, instructions were issued to assessors of Income-tax that they should get increased income-tax from persons who were supposed to have made satisfactory contribution to the war loan.

23. *Conspiracy* :—On the evidence before us there is nothing to show that the outbreak in the Punjab was part of a pre-arranged conspiracy to overthrow the British Government in India by force. On the other hand, the Punjab had been advised by their legal advisers that the *Satyagraha* movement amounted to an illegal conspiracy against Government. We believe that Mr. Gandhi is honestly oppossed to the employment of force or violence in the prosecution of his aims. But the general teaching of the doctrine of civil disobedience to laws by masses of uneducated men must inevitably lead to breach of the peace and disorder. Apart from the use of force, civil disobedience to laws, if extensively preached and practised, would mean the paralysis of the Government.

### **253. The Disorders Inquiry Committee on Martial Law,<sup>1</sup>**

**26 May 1920**

#### *Crawling Order*

The most criticised of these orders is probably what has come to be known as General Dyer's crawling order.

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report, 1920, pp. 95-96.

On the 10th April, 1919 Miss Sherwood while bicycling in Amritsar had been brutally assaulted and left for dead in a street of the city. The perpetrators of this dastardly offence were deserving of the severe punishment. Some days after the assault had been committed, General Dyer erected a triangle or whipping post at the place where Miss Sherwood fell. His intention was that those who had been guilty of the assault should be publicly flogged at the triangle. He placed two pickets at different parts of the street with instructions that no Indians were to pass between these points of the street, but he added that, if they had to pass, they must go on all fours. This order was issued on the 19th April, i.e. 9 days after the assault had been committed on Miss Sherwood. It continued in force until 26th April when it was withdrawn on the instructions of the Punjab Government who disapproved of it.

At that time when he issued the order, General Dyer says that it never entered his brain that any sensible or sane man would intentionally go through the street, which he desired to choose. Unfortunately, just after he gave the order to the picket, some men were brought by the police before General Dyer for not salaaming and, on account of their impertinent demeanour to him, he ordered them to be arrested and taken to the police office. These men were taken by the police past the picket, who insisted on their crawling. General Dyer, however, explains that, in ordering their arrest and removal to the jail, he had no idea that they would pass along the street to which the crawling order applied. On the following day, six men were sentenced to be flogged for some breach of fort discipline, the exact nature of their offence was not proved. They appear to have been underarrest for the assault on Miss Sherwood. They were taken to the whipping post and there flogged. On their way from the picket to the post and back they were made to crawl. We understand that these six men were afterwards convicted of the offence against Miss Sherwood with which they were charged. In addition to the cases we have mentioned, other people had to crawl along the street. Altogether about 50 people seem to have done so. There are a number of houses on the street. The inhabitants of these houses have occasion to use the street for the purpose of getting the necessities of life or on other legitimate occasion. General Dyer thought all the houses had back entrances but in this he was wrong. On their error being pointed out to him he suggested that it was only a slight inconvenience for the people to go on the roofs of the houses and improvise other means of getting supplies than using the street. In this we cannot agree. The order is certainly open to the objection that it caused unnecessary inconvenience to a number of people and that it unnecessarily punished innocent as well as guilty. Above all, from an administrative point of view, in subjecting the Indian population to an act of humiliation, it has continued to be a cause of bitterness . . . .

**254. The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report (Minority) on the Nature of Disturbances,<sup>1</sup> 26 May 1920**

The question that first arises is whether these events were in the nature of a rebellion as commonly understood, that is, arising for the purpose of turning out the British Government and were the result of an organized movement for that end. It was stated before us by some officials that these disorders were in their view the result of an organised conspiracy throughout the country to turn out the British Government, and it was said that such organisation was connected with the ferment in Egypt and the machinations in Afghanistan. One witness even suggested that it was connected with, if not financed by, the Russo-German Bolshevik organisation. The views were based on inferences from the nature of the occurrences themselves and no evidence in support of them was forthcoming. The Hon'ble Mr. Thompson, Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, admitted in his examination before us that there was nothing more than conjectural connection between the disturbances in the Punjab and the ferment in Egypt, the machination in Afghanistan or the Bolshevik influences. He did not wish the Committee to draw any inferences in this connection from the facts placed before us by him.

On the evidence before us we are of the opinion that there was no rebellion in the sense we have mentioned, nor any organisation for that purpose; further that there was no organisation even for bringing about the disturbances and the atrocities which were committed by the mobs seized by the frenzy of the moment. The Punjab Government in their case presented to us take the view that the disturbances cannot be rightly attributed to an organisation for that purpose but must be referred mainly to local causes. They say in many cases the *hartal* of the 6th April owed very little to a direct organisation of public men. The movement against the Act thus working up to the general demonstration of the 6th was not in itself of an exceptional character. There was not as far as can be ascertained any general intention of carrying it beyond political agitation and passive resistance. For the disturbances that ensued we must mainly look to local causes. Speaking about Amritsar where the worst disorders took place, the Punjab Government say that certain local factors resulted in turning what started as a protest in force against the deportation of Drs. S. Kitchlew and Satyapal into mob-violence marked by murder, pillage and incendiarism.

**255. C.A. Barron's Statement on the Disturbances in Delhi Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Thus the ground was well prepared for agitation and misrepresentation

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee Report (Minority), 1920, pp. 109-10.

<sup>2</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, I, Delhi, p. 123.

among the lower and more ignorant classes. When the agitation was at its height it was found that misrepresentation was not confined to the 'Rowlatt Act', bad though the distortion of that Act were. The Excess Profits Tax and the new Income Tax Act lent themselves to the misrepresentation that all property was to be confiscated by Government upto at least half a man's possession, including not only those of city people but of the agriculturists in the villages, and that a most inconvenient and utterly unjustifiable inquisition into honest traders' profits was to be introduced. The Patel Marriage Bill (introduced by a non-official member of the Council) could be and was distorted into an intention by Government to interfere with orthodox Hindu marriage customs. Many other false rumours were industriously and successfully circulated. Under the Rowlatt Act itself the police were credited with an almost unlimited power of search in private houses, and with authority to arrest any three persons seen talking together. The high prices of most of the common necessities of life caused by the war, which, instead of falling on the conclusion of the armistice, appeared to be only rising to almost unendurable heights, formed another indictment against the Government. The British Government, if it was all powerful, and if it had successfully defeated its enemies as it announced, should have been able to reduce prices by executive order or other authoritative action. The economic hardship caused by high prices should not be forgotten as providing a fruitful soil in which the professional agitator could sow his poisonous seed. Another economic cause, which was assigned at the time for the unexpected promulgation of the *hartal*, was the effect of the sudden drop in the price of cotton and woollen goods in the Delhi market when peace came in sight. Large dealers in piece goods who had bought at high rates were faced with considerable losses, and it was actually alleged that it was to the interest of these men to foment the trouble and keep the city in a disturbed state, in the hope that the price of the goods on their hands might be raised and their losses thus reduced. It was in conditions such as these that following Gandhi's lead, the local *Satyagraha* Sabha held meetings in the latter half of March to promote his passive resistance movement. The Vernacular press took good care to keep the members alive.

#### **256. Swami Shraddhanand's Statement on the Disturbances in Delhi<sup>1</sup>**

I asked the huge audience to follow me and to leave quietly when nearing their residences. We were walking in order. When we were nearing the Clock tower, Gorkhas were in the middle of the road, in double file facing

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, I, Delhi, p. 188.

both ways. On seeing us they marched to the right foot-board. We thought they had left the road in order to enable us to proceed but when we reached near them, a rifle was fired into the crowd. There was a stir and a deep tone of resentment among the crowd. But I asked all to halt and they obeyed. In My *sanyasi* dress I went up to the footpath alone and asked the Gurkhas why they were firing on innocent peaceful people. Two [were] saying in a very insolent tone *tum ko chhed dange* (we will pierce you). I stood quietly before them and said '*Main khara hun, goli maro* (I am standing, fire). At once eight or ten rifles were aimed at my breast and insolent threats went on.

The crowd could contain itself no longer and was about to rush, when a wave of my hand and a short appeal to their vow stopped them. But they were saying "Let us die and not you, let us die". The rifles had remained pointed at my breast for some three minutes, when a European on horse back approached and asked the only police man present whether he had ordered firing. I stepped forward and asked the European officer whether he had heard the rifle fire. He impatiently answered that he was enquiring about it.

I then left with the people following me. Then there was a strange sight. A Gurkha came near me brandishing his naked *kukri* right and left. No one being cowed down he left. The machine-gun motor was rattling away encircling us, with the gun constantly pointed at us, and with the hand of the gunner on it. The crowd was neither cowed down nor impatient.

At Fatehpuri I sent many of them home, but again many followed till I reached my place where all (Hindus and Muhammadans) took affectionate leave of me.

I have no sense of resentment against the military or the Government officials but those whose relations have been murdered or wounded are inconsolable and in the whole population of Delhi [there] is a sense of insecurity and complete distrust in the justice of the officers in-charge here. A helpless people, specially imbued now with *Satyagraha* principle, will keep quite but this shedding of blood on a bloodless day will not pass unnoticed by the Master of the Universe.

#### **257. Statement of P.L. Orde Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee<sup>1</sup>**

To sum up the conclusions to which these enquiries have led me are that the disturbances were not due to a conspiracy to rebel against the British Raj. It was never intended by the members of the *Satyagraha* Sabha or by others who fostered the agitation, that their activities should result in violence.

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, I, Pt. II, Delhi. p. 122. P.L. Orde: Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Delhi.

There is no doubt that the misrepresentation of the Rowlatt Acts had aroused strong feeling, and this is not a matter for wonder, since it was freely rumoured that the Acts gave power to the police to arrest any four men seen conversing together, that any land in excess of 50 *bighas* would be confiscated by Government and other such absurd fallacies. The riots occurred, however, simply because the men who had inflamed the mob were incapable of controlling it and not because they favoured an attempt to overcome the administration by force. It has been argued that if Gandhi had not been arrested, the second outbreak would not have taken place. Though somewhat discredited now, Gandhi was then a popular hero, and his arrest was undoubtedly the cause of much dissatisfaction. At the same time, there is no possible doubt that the result of visit from him—at a time when the people were again settling down to their normal occupations—would have merely unsettled them once more, particularly as he would undoubtedly have made capital out of the order excluding him from the Punjab, and would have started forth from Delhi on a deliberate and well-advertised infringement of this order, to say nothing of the probability that he would commit some illegal act which would have necessitated his arrest in Delhi were unconnected with any disturbances elsewhere in India, except in so far as they were due to similar causes. They were due partly to economic distress occasioned by the war, and partly to protracted political agitation culminating in a violent campaign against the unpopular Rowlatt Acts. It should be added that this political agitation was, almost exclusively, the work of men who are not natives of Delhi.

### **258. Miles Irving's Statement on the Amristar Disturbances<sup>1</sup>**

... On the morning of April 12th a military force was sent round the city to prevent a threatened disturbance and then marched into the city when a considerable number of important arrests were made. As trouble was threatened from Tarn Taran a small force was sent out on an armoured train, but owing to a misunderstanding did not remain there. After they had gone a body of villagers collected with the object of looting the *tehsil*, but were dispersed on a bold front being shown by Inspector Aziz-ud-Din and a few men. A permanent force was despatched early the next morning.

21. April 13.—About 2 a. m. this morning the line was cut between Chheharta and Khasa and a goods train derailed. The situation was still critical. In Amritsar the mob still, when out of sight of the military, boasted that it might be the Raj of the *Sarkar* outside, but inside it was *Hindu Musalman Ki Hakunmat*. At the same time villagers were pouring into the

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, III, Amritsar, p. 181.

city, and the wildest rumours were prevalent that the bazars would be looted. Subsequent inquiries make it appear that there were substantial grounds for this fear, and that the influx of villagers was inspired with the idea of loot and was not merely due to the *Baisakhi*. In the district the attitude of the people was still in suspense, and it was said that Government could not or would not use force. In the forenoon the Officer Commanding Troops, Brigadier-General Dyer, accompanied the Deputy Commissioner, marched through the city at the head of a body of troops with the object of giving a clear warning that no meetings should be allowed. At every important street the column stopped while this was announced by beat of drum. Notwithstanding this warning news was received at about 4 p.m. just after the column had returned, that a meeting was being assembled in the Jallianwala Bagh. The General took a small party of 50 Indian troops and an armoured car to the spot, being accompanied by the Superintendent of Police, and on entering the garden with the infantry found a large crowd assembled, which he considered necessary to disperse by fire. He estimated the casualties at about 200 to 300 killed, besides wounded. . . .

#### **259. Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smith on the Amritsar Disturbances<sup>1</sup>**

. . . I doubt if even Turkish affairs influenced the city Moslem as much as on the surface it would appear. What influenced both Hindu and Moslem was more allied to a wave of Bolshevism if some of the parties were not even in the pay of the Russo-German Bolshevik organisation. What facilitated the operations of the 10th April was the fact that the present system adopted in Municipal elections necessitates that aspirants for seats in the Municipal Council shall canvass for votes. Formerly the "classes" and the "masses" were not in intimate touch with each other. The present system implies organization. The organization has no scruples about employing the headmen of the hooligans of which there are many for purposes of intimidation. Hence for April the 10th there was experience of organising the poorer elements of the city and the hooligans, so that it was a comparatively easy matter with the funds at the disposal of the politicians to organise revolutionary mobs. If the Indian gentleman, who gave evidence be examined on this issue, I have no doubt that they will support my views.

I observed the development of the change in the temper of the people from being reasonable to being revolutionary. After the *hartal* on the 6th of April their mental attitude was to be able only to see different shades of red,

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, III, Amritsar, p. 192. Henry Smith was Civil Surgeon of Amritsar.

so to speak. This does not apply to all. There are many men in Amritsar who disapproved of the whole propaganda, but who, I am convinced, were so terrorised that they were afraid to be seen visiting an officer's bungalow. Those who command the chiefs of the hooligans of Amritsar—this requires money—can terrorize almost any resident.

... That the Sikh villagers did not act earlier I explain by the fact that in my opinion the city people did not take them into their confidence and that they were then not in the organisation, as the city people were afraid of them that they would at once go looting and display all the views associated with looting under such circumstances.

#### **260. Statement of Brigadier-General R.E.H. Dyer on the Firing in Jallianwala Bagh<sup>1</sup>**

I was faced by a dense mass of men evidently holding a seditious meeting. In the centre of the square was a raised platform and a man on it was gesticulating and addressing the crowd. The crowd appeared to be a mixed one, consisting of city people and outsiders. I did not see a single woman or child in the assembly. Many villagers were, I understand, induced to come to the Bagh by a promise that their taxes and land revenues would be abolished as the British Raj was at an end. Evidently those who came believing the British "Raj" was at an end were themselves not very innocent . . . .

The "*hartal*" continued in Gujranwala, Lahore, Lyallpur and other large cities until the news of the firing and the consequent opening of the shops at Amritsar on the 14th spread and then the news (exaggerated) of the measures taken against the mob at Amritsar reduced their morale, and they did not carry out their plans of loot and murder.

My work that morning, in personally conducting the proclamation, must be looked upon as one transaction with what had now come to pass. There was no reason to further parley with the mob, evidently they were there to defy the arm of the law.

The responsibility was very great. If I fired, I must fire with good effect, a small amount of firing would be a criminal act of folly.

I had the choice of carrying out a very distasteful and horrible duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing disorder or of becoming responsible for all future bloodshed.

We cannot be very brave unless we be possessed of a greater fear. I had considered the matter from every point of view. My duty and my military instincts told me to fire. My conscience was also clear on the point. What faced me was, what on the morrow, would be the *Danda Fauj*.

<sup>1</sup>The Disorder Inquiry Committee. Evidence, III, Amritsar, p. 203.

I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce, if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd; but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present but more specially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity.

Immediately after ceasing fire, the troops returned to the Ram Bagh and at once, on arrival, the man's pouches were examined. It was noted that 1,650 rounds had been fired. The ammunition used was .303" Mark VI, the ordinary ammunition issued by arsenal and used throughout the army. Fire was directed on to the crowd and not on to individuals. No military parties visited the Bagh subsequent to the firing either that night or the following morning.

The necessity was very great indeed and the means have been justified by the end.

Many inhabitants subsequently thanked me and recognised that I had committed a just and merciful act. In later days I was thanked by thousands and the press on one occasion was greater than the Circuit House grounds could hold.

I then estimated the crowd to number 5,000 but now learn that there were probably from 25,000 to 30,000 collected there and every man who escaped from the Jallianwala Bagh was a messenger to tell that law and order had been restored in Amritsar.

It may be asked whether after the shooting was over, I offered help to the wounded. I did not offer help because the military situation had to be considered throughout the incident. The crowd was so dense that if a determined rush has been made at any time, arms or no arms, my small force, instantly [would] have been overpowered and consequently I was very careful of not giving the mob a chance of organizing. I sometimes ceased fire and redirected my fire where the crowd was collecting more thickly. By the time I had completely dispersed the crowd, my ammunition was running short. I returned to the Ram Bagh without counting or inspecting the casualties. The crowd was free now to ask for medical aid, but this they avoided doing lest they themselves be proved to have attended the assembly. They asked if they might bury their dead, and to this I consented . . . .

## 261. Statement of E. P. Broadway on the Nature of Agitation<sup>1</sup>

*Classes prominent in prompting Disturbances*

. . . Artisans and menials make up 40 per cent of the convictions by the

<sup>1</sup>The Disorder Inquiry Committee, Evidence, IV, Lahore, pp. 340-41.  
E.P. Broadway was Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

Special Tribunals. It was not a rural movement in any way: 77.7 per cent of persons convicted of rioting were urban and less than 15 per cent *zemindars*. Only one returned emigrant was convicted. Over 50 per cent of the convicts were literate. This, however, does not mean that over 50 per cent of the mobs were literate, but that the literate, who it is true, were quite a considerable proportion were the more prominent and easily recognised. The rural 20 per cent was confined to a small group of villages near Lahore, e.g. Wagah, etc. Hardly any students were convicted, for boys, having less developed features, are naturally not easily identified by lookers on. But very large number were punished departmentally at Lahore and Kasur because they were known to have been concerned in the disturbances.

Of Government servants, nine were convicted in connection with the Lahore disturbances. Twelve in all are shown but two of these were in the Kasur cases, and one was a police sub-inspector, convicted for extorting a bribe, and not for taking part in the disturbances. Of these nine, none occupied a high position. It may be noted that one is an engine driver, one a railway office clerk and one an employee of the telegraph department. The palpable treachery of the railways staff at Kasur is dealt with separately.

The police and the military show up very well as regards the disturbances. The only case of a policeman shown convicted was not (*see above*) one of sedition.

The one entry under 'soldier' refers only to a *khalasi* attached to a regiment. One soldier was convicted by a Summary Court (at Kasur), but this case too had nothing to do with sedition. Seeing that a large number of demobilised soldiers especially of those recruited towards the end of the war, were in the town and the few villagers disaffected, this is not only a sign of the loyalty of the military but a further disproof of the allegation that recent recruiting methods were among the causes of disaffection.

#### *Nature of Movement, how far disloyal, anti-European or anti-Christian*

The movement at Lahore was primarily anti-Government. The idea was to stop Government work, paralyse communications, and inconvenience Europeans to such an extent that Government would be forced to capitulate over the Rowlatt Act. Any other motives were secondary and due to the fact that an Indian crowd is too excitable to be passive merely. Thus the movement incidentally revealed the real feelings of the urban population towards Britain. It may be said that they have no real feelings of loyalty or gratitude for favours past or to come. In their excitement they were willing to burn photographs of the King and Queen and so to show that it is not merely the 'bureaucracy' in India that they hate but England.

In Lahore District as a whole the movement was not anti-Christian, as it was in Gujranwala and Amritsar. The churches and missionary buildings and schools of Lahore and the missionaries scattered through the district were not attacked nor were Indian Christians singled out for maltreatment.

The Gandhi movement, as it appeared in Lahore, was directed against the Government, and, therefore, against all its officers; and as the Government was identified with the British, the latter were viewed collectively as foes. In opposing the Government the first aim was to hold up communications. Therefore, telegraph wires were cut extensively in Lahore and the district; successful attempts were made to derail trains; and the Railway staff were tempered with. A partial strike was engineered at the Railway station, and in the carriage and wagon and the Loco shops for several days in the middle of April only a small proportion of the men were at work. This was also due to picketing, whereby not only railway employees but government clerks of all descriptions were hindered from going to work. The railway employees had to be protected by police with drawn bayonets. Efforts were also made to attack the Lahore Railway Station, and the time office was at one time in danger. Railway stations all over the district were attacked and looted, and rails tempered with. Near Lahore also large grass farm stocks were burned.

The second method of opposing Government, or rather of displaying hatred of it, was to insult or attack officials. Repeated efforts were made by the mob to reach Government House. Their intention was, of course, to make a demonstration, but there is no shadow of doubt that had they reached there they would have lost their heads and run riot, and acted as their brethren at Amritsar did....

The police were constantly hooted and abused and stoned by the mob. On March 9th English Police officers entering the Breadlaugh Hall meeting were hooted. Many police [men] sustained slight injuries during the riots and in one case a CID (Indian) officer was nearly killed by the crowd at the Badshahi Mosque.

The people also displayed their anger with all creatures or supporters of the Government. At the Ram Naumi procession on April 9th in which Hindus and Muhammadans fraternized, supporters of Government were threatened and warned to keep away. On the 6th April crowds visited the dwellings of Honorary Magistrates and Municipal Commissioners (other than who were disloyal) and threw stones and shouted out abuse.

It was said above that the anti-government feeling when translated into action became anti-British. This was witnessed at Kasur. At Lahore the forces of law and order were too strong. But officers who were in the midst of events say that the people's faces were disfigured with fury, and that they used to shout out expressions of hatred of the English. Many instances were found of illustrated papers and of pictures being disfigured by filthy and obscene allusions to Europeans. And the very fact that the news of the four murders at Amritsar, instead of inducing the people to drop the movement, inspired them to redouble their efforts shows what their sentiments were.

### **262. E.D. Lucas's Statement on the Students Political Activity<sup>1</sup>**

. . . The year 1918-1919 started unpropitiously with the epidemic of influenza in October and November. The armistice came when the Lahore Colleges were closed on account of this epidemic. When the students re-gathered on the 19th, a few weeks were occupied in victory celebrations. One felt that students were not very enthusiastic about the victory, in fact, their whole attitude towards the war was one of extreme indifference. In December the National Congress met at Delhi, and some of our students attended it. Then came the debate in the Legislative Council over the Rowlatt Bill. The students regarded this Bill as an attempt to destroy the political liberties of India. They believed all that was said about the tyrannical nature of the Bill, and from January on much political excitement prevailed amongst the students of Lahore. In March came Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* movement and the *hartals* or strikes. The disturbances in Delhi on March 30th were regarded by the students as an initial attempt of the Government to check political activities, and those who were killed were regarded as martyrs. April 6th was observed as a *hartal* in Lahore. Students were used as propagandists in the campaign to promote it, and went around among shopkeepers, tonga drivers and servants urging them to do no work on Sunday. In conversation with students I found that none of them had read the Rowlatt Act, but they believed it to be a very direct threat to all forms of political action. I remember one conversation with a senior student in which I said that this law was directed against revolutionists, and that when the trouble broke out as it did in Delhi instead of the real agitators being killed or wounded, innocent spectators or those who were in the mob from curiosity were often the ones to suffer. He replied that if he had a small son in such a crowd he would gladly have him martyred for the sake of his country. I could give many instances to show the excited and unnatural state of mind of the students. After the firing on the 10th the students did not attend their classes, looked upon those who had been injured and killed as martyrs, and induced all students to regard those days as set aside for mourning. There was a great deal of talk about Hindu and Muhammadan unity, and Hindus and Muhammadans ate and drank together freely for a few days. On Friday evening, the 11th, in Newton Hall I tried to reason with the students living there pointing out to them that they had disobeyed the orders of the Government, and must expect to suffer, but they refused to listen to me. On the same day students insulted European ladies on the streets, and racial feeling was very strong. I think this covers the ground which I have been asked to report upon, but I would close with this remark. I believe that the difficulties of the students have perhaps not been fully appreciated. . . .

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, IV, Lahore, pp. 352-53. E.D. Lucas: Principal Foreman Christian College, Lahore.

**263. P. Marsden's Statement on the Disturbances in Kasur<sup>1</sup>**

*IV. Classes Prominent in Promoting Disturbances*

The main responsibility lies on the pleaders. The masses regarded them as leaders, and at every turn sought them out to make speeches. It is quite clear that the Bar had gone in for violent and indiscriminate, as well as uninformed, criticism of the Rowlatt Act.

The most inflammable material kindled by the above was the students. Young men of 16 and 17 from the schools were in the forefront, and even tiny boys were as violent as any one.

The mass of the crowd was composed of the lowest classes, viz. sweepers and artisans and leather-workers and butchers. Kasur swarms with these especially the 'Kots' near the station, and to this fact may be attributed the despicable nature of the mob. The men had a Dutch courage, which led them to throw stones at a distance and attack *en masse* but not to grapple individually with Europeans, who were thus able to escape through the scattered portions of the mob; and there was no attempt made to attack the very small band of police who fired on the large crowd from outside the Tehsil.

The shopkeepers also were prominent (several were convicted) and the *hartal* was universal and mainly voluntary in the bazars. So it may be said that the unrest was universal extending as it did through the professional, trading, labouring, menial and student classes.

**264. B.N. Bosworth-Smith on the Disturbances in Gujranwala<sup>2</sup>**

*IV. Classes Prominent in Promoting Disturbances*

The total number of really disaffected persons in this district was probably under three figures, though some ten thousand persons took part in demonstrations, looting or destroying without really knowing what they were doing.

In tracing the causes of disaffection it is a safe golden rule to look near home first of all. There is no place where disloyalty is so deep as in Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar. Similarly, in this tract, the homes of disloyalty were to be found in Sheikhupura, the headquarters of the Sub-Division, and the two markets at Chuharkana and Sangla. In Sheikhupura, a retired Inspector of Police, whose two sons were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and half a dozen pleaders and their *munshis* were

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, IV, Lahore, p. 364. P. Marsden: I.C.S., Sub-Division Officer, Kasur.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., V, Pt. III, pp. 212-23.

prominent. Had there been no pleaders in Sheikhupura, it is safe to say that there would have been no trouble there . . . .

#### *VI. Punitive Measures*

The total damage to public and private property was Rs. 27, 367-3-9, mostly at the railway stations. Only seven cases were dealt with by the Commission and substantial sentences were given; over 499 people were dealt with and 323 were convicted. In all, 40 whipping sentences were ordered, nearly all in the case of juveniles to save them from going to jail. The whipping was much less severe than that given in jail, and it was not public, though it was administered in the compound of the Canal Bungalows after the Court rose. No sentences of whipping were given for any offences committed after the 19th of April.

#### *VII. Effect of Disturbances and the Measures taken*

Traders are always a source of danger in bringing in new ideas, and will become increasingly so amongst the fiery and war-like population of the Punjab when places like Delhi are allowed to bring compulsion and pressure to bear on the trading community in the Punjab by refusing credit and the like with the object of securing their own disloyal aims. It should be made a penal offence for any trader to threaten another with stoppage of credit etc., in order to achieve a political end. There is nothing to prevent Delhi in the future stirring up similar trouble in the Punjab by similar methods. It was Delhi which forced a *hartal* on Ambala Cantonment and bazar, where the people were most loyal and most reluctant to take up such an attitude. A *hartal* is in itself illegal and an open incitement of violence, which should not be allowed after the present experience in the Punjab.

### **265. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain on the Disturbances in Lahore<sup>1</sup>**

#### *Administration of Martial Law.*

1. *Night passes.*—Required on the basis of nationality. An Indian Judge of the High Court, an Additional Secretary to the Punjab Government and Pro-Government men like Mr. [Mian Mohammad] Shafi and Sir Zulfikar [Zulfiqar] Ali<sup>2</sup> all required Night passes.

2.—*Passes for Travelling.*—As a rule issued only on the recommendation of a non-Indian, and Indian could get a pass if recommended by his Anglo-Indian chauffeur or butler, but not on his own representation. Mr. Shafi

<sup>1</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, V, Pt. III, pp. 241-42.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan: A prominent figure of Lahore.

(now member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy) and Sir Zulfikar [Zulfiqar] Ali (Khan) and Mr. Shah Nawaz<sup>1</sup> can support this allegation.

3. Martial Law Regulations made to punish those who had been taking leading part in political movements, e.g. placarding the gate posts and walls of the residences of such men. This distinction was conferred on me also though on account of my absence from Lahore, no fault could otherwise be found with me. . . .

4. Members of the Legal profession were subjected to greater annoyances and indignities than others.

5. Students were subjected to great indignities and humiliation. In some colleges parades were called four times a day in the hot sun, and Military arrangements for roll call under the shadow of bayonets and machine guns were obviously made to humiliate them and touch their imaginations rather than secure peace and good order.

6. Incidents as to compulsory salaaming by respectable people have occurred in Lahore (Mr. Shah Nawaz, B.A., LL.B., Bar-at-Law, Lahore, can give instances) and Mr. Bashir Ahmad, B.A. (Punjab and Oxon) Barister-at-Law, son of the last Justice Shah Din and son-in-law of the Hon'able Main Mohammad Shafi was one of the victims . . . .

*Effect of the Introduction of Martial Law and its continuance for more than two months and its Administration*

1. Faith of the people in British Justice and Rule of Law has been undermined. It has whitewashed Ahmadshahs and Nadarshahs whom in our school days [we were] taught to dread as inhuman tyrants. The very foundations on which the British Empire in India is based have been shaken and in consequence the cause of peace and good order cannot be said to have been served.

2. Coming as it has done within a year of the end of World War, it has shown that the authorities in India responsible for it have yet to be converted to the doctrine that Right is Might.

**266. Statement of R.B. Whitehead on the Disturbances in Ambala<sup>2</sup>**

. . . One or two reasons why the recent movement made so little an impression here can at once be set down. First of all the District is essentially rural. The so-called Ambala City, though the largest town after Ambala Cantonment, only contains 26,000 inhabitants : Jagadhri comes next with

<sup>1</sup>Mian Shah Nawaz, A prominent lawyer of Lahore and later a member of the Punjab Legislative Council.

<sup>2</sup>The Disorders Inquiry Committee, Evidence, V, Pt. III, p. 245. R.B. Whithead was the Deputy Commissioner at Ambala.

11,000. Then the peasants of the three southern *Tehsils* are poor-spirited and backward . . . . The Rupar Sub-Division is more efficient and progressive, but the District takes little or no interest in politics and modern problems of the day. Ambala is quite a different world from the Central Punjab. The people are leaderless, they still dislike and distrust the *Jagirdars* themselves with a few honourable exceptions are sunk in a life of indolence and self-indulgence and have no influence.

The Arya Samajists have seized upon the *Satyagraha* movement as a means of embarrassing Government, but it happens that the leaders of that community in Ambala City are moderate men.

**267. Montagu to Chelmsford on the Report of the Hunter Committee<sup>1</sup>, 26 May 1920**

His Majesty's Government have considered the report of Lord Hunter's Committee upon the disturbances which occurred in the Punjab and other parts of India in the early part of last year. They have further been informed by me of the conclusions at which Your Excellency's Government had arrived in your own review of the report as expressed in your letter dated the 3rd May the text of which you have telegraphed to me. The report and your letter naturally cover ground which His Majesty's Government did not feel called upon to survey in detail, but their consideration of the matter has led them to definite decisions upon certain of the more important questions arising out of the report, and they have desired me to communicate to you in my reply to your letter their considered statement of these decisions . . . .

The principle which has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the methods to be employed, when military action in support of the civil authority is required, may be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary. His Majesty's Government are determined that this principle shall remain the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire.

It must regretfully but without possibility of doubt be concluded that Brigadier-General Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh was in complete violation of this principle . . . .

His Majesty's Government repudiate emphatically the doctrine upon which Brigadier-General Dyer based his action—action which to judge from his own statement might have taken an even more drastic form had he had a larger force at his disposal and had a physical accident not prevented him

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. A, June 1920, Nos. 126-64 and K.W.

from using his armoured cars. They have not overlooked the extreme gravity of the situation as it presented itself to the authorities in India, generally, and to Brigadier-General Dyer, in particular, on April the 13th, nor have they failed to appreciate the immensity of the responsibility which Brigadier-General Dyer felt and rightly felt to be imposed upon him by that situation. They think it is possible that the danger to the lives of Europeans and to the safety of the British and Indian troops was greater than appears from the Committee's report. In Amritsar itself violent murder and arson of the most savage description had occurred three days previously and the city was still practically in possession of the mob. From the surrounding country-side reports were hourly being received of similar violent outbreaks and attacks upon communications, and the deficiencies in these reports (due to the success of the attacks on communications) were supplemented by rumours which there was little means of verifying and as little ground for disbelieving. In discharging this responsibility with the small force at his disposal Brigadier-General Dyer naturally could not dismiss from his mind the conditions in the Punjab generally and he was entitled to lay his plans with reference to those conditions. But he was not entitled to select for condign punishment an unarmed crowd which, when he inflicted that punishment, had committed no act of violence, had made no attempt to oppose him by force, and many members of which must have been unaware that they were disobeying his commands . . . .

9. As to the conclusions which Your Excellency's Government have recorded on other matters arising out of this report, I am glad to find that I am in general accord with your views, save in so far as otherwise appears from the foregoing paragraphs and I have little further to add at the present moment. Your Excellency's Government will, however, understand that the publication of documents in which the public, both in India and in this county, is vitally interested is not necessarily a final settlement of all the large questions involved. In particular, I shall expect you to submit for my early approval the draft of the Martial Law manual which you have under consideration. To this matter I attach the utmost importance. I need hardly say that I most earnestly trust that occasion may never arise for the enforcement of such rules. But this enquiry will have served a valuable purpose if it results in the enactment of a code of regulations calculated to ensure, so far as human foresight can serve, a system of administration which is at once adequate to repress disorder, to secure the speedy, just and fitting punishment of its promoters, and which yet subverts no more than the fulfilment of the requirements necessitates the ordinary rights and course of life of the people at large, and adheres to the processes of civil justice and Government. For in view of conditions which threaten the existence of the State, Martial Law is a necessary remedy, but it is a remedy which unless applied with wisdom and good judgement loses its value. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to do all in our power to prevent the depreciation of its value by

misuse. The same observations apply in my judgement to deportation, an expedient which in its present form it is so notoriously difficult to employ and the effects of which are so incapable of exact estimation.

10. His Majesty's Government found it necessary to criticise in strong terms the conduct of certain officers charged with the administration of Martial Law and Your Excellency's Government have indicated that all proved cases of abuse of their powers on the part of the subordinate officers of the police and other services will receive due notice. But these exceptions apart, His Majesty's Government desire me to express to you in no uncertain terms their warm endorsement of your appreciation of the conduct of officers and men, both civil and military, both British and Indian, upon whom fell the heavy task of assisting the people of India to recover their fair name for loyalty and orderliness. The burden thus imposed upon officers and men of His Majesty's British and Indian armies, of his police force and of his civil services who had already borne with fortitude but not without fatigue the trials and strain arising from a long drawn war, was a heavy one. In setting themselves to their task these men proved true to the great traditions of their services . . . .

#### **268. Sir Harcourt Butler to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>1</sup> 27 May 1920**

. . . Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru told me this morning that he liked the tone of the despatches on the Hunter Committee's Report, but that no Indian would ever accept the white-washing of O'Dwyer. There will be fireworks on both sides. Many, perhaps, are rather tired of the business and the controversy.

The extremists are making a great effort to cement the *entente* over the Khilafat question. There is a big meeting here on the 1st June. But the Musalmans will not give up their appointments, or professional practice as advised by Gandhi and Co. There are rifts in the Hindu-Mussalmans lute already.

It is very hot, but I am glad that I came down. I hope that I have been able to study some of our leaders. Opinion is quite unanimous that Government should pursue a patient policy with Musalmans just now.

#### **269. Resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee held in Benares,<sup>2</sup> 30 and 31 May 1920**

. . . 3. (b) That a petition be presented to Parliament on the subject of

Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 24, Roll 11, No. 628, pp. 530-31, NMML. Sir Harcourt Butler, Governor of U.P.

<sup>1</sup>A I.C.C. Papers (Supplementary), 1920, File No. 18, NMML.

the Punjab tragedy and that Parliament be requested to take immediate steps to institute proceedings, by way of impeachment or otherwise, to bring Sir Michael O'Dwyer to justice in respect of his oppressive regime in the Punjab and especially of his responsibility in connection with the events of 1919 in the Punjab.

(c) That the British Congress Committee and the Congress Delegation in England be authorised and requested to take immediate action to move the British Parliament and the British public with a view to secure full justice in the matter.

(d) That Parliament be requested to take such steps as are necessary to place General Dyer, Col. Johnson, Col. O'Brien and Mr. Bosworth-Smith before His Majesty's Court of Justice in Great Britain for the cruelties committed by them in April and May, 1919 in Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur and other places in the Punjab, and urges :

(e) That the Rowlatt Act should be repealed.

(f) That Rai Sahib Sri Ram Sud and Malik Sahib Khan be dismissed and prosecuted.

(g) That a local enquiry be instituted into the corrupt practices of minor officials whose names have been mentioned in the statements published in the Congress Commissions Report and that they should be dismissed and prosecuted, where sufficient evidence is available.

(h) That His Excellency the Viceroy be recalled.

(i) That the fines collected from the people who were convicted by the Special Tribunals and Summary Courts be refunded and all indemnities imposed on the cities affected be remitted, that wherever the same have been collected they should be refunded and that compensation be awarded to those who have suffered in the disturbances or whose relations have fallen victims and have themselves been left unprovided for . . . .

4. That the All-India Congress Committee records its indignant protest against the general policy and attitude of the Secretary of State for India on the Punjab affairs as disclosed in his Despatch on the Hunter Committee's Report and aganist the action of His Majesty's Government in accepting the principal recommendations of the majority of the Hunter Committee and in disposing of the grave and vital issues involved in the Punjab tragedy, affecting the conduct of their responsible agents without giving an opportunity for public criticism or debate in the Houses of Parliament on the gross outrages committed on His Majesty's subjects in India.

5. That the All-India Congress Committee desires to place on record its profound disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Report of the majority of the Hunter Committee on the events of last year in the Punjab and elsewhere and its complete dissent from their principal findings and recommendations.

6. That the All-India Congress Committee records its opinion that the inquiry conducted by the Hunter Committee was incomplete, one-sided and

unsatisfactory by reason of the refusal to grant the necessary facilities asked for by the Congress Sub-Committee to enable it to tender evidence, thereby shutting out important evidence and specially that of the very leaders of the Punjab whose acts, among other things, the Committee was called upon to investigate.

7. That the All-India Congress Committee deplores that the Report of the majority of the Hunter Committee should be tainted with racial bias and a desire to overlook and justify the manifest and proved grave acts of commission and omission of the Government of India and the Punjab Government and the many acts of inhumanity perpetrated by officers appointed during the Martial Law regime and that it should thus accentuate the tendency to count Indian life and honour as of little consequence.

8. That the All-India Congress Committee unhesitatingly rejects the conclusion of the majority that the Punjab was in a state of open rebellion and accepts the conclusions of the minority and the Indian member of the Government of India to the contrary.

9. That the All-India Congress Committee considers that the Government of India and the Punjab Government grievously erred in proclaiming Martial Law in the Punjab in every case after the disturbances had been quelled, in allowing it to be inhumanly administered and in continuing its administration for periods altogether too long.

10. That the All-India Congress Committee is clearly of opinion that *Satyagraha* was not responsible in any manner or degree for the disturbances in the Punjab and elsewhere and entirely dissents from the conclusions of the majority and minority of the Hunter Committee on this point. On the contrary, the Committee places its emphatic conviction on record that the teachings of Mr. Gandhi and the *Satyagraha* movement exercised a great restraining influence on the people in all parts of the country during a period of anxiety and excitement.

11. (a) The All-India Congress Committee regrets to learn that nearly 88 persons who were imprisoned in connection with last year's troubles in the Punjab and under sentences of Martial Law Tribunal are still undergoing imprisonment, and requests his Excellency the Viceroy and His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to set them at liberty in conformity with His Majesty's Gracious Proclamation of December last.

(b) That in view of the special circumstances of the cases of Ratan Chand and Bugga Chaudhri, the Committee appeals to the Government of India and the Punjab Government to stop their contemplated transportation to the Andaman Island . . . .

13. The All-India Congress Committee is emphatically of opinion that the Peace Terms offered to Turkey constitute a flagrant violation of the solemn pledges of His Majesty's Government, and are in complete disregard of the principle of National Self-Determination accepted by the Allied Powers and of the Muslim religious sentiment in India. Having regard to

the fact that the resources of India were freely used during the war in Asia the Committee deplores that their employment should have eventuated, under the terms of the said Treaty, in the virtual destruction of the power and prestige of the Khilafat and the removal of the Holy places of Islam from the custody and control of the Khilafat and their being placed under Christian influence or control.

The Committee strongly urges that, in the interest of the peace and contentment in India, the terms of the Turkish Treaty should be revised to bring them into conformity with the said pledges and the just sentiments of Indian Mussulmans.

14. This Committee resolves that in view of the general situation in India with reference to Indian public feeling on the Turkish Peace terms, the action of his Majesty's Government regarding the Punjab atrocities and the policy being pursued in giving effect to the Reform Scheme through the proposed draft rules and regulations, a Special Session of the Congress be convened at Calcutta as early as possible and not later than the 15th September, 1920 to consider the adoption of a policy of non-cooperation or of any other suitable course of action.

15. That the Provincial Congress Committee be invited to submit as early as possible to the General Secretaries their views on the principles and programme of non-cooperation and that this Committee should meet to consider those views some time before the Special Session of the Congress.

17. This Committee affirms that the Congress lead on the question of reforms has been given in Resolution No. XIV, passed at Amritsar dealing with the Reform Act and that no further consideration of the question by this Committee is necessary . . .

20. This Committee emphatically protests against the proclamation of the Seditious Meetings Act in the Province of Delhi as being opposed to the spirit of goodwill and cooperation and enjoined by His Imperial Majesty in His Gracious Proclamation of December last and as being detrimental to the successful inauguration of the New Era ushered in by the Reforms Act.

21. This Committee condemns the orders passed by the U.P. Government on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru extorting him from the Dehradun District in circumstance of exceptional inconvenience and trusts that better counsels will yet prevail with the said Government.

22. This Committee reiterates its demand for the cancellation of the orders of deportation passed on Mr. B.G. Horniman and earnestly appeals to the Government of his Excellency Sir George Lloyd to have them immediately revoked and strongly urges the release of the Savarkar brothers<sup>1</sup> in pursu-

<sup>1</sup>The reference is to V.D. Savarkar and his brother Ganesh Savarkar.

ance of the Royal Amnesty and especially in view of the undertaking given by them not to participate in unconstitutional agitation.

**270. M.R. Jayakar to G.N. Mishra on the Punjab Inquiry,<sup>1</sup>**  
**11 June 1920**

Your letter of the 5th instant reached me here about three days ago on my arrival in Bombay. I am grateful to the All-India Congress Committee and Pandit Motilal Nehru for their confidence in asking me to draft the proposed petition to Parliament about the Punjab tragedy. I regret, however, that I cannot undertake the work of drafting the petition. I am all spent up and feel so jaded about the Punjab topic owing to the hourly contact maintained with it during the last five months that it is impossible for my mind to recover its freshness of view about the subject for sometime yet. The very words Jallianwala Bagh have become an obsession so much so indeed that I have not yet read even the Hunter Committee Report beyond the few extracts quoted in the Newspapers. It is something like having to conduct a case for five months on end and I am full at present of the same anxiety to be relieved of the monotony that a lawyer would feel at the end of a half year's hearing.

Please, therefore, excuse me the drafting work. Don't feel equal to it. I would prefer a fresh mind to do it. A few men of my age who assisted us in Lahore will prove suitable for this work and will only be too glad to do the skeleton draft which may afterwards be put into proper form by the Committee appointed by the A.I.C.C. I am sure Mr. K. Santanam, our Secretary at Lahore, will prove useful.

**271. On the Hunter Committee Reports<sup>2</sup>**

Even the publication of the Hunter Reports has not brought the Punjab drama to a close. It has on the contrary given a fresh impetus to agitation. We think that had the Europeans not sided with Dyer and O'Dwyer, the agitation would not have arisen afresh. Whenever any European oppresses any Indian, the Anglo-Indians, forgetting their traditions of justice, side with the oppressor. Where is then the hope of cooperation with them?

<sup>1</sup>M.R. Jayakar, Correspondence, File No. 474.

<sup>2</sup>Dainik Basumati (Calcutta), 25 June 1920, Report on Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 390.

### **272. Plea for Action Against Officials<sup>1</sup>**

If General Dyer be not punished for atrocities which he admitted to have committed, on what justification can Britishers try and punish German soldiers for cruelty on the battlefield . . . . The Secretary of State's opinions was not in the least reassuring. It may be concluded from Sir Michael O'Dwyer's statement that he received the support of Mr. Montagu. It is now admirable on one part to seek the aid of a law court. For, aught we know, criminal and civil suit may be instituted in spite of the Indemnity Act, against the officials connected with the Punjab disturbances. But it is doubtful whether we shall get justice in the courts of India. There is small hope even in England. Is the decision of the Privy Council as to the necessity of proclaiming Martial Law promising in any way? It is necessary to file a suit in India and await developments. Dr. Moti Lal [Nehru] has already taken the initiative in the matter and every Indian ought to encourage him.

### **273. The Reform Scheme<sup>2</sup>**

Of what avail is the Reform Scheme? What is this jubilation for? It only makes for sin and declares the invincible power of the *Asuras* known that none of them—Besant . . . Chelmsford or Montagu—is your friend. The hood of the serpent has been raised and it will bite each of us—you, myself and all. By ready, be ready otherwise there is no hope left.

### **274. The Khilafat Agitation<sup>3</sup>**

Reports from Bengal, Bombay and Sindh on this subject all indicate a lull. Non-cooperation is proving a difficult morsel to swallow and personal ambitions are strong even among some of the so-called leaders. Lajpat Rai's startling proposal of boycotting the Reformed Councils has been postponed for further deliberation. The only noteworthy items in the reports are the consultation of the Bengal leaders by Jinnah as to boycotting the reception committee formed in connection with the Prince's visit and the propaganda of intimidation and abuse carried on by the *Al-Wahid* of Karachi against loyal Muhammadans. Outwardly there is comparative calm, whatever is

<sup>1</sup> *Hitavadi*, 25 June 1920, Report on Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> *Nabya Bharat* (Calcutta), 5 July 1920, Report on the English Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Weekly Report, DCI, 5 July 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, July 1920, No. 104.

going on below the surface. As to this it is reported that three prominent Sindh agitators are going to Afghanistan on a pretence of *hijrat*, but really with the intention of rousing trans-frontier feeling against the British.

### 275. British Repression<sup>1</sup>

A truly valiant man is he who tries to redress the oppression on his mother, sisters and brothers and kinsmen and take revenge for them personally. If he fails to carry out that object alone, he seeks the aid of others to assist him in the work of revenge. If that work is thwarted, a self-respecting person feels greatly humiliated and sits idle or commits suicide, if unable to endure more. Sir Narayana [Chandavarkar] and Pandit Madan Mohan [Malaviya] have become so accustomed to the art of begging that they are still praying for redress at the door of the British for the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. And this prattling is being indicated at a time when the Hunter Committee's report has been published, and four white members of the said Committee have failed to find any fault with the Anglo-Indian community. The Viceroy and Mr. Montagu have praised Sir Michael O' Dwyer, and the Anglo Indian, both men and women, are proclaiming that General Dyer was their saviour. Have you forgotten in so short a time the language used by the General in giving evidence before the Committee? Every Anglo-Indian editor has approved of that language. Surely we cannot praise the sense of self-respect of those who can ask for such alms even after all this! Chelmsford, O' Dwyer and Dyer are officials of the conquering British nation and have come to this country to keep thousands of blacks in subjection. No body consulted you when they were appointed and they themselves are responsible to the English for their actions. Their appointments do not rest either with or on your praise or censure. We subject [sic] cannot ask for the recall of any one of them—we have not got that authority. To whom again are you humbly praying for their punishment. You are beseeching those who appointed them and are their kinsmen. It is impossible for the people of any other country but the English educated community of India to commit such a shameless act. Barring a handful of whimsical Englishmen the British public generally believes that the Jallianwala Bagh massacre was brought about for just reasons. On what grounds after this, do you ask the British nation to recall Lord Chelmsford? Why do you forget who you are [and] what are you? You killed six Englishmen, but why do you forget that many Englishmen will not be satisfied even by killing 60,000 of you? The administration of the English is based on terror-

<sup>1</sup>Nayak (Calcutta), 6 July 1920, Report on the English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 69.

ism and its secret is frightfulness. We have learnt that since the Punjab incidents, why do you not understand that? Why do you insist like a child on a thing which cannot or will not come to pass! Shame on your intelligence!

### **276. The Non-Cooperation Agitation<sup>1</sup>**

The non-cooperation movement is evidently in its last gasp. Not a word apparently was said about it at the recent Bombay meeting of the extremists nor at a Muhammadan meeting held not long ago, at Barisal, a centre of Muhammadans opinion. Mr. Gandhi and Lala Lajpat Rai now stand forth as almost the sole sponsors of a meaning, if not a discredited, movement. They are strenuously fighting for the cause, but their followers are falling off, they have certainly become lukewarm in their support. In Bengal, no body seriously talks about it. The accredited organ of extremism in this province is discreetly silent. Extremist champions do not hesitate to serve Governments in one capacity or another; Loud in their protests—of firm adherence to the Khilafat and the latter day Congress programme, they seek no secret of repudiating it in practice, when convenient. Divergence between theory and practice, between profession and conduct, is not calculated to inspire public confidence. Signs of warning public faith in the loud protestations of non-cooperation are visible on all sides. The rank and file are losing faith. The moderates, firm in their programme and in their convictions, are steadily gaining ground and they have the supreme satisfaction of noticing the conversion in theory as well as in practice of extremist leaders to their views. Their fundamental creed is operation with the Govt. where possible, opposition where necessary. They have preached this doctrine and have practised it with unfinished consistency.

### **277. H.S.L. Polak to C.F. Andrews on Ghandhi's Activities,<sup>2</sup> 7 July 1920**

. . . I entirely agree with all you say in regard to Ghandhi's activities in the Khilafat matter. It is very painful for me to have to feel that I am so

<sup>1</sup>Bengalee (Calcutta), 7 July 1920, Report on the English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, pp. 47-48.

<sup>2</sup>Banarsi Das Chaturvedi Collections, 1/B-497, NAI. H.S.L. Polak (1882-1959): Solicitor and Privy Council Agent; Attorney of the Supreme Council of South Africa, Transval, and Natal Provisional Division; associated with Ghandhi in South Africa.

far apart from him on this and cognate questions. I feel that he is showing himself to be a very dengerous, plausible and ill-informed fanatic on this question, and it seems that two things are inevitable, first, that he is helping to drag the country into untold difficulties, and impede the welfare of large members of his countrymen, and secondly, that he is rapidly deminishing the possibilities of useful public work for himself. The state of his health seems to be largely responsible for his mental attitude, and the extraordinary afflatus that possesses him at the present time. I have long since come to the conclusion that if Mohammad Ali's interpretation of Islam be correct, which I very strongly doubt, then Islam is a world danger to be fought remorselessly by all other peoples. With our love to you.

#### **278. Montagu on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 8 July 1920**

Are you going to keep your hold upon India by terrorism, racial humiliation and subordination, and frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon the goodwill, and the growing goodwill of the people of your Indian Empire ?

. . . The whole point of my observations is directed to this one question, that there is one theory upon which I think General Dyer acted, the theory of terrorism, and the theory of subordination. There is another theory, that of partnership, and I am trying to justify the theory endorsed by this House last year.

#### **279. Churchill on the Hunter Committee,<sup>2</sup> 8 July 1920**

However, we may dwell upon the difficulties of General Dyer during the Amritsar riots, upon the anxious and critical situation in the Punjab, upon the danger to Europeans throughout that province, upon the long delays which have taken place in reaching a decision about this officer, upon the procedure that was at this point or at that point adopted, however, we may dwell upon all this, one tremendous fact stands out—I mean the slaughter of nearly 400 persons and the wounding of probably three or four times as many at the Jallianwala Bagh on 13th April. That is an episode which ap-

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, Session 1920, Cols. 273-75.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Col. 290. Winston Churchill; Statesman and politician; Secretary for War and Air, Jan. 1919Feb. 1921.

pears to me to be without precedent or parallel in the modern history of the British Empire. It is an evidence of an entirely different order from any of those tragical occurrences which take place when troops are brought into collision with the civil population. It is an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation.

#### **280. Asquith on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 8 July 1920**

There is no evidence nor could there be that the bulk of the people were aware of the proclamation which had been issued earlier in the day. General Dyer with his troops, giving no warning of any sort or kind, fires indiscriminately into this mass of people until he has practically exhausted the whole of his available ammunition. There has never been such an incident in the whole annals of Anglo-Indian History, nor, I believe, in the history of our Empire, from its very inception down to the present day.

#### **281. Bennett on the Hunter Committee,<sup>2</sup> 8 July 1920**

If we are to continue the Dyer policy, the results must necessarily be no progress in India and no improvement in the relations between the people of India and the Government. The other day I had a letter from India, in which the writer—an Englishman who had lived the better part of his life there, and in whose judgement I place the most absolute confidence said "Dyer is the greatest asset that the extremists in India have got." . . . Dyerism will be enormous help to those who are trying to oust the British Government from its place in India. . . .

I hope that Hon. Members on that side who concentrate so much on the individual aspect of this case will realise its political importance and will realise that one of the lessons which we have derived from this experience is that we must never again allow the military authorities to get out of touch with the civil authorities. Let Hon. Members, if they want to see how things should be done, turn from Amritsar to Ahmedabad in the Bombay Presidency and see the success of an entirely different method. There the civil authority never lost touch with the military authority. The result was that within forty-eight hours the military authority was enabled to withdraw its orders suspending assemblages, and the abnormal conditions of things was brought to an end. The real lessons which the Government have to learn is

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, Session 1920, Col. 301.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Cols. 338-41.

to follow the example of Ahmedabad and never again allow the military authorities to get into such entire detachment from the civil authority as it was allowed to do at Amritsar, with consequence of the most deplorable kind.

### **282. Colonel Wedgwood on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 8 July 1920**

The principal charge I make against Dyer is not that he shot down Indians, but that he placed on English history the gravest blot since in days gone by we burned Joan of Arc at the stake.

. . . It is not just a question of punishing General Dyer. I agree with Mr. Gandhi, the great Indian, representing, I think, all that is finest in India, when he said, "We do not want to punish General Dyer; we have no desire for revenge; we want to change the system that produces General Dyers. That is what we must do . . . Britain's moral prestige, of greater consequence than military strength, will be irretrievably lost and peoples' hearts alienated from British rule." That message is sent by Jamnadas Dwarkadas who is a "moderate". That is the feeling of the moderates there about the course adopted by the extremists in India and England. It is an illustration of what I have said, that Hon. Members do not understand what is the feeling in India. They do not understand how near we are to Sinn Fein<sup>2</sup> in India, and that it will become more and more difficult to secure a settlement. . . .

What we are face to face with there is not a military uprising, but simply passive resistance. Once you get people refusing to take part in government, you may carry on for a few years, but in the end you will find yourselves where the Irish Government is to-day and without an Ulster!

I speak here today for thousands of Liberals as well as Labour Members in saying that we are against the Jallianwala Bagh murder, against the way in which Martial Law was carried on in the Punjab, against Sir Michael O'Dwyer and against the whole administration of the Punjab.

### **283. Gowyne on the Hunter Committee<sup>3</sup>, 8 July 1920**

What is Mr. Gandhi doing now? He started another organisation. He is

<sup>1</sup>Debate on the Indian Affairs, House of Commons, Session 1920, Cols. 353-56.

<sup>2</sup>A revolutionary and terrorist movement started in Ireland.

<sup>3</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Commons, Session 1920, Col. 368.

Stephen Lucius Gwynn (1864-1950): Author and politician, M.P. as an Irish Nationalist.

now at large in this country, and has even passed resolutions saying that his Excellency the Viceroy shall be approached and given notice of one month to see that the Turkish Peace terms are revised in accordance with Moslem sentiment and, in case it is not done, to start the movement of non-co-operation. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Wedgwood) said this movement of non-cooperation was hopeless in India, and it meant trouble. Here is Mr. Gandhi spreading it. He is at the head of the movement to bring about non-cooperation a fresh system of passive resistance, and that is the man whom the right hon. Gentleman [Wedgwood] is supporting.

#### **284. The Khilafat Agitation in India<sup>1</sup>**

The Khilafat agitation is not making headway. Meetings are held here and there with the object of preaching *Swadeshi* and inviting subscriptions in aid of the Khilafat Fund. In some places young men go about asking for donations. So far as I have been able to ascertain the collections are small and unsatisfactory. I have had talks with the most vehement exponents of the Khilafat who are also most active workers in the cause. They are pessimistic and complain that whilst their co-religionists are indifferent and apathetic, the Hindus do not go beyond lip sympathy. According to these people the progress of the Khilafat movement is very slow. A couple of months ago at a conference held in Delhi a Committee of Khilafat workers was formed. From a report of its work during the past six or seven weeks it appears that they claim that they have succeeded in inducing twenty thousand persons to take the *Swadeshi* vow and in getting half a dozen *Swadeshi* stores started. They complain that the subscriptions of their members are largely in arrears and that little or no real work is done. I have also talked with several Muhammadans who do not take the Khilafat agitation seriously and who maintain that but for the fuss made about the matter in the newspapers no one would do here anything about the Khilafat movement and the agitation connected therewith. I may mention that I have also met Muhammadans who whilst they do not deny that the Khilafat agitation has made no headway sincerely deplored what is going on in connection therewith. They say that the anti-Government and anti-British propaganda that is being carried on in the country under the auspices of the Khilafat Committees is gradually undermining respect for authority, injuriously affecting the law-abiding instincts of the people, injuring official prestige and authority and generally encouraging resort to disorders and lawlessness. There is undoubtedly some force in what these people say.

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 12 July 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, July 1920, No. 104.

**285. Venkatapati Raju's Question in the Madras Legislative Council and the Official Reply<sup>1</sup>, 13 July 1920**

*Venkatapati Raju's Question*

Q. Will the Government be pleased state

- (a) the number of deaths in the Madras Presidency due to influenza, plague, cholera, smallpox and malaria, respectively, during the last three years.

*The Official Reply*

- (a) The following statement shows number of deaths in the Presidency due to plague, cholera, smallpox and fevers in the three calendar years ending 1919

	1917	1918	1919
Plague	24,708	12,859	7,049
Cholera	58,938	1,22,263	87,268
Smallpox	34,958	51,752	43,022
Fevers	3,21,902	8,98,088	3,69,806

Sepapate figures for influenza and malaria are not available, these having been included under the general heading 'fevers'.

**286. Lord Sydenham's Question in the House of Lords and Lord Sinha's Reply,<sup>1</sup> 14 July 1920**

*Lord Sydenham's Question*

Will the important evidence of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Mr. Thompson, Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, General Hudson, Adjutant-General in India, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan be made public, and does his Majesty's Government approve the quotation in the minority report of selected progress from Sir M. O'Dwyer's evidence when the context has not been made available for the information of Parliament.

*Lord Sinha's Reply*

In reply to question I have to say that it is always desirable to treat as confidential evidence given *in camera*, and the Government of India are strongly opposed to the publication of the evidence of the witnesses mentioned, for reasons which the Secretary of State regards as conclusive. I have

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of Madras Legislative Council. July-Dec. 1920, XLVIII, p. 9. Venkatapati Raju: Member, Madras Legislative Council.

<sup>2</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Cols. 256-57.

no doubt that the noble Lord has noticed that portions of the evidence of Sir Michael O'Dwyer were quoted in both the Majority and Minority Reports. The conduct of the Committee is obviously a matter for the Chairman, and I, therefore, do not propose to express any opinion.

### **287. The Labour Agitation<sup>1</sup>**

Evidence is accumulating of the unhealthy lines on which the organisation of labour is proceeding in this country. Statistics of existing unions so far received demonstrate a preponderance of outsiders among the officials of the organised workers. The presence of intellectuals in the ranks of an incipient labour movement, when labour is more or less uneducated, is perhaps more or less inevitable, though this is not the way in which Unionism grew to its present strength in England. But when these intellectuals are all more or less of the same political complexion, and that [too] extremists there is danger of the power of organised labour being used for other purposes than economic. The latest phases of labour organisation are entirely undisguised; they are the formation of big unions and of cooperative bodies. These phases are apparently direct imitations of Trade Union experienced in England, Canada and possibly elsewhere.

In Bombay on July 7th there was held an advertised mass meeting of labour arranged by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Union, the Bombay Dock Workmen's Union and the Bombay United Textile Workmen's Union. It was attended by 300-400 persons including the self-constituted labour leaders of Bombay—Chaman Lal, Power,<sup>2</sup> [D.D.] Sathaye, etc. All these persons are extremist politicians and most of the speakers were drawn from their ranks. Baptista, Tilak's followers and the promoters of the Kamagar Mitra were absent. Two of the matters before the meeting were the holding of a workmen's congress in the near future and formation of a cultural Union. The meeting finally appointed sub-committees consisting entirely of politicians, one "charged with the object of forming a Provincial Federation of Bombay Workers", the other a reception Committee for the first All India Trade Union Congress. The speeches made at this meeting have not yet been reported; but it is not too much to expect that under the guidance of men little qualified to deal with labour questions, but obsessed by strong political prejudices, mass action may be directed to ends not purely economics.

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 19 July 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, July 1920, No. 104.

<sup>2</sup>Power : A prominent labour leader.

### 288. The Khilafat Agitation<sup>1</sup>

Reports received from Bengal, Bihar and Bombay indicate that the non-cooperation question and in particular the proposed *hartal* on August 1st, are receiving increased attention. The more determined leaders of the Khilafat Committee in Bengal are said to feel that unless they act unitedly and make some sort of a show in Calcutta, the whole movement in Bengal will fail. For this reason considerable pressure is being put upon the members of the committee, who do not favour non-cooperation. The following notice and declaration is being circulated by the Central Committee, though its appearance in only one district has been so far reported.

Brethren Hindus and Muhammadans of our country are hereby informed that the time is at hand when we should look to our own interest so that our country may prosper; and with our combined efforts we may get our lawful rights successfully, and, therefore, you should fill up the following declaration and send it to the officer in-charge of the Central Khilafat Committee.

#### DECLARATION

I hereby declare that from this day I will never use foreign goods except *Swadeshi* goods and also always try to draw the attention of my countrymen to the above declaration.

Signature-----

### 289. Gandhi's Political Activities<sup>2</sup>

I have stated at the commencement of this letter that so far as Mr. Gandhi is concerned, the die is cast. He has made up his mind to give Government all the trouble that he can. He knows that the non-cooperation scheme as propounded by him has been subjected to much adverse criticism in the country. He knows also that the Congress is not likely to endorse it. He knows at the same time that there is good deal of anti-government feeling in the country in connection with both the Khilafat and the Punjab questions, and he is anxious to make the most that he can of it, in the interest of his own anti-government propaganda. There is not

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Report, DCI, 19 July 1920, Home Poll. Deposit, July 1920, No. 104.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

the least doubt that Mr. Gandhi's ultimate object is to shatter the prestige of Government to pieces, and to bring about the collapse of the machinery of law and order all over the country. There is a general impression abroad that Government is afraid to touch him and this enables him to strengthen his propaganda of insidiously undermining the prestige of Government. There is no doubt that the policy of conciliation adopted by Government during the past eight or nine months has strengthened the forces of disorder in the country, and it is proved that the clemency shown in December last to agitators and law-breakers, especially in the Punjab, has done more harm than good. The majority of the men in the Punjab political agitators who have benefitted by the Royal Clemency of last year are doing all they can to embarrass Government. Their tongues and purses are freely employed to weaken the law-abiding instincts of the people. Mr. Gandhi sees in all this a capital opportunity to promote his anti-Government propaganda. Loyal and friendly Indians are of opinion that the greater the latitude allowed to Mr. Gandhi at present the more difficult will it be impression in the country that there are differences between the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India, and the former does not allow the latter to adopt effective measures to control the activities of those who take delight in provoking incitement to break the law. In political circles it is generally stated that the deterrent effect produced by the Martial Law administration of last year has been more than neutralised by the 'Hands off' policy that has been pursued for the past eight or nine months. Mr. Gandhi seems determined to take the fullest possible advantage of all this.

#### **290. Viscount Finlay on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 19 July 1920**

It is curious incident that the Sikh felt so strongly what General Dyer had done that they conferred upon him what, I believe, is a very rare honour, and what they regard as a very high honour, the honour of making him Sikh. The investiture consists in putting a slender armlet upon the wrist of the recipient of the honour. It is an honour that I am told that has never been conferred on any British subject before; and that was the action of the Sikh population of the district.

He [General Dyer] was condemned without trial and, as I believe, on a misconception as to the considerations which should govern a soldier in dealing with a local disturbance which is part of a general insurrection.

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Cols. 305-6. Robert Bannatyne Finlay (first Viscount Finlay) 1842-1929: Lawyer and politician, Solicitor-General, 1895; Attorney-General, 1920-5; Lord Chancellor, 1916; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Whether judged by that standard—the only true standard—his action was excessive, was a matter which, before he was condemned, should have been tried by a qualified Court of Inquiry; and I am certain of this, that any competent Court would, in such circumstances, attach very great weight to the opinion of the man who was on the spot and who had to decide.

#### 291. Lord Sinha on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 19 July 1920

. . . I will, therefore, content myself with a very few words only as to the Jallianwala Bagh incident and the decision of the Government thereupon I have incidentally referred to the details of the firing. I have told your Lordships that the crowd was unarmed; that it was listening to a lecture; and that there must have been, according to the case of the Punjab Government themselves, a very large number of outsiders from the Punjab who were not there for any political purposes; who were not aware even of the proclamation that had been made that morning: and who were there merely as spectators, and there is reason to believe that many of them had been misled into coming to that assembly by false representations as to what was going to be done there. That being so, I submit there was no justification for firing upon the crowd at once. It was not attacking anything or anybody; it was not doing any act of violence, it was sitting on the ground, and, as General Dyer himself said, there was no question of its trying to attack or rush him, or anything of that kind.

Assume, even on the basis of the reasoning that Lord Finlay has urged, that it was necessary or desirable, or justifiable to fire without previous notice, was it necessary to continue the firing, to the extent and in the manner that was done?

. . . Therefore, admittedly, we are on common ground that more force was used than was necessary to disperse the crowd, and if more force was used, it was used for what purpose? For the purpose of creating a moral effect; that is to say, of intimidation, terrorism, frightfulness, or whatever else you choose to call it. And that, my Lords, is the doctrine which I am profoundly thankful to think His Majesty's Government has emphatically repudiated. . . .

. . . But I cannot conclude these remarks without dwelling for one moment on the lessons to be learned from these bitter experiences, which would otherwise be thrown away. To my mind there are lessons to be learned both by the rulers and the ruled. Both sections of the Hunter Committee have unanimously said that the moment of *Satyagraha*, passive resistance, civil disobedience, or by whatever name it has been called, has been to

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Cols. 320-21.

some extent, at any rate, if not to a great extent, responsible for the spirit of lawlessness which resulted in these disorders. I ask my fellow-countrymen to lay well that lesson to their hearts. I ask them to disassociate themselves from similar pernicious movement started by Mr. Gandhi—a movement which he calls by another name that of non-cooperation. It can only lead to the same disastrous results as the *Satyagraha* or the civil disobedience movement, produced in April of last year. The more reasonable section of my countrymen—and they are by far the majority—have already disassociated themselves from this movement, and if the Government of India is only allowed to pursue the wise course it is now pursuing, I have no doubt that soon there will not be a single Indian, either Hindu or Musalman, who will subscribe to, or act upon, that doctrine.

. . . There is also another to be learned by the Government and that is the policy which was pursued so successfully in the United Provinces by Sir Harcourt Butler. In Bombay, by Sir George Lloyd, and in Bengal, by Lord Ronaldshay. Do not interfere too hastily or too violently, with an agitation of this nature. Let it kill itself; as in time it will . . . shops cannot be closed for ever. It is against the interests of the people themselves to allow that. Ruthless methods of repression and coercion result in disorder as much as passive resistance, and direct action or civil disobedience.

## 292. Lord Birkenhead on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 19 July 1920

I shall attempt and hope to justify, that he (Dyer) committed a tragic error of judgement upon the most conspicuous stage, and it would be a day of ill augury for the future of the British Empire if the view which he formed were well founded, and if the act of which we disapprove were allowed to pass with impunity.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer has recorded his opinion of the "Crawling Order" and he says that it was wholly indefensible. What was this which Sir Michael O'Dwyer found indefensible? It was an order, coming after all these tragic events, that in the street in which an English lady, Miss Sherwood, had been vilely and violently handled by a savage and blackguardly crowd, every one who went down that street was to go on "all fours".

The effect of this, of course, upon those who lived in the street was obvious. But others, and innocent people, were subjected to this vile

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Cols. 336-46. Lord Birkenhead, Fredrick Edwin Smith (1872-1930): M.P., 1906-18; Attorney-General, 1915-19; Lord Chancellor, 1919-22.

racial humiliation which, though it does not count by the side of blood, is sometimes far more tenacious in the memories and resentment of individuals and peoples than mere violence and blood.

**293. Lord Harris on the Hunter Committee,<sup>1</sup> 19 July 1920**

... Gandhi, if any one is the responsible author of all these riots, all this agitation, all the violence, and all the murders—not directly. I admit, but indirectly, unquestionably. His advice to resist Government action was the root and cause of the lamentable outrages and murders that followed. I must say a word here from my own experience. I think one of the most lamentable things about India is the dependence that is placed upon the theoretical view of half-educated people; people who may be very highly educated in literary matters, but who have absolutely no experience whatever of practical politics and the management of great masses of people. I dare say Mr. Gandhi is a benevolent person, or thinks he is, but he had no knowledge of what may result from such peaceful refusal to obey the law as he advocates.

**294. Lord Ampthill on the Hunter Committee,<sup>2</sup> 19 July 1920**

I shall endeavour to prove that the appointment of the Hunter Committee was a mistake; that its composition was faulty; that its investigations were incomplete; that its proceedings were questionable; and that its findings were inconsistent.

**295. Lord Meston on General Dyer's Action in the Punjab,<sup>3</sup>  
20 July 1920**

A lady who knows India very well and who lost her distinguished

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Col. 355. Sir Perry Alfred Harris: Liberal M.P.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Col. 363.

Ampthill, Baron, Arthur Oliver Villiers Russell (1869-1935): Governor of Madras, 1900-04; opposed the Indian Bill of 1919 in House of Lords.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, Col. 420. James Scorge Meston (1865-1947): I.C.S., Lieutenant-Governor, United Provinces, Agra and Oudh, 1912-18; Finance Member, Governor-General's Council, 1919.

husband in its service, said to me the other day; "General Dyer has done me a great disservice. I used to be quite happy about my boy and his young wife in their lonely station in Upper India. I am not happy now." That is what General Dyer has done. His vengeance has recoiled upon us in bitterness, in sadness, and in distrust.

**296. Earl Curzon of Kedleston on General Dyer's Firing in the Punjab,<sup>1</sup> 20 July 1920**

I do not wish to labour the point further, but the evidence, I think, is irresistible that General Dyer, although he acted, I admit, under extreme provocation, was unfortunately guilty of an act in respect of this "Crawling Order" which it is impossible to excuse; that it was intended to humiliate, and that an explanation has afterwards been found which is not consistent with the facts. I have said that the provocation was extreme and intense, and no one man can discern what another man would do in circumstances such as these, but I think this proclamation did indicate a lack of balance of mind and of soundness of judgment on the part of General Dyer. It makes one wonder very much whether "the man on the spot" can always be vested with the unquestioning discretion which was claimed for him by Lord Finlay last night.

**297. Congress Politics<sup>2</sup>**

One has to admit that the Congress, because of its large organisation, is the only body which is representative of that class of educated Indians who make a study of politics and who would push their way into positions of authority were the Govt. of India to resign, like the Manchus,<sup>3</sup> the reigns of office. We do not overlook the Moderates, but this party is not sufficiently organised to impress the public. For the present the Congress represents the opposition, and following the Home analogy, the Congress would assume the function of Govt. were the Govt. defeated by the elaborate intrigues that are at present proceeding both in England,

<sup>1</sup>Debate on Indian Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1920, Col. 426. George Nataniel Curzon, First Marquess of Kedleston (1859-1925): Under-Secretary for India, 1891-92; Viceroy of India, 1898-1905; Member of the War Council, 1916-18; Foreign Secretary, 1919-24.

<sup>2</sup>The Englishman, 20 July 1920, Report on the English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal 1920, p. 101.

<sup>3</sup>The Manchus ruled in China, 1644-1912.

and in this country. It happens, however, that there are fiercely antagonistic parties within the Congress itself, and there is no doubt that were India self-governed today she would be on the verge of civil war. When the Congress joined hands with the Moslem League, or rather when the League accepted the principles of the Congress, it was felt by Indian politicians that a great victory had been gained for Indian Nationalism. The League had not seen previously eye to eye with the Hindus, and, indeed, was originally formed with a view to preventing Hindu encroachments upon Muhammadan rights and privileges. It is no wonder then the Nationalists, working for Home Rule, acclaimed the Moslem alliance. It has happened, however, that the men who have impressed themselves on the League are not now taking an active part in the Congress [and] have ideals quite different from those of the Hindus. To begin with both parties joined the Khilafat agitation. Here was the very thing which would embarrass the Govt. The Hindu politicians joined with the Muhammadans in stirring up the ignorant Moslem with a cry of religion in danger. The Hindu extremists, when asked how their religion was in danger, said that they sympathised with the others, and that it was because of the poverty and strength of their own beliefs that they lent their aid to the Khilafat people. Of course, they were not aware that the latter would proceed from one preposterous argument to another, till they finally arrived at the present stage at which the Khilafat agitators stand committed to the definite statement that the Sultan of Turkey is the Temporal Ruler of all the Muhammadans and that if, as a result of the war, he is deprived of any of his territories, it will be the duty of the Indian Muslims to take up arms in his behalf for the threat of violence and nothing else is what lies behind the utterances of the Khilafat agitators. Very obviously here is a declaration of policy to which no Hindu can subscribe. The Hindu extremists are very anxious to get rid of the British, but with the exception of Mr. Gandhi, whose conceit has clouded his judgement, they all see that unless they are very careful any British withdrawal will be followed by Muhammadan supremacy. They have no desire to be ruled by Afghans or Turks, who are frankly despotic in their methods. They have as little desire to be governed by Indian Muslims, who would certainly assume all authority were the Khilafat agitation to assume all uncontrollable dimensions. Many of the extremists are now greatly alarmed at the proposals made by Mr. Gandhi and there can be no doubt that a great split is pending in the Congress ranks. The difficulty about the exact locality in which the special session of the Congress is to be held, is due to the fact that Congress leaders themselves are wavering and undecided. People who do not want to commit themselves can always make the excuse that business or private affairs have prevented them from making the long journey to such and such a town, but if the sessions are held in their town, they are in a hob. A few mis-

chievous extremists, however, who are too deeply implicated in the pro-Turk movement to draw back, are anxious that the sessions should be held in their own districts. In the meanwhile, it is by no means settled that the session will take place in Calcutta.

**298. Khaparde on the Punjab Affairs in England,<sup>1</sup> 20 July 1920**

Later on came Mr. Bomanji and spoke about how he made remarks at Curzon House in the presence of Lord Curzon and Sir O'Dwyer and the latter's wife. Then he talked Punjab matters and how hard Lord Sinha and Surendra [N. Banerjea] opposed him. His idea it was that we should all decline to give evidence before the Joint Committee. [V.J.] Patel was of this opinion. I and [N.C.] Kelkar thought that unless all joined the move will not be right.

**299. Sir Harcourt Butler to Sir William Vincent on the Punjab Situation,<sup>2</sup> 27 July 1920**

. . . I write with regard to the present situation, the proposed *hartals*, and the policy to be followed.

2. There has no doubt been a great rise in racial feeling since Amritsar debates. It can hardly be expected that this will decrease for some time. This factor must be borne in mind and allowance must be made for inflated feelings on both sides.

3. The Afghan delegates have left Mussoorie. My own view is that one of their object in coming to India and staying for so long was to spy out the land and spread their influence, and that in certain parts of the provinces they have tried to carry out fairly extensive though secret propaganda. On the other hand, there seems to be a general inclination among the Mussalmans to take active part in the non-cooperation movement though several very loyal Mussalmans have told me that they do not know what will be the result of the appeals made to Mussalmans generally after August at any rate in the town. The districts so far have been little affected. On the whole, the evidence seems to suggest that this particular movement is not likely to succeed. We may be certain, however, that, if

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary 1920, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Home Poll. B, August 1920, Nos. 333-35 Sir (Spencer) Harcourt Butler: I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow; Member, Governor-General's Executive Council; Lieutenant-Governor, Burma, 1915-17; Governor of U.P., 1917-21.

this movement fails, the party behind it, both Hindus and Mussalmans, will endeavour to force on some other movements which will unite the malcontents. . . . Against this must be set the considerations that the *entente* between the Hindus and the Mussalmans seems to be weaker than it was and that the action taken by the extremists in Europe and indeed out here, has damaged rather than promoted the cause they held. The success of the Greeks, the reasoned acceptance of the Peace Terms by the Turkish Govt. at Constantinople may also be expected to have a steady influence on Mussalman opinion, generally rather disposed to accept the *fait accompli*.

4. As regards the policy to be followed—I have no doubt that we should stick to that which has been successful hitherto, i.e. not to interfere with the people so long as they do not molest loyal citizens whom we are bound to protect. Force must be ready in the background, where there is any expectation of trouble, but it should be hidden as far as possible. If the people want *hartals*, let them have them. They do no harm to any one. And if any one is such a fool as to resign his title, honorary powers or appointment, let him do so and fill<sup>1</sup> his place at once. He should not be molested for doing so, but also he should not be received by any official after doing so as he will have openly and publicly disassociated himself from the Govt., and, if he is on the Durbar list his name should be removed therefrom. In emergency, district magistrates should use their powers under, the criminal procedure code, reporting their actions by telegram to Govt. before any action is taken.

5. The situation may at any time deteriorate, but I hope if developments are met with patience and cool heads, and allowance for excitement, we may get through the present situation without serious trouble. The rains promise well and Turkey is far away.

### 300. The Non-cooperation<sup>1</sup>

. . . If we Indians also become hostile to Govt. at this juncture the wily Anglo-Indians will be able to prove as to be revolutionaries and thereby succeed in upsetting Mr. Montagu's work. It is for the reason that we are hostile to the N.C.O. movement. Cease to have all connections whatsoever with the British if you can. If not, do not act foolishly and thereby bring on repression. The Punjab incidents and the Dyer controversy have proved in what light Englishmen view Indians.

<sup>1</sup>Nayak, 27 July 1920, Report on Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 140.

**301. The Secretary to the Government of India to All Local Governments on the Non-cooperation,<sup>1</sup> 31 July 1920**

Clear the line—We should like to be furnished with a brief telegraphic appreciation of the extent to which the *hartal* of the 1st August has been observed. The report should be sent not later than the 3rd August. Any manifestation of non-cooperation brought to the (your) notice of the local should also be telegraphed on 3rd Aug.

**302. The Turkish Question<sup>2</sup>**

We are, however, in entire sympathy with our Muhammadan brethren in the expression of their feelings in regard to the Turkish question which is going to be settled in utter disregard of all principles of freedom, justice and self-determination and in direct conflict with all canons of political morality. The coming *hartal* is nothing but a protest against the injustice that is going to be done to Turkey. . . . The entire Hindu community is in absolute sympathy with them in the calamity which has befallen them and we hope and trust that Sunday next will be a day when the natural sentiments and feelings of the people, Hindu and Mussalman, will find expression in abstention from work as much as possible and in prayer and in fasting.

**303. Gandhi to Lord Chelmsford,<sup>3</sup> 1 August 1920**

. . . I venture to return these medals in pursuance of the scheme of non-co-operation inaugurated today in connection with the Khilafat movement. Valuable as these honours have been to me, I cannot wear them with an easy conscience so long as my Musalman countrymen have to labour under a wrong done to their religious sentiment. Events that have happened during the past month have confirmed me in the opinion that the Imperial Government have acted in the Khilafat matter in an unscrupulous, immoral and unjust manner and have been moving from wrong to

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll B., August 1920, Nos. 338-367 and K W. Telegram.

<sup>2</sup>Amrit Bazar Patrika, 31 July 1920, Report on English-Papers and Periodicals in Bengal 1920, p. 155.

<sup>3</sup>This letter was written on 1 August 1920. It appeared under the caption 'Renunciation of Medals' on 4 August 1920 in *Young India*. See also The Collected Works of M.K. Gandhi, XVIII, No. 73.

wrong in order to defend their immorality. I can retain neither respect nor affection for such a Government. . . .

### **304. The Non-cooperation<sup>1</sup>**

What happened in Calcutta, which as a city is about as emotional as any in the country. . . . A certain number of people did observe the *hartal*, but of these a large majority remained quietly at home. There was in the morning every indication that there would be no crowds and no processions. Later on, however, when the news of the death of Mr. [B.G.] Tilak arrived, masses of people began to collect and a very big procession was formed. The procession and the manifestation which accompanied it had nothing whatsoever to do with the *hartal*. . . . In any case as the afternoon wore on it became evident that any excitement there was in the city was connected with Mr. Tilak and not with the suggestions of Mr. Gandhi. . . . But the strongest proof of the failure of Mr. Gandhi to impress the people of Bengal at any rate is to be found in the failure of meeting at the Town Hall. . . . It may turn out that in some other cities outside Bengal, the meetings attracted more prominent persons than in Calcutta and that in one or two provinces titles and degrees will be shed like leaves in the autumn but the first stage of the movement was also to include the suspension of practice by lawyers, the boycotting of Govt. schools, Govt. functions, and the Councils and the refusal to accept civil and military posts. . . . The N.C.O. movement, therefore, has ended, as every body thought it would be, in a fiasco. Mr. Gandhi has said that if the first stage ended in a failure he would proceed to the second which would include the surrender of Govt. posts by all who held them. "Failure" in Mr. Gandhi's case, we all presume, was failure to include the Allies to revise the Turkish Treaty. What Mr. Gandhi had not considered was the failure of the movement itself.

### **305. The Non-cooperation Movement<sup>2</sup>**

The truth is the feeling against N.C.O. is growing. Mr. Gandhi must now realise that his movement is weakening. . . . But we are afraid that things might be differently ordered at the special session of the Congress, for the voting will not be according to the numerical strength of the delegates but

<sup>1</sup>*The Englishman*, 3 August 1920, Report on the English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>*Bengalee*, 3 August 1920, Report on the English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 155.

province by province. Nonetheless, the record of voting as we believe would tend to show that the older provinces which have been longest in public life such as Bengal (including Bihar and Bombay) were all against N.C.O. experience in politics and political life is emphatically against non-cooperation as fraught with mischief.

**306. Shaik Asgar to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement,<sup>1</sup> 3 August 1920**

I am directed to refer to your endorsement No. 2973 of the 31st July 1920 asking for a report by the 3rd of August on the extent to which the *hartal* was observed in this province on the 1st.

2. In reply I am to say that reports so far received show that complete *hartal* was observed in Lahore, Amritsar, Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Multan, Sarghoda, the Simla Bazar and Pathankot in the Gurdaspur district. There was partial *hartal*—Rohtak, Karnal, Montgomery, Gujranwala, Jhung, Gujrat and Jallundur. There was no *hartal* in Ambala, Sialkot, Lyallpur, Attack, Mianwali and Muzaffargarh.

In a few cases meetings were held, resolutions were passed and prayers were offered on behalf of Turkey but no other manifestations of non-co-operation have been reported and no disturbances occurred.

**307. The Secretary to the Government of Madras to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement<sup>2</sup>, 3 August 1920**

Your telegram No. 2979 dated 31st July Madras *hartal* almost all shops were shut but as it was Sunday it is difficult to say whether this was due to *hartal*. A meeting of 10,000 men held on the beach was spoilt by the rain; half the number were Hindus. Nothing very objectionable occurred beyond the hoisting of Turkish flag. A resolution was passed approving the non-cooperating movement. In mofussil a half hearted *hartal* was observed; in some cases meetings were held. No disturbances are reported. No manifestation of non-cooperation was noticed.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, August 1920. Nos. 338-67 and K.W. Shaik Asgar: Additional Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Telegram.

**308. The Secretary to the Government of Bombay to the Secretary, the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement<sup>1</sup>, 3 August 1920**

It would appear that only a slight disturbance took place at Karachi, where boys tried to force two cinemas to close down, ending in slight destruction of property and some arrests; in Bombay four *garriwallas* were attacked by comrades for plying and attempts were made by mourners in Tilak's funeral procession to remove head-gear of the spectators; *Hartal* in Bombay was little different from last occasion; and [there] would have been loss but for Tilak's death. At a meeting of four thousand persons a resolution supporting non-cooperation was passed; speeches being moderate. There is very little sympathy for movement in central and southern divisions except Sholapur where there was a partial *hartal* probably due to mourning for Tilak.

There was practically a complete *hartal* in the districts of Ahmadabad and Kaira, as well as in Karachi and Larkana; but it was very partial in Hyderabad, which was the main centre of the movement in Sind. Although the District Magistrate reports some excitement over Pir Mahboob Shah's<sup>2</sup> arrest under section 124-A, as reported in my last fortnightly report, there was no outcry of non-cooperation anywhere in the presidency, save some resignations by a few subordinates and three menials in the Larkana district.

**309. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Non-cooperation Movement,<sup>3</sup> 3 August 1920**

Clear the line: Your telegram of 31st July. *Hartal* of Aug. 1st practically a failure. No general observance in Calcutta. Only few shops were closed. A meeting of about 6,000 was held at Town Hall, elsewhere no observance generally; no general fasting or prayers. In some big town shops were partially closed; Hindus were very little affected; and Muhammadans only very partially. A few meetings have been held but no enthusiasm displayed. Only instances of non-cooperation so far reported are return of one recruit's certificate; refusal of one invitation to Durbar; and of another to Governor's garden party.

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, August 1920, Nos. 338-67 and K.W. Telegram.

<sup>2</sup>Pir Mahboob Shah: A prominent Muslim leader, sentenced for sedition in Sind and was given two years imprisonment, but later he tendered an apology and was released from jail.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. B, August 1920, Nos. 338-67 and K.W. Telegram.

**310. The Secretary to the Government of the United Provinces to the Secretary, The Government of India on the Non-co-operation Movement,<sup>1</sup> 3 August 1920**

*Hartal* observed in most headquarters towns and in a few others, but it was partial and half-hearted. It was the worst supposed *hartal* so far held. There was no *hartal* in the districts. Fairly well-attended meetings were held in some of the big towns but there was no indication of any excitement or enthusiasm. No instances of non-cooperation are reported.

**311. The Chief Secretary to the Governments of Bihar and Orissa to the Secretary to the Government of India on the Hunter Committee,<sup>2</sup> 3 August 1920**

Magistrate reports that a fairly successful *hartal* was held in Patna and Bihar towns; but according to police report only 22 shops closed in main road in Patna; and four more partially closed but transacting business.

Shops closed all day in Daltonganj and partially in following towns: Monghyr, Gaya, Chapra, Bhagalpur, Ranchi. Elsewhere *hartal* was apparently not observed. About a thousand attended a non-cooperation meeting at Patna and 500 in Gaya. Meetings were also held in Daltonganj, Ranchi, Darbhanga. There was no disturbance and lack of enthusiasm everywhere. Badr-ud-Din<sup>3</sup> of Phulwari resigned [the] title of Shams-ul Ulama, Sulaiman<sup>4</sup> of same place honorary magistracy and Nural Hasan<sup>5</sup> of Legislative Council. No other signs of non-cooperation.

**312. The Non-cooperation Movement<sup>6</sup>**

Sunday last was observed throughout India as the 3rd Khilafat day. It appears from the report to hand that, on the whole, the demonstration was a success, though not as successful as the second Khilafat day. N.C.O. was

<sup>1</sup>Home Poll. B, August 1920 No. 338-67 and K.W. Telegram.

<sup>2</sup>Government of India, Home Department Political B, August 1920, Nos. 338-57 and K.W. Telegram.

<sup>3</sup>Badr-ud-Din: A Prominent leader of Phulwari who participated in the Non-cooperation Movement.

<sup>4</sup>Maulvi Muhammad Sulaiman (1886-1941): Prominent lawyer and Judge, Allahabad High Court, 1920-37.

<sup>5</sup>Nural Hasan: Member, Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council.

<sup>6</sup>Musalman, 6 August 1920, Report on the Native Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 176.

to begin on that day, and though the renunciation of titles and honorary offices has not at all been plentiful as it ought to have been and as the necessity of the situation demands, the beginning has not, in our opinion, been very bad. In Bihar, the Hon. Mr. Nurul Hasan has announced his resignation of the membership of the local Legislative Council; Maulana Badr-ud-Din Sahib of the Phulwari, renounced his title of Shams-ul-Ulama and Maulvi Muhammad Sulaiman resigned his honorary magistracy. At Chittagong Maulvi Muhammad Rajam Ali<sup>1</sup> resigned his honorary magistracy and returned his Durbar medal and certificates of honour. At Agra Sir Syed Alay [Ali] Nabi<sup>2</sup> renounced his title of Khan Bahadur. Mr. Azaf [Asaf] Ali,<sup>3</sup> Barrister-at-Law, Delhi, has announced that he will suspend legal practice as a token of practical adherence to the-principle of non-cooperation. Mr. Sheriff Devyji Kanaji,<sup>4</sup> has resigned his seat from the Bombay Legislative Council as a protest against the Turkish Peace terms. It is already known to the reader that a few days before the Khilafat day Maulvi Abdul Rashid Khan<sup>5</sup> of Noakheli renounced his title of Khan Sahib and resigned his honorary offices. The letter he wrote to Govt. in this connection, ought to attract the notice of all men of our country and co-religionists. Mrs. Sarla Devi Chaudhurani<sup>6</sup> has given up broach which she had got in recognition of her services rendered by her in the formation of the Bengali Regiment. That Mr. Gandhi, the high priest of the movement, has returned the medals and, certificates, etc., that he got from the Govt. is, of course, no wonder. All these renunciations and resignations go to show that the beginning of NCO is not very bad, as we have already said. We do not say that the beginning is good, but it is not, at any rate, very disappointing. When we take into consideration that most of our people, Hindu and Mussalman, have been waiting for the decision of the Congress and the Muslim League, we cannot but think that there will be much room for hope if these two bodies approve non-cooperation. The third Khilafat day has given a start, and the success of the movement entirely depends on our countrymen and co-religionists adopting it in right earnest.

### **313. The Khilafat Movement<sup>7</sup>**

Our destiny depends upon our actions. The integrity and stability of the

<sup>1</sup>Muhammad Rajam: Prominent lawyer and Muslim leader of Chittagong.

<sup>2</sup>Syed Alay Nabi: A prominent resident of Agra.

<sup>3</sup>Asaf Ali (1888-1953): Barrister and a nationalist; took a leading part in the Khilafat Movement.

<sup>4</sup>Devji Kanaji: Member, Bombay Legislative Council.

<sup>5</sup>Maulvi Abdul Rashid Khan: Prominent Muslim leader of Bengal.

<sup>6</sup>Sarla Devi Chaudhurani: Writer and politician, wife of Pandit Ram Bhuj Datta and niece of Rabindranath Tagore and follower of Gandhi in 1919.

<sup>7</sup>Zamana (Calcutta), 15 August 1920, Report on English Papers and Periodicals in Bengal, 1920, p. 182.

Islamic Khilafat depends upon our steadfastness and perseverance. It is now for us to prove if we are to remain true musalmans or lead the life of a Jew. This is the proper time to show that there is life and spirit in us. Therefore, O, Musalmans! act with courage and perseverance. Bear trouble, grief and comfort, rest and life, defeat your enemies by the sword of non-cooperation, as your sacred religious duty and look to it as the national beacon. This is the only thing by which you can preserve the integrity of the Khilafat and prefer the interests of Islam.

#### **314. Khaparde on Non-cooperation,<sup>1</sup> 19 August 1920**

I met K.V. Rangaswamy Iyyanger. He does not like non-cooperation of Gandhi, neither do I like it myself?

#### **315. Khaparde on the Viceroy's Speech,<sup>2</sup> 20 August 1920**

The Viceroy made a long opening speech. I wish he had omitted some portions and dealt at greater length on others. I wish he had not spoken against non-cooperation because, he being unpopular, how the fact of his speaking against non-cooperation will make the movement popular.

#### **316. Viceroy on the Khilafat Agitation and the Non-cooperation Movement,<sup>3</sup> 20 August 1920**

... Hon'ble Members are fully aware of the line which my Government have taken in relation to the Turkish Peace terms, and I need not further dilate upon it. So far as my Government could we pressed upon the Peace Conference the views of Indian Moslems, but notwithstanding our efforts on their behalf, we are threatened with a campaign of non-cooperation, because, forsooth the Allied Powers found themselves unable to accept the contentions advanced by Indian Moslems. Could anything be more futile or ill-advised? This policy of non-cooperation must inevitably lead, if persisted into the discomfort of the community at large, and indeed involve the risk

<sup>1</sup>G.S. Khaparde's Diary 1920. NAI.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1920 to September 1920, LIX, pp. 4-5.

of grave disorder. I am glad to think that everything points to this policy being repudiated by all thinking people, and it is because my colleagues have faith in India's common sense that we have preferred to allow this movement to fail by reason of its intrinsic inanity. Can we, for instance, picture to ourselves the legal profession generally foregoing its practice in support of this policy? I am proud to belong to this great profession, but I cannot envisage such a possibility, and from one example can we not learn the unpractical nature of this visionary scheme? Much has been made in speeches and the Press of an answer given by the Secretary of State to a question in the House of Commons. He said:

I am prepared to support any steps the Government of India think necessary in the very difficult situation now arising. But I will not dictate any steps to the Government of India. I would prefer to leave it to them.

I think Hon'ble Members will agree with me in thinking that he could have given no other reply. There is a point at which no Government could refuse to take action to protect the interest of the community at large, and when that point is reached, Government is bound to and will use all the resources at its disposal. That is a platitude, but even platitudes require sometimes to be stated. But, as I have said above, I have every hope that this point will not be reached, but that the common sense of the people and the opposition of all moderate men will erect an insuperable bar to the further progress of this most foolish of all foolish schemes.

### **317. Sachchidananda Sinha's Questions in the Imperial Legislative Council and Sir William Vincent's Reply,<sup>1</sup> 27 August 1920**

#### *Sachchidananda's Questions*

- (a) What is the exact effect of the orders passed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on General Dyer?
- (b) For how many years longer, would General Dyer have been entitled to serve, but for the said orders being passed?
- (c) Will General Dyer draw from Indian remittances to the India office on account of pay and pensions to officials, and pay or pension? If so, how much?
- (d) How much would he have drawn as pay or pension if he had retired now of his own accord?

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, April 1920 to September 1920, LIX, p. 48.

(e) Has the attention of Government been drawn to the statement in the extract from an English newspaper, quoted in the Tribune of July 30th last under the heading 'Dyer's pay', that General Dyer 'was in receipt of the retired pay due to his rank'? Is that statement correct?

(f) If so, what is exactly the penalty imposed upon General Dyer by Government to mark their sense of disapproval of his conduct?

*Sir William Vincent's Reply*

(a) General Dyer, by his removal from his appointment, forfeited his tenure of command of a brigade which he might otherwise have held until he attained the age of 57 years, i.e. until the 9th October 1921.

(a) Unless promoted to the rank of Major General.

(c) General Dyer is residing in England unemployed. Under the new scale of unemployed pay recently sanctioned by the Secretary of State he will draw £ 701-17-6 per annum from Indian revenues.

On retirement he will be entitled to a pension of £ 900 per annum which will also be met from Indian revenues.

(d) He has already qualified for the full pension of his rank, viz. £ 900 per annum.

(e) As already stated in answer to part (c) General Dyer is now residing unemployed in England. The statement referred to is, therefore, incorrect.

(f) The answer is contained in the reply to (e) above.

**318. Babu Bhabendra Chandra Ray's Questions in the Bengal Legislative Council and Stephenson's Reply,<sup>1</sup> 1 September 1920**

*Babu Bhabendra Chandra Ray's Questions*

(a) Are the Government aware that the Government of Madras have by a recent order prohibited their officers to subscribe to the "Dyer Fund" on the ground that such action constitutes an offence against the Government Servants' Conduct Rules?

(b) Are the Government aware of an opinion that has been expressed that such action on the part of European officers would serve to foster racial animosity and disaffection against Government?

*Hon'ble Stephenson's Reply*

(a) It has been mentioned in the press that such an order has been issued

<sup>1</sup>Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Council, Vol. LII, p. 870. Babu Bhabendra Chandra Ray: Member of the Bengal Legislative Council. Sir Hugh Lansdowne Stephenson: I.C.S., 1895, Chief Secretary, Bengal, 1920.

by the Government of Madras but the local Government have not seen a copy of it.

(b) No.

**319. H.S.L. Polak to C.F. Andrews on Gandhi,<sup>1</sup> 2 September 1920**

My dear Charlie,

... I think that Gandhi has made a fearful mistake over the Khilafat movement, and his non-cooperation movement is calculated, in my opinion, to do infinite harm if in any way it be successful, which I very much doubt. I need not tell you how deeply I deplore the fact that, on hardly any point that is vital to him, do I see eye to eye with him and I was afraid, from your first letter, that even on colonial questions, we should drift apart, though I am glad to know from your later letter that he had now modified his views.

**320. Khaparde's Estimate of Gandhi,<sup>2</sup> 5 September 1920**

Attended the subject committee. There was tremendous discussion, Gandhi undermining to dominate the situation. He says he is not bound by the majority of the Congress and acclaims the right of acting against the wishes of the majority ... claims to be the chief adviser of the Congress and this creates the difficulty. I fear he will wreck the Congress.

**321. Sir Harcourt Butler to Sir William Vincent on the Political Situation,<sup>3</sup> 8 September 1920**

... The majority of the Mussalmans of the province appreciate the blessing of religious and secular security under British rule. Many are growing apprehensive as to their position at the approaching elections *vis-a-vis*, the Hindus. An active body of political agitators, however, are stirring up ignorant and disaffected people by spreading false rumours as to the violation of the sacred places, etc. These agitators have the support of all those (belonging to any community) who are hostile to British rule. The agita-

<sup>1</sup>Benarsi Das Chaturvedi Collection, NAI.

<sup>2</sup>G.S. Khaparde Diary, 1920, NAI.

<sup>3</sup>Home Poll. B, Sept. 1920, No. 355.

tors are noisy, insistent and provocative. The loyalist are shy and reluctant to come forward.

The action called for is twofold (a) political and (b) administrative.

**322. The Non-cooperation Resolution of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta,<sup>1</sup> 9 September 1920**

In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Mussalmans of India, and the Prime Minister had deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Moslem Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his Mussalman brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him.

And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of April 1919, both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself directly or indirectly responsible for most of the official crimes and callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the Debate in the House of Commons and specially in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India and showed virtual support of the systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab and that the latest Viceroyal pronouncement is proof of an entire absence of repentence in the matters of Khilafat and the Punjab.

This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without the redress of the two aforementioned wrongs and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of *Swarajya*.

This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent Non-cooperation inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi until the said wrongs are righted and *Swarajya* is established.

And inasmuch as a beginning should be made by the classes who have hitherto moulded and represented public opinion and inasmuch as Government consolidates its power through titles and honours bestowed on the people, through schools controlled by it, its Law courts and its Legislative Councils and inasmuch as it is desirable in the prosecution of the movement to take the minimum risk and to call for the least sacrifice compatible with the attainment of the desired object, this Congress earnestly advises:

<sup>1</sup>A.I.C.C. Papers (Supplementary), F. No. 18, 1920, NMML.

- (a) surrender of titles and honorary offices and resignation from nominated seats in local bodies;
- (b) refusal to attend Government levee's, durbars and other official and semi-official functions held by Government officials or in their honour;
- (c) gradual withdrawal of children from schools and colleges owned, aided or controlled by Government, and, in place of such schools and colleges, establishment of national schools and colleges in the various provinces;
- (d) gradual boycott of British Courts by lawyers and litigants and establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid for the settlement of private disputes;
- (e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia;
- (f) withdrawal by candidates for their candidature for election to the Reformed Councils and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for election;
- (g) boycott of foreign goods.

And inasmuch as Non-cooperation has been conceived as a measure of discipline and self-sacrifice without which no nation can make real progress, and inasmuch as an opportunity should be given in the very first stage of Non-cooperation to every man, woman and child, for such discipline and self-sacrifice, this Congress advises adoption of *Swadeshi* in piece-goods on a vast scale, and inasmuch as the existing mills of India with indigenous capital and control do not manufacture sufficient cloth for the requirements of the Nation, and are not likely to do so for a long time to come, this Congress advises immediate stimulation of further manufacture on a large scale by means of reviving hand-spinning in every home and hand-weaving on the part of the millions of weavers who have abandoned their ancient and honourable calling for want of encouragement.

### 323. Estimate of Gandhi and Tilak<sup>1</sup>

In the same month of March, the remarkable figure of Mr. Gandhi once more came prominently to the fore. He was very largely responsible for the organisation of the National mourning day on the 19th of that month, which had been opposed by the leaders of Liberal opinion,

<sup>1</sup>India in 1920: A Report prepared for presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of section 26 of the Govt. of India Act, pp. 38-43.

and he plainly announced that in case the Khilafat sentiments of his Muslim fellow-subjects were not met by the terms of peace with Turkey, he would himself lead a non-cooperation movement directed towards making the position of Government impossible. . . .

He [Mr. Gandhi] embodies an other-worldliness essentially Indian, a spirit the West does not possess, a plane of detachment to which it cannot hope to aspire. Hence it is that his behests have the influence of semi-divine commands; and even those whose intellects are too keen to be dominated by his sway can rarely be found to resist the appeal which he makes to their innermost heart.

Mr. Tilak, worthy representative of a class which had buried empires and overthrown dynasties, belonged to the hereditary intellectual aristocracy of Maharashtra. He stood for Brahmin supremacy over India and for Brahmin control of India's destinies. A ruthless antagonist, a bold and subtle fighter, throughout his lifetime a perpetual thorn in the side of the administration, he retained to the last a unique hold upon the intellectual aristocracy of India. Where Mr. Gandhi appealed to the masses, to the simple, and to the uneducated, Mr. Tilak based his strength upon the traditional dominance of the Brahmin aristocracy. During the early part of the period under review a tacit struggle was waged between the ideals and the methods for which each of these leaders stood. As long as Mr. Tilak was alive, the success of Mr. Gandhi's appeal to the educated classes long remained in doubt. Mr. Tilak's influence was always sufficient to prevent the spread of the non-cooperation movement among the Deccani Brahmins who from the commencement have been the brain of militant Indian nationalism. But when the hand of death removed him in August 1920, the way was clear for the consolidation of Mr. Gandhi's influence over the whole country.

Many of the cooler-headed members even of the Left Wing Nationalist Party shared Mr. Tilak's doubts and suspicions. The Moderates from the very first threw all their weight against it; and there can be no doubt that among the solid middle classes of the country, particularly in Bengal, the Moderate opposition was responsible for the virtual failure of the movement. At first, it was confined almost exclusively to zealous Muhammadans, the few Hindus who announced their readiness to enlist themselves under Mr. Gandhi's banner being moved less by their conviction of the rightness of the cause they were supporting than by their inherent reverence for Mr. Gandhi's personality. There can be little question that, had it been possible to satisfy public opinion in regard to the Punjab occurrences, the non-cooperation movement would have failed throughout the country at large. What made that movement so

formidable, despite its almost fantastically impracticable character, was the gradual attraction, around this nucleus, of a floating mass of Indian sentiment, both of Muhammadan and Hindu, which had been aroused on account of the Punjab affairs.

## GLOSSARY

**Ahimsa** : Non-violence.

**Anjuman-Khuddam-i-Kaaba:** Association of the Servants of Mecca.

**Asuras** : Demons.

**Aveshas** : Remaining.

**Bagh** : Garden.

**Baisakhi** : A harvest festival.

**Bighas** : A measure of land, varying in extent in different parts of India  
In the north-west, the standard bigha is equal to 5/8 of an acre.

**Budmashes**: Anti-social elements.

**Burka**: Veil.

**Charpai**: Cot.

**Chaudhries**: The headman of a caste, guild, profession or trade; head-man of a village.

**Danda Fauj**: Men using bludgeon.

**Darshan**: Sight; inner vision.

**Durbar**: A Court.

**Fatwahas**: Religious decrees.

**Garriwalas**: Carters.

**Guru**: Teacher.

**Hartal**: Strike; cessation of work.

**Hazat**: Call to nature.

**Hindu Musalman ki Hakumat**: Rule of the Hindu Muslim.

**Hijrat**: Mass migration.

**Hundi**: A Bill of exchange, money-order.

**Imam**: One who leads prayers.

**Izzat**: Respect.

**Jagirdar**: One who holds a jagir.

**Jazirat-ul-Arab**: The entire region where the Holy places are situated.  
Island of Arabia.

**Jehad**: Religious crusade. Holy War.

**Jungly**: Wild.

**Kamdhenu**: It is the mythical cow which bestowed anything one wished for.

**Kafirs:** Infidels.

**Khaddar:** Hand-spun and hand-woven cloth.

**Khalasi:** Menial.

**Khalifa:** Caliph; successor.

**Khilafat:** Office of the successor to the Prophet.

**Kotwali:** Central Police Station.

**Kukri:** A small dagger.

**Kutchery:** A court hall.

**Lascars:** Indian sailors.

**Lathi:** Stick; a wooden staff or stick.

**Lathiwalas:** One who uses lathis.

**Mahatma:** A great soul

**Malguzar:** One who pays tribute; a landholder.

**Martial Law Ki Jai:** Victory to the Martial law.

**Mela:** Festival.

**Mirasdar:** It was used for the hereditary proprietor of land in Maharashtra.

**Mother Bharat:** Mother India.

**Munshis:** Clerks.

**Pandal:** Huge tent; canvass awning for a public function.

**Patwari:** A village accountant whose duty it was to keep and produce when required by Government officers, all accounts of lands.

**Pohkian:** Blank.

**Pucca:** Strong.

**Raj:** Rule.

**Rishi:** Sage.

**Rowla:** Disturbance.

**Sadhu:** A hermit; a religious ascetic.

**Salam:** Salute.

**Sanyasi:** A recluse; one who renounced the worldly life.

**Sarkar:** Government.

**Satya:** Truth.

**Satyagraha:** Literally holding on to truth; soul force.

**Satyagrahi:** One who practises satyagraha.

**Shetias:** The term is applied to bankers etc. as a title of respect.

**Sowars:** The mounted soldiers.

**Swadesh:** Motherland.

**Swadeshi:** Manufacture of one's own country; indigenous goods.

**Swaraj:** Self-rule; independence.

**Tamasha:** Play or game; recreation

**Tehsil:** Revenue sub-division of the district.

**Thana:** A Police Station.

**Tonga:** A two-wheeled horse-driven carriage.

**Tongawallas:** Coachmen.

**Ulema:** Scholars; most learned men.

**Wali,** Holyman.

**Zamindar** or **Zemindar:** Landowner.

## CHRONOLOGY

(1 January 1919 to 9 September 1920)

### 1919

- January 18**      The Rowlatt Bills introduced in the Government of India Gazette.
- January 30**      In Madras a public meeting held to protest against the Rowlatt Bills.
- February 1**      A public meeting in Calcutta to oppose the Rowlatt Bills.
- February 2**      A public meeting in Bombay to protest against the Rowlatt Bills.
- February 6**      The Rowlatt Bill (Criminal Law Emergency Powers) introduced by Sir William Vincent in the Imperial Legislative Council at Delhi.
- February 7**      Debate on the Rowlatt Bill in the Imperial Legislative Council.
- February 10**      Another Rowlatt Bill (Criminal Law Amendment) by Sir William Vincent in the Imperial Legislative Council and the suggestion to refer it to the Select Committee.
- February 17**      Debate on Indian Affairs in the British Parliament.
- February 19**      M.K. Gandhi's article in the *Young India* against the Bills.
- February 24**      Gandhi's threat of Passive Resistance if the Bills were passed.
- February 26**      Gandhi's press statement on the inauguration of *Satyagraha*.
- March 2**      Manifesto of Non-official Indian Members of Imperial Legislative Council condemning the Passive Resistance.
- March 4**      Gandhi's interview with the Viceroy regarding the Rowlatt Bills.
- March 18**      The Rowlatt Act passed.
- March 19**      The Bombay Khilafat Committee set up with Mian Mahomed Chotani as its President.

- March 23      Gandhi launching the agitation against the Rowlatt Act by proclaiming a *hartal* on March 30.
- March 25      Gandhi's appeal to observe 6 April as a day of humiliation.
- March 28      M.A. Jinnah's resignation from the Imperial Legislative Council as a protest.
- March 30      Processions and *hartal* in Delhi.
- March 31      Swami Shraddhanand's statement on Delhi tragedy.
- April 6      *Hartals* observed against the Rowlatt Act throughout India.
- April 9      Gandhi arrested at Palwal.
- April 10      Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew arrested at Amritsar.
- April 13      Jallianwala Bagh massacre.
- April 15      Martial Law proclaimed in Lahore and Amritsar.
- April 18      Gandhi's suspension of the Passive Resistance.
- April 19      Proclamation of Martial Law in the District of Gujarat.
- April 24      The Martial Law Commission in the Punjab.
- April 26      B.G. Horniman deported to England.
- May 22      E.S. Montagu's announcement on the setting of an inquiry into the political disturbances.
- September 21    An All India Khilafat Conference at Lucknow to demonstrate Muslim feeling for the Sultan of Turkey and his Empire.
- September 25    The Indemnity Bill passed in the Imperial Legislative Council.
- October 14     The Disorders Inquiry Committee (Hunter Committee) appointed.
- October 17     The Khilafat Day celebrated throughout the country.
- October 29     The Disorders Inquiry Committee starting its proceedings.
- November 23    The Bombay Khilafat Committee changing to Central Khilafat Committee of India.
- December 23    The Government of India Act passed and Royal Amnesty to political prisoners announced.
- December 27    All-India Congress Session at Amritsar under the Chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru.
- 1920**
- January 4     A Provincial Khilafat Conference held at Sindh.
- January 19     A deputation of the Muslims to the Viceroy to ensure the preservation of Turkey and the sovereignty of the Sultan as Khalifa.
- February 15-17   The Third All India Khilafat Conference held in Bombay.
- February 26     The All India Khilafat Deputation at London,
- March 7      Gandhi's Manifesto on Khilafat.

- March 17**      *Hartals* observed on Khilafat issue.
- March 25**      Publication of the Report of Congress Sub-Committee on the Punjab.
- May 14**      Publication of the Allied Peace Treaty with Turkey in Sevres.
- May 26**      Publication of the Hunter Committee Report.
- May 30**      The All-India Congress Committee at Benares to discuss the Hunter Committee Report and the Turkish problem.
- June 3**      The All India Khilafat Conference held at Allahabad.
- June 9**      Gandhi's criticism of the Hunter Committee Report.
- June 22**      Gandhi and the Central Khilafat Committee's warning to the Viceroy that Non-cooperation would be launched if the Peace Terms were not modified.
- July 8**      Debate on the Hunter Committee Report in the House of Commons.
- July 18**      Debate in the House of Lords regarding the Dyer case.
- August 1**      The Non-cooperation Movement launched.
- September 4**      Special Session of the Congress held at Calcutta.
- September 9**      Gandhi's Resolution on Non-cooperation Movement at Calcutta.

# INDEX

- Abdul Bari, Maulana, 210  
Abdul Kasim, 202  
Abdul Majid, Maulana, 202  
Abdur Rahim, 139, 140  
Abdul Rauf, 140  
Abhyudaya, 8  
Africa, 103, 134  
Afghanistan, 81, 194, 216, 242, 270  
Agha, Mohammad Safdar, 201  
Ahmedabad, 76, 89, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 116, 117, 125, 135, 233, 246, 274, 290  
Ahimsa, 58, 123, 246  
Ahmad, Bashir, 261, 262  
Ahmad, Nazir, 212  
Aiyer, Sir Sivaswamy, P.S., 160, 172, 174  
Akalgarh, 132  
Ali, Asaf, 292  
Ali Raza, Syed, 202  
Ali, Zulfiqar, 260, 261  
Allahabad, 133  
All India Congress Committee, 98, 99, 119, 120, 130, 131, 133, 136, 183, 264, 265, 266, 268  
All India Congress Committee of Enquiry, 234  
All India Khilafat Conference, 136  
All India Muslim League, 138, 202  
All India Trade Union Congress, 277  
Al-Khalil, 241  
Al-Wahid (Karachi), 269  
Ambala, 261, 289  
Ampthill, Lord, 282  
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 241, 287  
Amritsar, 71, 76, 77, 88, 89, 99, 117, 120, 121, 127, 132, 137, 156, 157, 162-68, 170, 175, 176, 178, 185, 190, 192, 194, 209, 213, 214, 228, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 242, 252-57, 259, 265, 274, 289  
Andamans, 181  
Andrews, C.F., 59, 100, 120, 126, 128, 164, 167, 271, 296  
Anglo Indians, 118, 268  
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 210  
Ansari, M.A., 89, 201  
Arundale, G.S., 212  
Asquith Herbert Henry, 204, 273  
Austria, 103, 109  
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 201, 218  
Badruddin, Abdulla Koor, 240  
Badruddin, Maulana of Phulwari, 291, 292  
Baig, Abbas Ali, 139, 140  
Benerjea, S.N., 8, 12, 18, 19, 25, 27, 30, 32, 37, 113, 184, 285  
Banker, S.G., 95  
Baptista, J., 3, 60, 108, 277  
Bannett, T., 114  
Barron, C.A., 66, 106, 164  
Beasant, Annie Mrs., 21, 95, 108, 111, 122, 129, 157  
Benares, 264  
Bengal, 181, 191, 269, 271, 278, 289  
Bengalee, (Calcutta), 174, 271  
Bengal Legislative Council, 295  
Ben Spoor, 171, 205  
Beynon, Gen., 177  
Bezwada (Madras), 98  
Bhagalpur, 291  
Bhai Parmanand, 227  
Bharat Bandhu (Hathras), 103  
Bhavishye (Allahabad), 16, 105  
Bhurgi, G M, 130  
Bihar, 20, 92, 191, 278, 289, 291  
Birkenhead, Lord, 281  
Bolshevik (ism), 16, 111, 188, 189, 194, 210, 212, 214, 217, 218, 222, 230, 232, 238, 249  
Bokhara, 216  
Bomanji, S.R., 183, 285  
Bombay, 20, 66, 67, 71, 76, 87, 89, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 104, 105, 116, 125, 132, 134, 142, 190, 209, 233, 239, 269, 278, 289, 290  
Bombay Chronicle, 56, 70, 95, 97, 100, 101, 128, 134, 161  
British, 237, 249  
British and India Socieiy, 107  
British Congress Committee, 104, 265  
British Commonwealth, 111, 200  
British Parliament, 110  
British Raj, 251, 254, 257, 273  
British Rule, 274, 296

- Broach**, 125  
**Broadway**, E.P., 255  
**Burma**, 66  
**Bureaucracy**, 22, 60, 62, 68, 71  
**Butler**, Harcourt S.W., 264, 281, 285  
  
**Calcutta**, 76, 77, 83, 99, 117, 130, 131, 218, 232, 267, 285, 288, 290, 297  
**Canada**, 103, 277  
**Candler**, Edmund, 214  
**Captain Develton**, 174, 225  
**Cawnpore (Kanpur)**, 176, 212, 215  
**Central Communist Committee**, Moscow, 222  
**Chakravarty**, B., 78, 82, 84, 182  
**Chaman Lal**, 108, 212, 238, 277  
**Chanda**, Kamini Kumar, 143, 146, 147, 149, 153  
**Chandni Chowk (Delhi)**, 146  
**Chandravarkar**, Sir Narayan Ganesh, 140  
**Charles**, Cleveland, 206  
**Chaturvedi**, Benarsi Das, 221, 296  
**Chaudhry**, Bagga, 72, 266  
**Chaudhry**, Pt. Rambhuj Dutt, 201, 210  
**Chaudharani**, Sarla Devi, 292  
**Chelmsford**, Lord, 3, 14, 16, 22, 56, 59, 60, 61, 68, 101, 102, 117, 129, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 170, 173, 177, 181, 193, 202, 203, 213, 232, 262, 264, 269, 287  
**Chotani**, M M., 240, 241  
**Churchill**, Sir Winston, 272  
**Civil Disobedience**, 58, 59, 91, 100, 101, 115, 122, 123, 124, 125, 135, 141, 142, 235, 246  
**Civil Resistance**, 134  
**Clarke**, Dr., 183  
**Cocanada (Madras)**, 98  
**Cocks**, G.G., 116  
**Congress**, 98, 107, 108, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 163, 169, 178, 180, 182-85, 190, 192, 241, 265, 271, 278, 283, 284, 297, 298  
**Congress, The (Delhi)**, 217  
**Constantinople**, 198, 219, 286  
**Craddock**, Sir Reginald, 177  
**Curzon**, George Natanatal, 283, 285  
  
**Daily Herald**, 102, 107, 135  
**Daily News** 102, 135  
**Daily Telegraph**, 102  
**Dadar (Bombay)**, 95  
**Darjeeling**, 93  
  
**Das C.R.**, 84, 131, 225  
**Defence of India Act**, 5, 10, 11, 26, 35, 64, 99, 106, 110, 122, 242, 243  
**Delhi**, 66, 67, 68, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, 99, 101, 106, 108, 114, 117, 121, 131, 134, 137, 164-66, 168, 173, 206, 233, 234, 235, 245, 246, 250, 251, 258, 259, 260  
**Dera Ismail**, 218  
**Deva Dat**, 207  
**Devdhar**, G.K., 184  
**Din**, Shah, 261  
**Disorders Enquiry Committee**, 242  
**Dubonlay**, J.H., 92  
**Dunedin**, Viscount, 139  
**Dyer**, General E.H., 126, 127, 132, 133, 165, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 224, 225, 230, 235, 236, 247, 253, 254, 262, 263, 265, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 277, 279, 280, 283, 294, 295  
  
**Egypt**, 102, 117  
**Elaichpur**, 85  
**Ellora**, 98  
**England**, 26, 55, 67, 71, 81, 98, 102, 104, 111, 119, 120, 127, 129, 175, 176, 189, 256, 265, 277, 285  
**European**, 85, 109, 117, 127, 147, 148, 150, 195, 214, 228, 251, 257, 259, 263  
  
**Fabrian Society**, 108  
**Fazil-Hussain**, Mian, 216, 217  
**Fazlul Bhoy Curimbhoy**, 201  
**Finlay**, Viscount, 279, 280  
  
**Gait**, Sir Edward Albert, 139, 140  
**Gandhi**, M.K., 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31, 39, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 78, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 110, 114, 115, 116, 119, 125, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 141, 157, 158, 159, 162, 167, 168, 169, 179, 184, 185, 190, 201, 208, 210, 219, 221, 227, 235, 238, 239, 240, 241, 245, 246, 247, 252, 257, 258, 264, 271, 278, 279, 282, 284, 287, 288, 292, 296, 297, 298, 299  
**Gandhi**, Hira Lal, 78  
**Ganpat Rai**, 120  
**Gaya (Bihar)**, 92, 291  
**Germans**, 176  
**Ghosh**, Rash Behari, 38  
**Golden Temple (The Darbar Sahib)**, 156

- Gowyne, Stephen Lucius, 274  
 Governor General, 75, 76, 77  
 Great Britain, 241  
 Gujranwala, 132, 175, 177, 237, 254, 256, 259, 265  
 Gujarat, 224, 237, 289  
 Gujarat Mitra, 71
- Hailey, W.H., 66  
 Hailey W.M., 157  
 Hignell, S.R., 159  
 Hamdam, 241  
 Hansraj, 228, 229, 230  
 Harris, Lord, 282  
 Hasan Imam, 92, 93  
 Hassan, Yaqub, 130, 212  
     aq, A.K. Fazlul, 132, 202  
 Haq, Mazharul, 10, 92, 93  
 Haji Ahmad of Larkana, 209  
 Hijrat, 242, 270  
 Hind Swaraj, The, 123  
 Hindu, The, 16, 54, 99  
 Home Rule, 89, 284  
 Home Rule League, 239  
 Hoshiarpur, 289  
 Horniman, B.G., 95, 96, 97, 104, 105, 122, 124, 126, 183, 267  
 Hough Burnard, 102  
 House of Commons, 113, 115, 297  
 House of Lords, 276, 297  
 Hunderfield, 102  
 Hunter Commission (Committee), 131, 132, 133, 160, 161, 179, 186, 192, 205, 206, 230, 232, 233, 234, 262, 264, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 273, 279, 280, 281, 282  
 Husain, Mumtaz, 202  
 Husain, Syed, 202  
 Husain, Syed Ahmad, 81  
 Hyderabad (Sindh), 215, 290
- Imam Ali, 93  
 Imperialism, 200  
 Imperial Legislative Council, 18, 22, 24, 40, 60, 61, 163, 145-50, 181, 294  
 Independent (Allahabad), The, 63, 99, 202, 217, 241  
 Indian, 102-109, 111, 113, 114, 118, 121, 127, 130, 131, 137, 141, 144, 147, 150, 172, 175, 176, 177, 195, 206, 209, 212, 213, 291  
 Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 18  
     Indian Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, 18  
 Indian National Congress, 8, 35, 66, 98, 132, 178, 179, 185, 186, 194, 258, 297  
 Indo-British Association, 109  
 Inqilab, The, 217, 241  
 Ireland, 102  
 Irving, Miles, 166, 252  
 Islam, 199, 210, 219, 240, 267, 272  
 Islamic Society of London, 222  
 Iyengar, S. Kasturi Ranga, 182, 212  
 Iyyanger, K.V. Rangaswamy, 293
- Jagat Narain, 233  
 Jallianwala Bagh, 126, 127, 128, 161-64, 166, 168, 174, 175, 177, 180, 192, 205, 207, 224, 228, 229, 230, 237, 253, 255, 262, 268, 272, 274, 280  
 James Du Boulay, 101  
 Jamna Das Dwarka Das, 95, 96, 126  
 Jambur The, 241  
 Jayakar, M.R., 99, 132, 177, 179, 185, 228, 268  
 Jehad, 216  
 Jenkins, Sir Lawrence Hugh, 138, 140  
 Jhung, 289  
 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 7, 8, 28, 29, 31, 34, 55, 60, 95, 99, 130, 202  
 Johnburg, 142  
 Johnson, Colonel, 174  
 Joshi, W.G., 85  
 Jullundur, 74, 126, 166, 190, 289
- Kabul, 156  
 Kanaji, Sheriff Devyji, 292  
 Kamal Mustapha, 216, 222  
 Kamagar Mitra, 277  
 Karachi, 9, 18, 26, 65, 290  
 Karnal, 289  
 Kasur, 132, 175, 177, 256, 257, 259, 265  
 Kelkar, I.J., 98  
 Kenworthy, J.M., 108  
 Kesari, 135  
 Khan, Ahmad Jan Sahib, 72  
 Khan, Ghulam Mohayuddin, 201  
 Khan, Hakim Ajmal, 88, 93, 178, 200  
 Khan, Haji Moosa, 201  
 Khan, Malik Sahib, 224, 235, 265  
 Khan, Malik Umar Hayat, 155, 276  
 Khan, Mohammad Ali, Honble Raja of Mahmudabad, 9, 201, 240

- Khan, Maulvi Abdul Rashid, 292  
 Khan, Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed 283  
 Khaparde, G.S., 8, 11, 19, 31, 55, 85, 101, 104, 107, 135, 141, 155, 171, 183, 185, 194, 205, 285, 293, 296  
 107, 136, 182, 192, 1931, 96, 198, 199, 203, 204, 209, 212, 215, 217-19, 220, 222, 231, 232, 237, 238, 240, 242, 264, 267, 278, 284, 287, 291, 292, 293, 299  
 Khulna, 81  
 Kichlew (Kichloo), Dr. Saifuddin, 71, 72, 192, 201  
 Kidwai, M.H., 212, 218  
 Kisan Sabha Movement, 212  
 Kitchin, 165  
 Labour Party, 173, 182, 189, 196  
 Lahore, 66, 74, 76, 88, 100, 114, 121, 132, 137, 147, 156, 163, 166, 171, 175, 190, 210, 214, 233, 234, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259  
 Lahore (Central Jail), 131, 148  
 Lala, Kanhaiya Lal, 228, 229  
 Lala Lajpat Rai, 66, 170, 183, 238, 269, 271  
 Lala, Mukund Lal, 212  
 Lala, Sunder Das, 226  
 Lansbury, George, 102, 103, 104, 107  
 Lawrence, Sir Walt, 138  
 Leader, The, 105  
 Lenin, 189, 208, 231  
 Litvinoff, 212  
 Lloyd, George, 38, 56, 86, 104, 125, 130, 135, 144, 161, 198, 219, 220, 267, 281  
 London, 132, 141, 203  
 London Times, 39  
 Lowndes, Sir George, 10, 15, 17, 31, 55, 66, 233  
 Lucas, E.D., 258  
 Lucknow, 108  
 Ludhiana, 289  
 Mac-Donald James Ramsay, 102  
 Maclegan, E, 121, 149, 150, 165, 166, 186  
 MacRae, Colonel, 174, 225  
 Madras, 97, 190, 237, 289, 295  
 Madras Legislative Council, 276  
 Maffey, J.L., 59, 100, 164  
 Maharashtra, 299  
 Mahratta The, 57, 93  
 Majithia, Sardar Sunder Singh, 21  
 Malvia, Krishan Kant, 215  
 Malvia, Madan Mohan, 8, 29, 40, 61, 99, 146-48, 150, 154, 162, 175, 179, 190, 194, 215, 270  
 Mandevple, H.P., 96  
 Mandlik, R.N., 171  
 Mcpherson, H., 92, 158, 213  
 Medina The (Bijnore) 63, 241  
 Meerut, 231  
 Mesopotamia, 113, 282, 298  
 Meston, James, 66  
 Mian Mohammad Shafi, 9, 18, 233, 236, 260, 261  
 Michael, O'Dwyer, 55, 63, 66, 101, 106, 114, 117, 121, 128, 137, 147, 149, 165, 171, 173, 179, 180, 186, 187, 192, 213, 224, 227, 236, 241, 243, 264, 265, 269, 270, 276, 277, 285  
 Mishra, G.N., 163, 170  
 Moderates, 19, 37, 57, 103, 114, 138, 175, 184, 193, 237, 271, 283  
 Mohammadans, 20, 39, 63, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 89, 92, 97, 109, 123, 138, 140, 156, 185, 186, 191, 192, 194, 196, 202, 203, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 246, 257, 269, 271, 275, 278, 284, 299  
 Mohammad Ali, Maulana, 136, 182, 192, 200, 202, 272  
 Mohammad Fakhir, Maulana, 202  
 Mohammad Sulaiman Maulvi, 291, 292  
 Monghyer (Bihar), 92  
 Montague, E., 5, 6, 20, 22, 31, 55, 56, 60, 83, 86, 102, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 121, 122, 129, 130, 134, 138, 139, 141, 144, 150, 159, 161, 170, 171, 173, 181, 203, 220, 241, 262, 269, 270, 272, 286  
 Mohani, Maulana Hasrat, 202  
 Montgomery, 289  
 Mukherjee Asutosh, 30, 139  
 Multan, 117, 289  
 Musprath, S.F., 188  
 Muslim (Moslim) League, 130, 136, 170, 178, 185, 186, 190, 191, 232, 240  
 Mutiny, 137  
 Nadiad, 125  
 Naidu, Sarojini, 33, 126  
 Nair, Sir Sankaran, 11, 128, 147, 163, 180, 185, 186

- Naqqash, The (Calcutta), 241  
 Narang, Gokal Chand, 227  
 Natesan, G.A., 172  
 Natrajan, K. 105  
 Naya Bharat (Calcutta), 269  
 Nayak, The (Calcutta), 175, 177, 270  
 Nehru, Pt. Jawaharlal, 120, 142, 161, 162,  
     267  
 Nehru, Pt. Moti Lal, 99, 120, 131, 132,  
     133, 164, 172, 178, 192, 201, 208, 268  
 Neville, Arthur William, 133  
 New India, The (Madras), 241  
 Nizamabad, 132  
 Noakhali, 292  
 Non-cooperation, 240, 271, 275, 278, 286,  
     288, 289, 291, 292, 293, 297  
 Nurul Hasan, 291, 292  
  
 O'Breem, General, 225, 246, 265  
 Omar Sobhani, 95, 96  
 Orde, P L., 251  
 Orissa, 92, 291  
  
 Pal, Bipin Chandra, 98  
 Pan Islamic (ism), 188, 192, 209, 222, 232,  
     238, 239  
 Parekh, J.M., 103, 104, 108, 183  
 Parsee, Lakhmi Das, 95  
 Parliament, 18, 26, 114, 115, 141, 265  
 Pasha, Enver, 216  
 Passive Resistance, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 37,  
     56, 57, 62, 75, 93, 98, 184, 235, 244,  
     275  
 Patel, V.J., 135, 170, 175, 285  
 Pathankot, 289  
 Patiala, 150  
 Patna, 291  
 Peshawar, 156  
 Pickthall, M.M.W., 212  
 Pir Mahboob Shah, 290  
 Polak, H.S.L., 271, 296  
 Poona, 136  
 Prabha The, 212, 215  
 Praja Mitra, 121  
 Prakasham, T., 18  
 Prasad, Rajendra, 92, 93  
 Pratap, 63, 106, 212, 215  
 Press Act, 66, 67, 71  
 Punjab, 66, 67, 77, 87, 91, 97, 100, 103,  
     104, 106, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,  
     123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135,  
     136, 137, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146,  
     147-53, 157-61, 167, 169, 170, 181, 183,  
     185, 205, 206, 212, 213, 216, 241, 242,  
     249, 255, 260, 262, 265, 266, 269, 272,  
     278, 279, 283, 285, 297  
 Punjabee The, 123  
 Punjab Legislative Council, 216, 217  
  
 Qaum, 217, 241  
  
 Rajahmundry (Madras), 98  
 Ramnagar, 134, 224  
 Ranchi, 291  
 Rankin, Sir George Claus, 138, 140, 161,  
     233  
 Ransome, Mrs., 107  
 Rao, Siva P., 211  
 Ratan Devi, 225  
 Ratcliff, 108  
 Rawalpindi, 117  
 Ray, Babu Bhabendra Chandra, 295  
 Rebellion, 115  
 Revolutionaries, 64, 76, 110, 111, 114, 286  
 Revolt, 104  
 Rice, W.F., 138, 140, 160, 233  
 Riots, 61, 83, 94, 101, 113, 114, 129, 134  
 Roberts, Charles, Andrews, 172  
 Rohtak, 239  
 Rowalatt, Sydney, 3, 30  
 Rowlatt Act, 21, 41, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62,  
     75, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110,  
     111, 113, 114, 115, 129, 142, 149, 180,  
     184, 224, 250, 257, 265  
 Rowlatt Bill, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,  
     15, 16, 114, 178, 214  
 Rowlatt Legislation, 91, 95, 123, 124, 134  
 Rowlatt Commission (Committee) Report,  
     5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 30, 35,  
     37, 39, 40, 123, 124, 134  
 Roy, Kalinath, 124, 127, 149  
 Royal Wheat Commission, 113  
 Roy, S, 82, 211  
 Russia, 176, 222  
 Rutherford, 183  
 Ryland, 93  
  
 Sadaqat, 241  
 Sahni, Ruchi Ram, 184  
 Saklotvala, S.J., 238  
 Sangla Hill, 132  
 Santhanam, Krishnamachari, 120, 132, 268  
 Sapru, Sir Tej Bahadur, 9, 19, 20, 150,

- 264  
**Sarabhai, Ambalal**, 96  
**Sarabhai, Ansuya Behna**, 91, 96  
**Sargodha**, 289  
**Sarma, B.N.**, 54, 55, 145, 146  
**Sastri, V.S. Srinivasa**, 16, 18, 19, 20, 31, 32, 34, 39, 55, 194  
**Sastri Coomarswamy**, 30  
**Satyagraha**, 16, 18, 32, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 97, 98, 100, 105, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 134, 135, 142, 146-48, 210, 234, 235, 239, 245, 247, 250, 251, 258, 262, 280, 281  
**Satyapal, Dr** , 71, 72, 165  
**Sayed Zahur Ahmad**, 202  
**Scott, B.** 30  
**Searchlight, The**, 92, 93  
**Servants of India Society**, 133  
**Setalvad, Chunilal**, 116, 139, 140, 233  
**Seva Samiti**, 127, 133, 162  
**Shaukat Ali, Maulana**, 187, 192, 200, 218, 237, 238  
**Shaw Bernard**, 108  
**Shaik Asgar**, 289  
**Sheikh, Umar Baksh**, 120  
**Sherwood, Miss Francis**, 137, 163, 248, 281  
**Sheikhupura**, 132, 224  
**Shukla, B.D.**, 8, 40  
**Sialkot**, 289  
**Sikh (Nation)**, 154, 156, 279  
**Sind**, 269, 290  
**Simla**, 164, 166, 289  
**Sinha, Prasanna Satyendra**, 137, 169, 171, 276, 280, 285  
**Sinha, Sachidananda**, 92  
**Smillie, Robert**, 102, 103, 104, 107  
**Smith, Bosworth**, 224, 225, 259, 265  
**Smith, Henry**, 253  
**Snowden, Philip**, 102  
**Statesman, The**, 126  
**Stephenson, Sir Hugh Lansdowne**, 295  
**Sud, Sri Ram**, 224, 225, 265  
**Surat**, 125  
**Swadeshi**, 123, 209, 239, 275, 278, 298  
**Swadeshi, The (Gorakhpur)**, 67, 241  
**Swami, Shradhanand**, 21, 63, 86, 89, 91, 133, 191, 201, 246, 250  
**Swarajya**, 297  
**Syadpur**, 132  
**Sydenham, Lord**, 137, 169, 276  
**Syed Alay Nabi**, 292  
**Syed Ameer Ali**, 128  
**Tagore, Rabindra Nath**, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121  
**Tandon, Purshottam Das**, 120  
**Tarn Taran**, 74, 252  
**Tashkent**, 194  
**Tek Chand, Bakhshi**, 120  
**Thomas**, 233  
**Thomas, Capes**, 241  
**Thomson, J.P.**, 156, 164, 288, 290, 298, 299  
**Tilak, Balganga Dhar**, 3, 16, 20, 55, 60, 101, 104, 107, 108, 135, 155, 171, 182, 184, 194, 195, 196, 205, 277, 288, 290, 298, 299  
**Tivaraj, V.N.**, 133  
**Tolstoy**, 123  
**Trotsky**, 208  
**The Tribune**, 124, 128, 167  
**Turk, Turkey, and Turkish**, 86, 97, 109, 176, 178, 182, 186, 187, 193, 198, 202, 209, 215, 220, 232, 237, 243, 246, 253, 267, 275, 285, 286  
**Turkish Treaty**, 288, 293  
**Tyabji, Abbas Samsuddin**, 132, 202  
**Ulema**, 209  
**Ullah, Maulvi Kifayat**, 201  
**Ukhawat**, 115, 217, 241  
**United Provinces**, 66, 103, 106, 190, 210, 267, 291  
**United States of America**, 183, 198  
**Vankapati Raju**, 276  
**Vaze, S.G.** 16, 19, 55  
**Viceroy**, 8, 19, 21, 22, 54, 55, 100, 111, 118, 121, 125, 129, 160, 293  
**Vidyarthi, Ganesh Shankar**, 207, 212  
**Vijaya, The (Delhi)**, 217, 241  
**Vincent, Sir William**, 4, 11, 21, 23, 26, 28, 55, 66, 67, 129, 143, 145, 146, 150, 158, 165, 285, 294, 295, 296  
**Vikramgam**, 91, 97  
**Wacha, Dinshaw**, 18, 19, 32  
**Wazirabad**, 132  
**Wedgewood, J. Clement**, 107, 110, 113, 117, 175, 205, 274, 275  
**White Head, R.B.**, 261  
**William Duke**, 107

- William Robert, 102, 103, 104, 107  
William Rushbrook, 214  
Wilson, 79, 80  
Workers Welfare League of India, 196,  
    238  
Yathrib, The (Bijnore), 241  
Young India, The, 69, 118, 128, 129, 159,  
    162  
Zamana, The (Calcutta), 292











